Why did WWII happen ?

A// The German Zeppelin Raids as the Origins of Strategic Bombing

"On January 19, 1915...two zeppelin airships of the German Navy crossed the Norfolk coast and dropped bombs ("explosive devices" would be a better description) whenever they saw a cluster of lights". (Terraine, p. 9). This rather minimal attack was followed by an additional 52 zeppelin raids and then replaced by the Gotha bomber. The German raids ultimately killed a few thousand people and damaged a few buildings.

While these extremely crude operations represented "the first strategic air offensive in history", the historiography does not prescribe the operations with much more than symbolic importance. (Terraine, p. 9) The texts I looked at pointed to the inadequacy of German equipment and a total lack of doctrine. Terraine and Friedrich point out that a proper analysis of the operation would have discouraged postwar investment in the strategic bombing concept. Friedrich plainly states that all the wrong lessons were learned. (Friedrich, p. 65) Weigley even alludes to the fact that the British response to the attacks (the creation of a strategic bombing force) disrupted the previous British policy aimed at "military targets not far behind German lines". (Weigley, p. 225).

Despite evidence to the contrary, Trenchard and other British strategic bombing pundits pursued the concept in the 1920s. Much of the thinking concerning the weapon remained extremely crude. "Most major air powers were aware of the terroristic nature of bombing but only the RAF believed that it would seriously act as a deterent or, in the event of war, so undermine enemy morale that it would force capitulation or the demoralization of the enemy armed forces. (Overy, p. 13).

I would completely ignore WWI for reasons stated by Overy: "By the 1930s the lessons of the earlier conflict [WWI] had been turned from a hasty empiricism into a refined doctrine. By 1939 even the refined doctrine was becoming obsolescent, overtaken by scientific and strategic events". (Overy, p. 5)

B//The British Fascination with Strategic Bombing.

The second last point above is important. Only the British and Americans pursued strategic bombing in a rigorous fashion. Here are a few conclusions made by Overy:

1) LACK OF GERMAN PREPARATION: "The equipment and preparation of the Luftwaffe was hardly adequate since such a campaign had not been an important part of German air planning. There was no heavy bomber capable of carrying large loads over long-range". (Overy, p. 31) and "Although Hitler used the terror bombing threat to gain diplomatic concessions, neither he nor the Luftwaffe staff planned seriously for its use against a major military power once war had actually broken out". (Overy, p. 13).

2) LONGTERM BRITISH PLANNING (irrespective of Germany): "Rearmament...in the British case...had begun even before Hitler came to power". (Overy, p.19) and "The growing threat of Japan to British and United States interests in the Pacific, the fear in Russia that at any time the capitalist west or east might try to destroy the Bolshevik state, and the growing instability of Europe with the rise of fascist military power all contributed to the desire to arm in strength everywhere" (Overy, p. 19).

3) RESULTS OF LONGTERM ACTIVITIES: "...The Allies had more first-line aircraft than Germany and considerably larger reserves. German first-line aircraft were of a higher technical quality than those of the Allies, but the great disparity of forces believed to have existed in the air was a myth". (Overy, p. 23)

4) LONGTERM PLANNING: "Despite its ineffectiveness Bomber Command had taken the opportunity of the defeat of France to begin to launch a strategic air offensive along the lines planned in the preceding years". (Overy, p. 30). [ie. Bombing NOT a response to Rotterdam]

c//Why the German (London) Blitz?

1) "Germany was itself being bombed more and more regularly by Bomber Command, at night and at with increasing lack of discrimination in choosing targets. Hitler took the opportunity of a heavier raid on Berlin to announce in the Reichstag on 4 September 'Just now...Mr. Churchill is demonstrating his new brainchild, the night air raid...When they declare that they will increase their attacks on our cities, then we will raze their cities to the ground. We will stop the handiwork of these night air pirates, so help us God!' This mounting concern at the kind of war that was developing and which he, among other war leaders had sought to avoid before 1939, persuaded him of the need for reprisals and inclined him towards the night air raid, an inclination confirmed by the disastrous results of the early attempts to bomb London by day". [factories, etc.] (Overy, pp. 34-35)

CONCLUSIONS:

1) WWI is unimportant. The Zeppelin and Gotha attacks are a point of trivia.

2) The historians I looked at hardly emphasize early German bombing. Overy does not mention Warsaw, Rotterdam, etc. Terraine, as pointed out, writes that these attacks were secondary since the policy was already developed. (Terraine, p. 262) Friedrich points out that Rotterdam did help spawn a demand for retaliation, but he adds that "strategic bombing was a product of the industrial age" and not just emotion. (transl. Friedrich, p. 76). Anyway, the British concept remained fixed on victory and not merely retaliatory killing (Terraine p. 262).

3) The historians examined had generally negative comments concerning British strategic bombing. (Overy less so) Terraine was the most damning. They focused on "morale bombing": "'Morale' is a cosmetic word. Attacking morale, whatever phrases it may be dressed up in, really means one thing: putting the fear of death in individuals. On a collective scale, it means threatening a massacre". (Terraine, p. 261).

4) The historians refrain from the journalistic or moralistic "they started it" approach. Why? It is obviously untrue and is a road to nowhere.

The books consulted: (Relatively old, I know.)

Jörg Friedrich, Der Brand
Richard Overy, The Air War
John Terraine, A Time for Courage
Weigley, The American Way of War
 
boris116 said:
Оllie et al,

here are the numbers I have promised. They have been taken from the article by Dr. Mikhail Mukhin "Evolution of the Soviet Military Industry in 1921-1941 and the change of it's priorities"

http://www.rkka.ru/analys/oboronka/oboronka.htm

Here is my translation of the excerpt:

"From the moment of her creation, the Soviet Union had been preparing for the Big War. which neccesitated the permanent development and expansion of the Soviet military industry. Over time, the "oboronka"(defense industry) has become a huge industrial complex. In the end of the 30-s - early 30-s it was consuming up to 9-10% of GDP.
By the late 30-s it's share was about 30% of GDP"

Boris, sorry, I cannot read Russian. I wish that I could.:-(
 
LeEnfield said:
Ollie....Your post of the 29/3/06
[1] "Germany did start the terror bombing campaign"
[2] "The...bombing techniques was pioneered by the Germans"
[4] "In 1939 and the early part of 1940 Britain had no bomber of any note" and "Churchill ordered the bombing of Berlin after the Luftwaffe had bombed London".
[6] "Why shouldn't America design and build weapons"

For (1), (2) and (4) see my last post. These are not my opinions. Overy and Terraine are however giants in their fields. I will not ignore their points. They did the research.

As far as (6) is concerned, the US could do what it wanted. My problem is one of hypocritical morality. That is, the US developed and executed a strategic bombing campaign. Fine. Great. Go for it, guys. Do NOT, however, state during or after the war that this policy was only undertaken in response to German actions. Or, that the US decried the use of strategic bombing. [A side note: Why shouldn't Germany design and build weapons? That is one of my points concerning this thread. The problem is that the western Allies still pull this BS today. Why, for example, should Iran not have nuclear weapons? Why? Forget the BS legal and moralistic arguments. Just tell the Mullahs that they can't. We don't allow it. We don't consider you a sovereign or responsible state. "We've got the power", you "ain't got nuttin'". "We's a gonna blow you up if you don't do what we's a sayin'". Stripped down to the basic level, international relations (I am a realist) are about naked power. That is why WWII started. Naked power interests. Forget the schoolyard accusations: "He started it!" That is for kids.]
 
Well they don't call it diplomacy for nothing. The gunboat-politics have been thrown overboard as a standard approach. First you talk and make compromises (this often does work), if all else fails then you grab your stick and start swinging. Iran is in that fase, don't get me wrong! Just don't start out with "I am a hegemon, do as I say and don't so as I do!"
 
boris116 said:
Оllie et al,

here are the numbers I have promised. They have been taken from the article by Dr. Mikhail Mukhin "Evolution of the Soviet Military Industry in 1921-1941 and the change of it's priorities"

http://www.rkka.ru/analys/oboronka/oboronka.htm

Here is my translation of the excerpt:

"From the moment of her creation, the Soviet Union had been preparing for the Big War. which neccesitated the permanent development and expansion of the Soviet military industry. Over time, the "oboronka"(defense industry) has become a huge industrial complex. In the end of the 30-s - early 30-s it was consuming up to 9-10% of GDP.
By the late 30-s it's share was about 30% of GDP"
You're clearly an advocate of the 'Stalin first strike' theory, or at least that's the conclusion I've drawn. I assume the above quote and link demonstrating a build up of Soviet military spending is in support of a general theory that Stalin was out to conquer Europe for himself. I've a few questions to ask you regarding this.

1) Assuming the Soviet desire to build up their military machine, the Red Army purges of 1938 would seem counter-productive to that end. Was Stalin that short-sighted to remove talented and experienced men when they would be needed in the near future?

2) If we accept an aggressive Soviet intent, why did the Soviet Union make no move to invade Germany during May-June 1940 when the bulk of the Wehrmacht was in France? What was the difference between the combat readiness of the Red Army in 1940 compared to 1941. Not much I'll wager. Why wait until the Wehrmacht has rested and refitted before launching an attack? Moreover, the full impact of German Blitzkrieg tactics had not been fully realised or demonstrated in May 1940, meaning that Stalin must have been more confident of victory than he would have been in 1941. Also, by this time Germany had put her cards on the table as far as the Western Allies were concerned and Stalin would have had immediate allies had he attacked at this time.

3) Why did Stalin totally ignore the warnings of Churchill, the 'Lucy' Spy Ring and his redoubtable spy, Richard Sorge about an impending German attack in 1941? He did everything not to provoke Hitler here. Why would he bend over backwards and take such a risk? Is it because he was beaten to launching an attack by Hitler by even mere days?

4) Why was there such a large organisation of the Red Army underway between 1938 and 1942 if Stalin had earmarked this period for a pre-emptive strike on Germany? Why not wait until the reorganisation had been completed before attempting any aggressive action? David Glantz in "Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War", noted that the Red Army in 1941 was neither in a position or readiness to defend or attack. It seems to me that it wouldn't have made much sense to contemplate an attack at this time.

5) The Red Army suffered a humilating reversal in the Winter War in 1939/40. This must have made it very clear to Stalin that the state and readiness of the Red Army left much to be desired. Given this, why would he contemplate just a year later in 1941, attacking the world's most seasoned and professional army, which was fully rested and refitted to boot. Furthermore, Stalin must have been somewhat aware of the strength of the Axis units massing on his border, even if he didn't believe the sound intelligence advice he was receiving from 3 seperate sources. If we also consider the fact that the German and Satellite forces actually outnumbered the Red Army forces on their common borders, it's clear that the Stalin had nothing like the force-ratio necessary to achieve success, without some other factors like the element of surprise or greater tactical skill and so on being introduced.

I think that it just makes no sense for the Soviet Union to attack Germany in 1941 but I'm interested to hear what you have to say on the matter.
 
AN IMPORTANT POINT: BC began it's "private war" against German industry that evening. It is yet another horrific example of how the British government abandoned the French state. Instead of tactical daylight or night attacks against German troop concentrations, supply lines, etc., Churchill's government redirected the bombers to pursue a longterm strategy of industrial attrition.
It redirected them from leaflet missions. Surely even you must admit that even raids on military related targets on the Ruhr were more useful to the French than leaflet dropping
There should not be any doubt here. Terraine clearly explains that the Ruhr campaign did not influence the fighting in France. The cabinet's illusions were only feable excuses...excuses that surface time and time again.
That’s the funny thing about illusions, they seem real enough at the time
This brings up another point. The French government influenced the British decision to hold the bombers. The French reasoning was simple. The Luftwaffe could have retaliated by sending the bomber streams against Paris...a logical action if we regard the experiences of 1871/1914. The abandoning of their French ally allowed Britain to ignore this constraint. The timing of Churchill's decision (prior to the French surrender) was extremely cynical .
Amazing, according to you, the British abandoned the French even before they knew the Battle of France had been lost


(5) OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY: In leafing through Terraine's book, I do not get any indication of the "morality game"...ie., the attempt to place blame on either side for initiating the terror bombing of civilians. Instead, Terraine hints that the plans to kill women and children (on both sides) developed from a complex mixture of prewar planning, wartime events, and crude and escalating demands for retaliation. Seen in this way, the brutality of terror/ strategic bombing is similar to other darker episodes of WWII like the killing of POWs on the eastern front. [Doctrine or ideology combined with actual experience to increase the willingness to commit atrocities].
Indeed, and what is most noticeable is its the Luftwaffe who did almost all of the escalating.
Bomber Command clearly upheld a doctrine of saturation or carpet bombing that did not distinguish between military and civilian targets. Civilian targets (like marshalling yards, rail stations, and houses) in fact formed the basic target.
No
At the beginning of its campaign from May 1940 the RAF was committed to attacking military related targets only. If they couldn’t find the target they were instructed to bring back their bombs.
It wasn’t until they realised the ineffectiveness of their campaign compared to the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe area attacks that they altered their policy


:

The argument that Britain developed strategic bombing because of German WWI bombing is a poor one. This logic has no validity because it is extremly general and could be applied to every weapons system. Did the Germans develop battleships because of the "Dreadnought"? Sure. But technological developments are a part of life. Did the Americans and Soviets develop rocket technology because of Wehrner von Braun and Germany? Sure. But rockets were a good weapons system and could not be ignored. Did the Germans develop tanks because of British efforts during WWI. Sure. But none of this has any moral dimension. Furthermore, doctrine is another matter altogether
What is interesting about the German bombing campaign of WW1 is the different conclusions the two sides came to about its effect.
The Germans because it had failed to make any noticeable difference to the war situation regarded it a failure.
The British on the other hand regarded it as a major German victory. It had caused them to transfer a massive amount of resources to fight the threat, mostly for little success, and the effect on the British publics morale had been significant, causing near panic in some cases. It also caused a large increase in absenteeism in factories, something that wasn’t lost on the Minister of Munitions of the time, Churchill.
All this for a minor amount of effort on the German side.
While it is true that the British may have developed a Strategic bomber force without the bombing of WW1, the bombing ensured they did.

I am not sure, but I think that you are trying to suggest that the terror bombing of Germany can be attributed to WWI German air operations. I disagree.
So do I.
While the WW1 operations can be linked to the development of a British strategic bomber force, British terror bombing can be attributed to the German terror bombing of WW2.
It was the Luftwaffe who introduced the tactic of area bombing during the Blitz of 1940
German WWI air operations can themselves be indirectly attributed to pre-20th Century artillery bombardment. Cities suffered under siege conditions. "Softening" up a target, or terrorizing the civilian population is a traditional method of war as old as war itself. The Germans only "enhanced" the concept in WWI
So let me get this right.
According to you the German bombing of civilians in WW1 is just good old fashioned warfare, while the bombing of civilians by the RAF in WW2 is not.
Sorry I don’t see the difference.

I am going to look into this subject. I suspect that Allied air operations on the western front (ie. in Alsace-Lorraine) probably targetted German villages and towns and therefore predate the German attacks against Britain
The first attack on a German town on the Western front was at Freiburg, May10 1940
German planes got lost and bombed this German city by mistake, instead of Dijon in France.,There were 53 casualties, 29 killed.
Goebbels blamed it on the French, and used it as an excuse for the German attacks on French towns and cities ...

[The same could be true for Belgium/France in relation to the Germans] It is possible that the German high command adopted the viewpoint of Bomber Command in WWI...ie. we have to hit Britain and demonstrate defiance
.
The first raid on a German town by the RAF was on the 11/12 May - 19 Hampdens and 18 Whitleys bombed road and rail targets in München-Gladbach.
As you can see, the Luftwaffe started bombing German towns and cities before the RAF.




And, after reading Terraine, the British attacks against the German coast (which included such targets as the airfields at Wangerooge and not just naval vessels] led to civilian the attacks deaths because of the nature of strategic bombing.
The only RAF attack on a land based target on German territory until may 1940 was against the seaplane base at Hörnum. This was following a German attack on British warships in Scapa Flow during the night of 17/18 March, when 1 civilian was killed and 7 injured, a reprisal raid was ordered, such was the concern that civilian casualties were to be avoided that the remote base at Hörnum on the island of Sylt was chosen.
 
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Doppleganger said:
You're clearly an advocate of the 'Stalin first strike' theory, or at least that's the conclusion I've drawn. I assume the above quote and link demonstrating a build up of Soviet military spending is in support of a general theory that Stalin was out to conquer Europe for himself. I've a few questions to ask you regarding this.

1) Assuming the Soviet desire to build up their military machine, the Red Army purges of 1938 would seem counter-productive to that end. Was Stalin that short-sighted to remove talented and experienced men when they would be needed in the near future? .

Just an opposite. He has not considered these people as "talented and experienced", but as treacherous and cowardly. They were his enemies and the enemies of the state(from his point of view) and had to be eliminated - to make the USSR STRONGER!!

2) If we accept an aggressive Soviet intent, why did the Soviet Union make no move to invade Germany during May-June 1940 when the bulk of the Wehrmacht was in France? [/quote]

I believe, he was waiting for the "Sea Lion" in 1940, but when it has not happened and Hitler has turned to the East - Stalin was going to strike in 1942 or even earlier(not because he would be ready by that time) - but to prevent the German strike!

Doppleganger said:
3) Why did Stalin totally ignore the warnings of Churchill, the 'Lucy' Spy Ring and his redoubtable spy, Richard Sorge about an impending German attack in 1941? He did everything not to provoke Hitler here. Why would he bend over backwards and take such a risk? Is it because he was beaten to launching an attack by Hitler by even mere days?
It is very difficult to see what was going on in Stalin's head, you know...
One of the possible explanations - he didn't trust his sources... Look at Stalin's closest clone of the modern times - Saddam! Didn't he get enough notices about the Allied invasion in 2003? And he didn't believe them. He had known better...

Doppleganger said:
4) Why was there such a large organisation of the Red Army underway between 1938 and 1942 if Stalin had earmarked this period for a pre-emptive strike on Germany? Why not wait until the reorganisation had been completed before attempting any aggressive action? David Glantz in "Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War", noted that the Red Army in 1941 was neither in a position or readiness to defend or attack. It seems to me that it wouldn't have made much sense to contemplate an attack at this time.

What kind of choices he had? The army had to be reformed, but would the Germans wait?

Doppleganger said:
5) The Red Army suffered a humilating reversal in the Winter War in 1939/40. This must have made it very clear to Stalin that the state and readiness of the Red Army left much to be desired. Given this, why would he contemplate just a year later in 1941, attacking the world's most seasoned and professional army, which was fully rested and refitted to boot. Furthermore, Stalin must have been somewhat aware of the strength of the Axis units massing on his border, even if he didn't believe the sound intelligence advice he was receiving from 3 seperate sources. If we also consider the fact that the German and Satellite forces actually outnumbered the Red Army forces on their common borders, it's clear that the Stalin had nothing like the force-ratio necessary to achieve success, without some other factors like the element of surprise or greater tactical skill and so on being introduced.

As I have said earlier, in 1940 he was going to stab in the German back. Later, in 1941, as a preventive strike...

Doppleganger said:
I think that it just makes no sense for the Soviet Union to attack Germany in 1941 but I'm interested to hear what you have to say on the matter.

What would you suggest as a sensible course for the USSR at that time?
 
boris116 said:
Just an opposite. He has not considered these people as "talented and experienced", but as treacherous and cowardly. They were his enemies and the enemies of the state(from his point of view) and had to be eliminated - to make the USSR STRONGER!!
He did consider them enemies of the state but he must have known that the purges would cut the brains out of the Red Army. If he was planning to use it against a major power so soon, wouldn't this be stupidity even for Stalin?

boris116 said:
I believe, he was waiting for the "Sea Lion" in 1940, but when it has not happened and Hitler has turned to the East - Stalin was going to strike in 1942 or even earlier(not because he would be ready by that time) - but to prevent the German strike!

If he was waiting for Operation SeaLion, which his advisors must have told him had little chance of ever going ahead never mind succeeding, surely this indicates that Stalin wanted there to be as little risk as possible when committing his armed forces. Attacking when the Germans were not actually fighting makes even less sense as a result does it not?

boris116 said:
It is very difficult to see what was going on in Stalin's head, you know...
One of the possible explanations - he didn't trust his sources... Look at Stalin's closest clone of the modern times - Saddam! Didn't he get enough notices about the Allied invasion in 2003? And he didn't believe them. He had known better...

I don't think you can directly compare the Allied invasion of Iraq in 2003 with Operation Barbarossa. He obviously didn't believe his sources but he must have known that there was a German build-up in Eastern Europe nonetheless. It would have been impossible for him not to have known that there was something going on, even if he did ignore all the warnings.

boris116 said:
What kind of choices he had? The army had to be reformed, but would the Germans wait?

Probably not, but that doesn't mean to say that attacking just because you have to beat your enemy to it was a good idea. In fact it was a terrible idea given the state of the Red Army at the time.

boris116 said:
As I have said earlier, in 1940 he was going to stab in the German back. Later, in 1941, as a preventive strike...

Which begs the question as to why he didn't in 1940 when the Germans were busy elsewhere.

boris116 said:
What would you suggest as a sensible course for the USSR at that time?
Obviously. listen to the warnings from 3 seperate intelligence sources and disperse your army and airforce accordingly. Stalin had plenty of time to do this but took very little action and too late.
 
In response to Redcoat: [This subject is departing from WWII origins. Although important and interesting, the "who dun' it" first issue is also sort of dull].

Terraine (and others) paints another picture, especially concerning pre-May 1940, operations, but I really only want to address one issue. It seems that you do not really have a grasp of the meaning of strategic bombing. I will try. [But first, what strategic raids were launched by the Luftwaffe against Britain prior to May 1940? What German strategic bombing plan? What were the targets?].

THE OBJECTIVE: Once again, strategic bombing represents a military doctrine with a specific objective. Bombing is undertaken to restrict, neutralize or destroy the enemy's economic ability to wage war. For the Allies, this policy meant the utilization of airpower to bring Germany to its knees. The taking of ground, the normal aim of offensive military operations, is either made irrelevant or eased significantly. For the Germans...well...they never had a strategic bombing policy.

It might be helpful to outline what strategic bombing is not. Strategic bombing does not include the following (these are tactical air operations or like the extension of artillery or rather flying artillery):

(1) the attack on military formations or supply depots or artillery emplacements or headquarters. Artillery (within 10 or so km) or naval gunfire amounts to the same thing. Strategic bombing attempts to destroy the factories that equip the military formations, etc.

Examples: this is the standard stuff associated with Stukas, etc. Think about the German Mortain offensive in 1944, etc. You call in an airstrike. It is even used against civilian or refugee columns. The Germans used this tactic in Poland to slow the advance of their enemy. The Allies (especially the Soviets) used this tactic in Germany...ie. butchering the civilians trying to flee the battle area. Dresden was struck by the Anglo-Saxons primarily for this reason. [There were no more strategic goals in Germany in February 1945 owing to the inevitably of collapse...and operations turned tactical].

(2) the attack on cities in the line of advance or in seige conditions. Artillery again traditionally "softens" up targets to permit infantry assault. The German bombing of Warsaw or Rotterdam was therefore tactical in nature. Warsaw was for example significantly shelled. The German aim was NOT to destroy Polish factories and thereby win a war through attrition. The Germans were "softening" the capital for ground operations or trying to terrorize the population.

Examples: The Allies used this policy at Monte Cassino, Caen, etc. They even used heavy bombers (strategic) for this tactical purpose. Allied "softening" tactics were used extensively on the eastern/western fronts. Nobody, however, points out that the destruction of Caen represented anything improper -- maybe stupid, but not improper. The shelling or use of rocks against cities is as old as war itself. Even in terms of terror. The Americans bombed Baghdad for tactical reasons in Gulf One & Two. Why instrumentalize Warsaw and other German operations for the Nuremberg Trials?

(3) the attack on ships either at sea or in harbour. The bombing of shipbuilding facilties is on the other hand strategic. [This is clear]

(4) the attack on bridges and civilian infrastructure within the battle "area". This policy aims at restricting the enemy movement of reserves. The strategic destruction of bridges attempts at hindering the movement of raw materials and parts to the assembly plants or is part of a large plan aiming at neutralizing all movment.

Examples: Luftwaffe operations for "Sealion" or Allied operations for "Overlord".

One last point [ran out of time]: Some historians (more like biased teachers or profs and not the actual specialists) and the bombing pundits confuse tac/strat air for an important reason. Anglo-Saxon strategic bombing policy (prewar and during the war) called for the killing of civilians (morale bombing) as a war-winning method. It makes sense. If you kill enough people, the enemy ceases to exist and is defeated. But defacto genocide is a hard policy to support. It sort of clashes with all of the rules of war developed since 1648. Historians therefore go through the usual contortions and argue the following inaccurate and grossly twisted if not evil points of view:

(1) The Crude Variant: Warsaw or Rotterdam forced Churchill to order a massacre of Germans. "You see", they cynically point out, "he had no choice. He had to kill German kids. There was a war to win". [The confusion of tac/strat air and the confusion of military objectives with a war crime is specious].

(2) The He Dun' It First Variant: Warsaw or Rotterdam justifies all Allied bombing during the war. German aircraft killed Poles; therefore the bombing of Germans by the British is ok. In fact, throw out the rulebook altogether. [I plainly don't understand the logic of this one. Can you explain how this argument works?].

(3) The Weird Variant: The Germans attacked Warsaw with planes and artillery as part of their operational plan. This therefore justifiies the fire bombing of Lübeck in 1942 [no real war industry and NOT on the Allied line of advance until April 1945]. You see, you HAVE to believe that the German military only pursued terror bombing. If you acknowledge traditional military aims, the bombing of Lübeck stands out as a war crime.

CONCLUSION: Strategic bombing is NOT tactical bombing.

[By the way, Britain abandoned France during 1940 operations. That is sort of a standard interpretation these days. And, why make the bombing of Freiburg into something special. Friendly fire happens. What about the Americans during the Gulf War? What is your point?]
 
Doppleganger said:
He did consider them enemies of the state but he must have known that the purges would cut the brains out of the Red Army. If he was planning to use it against a major power so soon, wouldn't this be stupidity even for Stalin?

I repeat, he was not considering them as you are. They were enemies, they had to be "weed out"!
You are a normal person(is it true?:-D ), but Stalin was not! So, do not apply your logic to his actions!
Again, what was doing Saddam in March 2003? Killing his best generals, like Bashar, who was telling him the truth about the situation, not what Saddam wanted to believe in.

Doppleganger said:
If he was waiting for Operation SeaLion, which his advisors must have told him had little chance of ever going ahead never mind succeeding, surely this indicates that Stalin wanted there to be as little risk as possible when committing his armed forces. Attacking when the Germans were not actually fighting makes even less sense as a result does it not?

I repeat, after Hitler has turned to the East, Stalin, basically, had no choice...



Doppleganger said:
I don't think you can directly compare the Allied invasion of Iraq in 2003 with Operation Barbarossa. He obviously didn't believe his sources but he must have known that there was a German build-up in Eastern Europe nonetheless. It would have been impossible for him not to have known that there was something going on, even if he did ignore all the warnings.

I happened to live for the most of my life right on the Soviet borders with Poland and Romania. And I have read a lot of Soviet war memoirs...
All of those generals, who happened to be in the border areas on 6/22/41 tell the same thing: "We were sleeping in our tents, when the bombs have started to fall..."
One of such places - the old Polish military camp was located half a mile from my home... My summer home("dacha") was built in a shadow of the walls of the WWI fort...
How could these troops stay in tents for almost 2 years after being deployed to these camps?

They, definitely, were not going to dig trenches and build fortifications....

So, either their generals(like the Chief of Staff gen. Zhukov) where a bunch of stupid idiots, or... they were going to attack, not to defend.



Doppleganger said:
Probably not, but that doesn't mean to say that attacking just because you have to beat your enemy to it was a good idea. In fact it was a terrible idea given the state of the Red Army at the time.

It's what we know now. Saddam, for example, didn't think his army was so hopeless...

Doppleganger said:
Which begs the question as to why he didn't in 1940 when the Germans were busy elsewhere.

In 1940 Stalin has been busy, too. He had to consolidate his power on the newly acquired territories, for one thing.

BTW, I have heard a funny story from that time, that I would like to share:

I was staying in a hospital in 1981(after some nasty climbing accident) and I have shared the room with 3 other guys. One of them was very old Pole who told us how their little town Skidel (15 miles from Grodno where I lived) had celebrated it's first October revolution anniversary in 1939(just 40 days after their "liberation"):

"They build a tribune for the celebratory demonstration and all the dignitaries were standing there greeting the crowd. Suddenly, the NKVD chief has turned pale and run from the tribune into the crowd...

The reason for the alarm has been a guy, proudly carrying the portrait of Marshall Pilsudski...(the Stalin's mortal enemy)
He has been quietly apprehended by the NKVD guy and brought for an interrogation.
He was very drank and was repeating: "How could I distinguish between them? This one is called Joseph, and another is Joseph, too!"



Doppleganger said:
Obviously. listen to the warnings from 3 seperate intelligence sources and disperse your army and airforce accordingly. Stalin had plenty of time to do this but took very little action and too late.

He, probably, had his own reasons...
 
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Ollie Garchy said:
In response to Redcoat: [This subject is departing from WWII origins. Although important and interesting, the "who dun' it" first issue is also sort of dull].
Its only 'sort of dull' if you are trying to defend German actions in WW2. It kinda gets in the way.

Terraine (and others) paints another picture, especially concerning pre-May 1940, operations,
Actually I have only one Terraine book 'The Right Of The Line', a history of the RAF in WW2. In this he makes no mention of any bombing campaign on German land based targets, with the one exception (Hörnum.) pre-May 1940.
If however you could provide me with any info on any German land based targets bombed by the RAF pre-May 1940 I would be most grateful.

but I really only want to address one issue. It seems that you do not really have a grasp of the meaning of strategic bombing. I will try. [But first, what strategic raids were launched by the Luftwaffe against Britain prior to May 1940? What German strategic bombing plan? What were the targets?].
I do have a fair grasp of what strategic bombing is, and I will accept that the RAF was the first airforce to engage in strategic bombing in WW2.
However you seem to wish to equate only strategic bombing with terror bombing, while the truth is, terror bombing can be either strategic or tactical.
Terror bombing is the act of bombing civilians in an effort to break their morale.

Until early 1941 the RAF both tactically and strategically sought to minimise civilian casualties, its tactics didn't involve 'terror' bombing.
While the Luftwaffe used the tactic of terror bombing tactically from the first day (Warsaw, later Rotterdam) and strategically from September 1940 (London)


For the Germans...well...they never had a strategic bombing policy.
Not a well thought out one, that is true.
But their attacks on Britain in late 40/41 were indeed strategic, but with the Luftwaffe, terror was always an integral part of their bombing policy
[By the way, Britain abandoned France during 1940 operations. That is sort of a standard interpretation these days.
Is it ???
One of us must be reading the wrong sort of books then.
While some British actions in may 1940 could be viewed as selfish, the fact that Britain didn't seek peace with Germany in 1940, refutes the statement that we 'abandoned' France.
In fact, the fact that France sought a settlement with Germany without British permission despite treaty agreements, could leave France open to the accusation that they 'abandoned' Britain
Though to be honest, I think that would be as unfair on the French as is the accusation that Britain abandoned France
And, why make the bombing of Freiburg into something special. Friendly fire happens. What about the Americans during the Gulf War? What is your point?]
Freiburg is interesting because they were the first German civilians killed in a bombing raid on a German town during WW2 on the 10 May 1940.
I posted this in relation to a reference to British bombing policy pre-May 1940
 
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Boris stated in his post: All of those generals, who happened to be in the border areas on 6/22/41 tell the same thing: "We were sleeping in our tents, when the bombs have started to fall..."One of such places - the old Polish military camp was located half a mile from my home... My summer home("dacha") was built in a shadow of the walls of the WWI fort...How could these troops stay in tents for almost 2 years after being deployed to these camps?
They, definitely, were not going to dig trenches and build fortifications....
So, either their generals(like the Chief of Staff gen. Zhukov) where a bunch of stupid idiots, or... they were going to attack, not to defend. End Quote

Boris, it still does not make sense. Even if the Soviet Army was getting ready for an attack, why would they have had their forces living in tents for two years? The answer is, of course, that they deployed their army into a semblance of a DEFENSIVE or garrison position. However, it has been stated in numerous sources that Stalin refused to allow any actions that could be considered belligerent, right up to the building of defensive structures such as bunkers. The Soviet Army was not in either an offensive or a defensive structure, rather it was in a garrison structure, spread a bit thickly near the border and a bit less thinly everywhere else. (standard European peacetime practice) This does not allow an Army to attack or defend, and thus an army caught in this situation would hhave been slaughtered... as was the Soviet army during Barbarossa.
Zhukov was not an idiot, although he did plan some operations that were spectacular failures. At the time of Barbarossa, Zhukov was not even in the lline of command, having been replaced "by Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov (who was in turn replaced by Aleksandr Vasilevsky in 1942). Ironically, this led to a relative non-accountablity of Zhukov's military role in the huge territorial losses during the German 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union thus ensuring his presence "in the wings" for Stalingrad. The question of how much he might have prevented had he held command earlier is still much discussed." (Wiki)
The men who were in charge or the now-called Eastern Front (the Soviet western borders) were Stalins's yes men, and neither of them ever distinguished themselves with their incredible command of aggressive battlefield tactics until much later in the war. In other words, neither of these men would have, or even could have commanded an attack into Poland against the Germans for 1 main reason. The Soviet Army itself was still being re-built after the purges, and both men knew that they were not ready for such a campaign, and would not be for a very long time.
The plain truth is that the Soviets were not preparing an attack into Poland. Stalin did not believe in the attack in depth tactics that his generals were trying to develop, and the proof is that the first Svoiet attak into the German rear area during WW II was at Stalingrad. All of the other counter-offensives were attempts to push the entire German line back. Useless and costly.
Every single source that I have ever read is clear on these points. Stalin refused to allow his army to prepare for the German attack, and when the attack came, he did nothing for weeks, then began organizing the defense. All documents that showed the error that Stalin had made were destroyed (happened often enough) so today, we often have revisionist authors trying to paint a different picture of what really happened. But, as usual, the facts still do not fit the theory.

Dean.
 
Here is a synopsis of Redcoat's and my own position:

REDCOAT's Theory: The Luftwaffe started or initiated the first strategic bombing campaign during WWII and led directly to British and American retaliatory or strategic bombing. [Consequence: The Germans hold full responsibility].

OLLIE's Theory: German and British bombing policies were unrelated and the matter of instigation was purely propagandistic. [Consequence: Each of the belligerents were responsible for their actions, although they were influenced by those of the other side].

Recoat writes: "Its only 'sort of dull' if you are trying to defend German actions in WW2. It kinda gets in the way".

I am not "trying to defend German actions in WW2". On an academic level, I understand the reasoning behind terror bombing and accept the arguments involved. [They were still war crimes according to conventional thinking. Retaliatory war crimes are also outlawed]. The issue is "dull" because the strategic bombers did not lead directly to Britain's declaration of war or Germany's invasion of Poland. It has little to do with origins.

The attempt to find a culprit is in fact a useless exercise. The operation is quasi-religious/hyper-nationalistic. The question by definition implies that there was an instigator and it divides the world neatly into "us" and "them". In my experience, the two questions of "who started WWII (or any war)" or "who started strategic bombing (or any military campaign)" are therefore loaded ones. The answer is used to demonstrate political or national affiliation. It becomes an affirmation of your own culture or political system. It is blasphemy to understand the actions of the opponent and question your own state. The possibility of a complex interaction of multiple causes on multiple levels is downplayed. "Origins", using the accepted methodology, is just the "blame game". It is for this reason that the "Galloping Gertie" approach to WWI origins is often found unsatisfying. They "done" it. Period.

The Stalin example is an important one. It demonstrates the frighteningly religious nature of the WWII origins debate. Hitler and Stalin attacked Poland in 1939. Fact. London and Paris declared war on Hitler and not on Stalin. Fact. Attacking Poland in general was not the issue. Fact. The GERMANS attacking Poland was the issue. Fact. Stalin's actions in eastern Europe were therefore unrelated to WWII origins. Fact. Why? London and Paris developed the criteria for origins in September 1939. THE ORIGINS DEBATE WAS SETTLED. Stalin was a potential ally and blaming him for the war would not fit the anti-Hitler paradigm. This seems true for many historians today. [It was in fact not at all clear that the Allies would not declare war on Stalin. The argumentation had to first be developed].

"Ya don't think I am right"? Well, look at things this way. For most people, a calm analysis of WWII is impossible. People tend to view any attempt at a calm or balanced portrayal of WWII origins as indicative of a pro-nazi (read pro-German) political affiliation. For many people, it somehow LESSENS Hitler's evil to argue that Stalin was a responsible party. And the lessening of Hitler's evil is the act of a nominal supporter or neo-nazi. (here we go with automatic political affiliation).

We are working from a specific paradigm that moreorless states: "All German actions in WWII were evil". Considering this paradigm, any attempt to EXPLAIN German actions using the documentary record appears politically motivated and even blasphemous. The German pre-emptive strike against Norway is a good example here. I am only attempting to twist the theoretical framework to include a rational decision-making process on the part of the German military.

A point by Williamson Murray:

"Thus, the Germans approached the question of strategic bombing from a more skeptical point of view than did the British. A partial explanation lies in the German experience in Spain. Terror bombing had produced, for the most part, a counterproductive effect. Captain Heye of the Seekriegsleitung made the following report based on conversations with Luftwaffe officers serving in Spain:

'Disregarding the great military success accompanying use of the Luftwaffe for the immediate support of army operations, one gets the impression that our attacks on objects of little military importance, through which in most cases many women and children...were hit, are not a suitable means to break the resistance of the opponent. They seem far more suited to strengthening the resistance....Doubtless the memory of the air attack on Guernica by the [Condor] Legion still today produces an after effect in the population and permits no friendly feelings for Germany in the population of the Basques, who earlier were thoroughly friendly to Germany and in no manner communistic.'" [Williamson Murray, British and German Air Doctrine Between the Wars, Air University Review, March-April 1980].
 
An interesting article concerning strategic bombing doctrine. It underlines the point I have been trying to make: British doctrine called for the killing of civilians prior to 1939. Retaliation was always expected. Nothing more. Nothing less.

[First British instance of city bombing: 5 Sept 1939 RAF planes bomb the German fleet at Wilhelmshaven and Brunsbuttel at the entrance at the Kiel canal. Bombs miss the target and strike city. See opening chapters of Terraine's book. The problem with initial British bombing was that the tactics were terrible and the bombers were shot out of the sky.]

The Early Months, 1939–40

"When the war began there could be little doubt that the British people were all too aware of the potency of aerial weapons. Films such as Things to Come (1936), based on H.G. Wells’ novel, had graphically depicted the results of air raids. The bombing of Guernica (1937), especially as revealed by the newsreels, shocked the British public; and Stanley Baldwin had gloomily predicted that ‘the bomber will always get through’.24 Such an atmosphere stimulated interest in the RAF, and its bomber force in particular. In 1939, the British people expected both to be bombed and to bomb others."

Conclusion

"From late 1940, British bombers set out to smash German cities into submission by killing Germans, destroying their houses and ruining their industries. Harris knew it, Portal knew it and Churchill knew it; the crews probably guessed it but they were, in that rather hackneyed but in this case nonetheless true phrase, only carrying out orders. The only difference was that Harris was prepared to admit it to all and sundry.

The British public was presented with many different interpretations of the aerial war and was fed a diet of truths, half-truths and outright lies. The attitude of the newspapers varied only slightly; a reader of the broadsheets may have consumed slightly less lurid reportage, but the information and stance was remarkably similar to that of the tabloids. Later, this allowed the British people and politicians to claim ignorance as to the true nature of strategic air campaign. The British people were told that Germany was going to be ruined from top to bottom. They knew this was the promise of Bomber Command, and their newspapers and newsreels reminded them of this promise on an almost daily basis. Germany was going to have the guts ripped out of it. They knew this too. But some managed to convince themselves that it was going to be done by bombing factories alone. Most did not manage this trick and silently accepted the implications of the policy, probably even rejoiced in it. Some, a very few, yelled out loud against it.

By 1942, the war was very obviously one of national survival. Nazi forces were rampant on the Atlantic. They were preparing to swallow even more chunks of the Soviet Union. They were driving towards the Suez Canal and had pushed their ships through the English Channel under the eyes of the impotent British. In the Far East, Japan had taken Hong Kong, Singapore had fallen, Mandalay was abandoned, Darwin was bombed. It was not a moment for delicate stomachs. Britain needed to win, or else, in Churchill’s words, it ‘would slip into the abyss of a new dark age’ and in that moment of supreme national emergency a force was created which would unleash a terrifying level of violence against the enemy. In the postwar years the British retreated from the animal they had unleashed in themselves and made scapegoats of Harris and his men. This was a fudge, for if there is blame all are guilty."

http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2353/connerly.pdf
 
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WHY FRENCH DEFEAT? ABANDONED?

The explanations for defeat include the following:

(1) FRENCH DECADENCE: France caved in for reasons similar to that of the Roman empire. This hypothesis is hard to pin down. How can an historian actually determine that a society was "decadent"? Or why "decadence" led to defeat? What methodology do you use? What quantitative or qualitative factors underline decadence? (see Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat)

(2) THE COSTS OF WWI: This is the argument that my teachers often used. The hypothesis avoids the fact that France had a "mighty fine army" and instead looks at the development of "defeatism" and "pacifism" in the 1920s and 1930s. The general lack of willpower and use of "pacifism" to explain weakness is in my opinion a poor attempt at demonstrating French innocence and the lack of responsibility for the outbreak of war in 1939. (see most historical accounts)

(3) THE OUTDATED FRENCH MILITARY DOCTRINE: The historical community was shocked to discover after the war that the French ground forces actually outnumbered their German opponents. Besides killing the "German rearmament myth", the quantitative evidence forced historians to scramble for an answer to a hardcore question: how can a numerically and technologically superior force fighting a defensive war largely on inner lines actually lose? Some historians blamed the French defeat on retention of WWI doctrines, the Maginot line (also used for 1 & 2), a defensive mentality, etc. Many texts analysing WWI French doctrine lament the "cult of the offensive" and argue that the offensive was not the best option for France during the early years of the war. The defensive is in any case normally considered the more cost-effective way of waging war. Why is the defensive considered so wrong in 1939?

(4) MORE COOPERATIVE ALLIES: The lack of British and French military cooperation led to the formulation of two strategies based on the same premise of a long war. The French military hoped to hold off a German attack and subject the enemy to a war of attrition. The British military hoped to avoid a repetition of WWI by avoiding significant ground force operations and hitting German military-industrial production instead. This strategy, instead of being criticized, represented a smaller version of the alliance structure that actually did defeat Nazi-Germany. That is, the Wehrmacht was mauled in eastern Europe while the western Allies hurled millions of bombs against the civilian German population. The British strategy, however, depended on France surviving over the longer term. I therefore find it difficult to explain why (1) the British ground forces were simply pulled out and (2) RAF operations were so dogged by outside political pressures. [For the coordination problems see William Keylor, article in The French Defeat of 1940: Reassessments or Julian Jackson, The Fall of France (2004)]

The French People certainly felt abandoned:

FRENCH POPULAR ATTITUDES: "The R.A.F. attacks upon the aerodromes in the occupied region are used as evidence that the British, who have already deserted their Ally, are now making direct onslaughts on the Frenchman's home". [Article in The Times of London (17 August 1940) quoted in "France in Defeat, 1940," EyeWitness to History, www.eyewitnesstohistory.com (2006)].

The British government was not as "pro-war" as typically thought:

LONDON AS DEFEATIST: Julian Jackson points out certain irregularities in opinions at the highest levels of British government. London was far from united concerning the war against Nazi-Germany. Optimism was certainly not in the air (sorry for the airpower pun). Many members of both Chamberlain's and Churchill's cabinet simply did not hold much stock in French fighting capabilites even though French military output had surpassed that of Germany in early 1940. This crisis is important because the British longterm strategy against Germany depended on allies to supply the sufficient ground forces for a direct clash. Their own overblown estimates of German rearmament had therefore taken a frightening toll on decision-making. The pessimists in London even started "exploring the possibility of peace" during May 1940 prior to French defeat (p.20 Julian Jackson, The Fall of France (2004)].
 
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The Defeat of France (1940): A Chronology of Abandonment

[The abandonment was political in nature. NOT really military. The abandonment had to do with the half-hearted measures adopted to defend continental Europe from a significant change in the balance of power and the "Churchill factor". In some ways, it is possible to argue that Chamberlain accepted German continental control, while Churchill fought bitterly against any manifestation of German power. Both policies were extreme and worked against each other].

Prior to 10 May: The British, French and German governments discussed various ways to "bury the hatchet" and terminate an unwanted war. Military operations, considering that "world war" had supposedly broken out, were surpisingly smallscale.

10 May: Germans started offensive operations. London's and Paris' political policy backfired. The western Allies, who declared war, sat on their butts and wasted the perfect opportunity for a major spoiling offensive to save the Poles, gain the initiative, and cripple German production by at least placing artillery within range of the Ruhr. Throughout this period, BEF preparations for military operations were utterly inadequate. BEF: 10 Inf. divs, a tank brigade and 500 aircraft. [The Polish military contribution dwarfed that of the BEF. That the RAF was largely held back by the politicians was a clear sign of the times].

10 May: Chamberlain resigned and Churchill became PM. The changing of the guard led to a monumental change in British military policy. (see next few posts in a few days) The anti-German and anti-French fanatic (and relic of the 19th Century) took control of policy.

14 May: The Germans employed their revolutionary command & control concepts to send outnumbered and technologically inferior panzer columns through Sedan and towards the coast. Manstein's "sickle" cut the superior Allied forces in two.

15 May: The official start of the British strategic bombing offensive. One day after Sedan, the British ordered the employment of bombers against industrial or morale (retaliatory) targets in Germany. A total concentration on the panzer columns and supply depots might have been more appropriate. The strategic bombing decision is evidence that tactical concerns were rejected and that Britain now embarked on a longterm policy of industrial/societal attrition.

21 May: The overstretched and exposed German armour columns reached the coast and encircled the BEF. Rommel's men had repelled a significant Allied counterattack at Arras. The German high command still however entertained signicant worries of an impending collapse such as at the Marne in 1914. While only speculation, a continuation of "Arras-style" operations would have actually "Marned" or "Moscowed" the German military. The composition of the German military and low level of rearmament actually meant significant problems related to the taking of casualties. The Wehrmacht could not successfully absorb significant combat losses and support an offensive.

22 May: The British Military & Government decided to retreat via Dunkirk. [Again counterfactual: The British could have moved troops INTO the pocket to strengthen defensive capabilities and hold the German troops in place. The Dunkirk region was totally unsuitable for armoured operations. The Germans would have been forced to throw in their infantry at extremely high cost. The holding action would have permitted French reorganization and a major operation against the flank of the panzer advance.]


4 June: Germans took Dunkirk. 338,911 Allied soldiers were able to flee. The British left 2,472 artillery pieces and 63,879 vehicles behind. Churchill celebrated a victory instead. What followed was a catastrophe. Even though German losses were significant, the coming neutralization of France meant that Britain could not defeat Germany without the United States or Soviet Union. Only the British 51st Division and elements of the 1st Armoured Division remained in France as a token commitment.

4 June: Churchill: "We shall fight on the beaches". Churchill was not referring to the beaches of France. France, not yet defeated, was obviously abandoned by the political leadership.

5 June: The Wehrmacht renewed operations in the direction of Paris. The death coup that followed was only possible because of British departure and a comprehensive collapse of French fighting spirit. German losses were still high.

14 June: Paris capitulated.

22 June: Fall of France. The BEF lost a mere 68,000 men.

3 July: British Navy fired on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir. The act, one that gave the derogatory term "Perfidious Albion" new meaning, is normally considered an attack of war. (ie. Pearl Harbor). British apologists argued that it was a strategic decision. Well, the sinking of the French fleet was followed by 4 years of strategic bombing and the killing of more than 50,000 civilians by Bomber Command. [It is amazing how British "strategic decisions" are always justified. By the way, the Armistice stated that the French fleet would continue to fly under the French flag.]
 
A good, well-reasoned argument Ollie, and one with which I agree. IMO it's not supportable by body of evidence nor by reasoned debate that Allied strategic bombing policy was initiated as a result of what the Luftwaffe did first. That doesn't make much sense to me and indeed, even appears childish. It was an obvious outcome of the development of bomber aircraft that the notion to use such aircraft to bomb industrial and political targets would arise. That the Luftwaffe "did it first" is irrelevant.

As a Briton I have no problem in looking into the darker side of British policy during WW2. By that I mean the fact that we are not the totally good, upstanding nation that we are led to believe. No nation is. Although we did not decide to exterminate a race of people like the Nazis did we were quite prepared to do what was necessary to defend our own interests. We did abandon France to its fate. As Albert Lebrun, the President of France until July 10, 1940, said in 1945; "From the moment when one of the two countries which signed a convention like that of March 28 [1940] retains part of its forces for its own defence, instead of risking it in the common battle - as the British Empire did - it can always keep a paper to recall us to the obligations written on it. But it no longer has the moral authority to say: I will not release you from your obligations." I think we were guilty of selling out the French in the same way we had sold out the Poles, although the facts of each case are quite different.

Looking at the facts it is clear that we made a half-hearted attempt to defend France and then abandoned them to their fate. There were several opportunities where a strong Allied thrust could have spelt disaster for the German panzers, as exposed as they were becoming the further they advanced into France. Part of successful warfare is firstly recognising opportunities and secondly seizing them. Lastly is having the courage to execute them and although in many ways we showed courage and determination in spades, sadly not much of this was evident in our contribution to the land war in 1939-40.
 
Doppleganger said:
As a Briton I have no problem in looking into the darker side of British policy during WW2. By that I mean the fact that we are not the totally good, upstanding nation that we are led to believe. No nation is. Although we did not decide to exterminate a race of people like the Nazis did we were quite prepared to do what was necessary to defend our own interests. We did abandon France to its fate. As Albert Lebrun, the President of France until July 10, 1940, said in 1945; "From the moment when one of the two countries which signed a convention like that of March 28 [1940] retains part of its forces for its own defence, instead of risking it in the common battle - as the British Empire did - it can always keep a paper to recall us to the obligations written on it. But it no longer has the moral authority to say: I will not release you from your obligations." I think we were guilty of selling out the French in the same way we had sold out the Poles, although the facts of each case are quite different.

Looking at the facts it is clear that we made a half-hearted attempt to defend France and then abandoned them to their fate. There were several opportunities where a strong Allied thrust could have spelt disaster for the German panzers, as exposed as they were becoming the further they advanced into France. Part of successful warfare is firstly recognising opportunities and secondly seizing them. Lastly is having the courage to execute them and although in many ways we showed courage and determination in spades, sadly not much of this was evident in our contribution to the land war in 1939-40.

Hey Doppleganger,

A couple of thoughts:

(1) I personally would not call any British policy "dark". More like realistic. Maybe I am just too "dark" or jaded by human history. I read an article recently that "uncovered" a "dark truth": the British military used Gestapo-style torture chambers in WWII to force confessions. My initial reaction was: "so what". I guess that I simply do not like the "fairytale" line of interpretation that lists German atrocities without putting anything in perspective. Older Germans (the guys who went through the war) generally have a much different perspective than the post-1945 generations. In a recent television depiction of Dresden, an old dude commented on the fire-bombing of German cities in 1945. He shrugged his shoulders and stated "it was war". That was all he had to say. The younger generations here in Germany actually argue that it was the moral thing to do. Killing German civilians, that is. I personally have a tough time with moral justifications, etc. It was war. Period. I do despise the "we had no choice" or "they started it" type of arguments, however. [Now comes the hard part..."War is the continuation of politics by other means"....oh oh. Maybe we should get rid of the conditions that lead to war or at least think about them.]

(2) Do you think that Europe could ever fight another major regional conflict like WWI or WWII? Has this issue been discussed in another thread? Some French friends of mine think that Germany will once again attempt to dominate Europe militarily. I tried to explain to them that their own bias concerning the origins of WWI and WWII was the primary factor behind their question. I just dryly told them: "Only if France wants one". They of course got mad and held closely to their bias and national myths.

What is Germany? Who in Germany wants war? Is Germany even capable of fighting a war? These French people were content with the kind of argumentation that helped destroy Europe in the first place: Germany reunified. Germany has industrial power (now that's a laugh). This power will lead to war. The traditional French perspective, and I am shocked by this, seems to reduce everything to a theoretical geopolitical calculation. It makes the mere possession of "power" the prime variable for an aggressive foreign policy. Ie. country "x" is dangerous because it seems to have "power". Now, that is crude and dangerous.

[On that note, I think it is high time for a British-German quasi-alliance. A better Europe should be led by the guys who pay for the damn thing, anyway. A British-Dutch-German axis around which Europe revolves. I say: "No more highways to nowhere in Portugal". I say: "No more French agricultural subsidies". I say: "A better energy policy that is not built on French nuclear technology". I say...well, you get the point...A better Europe is one with less French involvement. Does any of this have anything to do with WWII origins. No. I even (sort of) like France and some of the people who live there].
 
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Dean said:
Boris, it still does not make sense. Even if the Soviet Army was getting ready for an attack, why would they have had their forces living in tents for two years? The answer is, of course, that they deployed their army into a semblance of a DEFENSIVE or garrison position. However, it has been stated in numerous sources that Stalin refused to allow any actions that could be considered belligerent, right up to the building of defensive structures such as bunkers. The Soviet Army was not in either an offensive or a defensive structure, rather it was in a garrison structure, spread a bit thickly near the border and a bit less thinly everywhere else. (standard European peacetime practice) This does not allow an Army to attack or defend, and thus an army caught in this situation would hhave been slaughtered... as was the Soviet army during Barbarossa.
Zhukov was not an idiot, although he did plan some operations that were spectacular failures. At the time of Barbarossa, Zhukov was not even in the lline of command, having been replaced "by Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov (who was in turn replaced by Aleksandr Vasilevsky in 1942).

Dean, you have almost convinced me:)

However, nothing is as simple as it looks.
Zhukov was not in the line of command, as you've said. He was nonetheless the Chief of Staff from January to July 1941 and should have been responsible for this strange disposition of troops neither in defensive nor offensive position. He had to plan for their readiness. However, he was not held responsible by Stalin, who was ordering people to be killed for much lesser failures. Suvorov believes that this has happened because Zhukov has been told to do what he has done.

Another interesting moment is how the Soviet forces on the Southern flank has responded to the war's beginning... They were against weak Rumanian army, so they were not subjected to the decimation during the first hours of hostilities. Their commanders have opened their sealed orders and started to implement them. What did they do? The have invaded Rumania!
One can only speculate what were the orders that have been destroyed by the commanders in other places...

I just want to remind you about total secrecy and paranoia of these years. I am not so old to remember, but what I remember - only in the 70-s the Soviet veterans of the Korean war have been allowed to talk about it. My brother-in-law had participated and was wounded in one of the incidents with the Chinese in the 70-s.
He had told his family about his experience only in 2002 here in the States!!!

Stalin in 1941 was in a bind. He has refused to be a full-blown German ally, he has known about the German build-up.
I have never believed that he was so blind and deaf not to see it coming...But he was behaving like lamb...
 
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