WWII's Top Mistakes-USSR

Ashes

Active member
What were the Soviets top mistakes.

Everyone debates how much Hitler interfered in Germany, and the list of mistakes the Germans made, and if they fought the war differently how it may have turned out, but on the other hand, Stalin and the long list of Russian mistakes are not mentioned very much.

They probably trumped even the German errors.
 
Ashes said:
What were the Soviets top mistakes.

Everyone debates how much Hitler interfered in Germany, and the list of mistakes the Germans made, and if they fought the war differently how it may have turned out, but on the other hand, Stalin and the long list of Russian mistakes are not mentioned very much.

They probably trumped even the German errors.

A very tough question!

It is very difficult to define whether it was an error or a policy(a bug or a feature:-D )?

For example, the infamous purges in the Armed Forces. For the outsider, it was a huge mistake. But for Stalin it had it's own logic and he never regretted it. And it had some positive effect in creating opportunities for the young officers like Zhukov and Rokossovskij.

He has imprisoned many leading aircraft designers(i. e. Tupolev) and forced them work on their designs in the special prison camps. But he has not killed them.
My list of the top Soviet mistakes, however, would be as following:
1. Inability to stab Hitler in the back in 1940-41when he was still busy elsewhere.
2. Inability to believe the numerous intelligence(Zorge, Churchill and many others) who has warned Stalin about the imminent German attack on 6/22/41.
3. Dismantling of the fortifications on the old Polish-Soviet border before the new ones have been built.
4. War with Finland (the Winter War of 39/40). Neutral or even allied Finland could have helped a lot the Allies in general, not just the Soviets
This list can go on and on...
 
Well I think the largest error was when Stalin purged all his experianced officers from the Red Army, replacing them with political appointments or greenhorns who couldnt tell the difference between the Butt and the Barrel of a Nosin-Nagent rifle. Needless to say, they were steamrolled by the German Juggernault.
 
The 3 biggest mistakes were as already stated namely:

1. The Stalinist purges of the late 1930s purged many fine officers from the ranks of the Red Army. Because of this, inexperienced and mediocre commanders were placed in charge of Red Army formations that otherwise they never should have had the right to command. A good example of this would be Marshall Semyon Budenny, a character that looked like Daniel Day Lewis's character from 'Gangs of New York' but who was responsible for the loss of over 600,000 men at Kiev.

2. The failure of Stalin to believe that a German attack was imminent. Old Josef had the 'Lucy' Spy Ring, Winston Churchill and Richard Sorge all warn him of the aggressive intent of Germany. Stalin had the date of the attack, the German campaign plan, the names of each Army and all the names of all Army commanders down to Corps level. He also knew exactly how many tanks each Army Group had, what type they were and their initial deployment and lines of attack. Never has there been a state that was better warned about the intentions of another but Stalin did nothing, fearful that 'enemies' were trying to put a wedge between himself and Hitler.

3. The Red Army defending the border with Germany was wrongly dispersed. As a means to appease Hitler and not give him any possible provacation, Stalin had the Red Army widely dispersed in forward positions. The length of front allocated to each Army was far too long for them to realistically defend and the distance from each Army to its HQ meant that orders to withdraw into defensible positions couldn't possibly be received in time when the Germans attacked. Also, as a result of their forward dispersation, the Germans had suceeding in cutting much of the communication lines between the Red Army forward units and their HQs, further adding to the confusion. Moreover, the Soviet airforce, the VVS, was not able to be properly dispersed in time and consequently the Luftwaffe destroyed a large proportion of it on the ground.

I haven't included the Winter War because, although a humilating defeat for the USSR, IMO it didn't really have a long term impact on the war. Of the 3 mistakes above No 2 is the most glaring.
 
Doppleganger said:
The 3 biggest mistakes were as already stated namely:

3. The Red Army defending the border with Germany was wrongly dispersed. As a means to appease Hitler and not give him any possible provacation, Stalin had the Red Army widely dispersed in forward positions. The length of front allocated to each Army was far too long for them to realistically defend and the distance from each Army to its HQ meant that orders to withdraw into defensible positions couldn't possibly be received in time when the Germans attacked. Also, as a result of their forward dispersation, the Germans had suceeding in cutting much of the communication lines between the Red Army forward units and their HQs, further adding to the confusion. Moreover, the Soviet airforce, the VVS, was not able to be properly dispersed in time and consequently the Luftwaffe destroyed a large proportion of it on the ground..

There is a very popular theory in Russia(the most prominent proponent is Viktor Suvorov a.k.a Rezun - former GRU officer, now in exile in the UK) that the USSR was preparing her own blitzkrieg to be started in July 1941.
There are many facts supporting this theory... For example, when the war started, the commanders of the Army and Navy units on the southern flank(where there was no German troops at that time just the Romainians) have opened their sealed orders - there were orders to atack!
And they have attacked ans occupied some Romainian territory before being outflanked by the German advance in the Western Ukraine. The Black Sea Fleet has bombed the Romainian ports and the oil fields have been mombed as well.
In my previous life(in the USSR) I have read a lot of war memoirs of the Soviet Marshals and Generals. Of those who happened to be near the border on 06/22/41 have written the same story: "We were sleeping in our tents when the bombs started to fall..." Those troops who are getting ready for the defense don't sleep in tents - they build bunkers!

Doppleganger said:
I haven't included the Winter War because, although a humilating defeat for the USSR, IMO it didn't really have a long term impact on the war. Of the 3 mistakes above No 2 is the most glaring.

There were a few of long lasting effects:

1. Finland was a pro-Ally and anti-German country before the Winter War. after the war, she had no choice but to join Germany
2. Due to this, the Baltic has become a German lake and the cruicial link between Germany and Sweden has been secured until winter of '45.
3. Russia couls spare a lot of troops and efforts to help in other places as well to push into Northern Norway which would be appreciated by the Allied sailors a lot
 
boris116 said:
There is a very popular theory in Russia(the most prominent proponent is Viktor Suvorov a.k.a Rezun - former GRU officer, now in exile in the UK) that the USSR was preparing her own blitzkrieg to be started in July 1941.
There are many facts supporting this theory... For example, when the war started, the commanders of the Army and Navy units on the southern flank(where there was no German troops at that time just the Romainians) have opened their sealed orders - there were orders to atack!
And they have attacked ans occupied some Romainian territory before being outflanked by the German advance in the Western Ukraine. The Black Sea Fleet has bombed the Romainian ports and the oil fields have been mombed as well.
In my previous life(in the USSR) I have read a lot of war memoirs of the Soviet Marshals and Generals. Of those who happened to be near the border on 06/22/41 have written the same story: "We were sleeping in our tents when the bombs started to fall..." Those troops who are getting ready for the defense don't sleep in tents - they build bunkers!

I've heard about this theory but most experts seem to debunk it. Glantz in particular has stated that the Red Army in 1941 was neither in a position to defend nor attack adequately. Perhaps Stalin did have some plans to attack Germany but not in 1941. Certainly, the Red Army was going through a big reorganisation after the purges of 1938. Many new tank corps were being formed for example. Hitler had been advised by his own experts that Germany's enemies would reach tactical and technological parity by 1943. Hitler expected an attack at some point from Stalin and I think he knew he had to get there first. I think, however, any Soviet attack on Germany in 1941 would have been a disaster for them in any case.

boris116 said:
There were a few of long lasting effects:

1. Finland was a pro-Ally and anti-German country before the Winter War. after the war, she had no choice but to join Germany
2. Due to this, the Baltic has become a German lake and the cruicial link between Germany and Sweden has been secured until winter of '45.
3. Russia couls spare a lot of troops and efforts to help in other places as well to push into Northern Norway which would be appreciated by the Allied sailors a lot

I don't want it to seem like I don't think there wouldn't be any positive impact for the USSR by having Finland as an ally. Of course there would be. But in reality although Finland was allied with Germany they didn't contribute all that much to Barbarossa, and I don't think their influence on the war had any significant impact to the final outcome.
 
Doppleganger said:
I don't want it to seem like I don't think there wouldn't be any positive impact for the USSR by having Finland as an ally. Of course there would be. But in reality although Finland was allied with Germany they didn't contribute all that much to Barbarossa, and I don't think their influence on the war had any significant impact to the final outcome.

You are right. Finland was not a very enthusiastic ally for the Germans. They have recovered the territories taken by the Soviets after the Winter War and then stopped!
However, as soon as they got a peace threaty with Stalin they have dealt very swiftly with the German forces in Finland!

There are numerous jokes about some countries as allies vs. foes. I would always prefer to have the Finns as allies, not as enemies
 
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Not enough to put Russian soldiers on the border with Germans. They should keep eyes on the germans. You know, Nazi are part of anti-communist. Russian communist shouldn't trust the Nazi because Nazi are against the communists. Also, Nazi Germany were allied with Fascist Italian. Fascist gov't are against communists, too.
 
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I agree with Boris and Dopplganger on those almost unbelievable blunders by Stalin, it just shows what a imbecile he was, it seemed as though he was doing all he could to hand all the advantages to Hitler.

In Ericksons book ''The Road to Stalingrad'' he explains how paranoid Stalin was not to provoke Hitler even to the point of not allowing Russian AA batteries to fire on dozens of daily German recon. flights over key Russian military installations, to refusing any blackouts in frontier positions.
The forward positions were actually being over run by the Germans, and the front commanders were still not given permission to fire.

It would be laughable if it wasn't so tragic.

On the purges.......
It wasn't just the total of 35,000 officers that were either shot or imprisoned, but it included men like Tukachesvky an expert on the theory of armoured warfare and deep strike tactics, who was beginning to organise armoured divisions the same time as Guderian was in Germany, and had plans to raise tank armies, and he was responsible for the first parachute brigade in any army.

So Stalin has commanders like Tukachesvky shot and men like Rokossovsky in prison then puts his inept cronies like Buddeny in a key command of a million men.

I wonder If that sort of purge happened to the German army, what state would they be in for an attack on Russia, or even defending themselves?

And could the war in Europe possibly have been over by 1940?

If, as some people say, Stalin was intent on invading Germany, he had the perfect chance in '40 when up to 80% of the Werhmacht was fighting the French and British.
What was there to stop him over running the German forces in occupied Poland and moving on to Berlin.
The Germans would have to turn armies against the Russians easing the pressure on the French, the war might have been finished there and then.

Even passing up on that opportunity, he could have at least fully mobilised, so when the Germans turned East, they could be facing anything up to 10 million men instead of 2.9 million.

But, unfortunately he was afraid to even do that for fear of provoking Hitler.

And as you say, Stalin actually having the dispositions of the forces fronting him, the date, and even the time of the attack, on his desk before the attack and ignoring it, must be one of the greatest blunders of the war.

On Suvorov......
He claims in 'Icebreaker' that stalin was going to attack on the 7th July '41, two weeks after Germany invaded, which seems pretty ridiculous.

A perfect example of Suvorov's suspect claims is that Soviet BT tanks were designed to operate on German Autobahns; the only problem with this great piece of logic is that in the Soviet Union the production of the BT-series began in 1931, when there were no Autobahns in Germany and also at a time in which the Soviet Union and Germany lacked a common border.

I think that just about sums him up.

As has been said, Glantz debunked Suvorov's arguments in his book 'Stumbling Colossus'

And it was no 'get them before they get us' by Hitler to attack East, he'd been planning it since 1923, it's all there in black and white. As for Stalin attacking at some in the distant future, well I guess any thing is possible, but all the evidence points the other way, I doubt he'd ever attack a strong Germany, he'd just pick up any scraps that came his way.
 
Is that true if the russian soldiers are retreating back to line and russian soldiers on the line will shoot russian soldiers if they are retreating? I'm just curious.
 
Fox said:
Is that true if the russian soldiers are retreating back to line and russian soldiers on the line will shoot russian soldiers if they are retreating? I'm just curious.

Yes, there were special units with the machine guns located behind the front lines. So called "zagraditel'nye otryady" They were NKVD, not the Army.

The German had adopted it too, but in lesser scale
 
Doppleganger said:
I've heard about this theory but most experts seem to debunk it. Glantz in particular has stated that the Red Army in 1941 was neither in a position to defend nor attack adequately. Perhaps Stalin did have some plans to attack Germany but not in 1941. Certainly, the Red Army was going through a big reorganisation after the purges of 1938. Many new tank corps were being formed for example. Hitler had been advised by his own experts that Germany's enemies would reach tactical and technological parity by 1943. Hitler expected an attack at some point from Stalin and I think he knew he had to get there first. I think, however, any Soviet attack on Germany in 1941 would have been a disaster for them in any case.

Technically, yes, these experts are right.
However, the leaders, especially, totalitarian leaders, like Stalin or Hitler, or Saddam not always follow the "common" logic or even math.
If one man says 2+2 =5 150 million will confirm this(providing that man is the Great Leader
 
Ashes said:
On Suvorov......
He claims in 'Icebreaker' that stalin was going to attack on the 7th July '41, two weeks after Germany invaded, which seems pretty ridiculous.

A perfect example of Suvorov's suspect claims is that Soviet BT tanks were designed to operate on German Autobahns; the only problem with this great piece of logic is that in the Soviet Union the production of the BT-series began in 1931, when there were no Autobahns in Germany and also at a time in which the Soviet Union and Germany lacked a common border.

I would not think that BT tank example disproves the Suvorov's theory.
There were no Authobans in Gemany and there was no common border with her either. So what?

The roads in Western Europe(even in Poland) were much better in 1931 than the roads in Russia in 2006!
Last month, it was a discussion on Russian forum I am a member of, when another member, an Orthodox priest, has gotten himself a parish in Northern Russia and started to look for a car/jeep to be able to move around there. Basically, the verdict was - he needs a helicopter:crybaby:
Unfortunately, he has no more than 3 grand, so he will, probably, buy a horse cart instead.
Another guy has taken a bus trip from Moscow to Volgograd(Stalingrad) last summer - another good story.

Why the hell the Soviets have bought the design from the US and built tens of thousands of these fast tanks, if not to use them in Europe?
They were obsolete from the day one in Russia where "there are no roads, just directions"(Churchill)

Your another objection - about the common border with Germany - doesn't stand either, IMXO.
First, Poland was a mortal enemy of Stalin and he was eager to extoll his revenge whenever possible(Katyn and Warsaw uprising, for example). So he wouldn't mind to obliterate Poland on his way West.
Second, Stalin's goal(per Suvorov) has been to conquer ALL of Europe, not just Germany. One border more, one border less - who cares?
 
Stalin did not want war with Germany. All of the actions, orders and dispositions of the Red Army bear that out, and for anyone to claim anything different is simply a blind attempt to re-write history. IMO, what Stalin did want was security, and that is why he signed the non-aggression pact and followed it blindly even when it was completely apparent that Hitler was in the process of breaking it. You have to remember that Stalin had no discernible ideology other than using fear to cement his grip on power, and the non-aggression pact allowed him to concentrate on doing exactly that with no interference from Europe. Japan was not a danger to him, as he knew that the Japanese would never be able to significantly threaten him from the east, as they had lost every single border skirmish they fought.
Stalin completely underestimated or misread Hitler. He really thought of Hitler as, well, not an ally or a friend, but as someone who, in spite of all the anti-communist diatrabes he had spouted, could be trusted. Just as Stalin called himself a communist when he was nothing of the sort, he believed that Hitler was using the anti-communist policies to cement his hold on power in Germany just as Stalin himself was using his communist credentials to cement his grip on Russia. I really believe that Stalin thought of Hitler as much like himself, and he therefore thought that he understood Hitler, and that Hitler understood him. In doing so, Stalin's misreading of Hitler was complete, and as someone else in this thread said, Stalin made sure that the Soviet Army was neither in a position to attack or defend when the war started. I beleieve that this was the greatest Soviet error of WW II; Stalin's misreading of the situation before Barbarossa in such a way that he rendered the Soviet Army completely useless when it was most needed.

Dean.

Oh, and Suvorov was wrong.
 
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Dean said:
Stalin did not want war with Germany. All of the actions, orders and dispositions of the Red Army bear that out, and for anyone to claim anything different is simply a blind attempt to re-write history. IMO, what Stalin did want was security, and that is why he signed the non-aggression pact and followed it blindly even when it was completely apparent that Hitler was in the process of breaking it. Oh, and Suvorov was wrong.

Dean,

how would you explain then, why so many Soviet troops have been concentrated on the Soviet-German border?
And it was there they were obliterated in the first days of the war.
If Stalin has trusted Hitler so much, why he kept these troops there and didn't move them farther East? One of the units in Odessa Military district was a Mountain division. Where are the mountains Southern Ukraine?
Why th Soviet Army had several Airborne divisions?
There are so many unanswered questions about Soviet plans and intentions that everybody can make a guess.
These plans are still classified. I am not sure that Suvorov is wrong. Or right. I just believe that with Stalin everything was possible.
 
Dean said:
Stalin did not want war with Germany. All of the actions, orders and dispositions of the Red Army bear that out, and for anyone to claim anything different is simply a blind attempt to re-write history. IMO, what Stalin did want was security, and that is why he signed the non-aggression pact and followed it blindly even when it was completely apparent that Hitler was in the process of breaking it. You have to remember that Stalin had no discernible ideology other than using fear to cement his grip on power, and the non-aggression pact allowed him to concentrate on doing exactly that with no interference from Europe. Japan was not a danger to him, as he knew that the Japanese would never be able to significantly threaten him from the east, as they had lost every single border skirmish they fought.
Stalin completely underestimated or misread Hitler. He really thought of Hitler as, well, not an ally or a friend, but as someone who, in spite of all the anti-communist diatrabes he had spouted, could be trusted. Just as Stalin called himself a communist when he was nothing of the sort, he believed that Hitler was using the anti-communist policies to cement his hold on power in Germany just as Stalin himself was using his communist credentials to cement his grip on Russia. I really believe that Stalin thought of Hitler as much like himself, and he therefore thought that he understood Hitler, and that Hitler understood him. In doing so, Stalin's misreading of Hitler was complete, and as someone else in this thread said, Stalin made sure that the Soviet Army was neither in a position to attack or defend when the war started. I beleieve that this was the greatest Soviet error of WW II; Stalin's misreading of the situation before Barbarossa in such a way that he rendered the Soviet Army completely useless when it was most needed.

Dean.

Oh, and Suvorov was wrong.

Stalin did not want war with Germany in 1941, but I don't think you can say he didn't want war at all. He just wanted it on his terms. I think if Germany and the USSR had been able to put their partitions of the world into practice (as agreed as part of their non-agression pact) war may have been delayed for a few years but war at some point would almost certainly have happened.
 
boris116 said:
Dean,

how would you explain then, why so many Soviet troops have been concentrated on the Soviet-German border? And it was there they were obliterated in the first days of the war.

They were close to the border for two reasons. First of all, Stalin did know that Hitler had started wars, and for that reason, many units were quite close to the border. On the other hand, all of those units had very strict order not to do anything that could be remotely considered an aggressive move, right up to building defensive bunkers. The second reason was that at the time in Europe, this was standard practice. The idea of defence in depth was well known, but almost never practiced, and this meant that forces were generally stationed close to the borders that they would protect. If you look at Belgium and France, they had the same policy, and even today, parts of Verdun in France and Eben Emael in Belgium are military bases. Both are right up against the German border. I guess old memories die hard.
Stalin did indeed move some units close to the border, the bulk of his forces were farther back, and because those that were close to the border were unable to propare in any way for the invasion, (in spite of the thousands of warnings), they were slaughtered, surrounded, outmanuvered and taken prisoner in absolutely staggering numbers. IIRC, only one division was able to mount an effective defensive battle, and it was because the divisional commander had disobeyed the pre-war orders.

boris116 said:
If Stalin has trusted Hitler so much, why he kept these troops there and didn't move them farther East?

It served no purpose to do so. If you look at the population map of the USSR, you will see that the vast majority of people lived in the cities in European Russia and the Ukraine. He stationed his troops to defend the borders and to support civil authorities in the case of other "troubles."
The really strange dichotomy that you have to keep in mind is that Stalin was probably the most paranoid person in the world, more so than Hitler. The fact that he put so much weight on the piece of paper called the non-aggression pact remains one of the strangest mysteries about the man.

boris116 said:
One of the units in Odessa Military district was a Mountain division. Where are the mountains Southern Ukraine?

I can't comment on this, as I really have no idea. I never heard about this.

boris116 said:
Why did the Soviet Army had several Airborne divisions?

I think they had them for the same reason that they had maritime infantry (marines) They had them because others had them. However, you may hae alluded to the answer to one of your own questions: None of the units we have mentioned were ever used effectively during the entire war. I cannot think of one example when a Soviet Airborne Division dropped into combat, and I can only think of one time when their marines were used in anything resembling an amphibious role. (Sebastopol and the Crimea) Shock, guards, tank and infantry divisions and armies were often intermixed and they were all used in the same role. So that mountain division may not have actually been trained in the mountain fighting role, and they may have been there because it was convenient.

boris116 said:
There are so many unanswered questions about Soviet plans and intentions that everybody can make a guess.

Very very true. In addition, many of the plans and orders that have been clearly shown to be blindingly stupid were destroyed so as not to impugn the reputation of the great leader....

boris116 said:
These plans are still classified. I am not sure that Suvorov is wrong. Or right. I just believe that with Stalin everything was possible.

Yes it was, but I believe that Stalin made the major decisions about the deployments of the Soviet army at the time. Afterwards, in order to deflect possible criticism, history was re-written, (try to find out details of Operation Mars) and Suvorov then went on to try to justify that re-writing. Remember what happened to "the hero of Stalingrad" who was rewarded with internal deportation for his loyalty. (sorry, the name escapes me... memory cramp. I'll edit when I remember) Suvorov also knew that when the war was over, his own position was less than assured. So let me re-state that: Suvorov was wrong. But he knew it.

Dean.
 
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[Dean/quote]They were close to the border for two reasons. First of all, Stalin did know that Hitler had started wars, and for that reason, many units were quite close to the border. On the other hand, all of those units had very strict order not to do anything that could be remotely considered an aggressive move, right up to building defensive bunkers. [/quote]

It's a plausible explanation. However, there could be others, no less plausible. Why the fortifications on the old border have been abandoned?
A new ones have been started(contrary to your statement!), but were not ready yet. Sure, everything could be explained by the Stalin's fobias, but he could not have been wrong on everything.


[Dean/quote]I think they had them for the same reason that they had maritime infantry (marines) They had them because others had them. However, you may hae alluded to the answer to one of your own questions: None of the units we have mentioned were ever used effectively during the entire war. I cannot think of one example when a Soviet Airborne Division dropped into combat, and I can only think of one time when their marines were used in anything resembling an amphibious role. (Sebastopol and the Crimea) Shock, guards, tank and infantry divisions and armies were often intermixed and they were all used in the same role. So that mountain division may not have actually been trained in the mountain fighting role, and they may have been there because it was convenient.[/quote]


I have done a little mountain climbing myself, so I was familiar with the history of the mountain troops in the USSR. I am old enough even to climb with former vets who have fought in the Caucasus.

Their story is similar to the one of the paratroopers and the marines - the Soviet Union has spent a lot of resources before the war to create, train and expand these specialised troops - to completely abandon them, more precisely, degrade them to the common infantry when the war has started.
Before the war, the Soviet platoons and companies have ascented Mt. Elbrus (5642 m) with their rifles and machine guns. Since 1930s and up to the 1991, the mountain climbing has been considered as as a military-related sport and the alpine instructors had a right to leave their workplaces in the factories and design bureas for all summer for a state duty - train new mountaineers.
However, when the war has started it was completely different war - not the one all these paratroopers and climbers have been preparing to.
Instead of Blitzkrieg to the West, the Soviets have been Blitkrieged themselves.
And when the German Alpine division "Edelwaiss" had blocked the passes over the Caucasus in 1942 there were no mountain troops to stop them.
The Soviet Army had to recall all people from the other fronts who had any climbing experience and rush them to Caucasus




[Dean/quote]
Yes it was, but I believe that Stalin made the major decisions about the deployments of the Soviet army at the time. Afterwards, in order to deflect possible criticism, history was re-written, and Suvorov then went on to try to justify that re-writing. Remember what happened to "the hero of Stalingrad" who was rewarded with internal deportation for his loyalty. (sorry, the name escapes me... memory cramp. I'll edit when I remember) Suvorov also knew that when the war was over, his own position was less than assured. So let me re-state that: Suvorov was wrong. But he knew it.

Dean.[/quote]

I am not sure, what you have meant about Suvorov - he was born after the war.
 
[Dean/quote]They were close to the border for two reasons. First of all, Stalin did know that Hitler had started wars, and for that reason, many units were quite close to the border. On the other hand, all of those units had very strict order not to do anything that could be remotely considered an aggressive move, right up to building defensive bunkers. [/quote]

It's a plausible explanation. However, there could be others, no less plausible. Why the fortifications on the old border have been abandoned?
A new ones have been started(contrary to your statement!), but were not ready yet. Sure, everything could be explained by the Stalin's fobias, but he could not have been wrong on everything.

I did say that some units did prepare themselves, and these may be the fortifications to which you are referring. But I know that I am correct in stating that the vast majority of the Soviet Army was completely unprepared for Barbarossa. One of the Soviet Army's great strengths has been it's engineers. they have always been good, and I am sure that they realized that the frotifications facing Poland were next to useless. So I am also sure they decided to replace a lot of them... when Stalin allowed it. How many were replaced? Not a whole lot.

[Dean/quote]I think they had them for the same reason that they had maritime infantry (marines) They had them because others had them. However, you may hae alluded to the answer to one of your own questions: None of the units we have mentioned were ever used effectively during the entire war. I cannot think of one example when a Soviet Airborne Division dropped into combat, and I can only think of one time when their marines were used in anything resembling an amphibious role. (Sebastopol and the Crimea) Shock, guards, tank and infantry divisions and armies were often intermixed and they were all used in the same role. So that mountain division may not have actually been trained in the mountain fighting role, and they may have been there because it was convenient.[/quote]


I have done a little mountain climbing myself, so I was familiar with the history of the mountain troops in the USSR. I am old enough even to climb with former vets who have fought in the Caucasus.

So have I.

Their story is similar to the one of the paratroopers and the marines - the Soviet Union has spent a lot of resources before the war to create, train and expand these specialised troops - to completely abandon them, more precisely, degrade them to the common infantry when the war has started.
Before the war, the Soviet platoons and companies have ascented Mt. Elbrus (5642 m) with their rifles and machine guns. Since 1930s and up to the 1991, the mountain climbing has been considered as as a military-related sport and the alpine instructors had a right to leave their workplaces in the factories and design bureas for all summer for a state duty - train new mountaineers.
However, when the war has started it was completely different war - not the one all these paratroopers and climbers have been preparing to.
Instead of Blitzkrieg to the West, the Soviets have been Blitkrieged themselves.
And when the German Alpine division "Edelwaiss" had blocked the passes over the Caucasus in 1942 there were no mountain troops to stop them.
The Soviet Army had to recall all people from the other fronts who had any climbing experience and rush them to Caucasus


Sad, wasn't it... Unfortunately, that waste was quite typical of the times...

[Dean/quote]
Yes it was, but I believe that Stalin made the major decisions about the deployments of the Soviet army at the time. Afterwards, in order to deflect possible criticism, history was re-written, and Suvorov then went on to try to justify that re-writing. Remember what happened to "the hero of Stalingrad" who was rewarded with internal deportation for his loyalty. (sorry, the name escapes me... memory cramp. I'll edit when I remember) Suvorov also knew that when the war was over, his own position was less than assured. So let me re-state that: Suvorov was wrong. But he knew it.

[/quote]

I am not sure, what you have meant about Suvorov - he was born after the war.[/QUOTE]

I was referring to the GRU chap whom you quoted earlier on in this thread.

Just out of curiosity Boris, Where in Russia are you from?

Dean.
 
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