WWII's Top Mistakes - U.S.A.

[Ted]

Because I am at work enjoying this here forum I can't give the title and author of a book which goes into detail about tank warfare in Normandy. It's a book which uses extensive eye witness stories of both allied and axis troops.
Two stories are from English and German troopers relating the superiority of the German tanks. If somebody is interested I'll put the ISBN number, title etc on the forum. I recommend it to anybody who's interested in teh Normandy campaign.

 

[LeEnfield]

What puzzles me is that with all this fighting going on all over the world America had done so little to rearm in case it was attacked.

 

[Ollie Garchy]

After reading some of the answers to the question, and being in agreement with most of them, I think it is time to give the problem a little twist and some spice. Did American industrial production give the United States government and military a "get out of jail free card". That is, did industrial output minimize serious mistakes that would have crippled other states?

Here are a few examples:

(A) Think about the P-51. The German fighter pilot Adolf Galland in his memoirs agreed that the plane led directly to the defeat of the Luftwaffe, but mainly because (1) the quality of German pilots deteriorated owing to losses against the bomber fleets and in Russia, (2) Hitler and Goering refused to expand the fighter arm until far too late, (3) the German manufacturers experimented with too many designs instead of concentrating on the FW-190, and (4) the Allies completely outnumbered the Germans. If Galland's points were valid, it appears that the P-51's success (or the Spitfire or any other fighter) was guaranteed. Galland tried to pressure Goering into authorizing higher fighter production in 1940. The British in fact surpassed German aircraft production levels in that year. The P-51 was "doomed" to succeed. (sort of like the entire Allied war effort).

(B) WWII American tactics and ground force weapons systems were poor. Think about the MG-42 or "Panther" or nearly all German equipment in relation to that of their American enemy. Van Creveld's work in comparing the American and German military systems demonstrates the American deficiencies. The list of American/ British mistakes on the western front is also quite long. Think about the many operations aimed at breaking out of Normandy, why they failed, and why the Allies ultimately broke the back of the German military. The answer is simple. Given enough time, the attrition rate doomed the German military. Numbers counted far more than quality. [The same is true of all Allied encounters against German troops]. It is self-serving to argue that victory meant fighting excellence. American strategists, industrialists and workers won the war...the generals were incompetent and the GIs nothing more than cannon fodder.

My hypothesis: The United States policymakers and military leaders, despite many small weapons procurement errors and grotesque tactical or operational mistakes, were able to wield an industrial sledgehammer that shattered Hitler's empire. How much this superiority was caused by (1) an equally grotesque German industrial policy or (2) eastern front operations is the issue to answer...but not whether the American military was actually a highly skilled fighting force during the period under question.

One more point: When discussing the abilities of the various military organizations of WWII, it is amazing how much (1) the outcome of the battle or (2) bias influences our decisions. The Soviet forces, for example, lost far more troops at Stalingrad (1942-43) and Berlin (1945) than Germany, yet historians often applaud Soviet fighting skill instead of addressing their infantile and shockingly crude horde tactics. Second, the British army was totally routed in France (1940) yet historians sometimes celebrate Dunkirk like a victory. Third, the Americans (and this is important) could not encircle and destroy the remnants of OB West after the Germans desperately broke out of the Falaise pocket and retreated by foot in the direction of the German border. This is the most serious indictment of any military that I can think of. Either the Germans, who restored a defensive line in France/Belgium/Netherlands, were the best fighting force on a level never before seen in the annals of human history, or the Americans were just plain green, inexperienced or stupid. I prefer the latter argument.

Ollie Garchy

 

[LeEnfield]

Nice peice Ollie with some interesting questions. Now with time pressing I will just pick out a couple bits to write on. Dunkirk....was not classed as a victory but more as a deliverance, I think if you read Churchill's books even he said it was defeat, and should not be thought of as a victory. Now why was Britain defeated in France, well with the all the other armies falling back the the British had fall back as well or be cut off. Now I am not saying that we were well enough equipped to take on the Germans we were not, the Artillery was to small and there was not enough of it. The tanks were well armoured but under gunned and again we did not have enough to make any difference. Britain had not gone in for rearmament in case it set of an even larger arms race and our forces paid the price for this for years to come.
Yes the Russian tactic's were crude they had millions of men that they just threw at a problem and over run the Germans by a sheer weight numbers. If a Russian soldier retreated then he was made to lead the attack to retake the position, which soon got around that that you fight and die were you are. Many of the Russian troops that were captured by the Germans and managed to survive their time as slave labour were sent of to the Gulags when they got home for surrendering in the first place.
The P51 fighter was made to British requirements before America was in the War and America did not want the plane at first as they wanted mainly plane with a radial engine. Mind you they helped then selfs to the first few hundred P51 that came of the production that Britain had already paid for. The P51 did not become a war winner until the RAF fitted a few of them with the Merlin Engine, then it was in a class of it's own. The Merlin increase it's range, improved it's speed and operational ceiling.

 

[Doppleganger]

After reading some of the answers to the question, and being in agreement with most of them, I think it is time to give the problem a little twist and some spice. Did American industrial production give the United States government and military a "get out of jail free card". That is, did industrial output minimize serious mistakes that would have crippled other states?

Well in a word, yes. One obvious example is the M-4 Sherman tank. Servicable to begin with, it gradually become further and further outclassed as the war went on. One only has to look at the accepted tactics of both the British and American armoured formations when fighting German panzer units. Up to 6 Shermans were often needed to deal with a single Panther or Tiger, with several Shermans as bait while the rest attempted to get round to the rear of the German tank where the armour was obviously thinner. Although this tactic often resulted in the German tank being knocked out, it came at the expense of several of the Shermans. This tactic was only possible because of:

1) The mobility of the Sherman (one of the few good things about it)
2) The ability of the Allies, in particular the US, to churn out thousands of them
3) The logistical ability of the US forces in general

The fact that the Western Allies had virtual Air Supremacy for long periods, partly as as result of German mistakes and most certainly as a result of US industrial might being applied, also was a major factor in Western Allied success.

So to paraphrase what you said, yes the Sherman was "doomed" to succeed. Compared to the later German tanks it was poor but it didn't matter. Rather like say a human can kill many wasps before succuming to the accumalation of stings so thousands of Shermans could be knocked out but that the end result would be that there would still be more Shermans than Panthers or Tigers left operational on the battlefield.

Coming back to your comment regarding the outcome of battles it's a truism that the victor writes history. Anyone delving deeper into the actual details will see that the Western Allies fought a shell of the Wehrmacht that had marched into Russia 3 years earlier. Mainly because the Wehrmacht facing the Western Allies at this time had:

1) Very little air support
2) Very poor mobility due to lack of fuel and a deeper problem regarding the mechanisation, or lack thereof, of panzergrenadier formations
3) Combat replacements usually comprising green troops who sometimes had as little as one weeks basic training, ex training personnel, men who previously were deemed too young or too old for service, men previously deemed unfit for military service and ex Luftwaffe pilots who no longer had planes to fly

Given the above its clear that the Wehrmacht was an army whose combat abilities were in serious decline.

This was no fault of the Western Allies though and they fought what was in front of them. However, any achievements lauded upon US and UK commanders need to take all the facts into consideration. US servicemen had on average about 6 months basic training before being assigned to combat units and whilst I don't quite agree that their performance was as bad as Ollie is suggesting it's definately true that their advantages in logistics, industrial output and air cover did save them from what otherwise might have been humiliating reverses.

 

[Ollie Garchy]

This was no fault of the Western Allies though and they fought what was in front of them. However, any achievements lauded upon US and UK commanders need to take all the facts into consideration. US servicemen had on average about 6 months basic training before being assigned to combat units and whilst I don't quite agree that their performance was as bad as Ollie is suggesting it's definately true that their advantages in logistics, industrial output and air cover did save them from what otherwise might have been humiliating reverses.

Hey Doppleganger, it was not my intention to write such a tasty post. I started out with the desire for something "spicy" and then dumped too much on the subject.

I accept that the western Allies raised formations capable of "handling" the finest German divisions on occasion. The Canadian 3rd Division, for example, blunted the 12th SS drive at the outset of the campaign. The Canadian penetration and holding action owed more to their skill and courage than just a successful industrial policy or even air cover. The ground forces performed well. The same can be said of the American and British soldier.

Now, things change when evaluating the skills and capabilities of those "in charge". My post was intended to raise the possibility that external factors lessened the seriousness of Allied operational errors...errors that complicate the evaluation of military performance.

I will write more at a later date,

Ollie Garchy

 

[redcoat]

A) Think about the P-51. The German fighter pilot Adolf Galland in his memoirs agreed that the plane led directly to the defeat of the Luftwaffe, but mainly because (1) the quality of German pilots deteriorated owing to losses against the bomber fleets and in Russia, (2) Hitler and Goering refused to expand the fighter arm until far too late, (3) the German manufacturers experimented with too many designs instead of concentrating on the FW-190, and (4) the Allies completely outnumbered the Germans. If Galland's points were valid, it appears that the P-51's success (or the Spitfire or any other fighter) was guaranteed. Galland tried to pressure Goering into authorizing higher fighter production in 1940. The British in fact surpassed German aircraft production levels in that year. The P-51 was "doomed" to succeed. (sort of like the entire Allied war effort).

valid points, I agree with most of it.

(B) WWII American tactics and ground force weapons systems were poor. Think about the MG-42 or "Panther" or nearly all German equipment in relation to that of their American enemy. Van Creveld's work in comparing the American and German military systems demonstrates the American deficiencies. The list of American/ British mistakes on the western front is also quite long. Think about the many operations aimed at breaking out of Normandy, why they failed, and why the Allies ultimately broke the back of the German military. The answer is simple. Given enough time, the attrition rate doomed the German military. Numbers counted far more than quality. [The same is true of all Allied encounters against German troops]. It is self-serving to argue that victory meant fighting excellence. American strategists, industrialists and workers won the war...the generals were incompetent and the GIs nothing more than cannon fodder.

I agree with most of it, apart from the last line.. While on a tactical level the german units fought well, the performance of the german generals was shockingly bad. it was they who were forced to use German soldiers as cannon fodder in an effort to counter allied superiority in material*. Throughout the campaign it was they who were forced to react to Allied moves, they never once gained the initiative.
In the end the Germans spirited defence only lead to the destruction of their army.

*Even during Operation Goodwood the battle cost the Germans more in casualties than the allies, nearly 6000 compared to 4000 allied casualties

 

[Ollie Garchy]

"I agree with most of it, apart from the last line.. While on a tactical level the german units fought well, the performance of the german generals was shockingly bad. it was they who were forced to use German soldiers as cannon fodder in an effort to counter allied superiority in material*. Throughout the campaign it was they who were forced to react to Allied moves, they never once gained the initiative.
In the end the Germans spirited defence only lead to the destruction of their army.

*Even during Operation Goodwood the battle cost the Germans more in casualties than the allies, nearly 6000 compared to 4000 allied casualties

(1) The conventional argument is that German generals really only performed poorly on the strategic level. In terms of the tactical or operational levels, the old Prussian general staff system still pumped out the best.

(2) According to Creveld, the casualty ratio was between 1.2-1.4:1 against the western Allies. This ratio has come under considerable fire by critics, but I am unsure of alternatives. Know any?

(3) Normandy was a strange affair. I watched a few of the "Band of Brothers" films a few years ago. I got the impression that the German troops were great at getting "wacked". Dudes who ran around in random fashion like decapitated chickens until they were put out their misery. This does not accord with my own reading of the subject. In any case, it seems reasonable to argue that the men on both sides got "wacked". The only way that you can account for the higher German losses, since theory dictates a minimal superiority of 3:1 for a successful offensive and about the same in acceptable losses, is to argue (1) the Germans were actually decapitated chickens, (2) lots of prisoners were taken, (3) lots of prisoners were shot, or (4) your stats are wrong and Creveld's are right.

(4) Being on the defensive is not necessarily a bad thing. I agree with Clausewitz concerning the superiority of the defensive. The German problem in 1944 related to insufficient reserves and this problem goes back to a miserable industrial policy that failed to utilize the world's largest machine-tool capacities. And this problem can be attributed to the insane level of corruption in Nazi-Germany. (While the taxation level for American industrialists increased to help pay for the war effort, it actually shrank to zero in Germany during the war. Krupp & Co. paid nothing. Ole' Fritz or Hans, on the hand, saw his taxes rise astronomically. The average German was expected to pay for raw materials, build the armaments and die in battle! This was NOT the Prussian way. This was the Hitler way. Total war in Germany was only "total" for the masses. That is, you got "totally screwed". Now forget about the Holocaust for a moment. If I had lived during the war and my taxes were increased to about 8x pre-Hitler levels, I'd get my gun and bring down the government. It tells you something about the average "Hans" in Germany during that period. A German Chomsky (provided he did not end up in Dachau) would have helped).

Ollie Garchy

 

[Damien435]

Ollie, I think you fail to take into account WWI, the Great Depression and the subsequent increase in the German economy following Hitler's rise to power when you say that you would not stand to pay 8x the amount of taxes to pay for the war effort. Your nation went from the most powerful on Continental Europe, down to the poorest nation which was occupied for an enemy Army, and then you had a chance to become the most powerful again and get back some of that Prussian pride you keep touting. Are you seriously going to try and tell me you would shout for Hitler's head on a pike after he had made you great again?

 

[Ollie Garchy]

Ollie, I think you fail to take into account WWI, the Great Depression and the subsequent increase in the German economy following Hitler's rise to power when you say that you would not stand to pay 8x the amount of taxes to pay for the war effort. Your nation went from the most powerful on Continental Europe, down to the poorest nation which was occupied for an enemy Army, and then you had a chance to become the most powerful again and get back some of that Prussian pride you keep touting. Are you seriously going to try and tell me you would shout for Hitler's head on a pike after he had made you great again?

How do I respond to this view? Well, I will try:

(1) Take a look at the economic statistics of Germany/France/Britain for the period under question. You will notice that Germany was hardly the poorest nation in Europe. You are joking, arn't you?

(2) Hitler's economic policies during the 1930s were a continuation of the projects developed in Weimar. Like the Autobahnen, they aimed at developing the civilian infrastructure. Nazi policies did not make Germany great. In any case, Marshall in 1947 (as Secretary of State) built the Marshal Plan on German industrial productivity with the United States supplying the capital for the acquisition of raw materials. This hypothesis replaced the earlier model during the 1980s and is now the standard interpretation. Germany never lost the position of industrial dominance after 1918, 1929 or 1945. The State Department (if you look at the Foreign Relations series) points this out clearly.

(3) Hitler's weapons procurement policy was the primary reason why Germany lost WWII. I have written other posts addressing this subject.

(4) The "8x" number explains the increase that the German people paid. The industrialist tax rate however fell to zero. If the major corporations and large firms had paid their fair share, instead of nothing, then the German people would not have been "screwed" to the same degree.

(5) I do not tout Prussian pride. The Prussians developed the world's first general staff and was then copied by other countries 100 years later. (see Peter Paret) The Prussian university model became the standard copied by the United States (see Peter Novick). Industrialization kicked off an intense boom in science and university activities in Prussia/Germany (see Modris Ecksteins). These developments help explain how WWI/WWII happened and influenced the nature of combat. They are facts. (I do, however, have a strong liking for the work of Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, Moltke, Seeckt, Guderian and Manstein. Their work was modern or even revolutionary. The modern American military would agree. They do not however tout Prussian pride...they recognize the work.)

(6) Hitler did not make Germany great. Far from it. He destroyed Germany and left a raped corpse behind. Any half-assed conservative would have done a better job...without killing hundreds of thousands of oppositional Germans and millions of innocent civilians. Stresemann during the 1920s is the best example here. The man however died of a heart-attack, being totally obese, and left the cons waffling about trying to find a leader strong enough to protect Germany from the communists and nazis. Imagine a communist Germany in 1933. The world would be different today. We would either be singing praises to Marx and Engels or slowly dying in a Gulag in northern Canada or Norway.

 

[Damien435]

Looking back it is very easy for you to say that the Weimar Republic set the stage and Hitler just following their plans, but to the average German at this they viewed the Weimar Republic as a total failure, then this man came along speaking of greatness for the German people once more and he played the race card, anti-semitism was present the world wide, which led to him taking over the government of Germany even after a failed coup. Hitler, in the eyes of the average German at this time, had rebuilt the military, economy and industry of Germany, it was Hitler who built the autobahn and it was Hitler who sent Germany troops into the Rhine, Austria, Czeckloslovakia, Polond and the Balkans, in the eyes of the average German Hitler had erased the shame that followed Versailles. This is what they saw.

Personally, I think you have read way too many books about this subject and need to "dumb it down" a little. Look at this from the perspective of the average German who did not have near the resources you do and you can see why Hitler was seen as such a great leader to the Germans. Germany may not have had the poortest economy in Europe during the 20's, but so much was going to France and Britain that they might as well have. Hitler made Germany arguably the most powerful nation in the world, however briefly, during his tenure as "Der Fuhrer."

 

[perseus]

According to Creveld, the casualty ratio was between 1.2-1.4:1 against the western Allies. This ratio has come under considerable fire by critics, but I am unsure of alternatives. Know any?

On a man for man basis the German ground soldier consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50% higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. That is when they were attacking or defending, when they had a numerical superiority or when they were outnumbered when they had air superiority and not when they did not, when they won and when they lost. From a detailed analysis of WW2 by Trevor Dupoy (American Colonel) from Overlord, Max Hastings

(note : this applies to all battlefields not just Normandy)

 

[Reiben]

(B) WWII American tactics and ground force weapons systems were poor. Think about the MG-42 or "Panther" or nearly all German equipment in relation to that of their American enemy.

It is easy to generalise about equipment.

Some American was of superior quality to the German weapons. The main infantry weapon is the rifle. The Americans had the garand, which is a semi-automatic rifle. The Germans had the the Kar98, which is bolt action. Comparing standard infantry soldier to soldier, one armed with the M1 garand had greater fire power.

The M1 carbine was a good weapon too.

The Browning Model 1919 machine gun (30cal) was an excellent weapon, as was the M2 machine gun (50cal). Both weapons had extensive service after WW2.

The BAR was a good weapon too rugged and reliable but with a small magazine.

M1911 pistol was another excellent weapon, used long after WW2. Its still used today.

I have to agree I would rather be in a Panther than in a Sherman.

 

[perseus]

Ollie, whilst I generally agree with your thesis regarding the poorer quality of allied field command and troops, compared with German this does not do some of them fair justice.

Second, the British army was totally routed in France (1940) yet historians sometimes celebrate Dunkirk like a victory.

Are you referring to the planned strategic withdrawal of the allies to lure the Germans across the channel and infiltrate the French behind the lines? :wink:

More seriously, whilst your statement may be generally true, perhaps it is somewhat misleading since the British and some strong French divisions were outflanked by more powerful German forces which attacked at weaker points in the French sector. In fact the British were ranked as highly competent in Defence by Hitler himself.

Third, the Americans (and this is important) could not encircle and destroy the remnants of OB West after the Germans desperately broke out of the Falaise pocket and retreated by foot in the direction of the German border.

I thought that Bradley agreed with Montgomery and Eisenhower that the Americans would stop at an agreed line, and leave the British, Canadians and Poles advancing from the North to plug the gap?

 

[Reiben]

(1) the quality of German pilots deteriorated owing to losses against the bomber fleets and in Russia

This a case of poor German management compared to the western allies, as well as allied numbers. The Germans let their "experts" fly on, whilst being skilled pilots they flew on with some amassing huge scores, but inevitably becoming tired. I am sure battle stress played a part. There is still some debate about the size of German scores on the eastern front, due to over claiming, but they were certainly high.

Britain and America set tours of duty. Reducing the possibility of battle tiredness and helping those with experience pass on their knowledge.

 

[poacher63]

Are you prepared for total war? That was what goebbels minister for propaganda asked the German people. The unaquivicle answer is no, this is where the problems lie with Germany's defeat not in one but two world wars. Modern wars are not just fought effectively by the professional warriors but by he who understands what industrialy and strategically must be done and in what time frame. It is also on a political level where alliances are made. And even if i do not agree on much of what you say of Britains performance in both these wars(Which i wholeheartedly do not agree with!) The one thing that all the books tell you about both wars are on a Strategic/political level Britain was without a doubt far ahead of most of the Allies,from the necessity of making sure it secured the most powerful nation in the worlds support,mobilising more of its population in support and fighting the war. And whats more to boot it helped defeat a nation that had been planning and preparing its country idealogically and militarillary for 20years. That it was able to endure to become the anvil of freedom and after only 4 years train an Army of citizen soldiers able to meet the german soldier,support the Russians and was the only Army of the war to fight it from the very beginning to the very end on all the continents of the world and yet amazingly turns out according to you lot was pretty crap! Well so be it. I just hope the next time there is a great tyrant that needs to be delt with that we're there, what iraq? no problems even though we're crap we're there!

 

[Ollie Garchy]

(1)"In fact the British were ranked as highly competent in Defence by Hitler himself".

(2) "I thought that Bradley agreed with Montgomery and Eisenhower that the Americans would stop at an agreed line, and leave the British, Canadians and Poles advancing from the North to plug the gap?"

Greetings,

The first point was of course the case. I speculate that most of the Wehrmacht establishment was truly thrilled and relieved by the events of 1940. Perseus, do you know of any works that touch on the subject of German "relief" in 1940?

The second point was made more in relation to the Falaise gap and less in regards to the breakout. Right from the start, we have the problem that the British and Canadians engaged the German armoured divisions owing to the open flat terrain around Caen. Anyway, the Canadians were ultimately in the horrible position of closing the Falaise gap. The British Second Army had the easier job of pushing the German pocket. From what I remember, a friend of mine harped on the fact that the Americans could have provided far more assistance. In any case, the decision to hold the advance was probably a catastrophic error. The complete destruction of OB West would obviously have shortened the war. And, plainly, I cannot understand how the Germans even stabilized the region for a few months.

 

[perseus]

after the Germans desperately broke out of the Falaise pocket

Yes, sorry Ollie I wasn’t reading your post properly, you are talking about Bradley’s wider envelopment at the Seine. According to this account he largely did accomplish this, or the bits which made it that far were destroyed by air attack. However I was always under the impression that significant numbers did get back to fight another day
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/70-7_17.htm
Regarding the non-close of the Falaise gap itself most accounts suggest that the allies were not capable of putting a strong enough force there to hold the Germans, 'better a strong shoulder than a broken neck' perhaps this tells a bigger story and betrays the true relative capabilities of the forces involved. i.e. the allies were frightened of cornering a wounded animal, and preferred to pound it from afar!

 

[Ollie Garchy]

However I was always under the impression that significant numbers did get back to fight another day

So was I. Blumenson points out that the "armored divisions managed to get the infinitesimal total of 1,300 men, 24 tanks, and 60 artillery pieces of varying caliber across the Seine." [Fifth Panzer Army Report, 1650, 28 Aug, in AGp B KTB] The quality of the source tells it all. Unless he misread it, the German armies mobilized against the Allies in Normandy were effectively destroyed. I however disagree [now only in a minor sense] with his assertion that "If any part of Bradley's decision might be considered a mistake, it is only that he halted the XV Corps before it took and secured Argentan, and this in retrospect seems far less momentous than it may have seemed at the time." In any case, my dismissal of logistical realities--I now remember the reason for the slower Allied advance--is grossly wrong.

 

[Charge 7]

Yeah I know it's fftopic:

However, I just have to point out that those here who've criticised Eisenhower's tactical abilities are obviously unaware of his planning the Louisiana War Games of 1940 where his brilliance shown so clearly that General Marshall promoted him from Lt. Colonel to Brigadier General completely skipping "chicken" Colonel and made him director of all Army war plans. You don't do that unless you're very, very competent.

As for the topic, I think our biggest mistake overall was the same one the Brits, and the French made. We so wanted to avoid another devastating war like WWI that we allowed ourselves to be blinded to the growing threat until it was almost too late. I'll point out also to those who've critcised FDR for being President at the time that if there had been a Republican in office the isolationists would've had things much more their way. Who knows what the ramifications of that would've been?