WWII's Top Mistakes - Germany

[Doppleganger]

This is really what I meant. Would this not have prevented the Russian winter offensive and confidence this gave the Russians?

To some extent yes. However, the arrival of Siberian divisions in the Moscow region were not a critical factor in why Typhoon failed, although undoubtedly they did assist in making the Soviet counter-offensive more effective (at one point Army Group Centre was in danger of envelopment). In any case the critical factors as to why Typhoon failed to capture Moscow were mainly German in origin, with perhaps the two most important factors being that they:

1) Completely underestimated the amount of armies that the Soviet Union could put in the field and

2) Completely underestimated and miscalculated the courage, tenacity and above all will of the average Red Army soldier to fight for the Soviet regime.

 

[godofthunder9010]

Battlefield: Hitler was the greatest asset and greatest detriment to the Third Reich. It was his open minded nature that led to the creation of the Panzergruppen, the Luftwaffe and the advocation of "nontraditional/unconventional" tactics for both being adopted. He directly caused all of the following:
1.) Germany's failure to eliminate the BEF at Calais and Dunkirk when they had the opportunity. In the overall scheme of things, we're talking about a relatively small force that escaped across the English Channel, but it's destruction would have put the UK in an extremely precarious situation. Hitler might have had much greater success at persuading the Brits to withdraw from the war.
2.) Diverting the Luftwaffe from military targets to civilian targets during the Battle of Britain. The RAF was given the chance to lick their wounds and turn the tide because the Germans' focus on the RAF's elimination was prematurely cancelled as number 1 priority.
3.) Diverting Army Group Center into the Ukraine. Army Group South was not making enough progress to suit Hitler. Army Group Center was well on its way to Moscow and making stunning progress. There is little room to doubt Moscow would have fallen if they'd been allowed to continue. As it was, they abandoned all their gains toward Moscow, assisted with the Ukraine, finally resumed their original mission to take Moscow in late November and still almost succeeded.
4.) Hitler's policy of "never giving up ground" and "never surrendering." They might sound nice in a poem or film or novel, but Hitler was woefully ignorant of the fact that, a.) The modern battlefield must be fluid and the commanders must be able to make tactical retreats from time to time. b.) He had some very gifted commanders, and he was much like a three year old trying to teach Einstein about physics. Had his best commanders been given more free reign, they'd have likely been victorious in World War II. (Thank goodness the man was such a twit!!)

Non-Battlefield: I wholeheartedly agree with one Dopp said. The German economy should have been put on wartime footing much sooner. Also, I believe that the Jewish Holocaust was an immense waste of resources and one enormous shame on the history of humanity. Considering the man that Hitler was, I don’t know what could have been done to avoid it short of his removal from power. Also, the failure to capitalize on the Ukrainian people’s hatred of Stalin was just pure foolishness.

Political: 1.) Allying with Japan. This alliance had no possible means of benefiting Nazi Germany with Britain and the USSR in play. If those two powers had been overcome, Germany would have very likely gone to war with Japan anyways. 2.) Needlessly declaring war on the United States and then guaranteeing American retaliation by sending U-boat Wolfpacks to sink the US merchant marine in the Atlantic.

 

[perseus]

Fine analysis godofthunder9010 except

Political: 1.) Allying with Japan. This alliance had no possible means of benefiting Nazi Germany with Britain and the USSR in play

This is often said, but I have always found this difficult to understand since the British war was mainly a naval one and Japan had the superior navy in the world prior to Midway, and certainly far superior to Britain's. True Japan was remote from the European theater, but German ships roamed far and wide using their refueling ships until they were eventually destroyed with help of intelligence data (actually this was one innovation Britain and Japan never mastered). If there was some trust and coordination built up between the axis nations (admittedly unlikely) the French Western ports could have been used for carrier bases, and This would have also spelled the end of the battle of the Atlantic.

Simply concentrating on British possessions in the East, rather than attacking Pearl Harbour could have had Churchill sending the remainder of the elderly British battleships and outdated fleet air arm for destruction in the Indian Ocean to protect his precious India. Middle Eastern oil would then have been up for grabs for both Germany and Japan.

Of course if there was no British involvement and with the US out of the war then there wouldn't be any need for German defence or offense in the West, and no Arctic convoys or Persian route to supply Russia either. Could Russia have survived then?

 

[godofthunder9010]

Japan repeatedly showed their true colors throughout World War II. They couldn't be bothered to open a second front with the Soviet Union because they had secretly signed a treaty with the Stalin promising not to. And while they did hurt the British Empire to some degree, they were more interested in their endless quagmire in China. That and of course picking a fight with the United States. The simple facts are that only one party benefitted from their alliance and that was Japan. The manipulation of the Vichy Government of France effectively handing over French colonies to the Japanese. The diversion of US assets toward the European war with Germany. Keeping the juggernaut Red Army occupied whilst Japan turned their attentions to grapping up territory elsewhere. Japan does not seem to have ever been interested in being a productive partner in their alliance with Germany.

 

[Doppleganger]

3.) Diverting ArmyGroupCenter into the Ukraine. Army Group South was not making enough progress to suit Hitler. ArmyGroupCenter was well on its way to Moscow and making stunning progress. There is little room to doubt Moscow would have fallen if they'd been allowed to continue. As it was, they abandoned all their gains toward Moscow, assisted with the Ukraine, finally resumed their original mission to take Moscow in late November and still almost succeeded.

I know I've said this before but there was some merit in the diverting of the German schwerpunkt to Kiev away from Moscow. At that time there were 5 Soviet Armies on the right flank of Centre and at some point they had to be dealt with. Had Centre pushed towards Moscow there was a possibility of those Armies outflanking and possibly enveloping German forces pushing on to Moscow. That scenario played out would have been disasterous and therefore Hitler's decision is understandable from that point of view. It all depends on whether you believe that a) Centre was strong enough to capture Moscow before the onset of the [SIZE=-1]rasputiza[/SIZE] and that b) Army Group South would be able to keep those 5 Armies sufficiently busy, weakened as it was.

 

[zander_0633]

Well, but the Germans did capture Moscow, did they?

 

[Ollie Garchy]

Hi Guys,

The German failure to take Moscow in 1941 was utterly unimportant from the perspective of total war. The "contribution" of Germany's allies also falls into this category. Why? I say it again: WWI demonstrated to nearly everyone that industrial war potential and not just the quality of the military forces determined the outcome. Krupp or Ford were therefore more important than Manstein or Patton. Even though Hitler understood this problem to a remarkable degree, Nazi-style procurement policies failed. Why? Hitler's "Führerstaat" disrupted the German dual-use economy across the board. The Nazis forgot that economic potential has to be activated.

Here is a small list of some of the issues:

(1) Nazi/Elite Corruption: Class and party corruption was rampant in Germany. I have pointed out in other posts that tax rates for the industrialists (and party hacks) fell to zero during the war. Remember the ole' argument that the German economics minister, Hjalmar Schacht, resigned prior to the war owing to the balance of payments problem and hyper-inflation. Well, corruption was a big part of the reason. Corruption led to waste, but more importantly demonstrated an incredible lack of interest in the war effort on the part of the elite. They lived it up instead.

(2) Bureaucratic infighting: A long list of interest groups competed for resources and contracts. Companies fought against their rivals. The branches of the military fought against each other. Compounding the problems, Nazi "Gauleiter" and Göring tried to maximize their controls over industry to gain power and wealth. German industrialists quickly learned that bribes kept them independent and in production. The Nazis operated according to a loose and paradoxically democratic system that robbed Germany of centralized planning. The Germans did not have anyone the likes of General Lucius Clay. He was able to channel American productive energy and force the industrialists to concentrate on the weapons systems that the military wanted. After 1942, Albert Speer acted like Clay in many ways and demonstrated the real potential of German industry. Speer, unlike Todt, now actually had a strategic aim -- defending Germany from complete eradication.

These two structural problems hobbled the German military effort. A couple of examples:

(1) The Truly Bizarre: During the late 1930s, IG Farben decided NOT to build more oil synthesis facilities because the existing plant already satiated domestic CIVILIAN requirements. IG Farben worred about profitability. The Nazi leadership (obviously planning for some type of major conflict) let the issue ride instead of forcing IG Farben to act in accordance with their policies. Bizarre is the only appropriate descriptive term. The oil synthesis issue demonstrates how the civilian orientation of German firms helped seal Hitler's fate. The Nazis failed to understand that total war meant the total mobilization of society in pursuit of a military strategy. The Nazis only talked at length about the merits of total war. They did not really understand what total war meant. Nor did they initially have a real strategic aim.

(2) Poor Concentration: The decentralized German allocation system meant that companies competed with each other instead of joining forces and picking the best weapons systems to produce in large volume. When cooperation did happen, such as with the outdated VII U-Boat, production was extensive. As it was, the Nazis normally failed to force industrial compliance and therefore failed to generate production levels equal to the other belligerents. Examples such as Henschel's "Tiger" stand out as a classic wasted effort. All German automotive firms should have joined Daimler, MAN and Rheinmetal-Borsig such as was the case with GM, Ford, etc. in the United States. In any case, as I have pointed out, German firms were still building and exporting automobiles in 1943.


If we want to understand WWII, we have to question the effectiveness of Nazi economic policy. We have to try to understand why Germany, endowed with productive capacities as high as the United States and strengthened by the occupied territories, could not even outproduce Stalin's backward prison state. Historians normally denigrate all aspects of Nazism. Why not in this case? Is it because few people actually want to accept that Hitler's war preparations were so stupid?

Again, I want to sound tough. The Soviet Union and all their junk only looked powerful because of gross failure on the part of Hitler's Germany. The Soviet Union was in fact as weak as Hitler had originally speculated. Why did Stalin then prevail? Hitler and his idiots could not fathom how destructive their own economic policies actually were. Hitler only understood the numbers...not the substance. In a state as morally bankrupt as that of Nazi-Germany, too many people were involved in enhancing their own power. That is arrogance.

 

[perseus]

The decentralised German allocation system meant that companies competed with each other instead of joining forces and picking the best weapons systems to produce in large volume. When co-operation did happen, such as with the outdated VII U-boat, production was extensive.

This point is interesting, since British foreign policy in the late 30s was based on Germany’s growth being unsustainable. Appeasement was fostered by the belief that Georings wasteful 4 year plan would puncture Schacht’s miracle which Schacht himself believed was likely to happen in early 39. However, the military strength of Britain and France declined relative to Germany in 38-39. British industry was still working to a peacetime footing, strikes were threatened and working practices were inflexible. In fact it was political rather than military or economic tactics which won out in the early stages prior to the war due to the German acquisition of the Czech economy and their tank production. Therefore appeasement merely placed Britain and France further behind.

Once the war started Hitler’s plan was to knock out the opposition militarily before they could recover and regenerate their economies. Therefore the war was mainly dictated by the military situation early on and the economies of nations and numbers of men took over later. So the failure to defeat Russia quickly and the declaration of war on was catastrophic for Germany in the long term. It was similar in WW1.

In the later stages of the war Speers efforts at increasing economic production was judged to be astounding, especially in view of the reduced supply of raw materials and sustained bombing on German industry, so presumably he must have rectified these mistakes to some degree?

I have always believed that centralised economies using co-operation are potentially economically superior to market based ones, and indeed communist Russia and China generated rates of growth which were unheard of before and after WW2 respectively. However, why do we judge market economies superior? is it any different in war? Perhaps the success is nothing to do with competition and more to do with market economies having greater access and control over 3rd world ‘slave’ and illegal immigrant labour to maintain our lifestyle under the disguise of fair international competition. I wonder if there are any analogies to the war there?

 

[Doppleganger]

Hi Ollie.

I agree with your post but I would like to make a couple of obversations. The first being that during 1941, only the Soviet Union was actively engaged in the concept of 'total war', and out of necessity to survive. The complete upheaval of most of their industrial infrastructure gave them the opportunity to realign it for total war once it had been re-established further eastward. However, had the Wehrmacht taken Moscow and brought on a general collapse of the Soviet regime as some believe would Hitler's [SIZE=-1]lacsadasical[/SIZE] approach really have mattered? Perhaps with any future war with the USA but with Moscow captured and held through desperate Soviet counter-attacks it is possible that a lack of a German total war footing wouldn't have mattered all that much anyway.

Secondly I acknowledge your point regarding industrial war potential and generally agree with it. However, WW1 was mainly fought with forces using roughly the same military tactics and with the same general weaponry, designs like the tank not withstanding (and which had a limited effect anyway). The advent of fast moving armour, close air support, widespread use of radio, along with 'Blitzkrieg' style tactics meant that in WWII a new way of war was ushered in. The Germans made good use of these new technologies and tactics, partly as circumstances following WW1 had forced them to. They got lucky on a few occasions too but utilizing these new standards allowed them to overcome traditional military convention. The Wehrmacht never should have been so successful against the BEF and French Army but it was. Part of this was Allied dawdling and indecisiveness but the other factor was that the Germans had rediscovered the ancient art of mobility and element of surprise.

So despite Hitler's arrogance regarding the Nazi industrial footing for war, for I really think it was arrogance, Hitler was winning battle after battle and country after country. Sure he became a cropper in the Soviet Union, but you can blame a faulty, hopelessy over optimistic, racist plan for that as much as his lack of pushing Germany towards a wartime footing.

 

[godofthunder9010]

I know I've said this before but there was some merit in the diverting of the German schwerpunkt to Kiev away from Moscow. At that time there were 5 Soviet Armies on the right flank of Centre and at some point they had to be dealt with. Had Centre pushed towards Moscow there was a possibility of those Armies outflanking and possibly enveloping German forces pushing on to Moscow. That scenario played out would have been disasterous and therefore Hitler's decision is understandable from that point of view. It all depends on whether you believe that a) Centre was strong enough to capture Moscow before the onset of the [SIZE=-1]rasputiza[/SIZE] and that b) Army Group South would be able to keep those 5 Armies sufficiently busy, weakened as it was.

To some degree, I did and do see your point. But "overextending and being outflanked" were the excuses that superior commanders tried to press on Guderian in France. Oh, sure, Guderian did not head Armygroupe Center, but neither did Subedai head the armies of Batu. The era's foremost battlefield operational genius was there, I think he'd have managed to come up with something before the Russians outflanked or encircled him. And as much as they were struggling (by comparison), Armygroup South was in fact moving forwards and not backwards. In all likelihood, the Russians would have desperately recalled the bulk of those 5 armies to try to save Moscow and they'd have probably been too late. And let's not forget how completely disoriented the Red Army was at that time. The truth of the matter is, we don't know for certain if they'd have jumped at even a very obvious opportunity to encircle or flank the Germans.

You know, I think that I lost my mind and forgot to put down "Hitler Firing Guderian" as one of Germany's greatest WW2 blunders. Ooops!

 

[AussieNick]

Not taking Tobruk from the Australians. If they had taken Tobruk, it would have opened the flood gates in the Middle East. From there the Germans would have oil and a new passage to Russia. It could have meant the war went the other way.

 

[Ollie Garchy]

Not taking Tobruk from the Australians. If they had taken Tobruk, it would have opened the flood gates in the Middle East. From there the Germans would have oil and a new passage to Russia. It could have meant the war went the other way.

Tobruk fell: I would argue that Rommel was then able to work against OKW orders and press the attack on Alexandria. Had Rommel done what was expected of him, ie. build a better defensive position, no Montgomery victory at El Alamein.

"On May 26, 1942, Rommel renewed the attack, but was blocked by strong resistance and caught between two strongpoints on the Gazala Line. Living up to his nickname of the “Desert Fox,” Rommel wheeled on the British, smashed the defenders of Bir Hacheim, and took Tobruk on June 17. Rommel captured 30,000 defenders and captured the supply dump there."

http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/africa.htm

 

[Young Winston]

Attacking USSR.

 

[zander_0633]

Whoa nice!

 

[KC72]

Rommel wheeled on the British, smashed the defenders of Bir Hacheim, and took Tobruk on June 17. Rommel captured 30,000 defenders and captured the supply dump there."

Whoa boy! the French at Bit Hacheim held up the German and italian forces and Rommel eventually went around them, the French pulled out later with help from a British rifle regiment after heavy air attacks.

 

[Papashah41]

The huge mistakes began immediatly after the fall of France. Hitler should have immediatly put troops in North Africa, viz: Algeria. At the same time he should have taken the French fleet. France would have complained, but they couldn't have done anything. The next German move should have been the complete taking of North Africa, with Egypt as the prize, particularly the Suez Canal. But Hitler's only interest in the Mediterranean was Gibralter. His goals should have worried more commanders than it did. It also shows how muddled Hitler's mind was. The reason he rose no farther in rank than Corporal in the 1st WW is obvious. The man had no strategic sense. He took power because he saw not only the unfairness of the Versaille Treaty but also it's stupidity and he saw it for the black-mailing document it was. If certain allied powers were not happy with Germany's performance the treaty could be changed and the amount of reperations increased. Hitler thus had a giant axe to grind and grind it he did. His political victories were brilliant but he understood little of military things. His grasp of strategy was almost nil. A nation at war lets it's best military people plan and guide the war. They do not let their confused leader call the shots.

 

[Doppleganger]

The reason he rose no farther in rank than Corporal in the 1st WW is obvious. the man had no strategic sense. His political victories were brilliant but he understood little of military things. His grasp of strategy was almost nil.

On the contrary, Hitler had a good deal of strategic sense, IMO. He demonstrated in WW2 that he had a firm grasp of German military strategy as laid down by Scharnhorst. Clausewitz etc, by attempting to destroy enemy armies in the field first, seizing economic and industrial targets second and leaving the capture of prestige targets third. His decision in July 1941 to target Kiev, and the vast Soviet armies that lay on Army Group Centre's right flank, was military sound. Not dealing with this threat might have seen the encirclement of Army Group Centre before it even got close to Moscow.

The problem with Hitler was his racial delusions, certain aspects of his personality, his attempt to micromanage the German Army after 1941 and his gradual onset of Parkinson's Disease, not his strategic sense, which was very good.

 

[errol]

On the contrary, Hitler had a good deal of strategic sense, IMO. He demonstrated in WW2 that he had a firm grasp of German military strategy as laid down by Scharnhorst. Clausewitz etc, by attempting to destroy enemy armies in the field first, seizing economic and industrial targets second and leaving the capture of prestige targets third. His decision in July 1941 to target Kiev, and the vast Soviet armies that lay on Army Group Centre's right flank, was military sound. Not dealing with this threat might have seen the encirclement of Army Group Centre before it even got close to Moscow.

The problem with Hitler was his racial delusions, certain aspects of his personality, his attempt to micromanage the German Army after 1941 and his gradual onset of Parkinson's Disease, not his strategic sense, which was very good.

I always believed that attacking Kiev was a terrible blunder as it cost Bock precious time and resources before the Russian winter to attack and take Moscow. Kiev never seemed a good idea to me but I do see your point Doppleganger.

Do you think Hitler was overconcerned about being outflanked by the Russians? Were the Russians at that stage of the war really able to achieve effective counter-attacks into the flanks of Army Group Centre?

Guderian, I believe, wanted to keep pushing straight for Moscow. He was convinced it was the best thing to do with the time available, the disarray of the Russian forces and the Russian winter approaching.

I have my doubts about Hitler's strategic sense. If this was one of his great points, why didn't he pour more resources into the Middle East campaign, take Cairo and eventually all of Palestine, before charging into Russia? I feel that Hitler, too often, thought tactically, and even then stuffed things up by meddling in German High Command decisions and eventually taking away there operational decision making completely.

 

[Doppleganger]

I always believed that attacking Kiev was a terrible blunder as it cost Bock precious time and resources before the Russian winter to attack and take Moscow. Kiev never seemed a good idea to me but I do see your point Doppleganger.

Well it was either Kiev or Moscow but Hitler chose Kiev and then was persuaded by his generals to gamble for Moscow. Hitler possibly wanted to wait until 1942 before driving for Moscow which wasn't a bad idea under the circumstances.

Do you think Hitler was overconcerned about being outflanked by the Russians? Were the Russians at that stage of the war really able to achieve effective counter-attacks into the flanks of Army Group Centre?

Yes he was concerned about being outflanked; anyone with military training would have been concerned. The Russians were very much capable of counter-attacking if they were given the time and space to attack. Leaving 5 Soviet Armies on your right flank and merely employing a screening flank guard might have been tantamount to disaster. Army Group South could not have done much more than check their advance southwards - northwards there would have only been one army, probably 2nd Army, to guard the entire right flank of Centre.

Guderian, I believe, wanted to keep pushing straight for Moscow. He was convinced it was the best thing to do with the time available, the disarray of the Russian forces and the Russian winter approaching.

Guderian wanted to drive to Moscow before Kiev and felt that Kiev critically delayed his advance, which it did. Guderian was a gambler though and perhaps he was right. Perhaps a rapid thrust to Moscow would have been successful. But it would have been a big gamble...

I have my doubts about Hitler's strategic sense. If this was one of his great points, why didn't he pour more resources into the Middle East campaign, take Cairo and eventually all of Palestine, before charging into Russia? I feel that Hitler, too often, thought tactically, and even then stuffed things up by meddling in German High Command decisions and eventually taking away there operational decision making completely.

Hitler's racial delusions and aspects of his personality such as overconfidence overrode his good strategic sense. I'm not saying Hitler was a strategic genius - he most certainly was not - but he wasn't an idiot either. The meddling in the German High Command decision making only began after 1941 and steadily got worse; before that Hitler gave his more aggressive Generals (Guderian, Rommel, Hoth etc) a lot of latitude.

 

[Papashah41]

On the contrary, Hitler had a good deal of strategic sense, IMO. He demonstrated in WW2 that he had a firm grasp of German military strategy as laid down by Scharnhorst. Clausewitz etc, by attempting to destroy enemy armies in the field first, seizing economic and industrial targets second and leaving the capture of prestige targets third. His decision in July 1941 to target Kiev, and the vast Soviet armies that lay on Army Group Centre's right flank, was military sound. Not dealing with this threat might have seen the encirclement of Army Group Centre before it even got close to Moscow.

The problem with Hitler was his racial delusions, certain aspects of his personality, his attempt to micromanage the German Army after 1941 and his gradual onset of Parkinson's Disease, not his strategic sense, which was very good.

Really, If he had such a firm grasp on military strategy, why did he have a war going on two fronts? His attack on Russia was the death knell of the German Army, including the SS. It was also the end of The Luftwaffe. A clever conqueror strikes at his enemy at their weakest point. He doesn't butt heads with a giant. And yes, his racial nonsense was just that. Nonsense. The hundreds of thousands of wasted troops and materials, just to murder civilians he personally thought were inferior, smacks of stupidity and a very serious character flaw. I still believe his best course was through North Africa after France. That he did not see the potential just adds weight to my assessment of him. Also, Hitler threw the idea around that the Sickle Cut strategy through the Ardennes was his. It wasn't. The idea and plans came from Manstein with help from Guderian. That the Russian Campaign wasn't a repetition of the blitzkrieg campaigns in the west should have lit a firecracker off in the back of his mind. It didn't, and eventually Russia swallowed the Heer, the SS and the Luftwaffe. You say his decision to take Kiev and the vast Soviet armies on the right of army group center was sound. I say it would have been sound if he had used his armies properly. He did not. Army group North and Army group South were eventually wasted. The three groups should have been sent directly through the center. Moscow should have been taken as the same time as Kiev or at least a little later. By virtually slicing the nation in half, you have done several things. You have not only disrupted communications but because Moscow is the communication hub for the entire country you have destroyed their communications. Set up your strong defenses and choose who you should attack first. Will it be the Leningrad front or Sevastopol and the Industrial hubs in the central and Southwest. But he shouldn't have attacked Russia in the first place. Why was the T34 a surprise? Canaris should have been sacked at once, but he wasn't. For the three pronged attack attempted he did not have enough troops or Tanks or artillery or equipment. He was an Amateur.