WWII's Top Mistakes - Germany

ECONOMIC MISCALCULATION: My Two Cents (Part One)

The question sounds simple: "What were Germany's top mistakes". If we are going to understand WWII, we have to look at where it was actually fought as defined by the number of men and the volume of equipment involved. We can then focus on the important stuff like strategy, tactics, manpower and equipment. Even though German industry waged the war according to western norms, with slave labour representing a significant departure, their Soviet counterparts did not. This post concentrates on this distinction.

THE TRADITIONAL ARGUMENT:

The traditional accounts of German military-industrial output distort the course and nature of the war. A lot of ink is spilled demonstrating the economic superiority of the American-British-Soviet alliance and what might be called the German productive blunder. Other members have written enough about this point. Doppleganger writes that "[Hitler] was trying to keep German public opinion and morale high but this plan soon backfired. Hitler knew he was planning to attack the USSR. With the enormous industrial capablities of his enemies ranged against him getting German industry onto a war footing should have been a top priority". The traditional hypothesis is however a weak one.

The old "Blitzkrieg" concept has been progressively dismantled in recent years. This traditional point of view developed after 1945 for a few reasons:

(1) The victors had to account for their own overblown estimates of German rearmament during the 1930s. Since France, Britain and the Soviet Union built far more weapons on a per capita basis, the myth of Nazi rearmament needed a quick fix. Instead of thinking hard about the subject or reading German documents, the scholars came up with the morale hypothesis.

The victors should have approached the subject differently. German industrialists in fact developed the civilian infrastructure for military reasons. Working with a concept that united civilian and military industrial capacities into what we now call "dual-use" capabilities, the Nazis rightly thought that all industrial power translated into military power. German automobile output and not that of tanks boomed during the 1930s. It was still rearmament.

(2) Scholars seem to have a hard time grasping dual-use capacities. They therefore tend to emphasize the overwhelming industrial superiority of the Allies as based on weapons output. Stalin's Russia therefore seemed somehow more industrialized than Germany because his factories poured out far more weapons systems than Hitler's. Certain statistics act as significant contradictions, however. While it is true that the Allies produced more weapons than Germany, these numbers distort real industrial potential or how industries work.

WHY IT IS WRONG:

First of all, industrial might in 1941 was partly measured in terms of machine-tools (there are many others of course but machine-tools are important). In this case, the Germans had a lead. Soviet stats are hard to find and many are coloured by propaganda. These statistics reflect those found in the documents or actually within Germany in 1945. The stocks of the occupied countries (the Nazis did not move the majority of this equipment) added to these totals. German industry, bolstered by the occupied territories, had an incredibly high armaments potential.

Britain: 450,000 in 1938 (doubled by 1945)
Germany: 1,281,000 in 1938 (doubled by 1945)
USA: 942,000 in 1940 (doubled by 1945)
USSR: 44,600 through Lend-Lease
(According to USSBS. Soviet Stats left out)

On the basis of these numbers, Germany was in an excellent position to increase base capacities as well as produce vast amounts of armaments. Given enough devotion to the war effort (say Germany mobilized twice the industrial resources of the United States) Germany probably could have outproduced the Allies in terms of tanks and even aircraft.
 
ECONOMIC MISCALCULATION: My Two Cents (Part TWO)

WHY THE ALLIED ARMAMENTS SUPERIORITY?:

German, American and British policies remained similar throughout the war. They invested in industrial expansion, upgraded their facilities or replaced worn equipment. The western Allies therefore approximated their German enemies. Strategic bombing made no impact on the tools. The incediaries burned the factory walls. The equipment remained fully intact.

Historians like Richard Overy point out that the Germans had outdated production methods. Companies, he points out, did not employ the American concept of industrial fabrication. This theory is both incorrect and irrelevant. Todt and Speer pressed industrial fabrication to a certain degree. The u-boats at Blohm & Voss or the tanks at Alkett-Berlin left the dry-docks or ran off the assembly lines like the "Liberty" ships and "Shermans". The American-German differences are overblown anyway. The types of machine-tools were nearly identical. But even the traditional German methods could have generated vastly increased output. Galbraith and the boys of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey were aghast at this realization in 1945.

The western Allies directed about 40% of their economies to the war effort (the Brits are higher). The western states followed uniquely similar patterns. This meant that Germany like the Americans still produced and exported automobiles as late as 1943. Companies remained interested in keeping their civilian production lines in working order. The Germans and Americans also devoted resources to the expansion of the industrial base or other upkeep projects.

The Soviets did not. The Allied-German differences therefore stemmed from Stalin's side. They first of all mobilized over 80% of their industry and came closer to the "ideal" of total war than any other state in modern history. This "miracle" came at a high price -- a price the Germans were never willing to pay. What state could?

There is another way to think of this. The Soviets employed military formations without sufficient supply troops or ancilliaries of any kind. They had a very non-western "tooth to tail ratio". The original German infantry division followed the western pattern and had approximately 4,000 frontline troops from a total of about 12,000 (rough numbers here). The larger number handled ordnance issues, etc. The Soviets discarded this model and elevated the number of actual fighting men. This high tooth ratio was only possible in a state that did not give a rat's ass about the men. Troops without a proper supply network, or doctors, or enough food suffer tremendously. Their fighting quality, over the longer term, decreased rapidly. In 1944, the Soviets demonstrated the ability to punch huge holes into Army Group Center albeit at equally huge cost. The Germans, equipped with what we should call a modern military infrastructure, could repair damage and regroup. The Soviets could only move in spurts and failed to take real advantage of their successes. But they never could have. They could only breach the lines in the first place because of the high tooth ratio.

Why did the Germans not produce more weapons between 1933-1939 or 1939-1943? The first period is simple to explain. Hitler and his gang expended energy building up infrastructure. The Autobahnen or highways were for example built to stimulate the economy. The roads stimulated the production and purchase of cars. The boom in the automotive industry helped companies expand production facilities and generate financial reserves. This boom therefore increased military-industrial capacities.

The second part is more complicated. The early victory over France and the massive truncation of the Soviet Union played the largest role here. The Soviet Union, the only real enemy that counted after 1940, technically lost 45% of it's industrial base to the Wehrmacht assault (people, resources, energy plants, etc). The Germans for all intents and purposes defeated the Soviet military-industrial system. The German economy, on this basis, could scale down armaments output and still expect to furnish enough weapons for victory.

Why adopt this policy? Many historians or historical enthusiasts fail to realize that industrial facilities require huge investments to keep them running well. A company needs new machine-tools to replace worn equipment and new developments require refitting efforts. The Germans during the early period therefore focused on returning some semblance of peacetime levels in order to save their industry from erosion.

The Soviet Union did not. They produced arms, arms and more arms. This only sounds smart. Soviet fertilizer output fell sharply as the war industries consumed nitrogen and other resources for explosives manufacturing. Crop yields shrank. The people and soldiers starved. Labour productivity could only fall as people ran short of calories and the will to continue. Here the "Gulag" and random executions helped fortify the people's will. Stalin therefore resorted to terror as the only way of holding the line. He basically sacrificed the civilian population and devoted almost all industrial capacities and resources to the war effort.

Time played the critical role. The Soviet Union could only produce armaments for a few years without significant machine-tool replacements. (Lend-lease was not enough). But the companies producing these commodities now built weapons and were running themselves down in the process. The Soviet economy was therefore facing burnout relativley quickly. Under these conditions, the entire Soviet economy faced total breakdown. Not enough steel for the shops, not enough chemicals for explosives, not enough food for the people, etc. Given enough time, the Soviet Union faced inevitable defeat. That fortune smiled on Stalin is another matter.

The economic situation explains the nature and factors influencing the war in the east. Whereas Hitler played for time, waiting for the Soviet crash, Stalin pushed and pushed for victory. Zhukov and his associates threw away their troops in desperate gambles (Doppleganger makes this point well) and huge operations aimed at bringing the German army to battle as quickly as possible. Think about the battles near and in Berlin during 1945. No other nation could throw hundreds of thousands of their men's lives away with the morale abandon of Stalin's generals. Why? They had no alternative.

THE GREATEST ERROR:

The greatest German error, one mentioned by Hitler in his testament, was in underestimating the incredible willpower of Stalin's regime. But the Germans did not really understand what that willpower meant. They did not need to crack the Soviet Union since Stalin's economic path led to German victory anyway. The Soviets did not have economic reserves.

In military terms, Doppleganger's comments elsewhere concerning Manstein's "Backhand Blow" (instead of the 1943 Kursk offensive) are incredibly astute and important. One of the aims of Zeitzler's "Citadel" was to grind the Soviets down like Falkenhayn tried against the French at Verdun. Had the Germans followed their own doctrine (that based on Clausewitz) and the experience of WWI, they would have husbanded their forces and forced the Soviets onto the attack. The Soviets were under a tight schedule. The OKH could have retained the needed reserves to hold the line while simultaneously creating a meat-grinder for the Soviets--precisely what Hitler and Zeitzler wanted anyway. By prolonging the war, the Soviets would have fallen prey to their own economic strategy. The factories would have slowed down considerably. Normal attrition would have crippled the Red Army.
 
Excellent post Ollie.

I've often thought it a case of WW2 being a war that Germany threw away in many respects. When you touched upon the point of 'total war' and how the cost would not have been acceptable to Germany (or by inference any western nation) you hit the nail on the head. Stalin consigned millions of his comrades to death by destroying the Soviet civilian industrial infrastructure in order to wage war on a new level. Like you pointed out Stalin had no choice really. From a purely military aspect, only by sheer numbers could the Red Army hope to push back the Germans and whilst they got the job done in the end, they paid a very heavy price. In the end, the Soviet Union's ability to maintain a large strategic reserve in place was the major factor for eventual Soviet 'military' success.

Given the Soviet's desperation to evict the Nazi invader from their soil an 'elastic defence' policy (or 'defence in depth' as it is known today) would have been very productive for Germany, As it is, the Red Army lost more men and equipment in 'victory' than they did during the largely disasterous years of 41/42. This fact is lost upon almost everyone until some study is undertaken. Krivosheev's book is currently the best we have for Soviet wartime casualties and it makes horrific reading. Elastic Defence would have made those figures even worse for the Soviet Union and IMO may have brought the Red Army to its knees. Remember that by 1945 the Soviet Union was beginning to run low on manpower. This manpower, and therefore the ability to maintain a strategic reserve, was the major factor for Soviet success. Remove that and the Soviets would have been struggling.

One of the main reasons why Barbarossa failed was of the German planners viewing matters in 'Western European' terms. If one bears this in mind the objectives of Barbarossa don't seem as unrealistic as first thought. For example, German military planners assumed that Russia would have a transport system similar to other European countries. The fact that the Soviet transport system was markedly inferior immediately threw off the timetable right from the start. Hitler and his General Staff planners simply couldn't comprehend that the USSR could have stayed in the fight after the losses they suffered in the first 3 months of war. To be fair to them I very much doubt any Western Allied planners would have thought any differently.

The role of Stalin in the Great Patriotic War is also very important. Suffice to say it can be argued that the will of this one man, and the political and ideological apparatus that snaked out from him, saved a nation. Even more so than Churchill standing defiantly alone after the collapse of France, Stalin galvanised a spirit of no defeat, no surrender that was carried down to all levels of Soviet society. Stalin simply does not get enough credit for this. So while on one hand Stalin's incredible misjudgement over the intentions of Hitler almost proved his undoing, he had the spirit and mental fortitude to resist when most other men might have crumbled. Indeed, his speech at the annual celebrations of the October Revolution on November 7, 1941 was every bit as important, if not more so, than Churchill's 'the few' speech. The Russian people were fighting hard as it is, after all this was their soil they were defending. Stalin's will though, backed up by his ruthless control of the military and political mechanism, was that little bit 'extra' that meant that the Soviet Union did not collapse and would endure terrific hardships for eventual victory.
 

He who wants to defend everything defends nothing, and he who wants to be everyone's friend has no friends in the end.
- FREDERICK THE GREAT
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Well Hitler’s strategy of defending all territory removed Germanys tactical strength, and prevented the implementation of Von Mansteins strategy. If Germany hadn’t defended all territory they wouldn’t have lost so many troops, would the 6th army been totally destroyed?

Defending all territory and not being flexible was a big mistake.
 
Reiben said:


Well Hitler’s strategy of defending all territory removed Germanys tactical strength, and prevented the implementation of Von Mansteins strategy. If Germany hadn’t defended all territory they wouldn’t have lost so many troops, would the 6th army been totally destroyed?

Defending all territory and not being flexible was a big mistake.
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Well you state that the Germans lost so many troops. The fact is, compared to the Soviets their losses generally were significantly lighter. The problem though was that the Soviets could afford these losses and replace them, whereas the Germans could not. But only up until a point. What the Germans had was an opportunity to make the Soviets pay an even higher cost for their advances, an opportunity that due to Hitler's lack of ambition they spurned.

The loss of 6th Army was a situation that rapidly spiralled out of control for Germany. The quest to take and hold Stalingrad became a battle of wills between Hitler and Stalin that overrided any sensible military judgement. Thus 6th Army was fed into what amounted to a giant mincer. The flanks of 6th Army were held by Romanian and Italian Armies that lacked armour and AT guns, on terrain that did not yield any significant defensible terrain. Moreover, the extreme cold made any attempt at digging in almost impossible. The Soviets realised all this and surmised that a strong attack on the flanks would lead to their collapse and thus encirclement of 6th Army, which is precisely what happened. So a different situation mainly because on this occasion the Germans were on the offensive.

Hitler's 'standfast' orders did lead to a lack of flexibility and unnecessary losses. Some would argue that those same orders saved the Wehrmacht from rout when the Red Army counterattacked in the winter of 1941 but I don't agree with that. Manstein with his backhand tactics probably saved Army Group South from total collapse after the surrender of 6th Army in early 1943 and this is where we come to the critical juncture. Had Hitler allowed Manstein to continue to use these tactics, which amounted to Elastic Defence tactics with local counterattacks to destroy overextended Soviet advances, then Soviet losses would have been even higher than historically.

So you're correct, in a sense. But the important fact about the lack of flexibility was not that it led to more German losses than was necessary, but more that it did not lead to enough Soviet losses to bleed the Red Army white before they reached Berlin.
 
You are correct to point out that the Germans couldnt afford the loses the Russians could. The German allies where not as well equiped.

The orders issued by Hitle limited the tactics and hence room for manoeuvre the German generals had. German success im 41 and 42 did involved pincer movements. Generals such as Von Manstein wanted to use movement, rather just stubborn static defence to defeat the russians. Von Manstein eventually realised that the war in the east could not be won, but thought by using movement and effectivley bleeding the russians dry a stalement could be forced.
 
Ollie, that is a very impressive post with an incredibly interesting thesis. I have one question. Suppose the war had gone on longer. I believe that the Soviets could have converted a large part of their (wartime) ecomomy over to peacetime production and still have continued to produce enough weapons to continue the war. The points you make never touch on this. While Stalin would never have wanted to produce fewer weapons, he was a pragmatist of the highest order. Imo, he would not have risked losing the war in order to continue high weapons productions. He was obsessed with winning, and if the war had continued, I do believe that he would have re-worked his economy to support it.
I must admit however, that most people would not agree with me.

Dean.
 
Dean said:
I have one question. Suppose the war had gone on longer. I believe that the Soviets could have converted a large part of their (wartime) ecomomy over to peacetime production and still have continued to produce enough weapons to continue the war. The points you make never touch on this. While Stalin would never have wanted to produce fewer weapons, he was a pragmatist of the highest order. Imo, he would not have risked losing the war in order to continue high weapons productions. He was obsessed with winning, and if the war had continued, I do believe that he would have re-worked his economy to support it.
I must admit however, that most people would not agree with me.

Dean.
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The Soviet Union suffered from considerable economic dislocation after 1945. In order to "convert" to a peacetime economy, the Kremlin needed more than a continuation of previous policies. These policies had focused on increasing the output of basic commodities such as steel, etc. The five-year plans strove for communist autarky and not the development of a western import-export and capitalist model. Hence the economic rape of eastern/central Europe after 1945. The Red Army "collected" every machine-tool, etc. that they could find. This theft helped the Soviet Union to a minimal degree.

While a civilian infrastructure can be employed for war purposes, the reconversion of armaments industries seems a little more difficult. Think about the Soviet Union. What major pharmaceutical firms can you name? What major chemical companies? How about automotive producers? Or what electrical firms? Machine-tools? The Soviet Union did not have a strong tradition in normal industrial production. They would have found it difficult to sell their goods on the world market. Stalin was therefore forced to prevent any competition from penetrating the Soviet Union. A continuation of autarky was his only choice.

Willpower helped galvanize Soviet society during war. The peace was another matter altogether. Soviet policies could only (and did) alienate all other non-aligned states. Furthermore, Stalin continued his gulag traditions and the Soviet people suffered as usual. While I do not want to beat this point too much, I just do not see modernity in the Soviet Union. The Bolshevik regime was backward and repressive. The government used the people as de facto slaves. The chances for a successful economic program, after decades of exploitation and the hard war years, were null. They needed whole generations of new equipment and not just Soviet junk.

And, anyway, the Soviet government pursued a postwar policy of power enhancement. The Kremlin sponsored a nuclear program, a space program, and pumped their resources into maintaining a massive military establishment. Stalin probably wanted to create a better overall economy, but he was a communist. He thought in terms of producing 50 million tons of steel or millions of tractors. The numbers counted. The lot of the people did not. The people were in fact secondary.

Ollie Garchy
 
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Doppleganger said:
The problem though was that the Soviets could afford these losses and replace them, whereas the Germans could not. But only up until a point. What the Germans had was an opportunity to make the Soviets pay an even higher cost for their advances, an opportunity that due to Hitler's lack of ambition they spurned.
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I am slowly thinking differently about this subject. Here are some statistics: (rough)

German population (with Austria): 76 million
Soviet population: 150-190 million

These stats have to be modified, however. Here are a few reasons:

(1) The Germans drew on the Volksdeutsche groups throughout Europe. With the millions of Germans in Poland, Sudetenland, etc., the overall statistic for Germany is probably nearer 85 or 90 million.

(2) The German government had many allies like Hungary, Rumania, etc. They matter because the British (plus colonies) and the USA were moreorless unable to bring German troops to battle until summer 1943.

(3) The German army overran the Soviet Union. Convention places the Soviet losses at around 45% of state manpower resources. Let us be conservative and place the revised Soviet statistic at 125 million people.

(4) The Soviet Army and people suffered tremendous losses throughout the war. The people were weak with starvation, sick with disease, and also dying from their deprivations. The overall statistic falls again.

The point is that the German and Soviet figures come closer and closer together. This is of course highly hypothetical. It just means that the older notion of vast Soviet hordes fighting a numerically outclassed Germany seems weak. The tooth to tail ratio issue explained elsewhere is a stronger way of explaining the 10 to 1 combat ratios seen during the war.

Ollie Garchy
 
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Ollie’s thesis of a Soviet Union working on a dwindling industrial lifeline imposed by machine tool wear and calorific limitations is a fascinating one. I also think the higher ratio of combat troops to total military numbers is an important one. However there is an important factor being missed here, Women!

Stalin didn’t only place the female half of the population into industrial production who consume less and usually are more productive than their male counterparts, but also expected them to engage in military duties. The same was true for the Western Allies. This was of course contrary to Nazi doctrine. Speer told Hitler that if he were able to use women in the factories he would be able release at least 3 million more men for the army. Although Hitler compromised a little towards the end it was far too late.
 
Attacking the USSR before finishing off Britian and declaring war on the USA when he could have kept it off his back.
 
I remember Antony Beevor answering questions after a lecture about his book Stalingrad. His view was that Germany's military ability was irretrievably damaged as early as the winter of 41/42 after the toll taken on men and materiel by the weather and conditions. If true the lack of preparation for the Russian conditions may have been Germany's most important blunder.
 
perseus said:
I remember Antony Beevor answering questions after a lecture about his book Stalingrad. His view was that Germany's military ability was irretrievably damaged as early as the winter of 41/42 after the toll taken on men and materiel by the weather and conditions. If true the lack of preparation for the Russian conditions may have been Germany's most important blunder.
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Hi Perseus.

It's hard to get a consensus on exact casualty figures for both sides for the Battle of Moscow. Figures I have seen range from about 150,000 to about 250,000 casualties of all types for the Germans during the final stages of 'Operation Typhoon', the German code-name for the assault on Moscow. Many of these casualties were caused by the lack of winter preparedness of the Wehrmacht and if we accept the higher figure these losses are approaching those of Stalingrad. It can be argued then that Beevor was correct although I don't think it was so much the loss of material and men that was so decisive about this battle, more the loss of opportunity. The divertion in August of the [SIZE=-1]schwerpunkt from Moscow to Kiev may have been a decisive blow to the aims of Barbarossa but there is some merit in Hitler's insistance that the threat to Army Group Centre's right flank be met and dealt with first.

I argued in an earlier post that Barbarossa may have worked as a two-season campaign, with the Wehrmacht halting on the line of the River Dnieper until Spring 1942, once it had become clear that the timetable for Barbarossa had irrecoverably slipped. That way, the German Army would have recieved its winter supplies earlier AND be better prepared to meet any Soviet winter counter-attack.
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perseus said:
I remember Antony Beevor answering questions after a lecture about his book Stalingrad. His view was that Germany's military ability was irretrievably damaged as early as the winter of 41/42 after the toll taken on men and materiel by the weather and conditions. If true the lack of preparation for the Russian conditions may have been Germany's most important blunder.
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The "defeat at Moscow" thesis fails to accept the industrial nature of warfare during WWII. While it is obvious that "Barbarossa" sputtered and died in the mud and snow -- that is a banality --, the "Moscow" theory takes warfare out of any industrial context. If we try to understand why the Soviet summer losses did not finish off Stalin's regime, while a few hundred thousand losses on the German side ended Hitler's chances for victory, only two answers are possible. The theory would either dictate that German industry was incapable of Russian-style armaments production or that the German state was unwilling to strain the economy. I prefer the following variant: Nazis economic policy retarded economic growth and expansion and therefore castrated the immense productive capacities of German industry. Germany was NOT militarily defeated in 1941/42. The Nazis defeated themselves.
 
Ollie
Yes I certainly agree that economic expansion was retarded by policy. As I indicated in another post, the opposition to using women in factories and in the military was a significant factor. However, wasn't a solid core of army professionals lost in the Russian winter in a similar way to a core of airmen were lost in the skies over Britain? It must have been difficult to replace these. With Russia it didn’t matter as much since they didn’t have as much experience to lose, and they could rely on numbers and attrition. The quality side has to place their pieces more carefully and not squander them needlessly.

Doppleganger
I think the combined psychological effect of losing Moscow and the logistical complications of cutting the North South rail links would have been decisive, so there may have been 3 or 4 opportunities lost, any one of which could have been decisive
  1. Winter Preparation
  2. Boldness to take Moscow quickly
  3. Economy
  4. Some sort of combined operation with Japan
 
perseus said:
Ollie
Yes I certainly agree that economic expansion was retarded by policy. As I indicated in another post, the opposition to using women in factories and in the military was a significant factor. However, wasn't a solid core of army professionals lost in the Russian winter in a similar way to a core of airmen were lost in the skies over Britain? It must have been difficult to replace these. With Russia it didn’t matter as much since they didn’t have as much experience to lose, and they could rely on numbers and attrition. The quality side has to place their pieces more carefully and not squander them needlessly.

Doppleganger
I think the combined psychological effect of losing Moscow and the logistical complications of cutting the North South rail links would have been decisive, so there may have been 3 or 4 opportunities lost, any one of which could have been decisive
  1. Winter Preparation
  2. Boldness to take Moscow quickly
  3. Economy
  4. Some sort of combined operation with Japan
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I think one way of comparing the 2 sides is to look at the quality of their AFV production. The fact that German tanks were being produced like they were luxury cars and T-34s were rolling out sometimes with only primer paint on their hulls and turrets speaks volumes. I think Olly is quite correct to point at industrial reasons for why Germany lost. Also, the construction of Soviet formations as being top-heavy in fighting men is very significant when you consider that the main military reason why the USSR won was due to them having a strategic manpower reserve.

I'm not so sure that the capture of Moscow would have led to quick Soviet collapse. I agree with your point regarding communication and transport links being cut North to South but the average Soviet soldier had fought so hard since June 22nd I find it hard to believe he would suddenly have lose heart if Moscow was taken. After all, Napoleon actually took Moscow in 1812 and it did him no good, although I accept that Moscow was not nearly as important back then as it was in 1941. If Moscow had been taken the next 3-4 weeks would have been crucial. The German forces were exhausted, over-extended and woefully unprepared for winter warfare. Could they even have held onto their prize?

BTW, any combined operation with Japan would never have been practically possible, or even very effective. The best the Japanese forces could have done was to keep Soviet forces tied down on the Manchurian border so that they couldn't be deployed westward. The Imperial Japanese Army did not have the AFVs nor experience in winter fighting to take on the Red Army in any meaningful way and they knew it.
 
The best the Japanese forces could have done was to keep Soviet forces tied down on the Manchurian border so that they couldn't be deployed westward.
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This is really what I meant. Would this not have prevented the Russian winter offensive and confidence this gave the Russians?
 
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