Why hold the Ypres salient?

J

Jeff Simmons

Active member
I do not understand why the Allies refused to yield the Ypres salient to the Germans and pull back to a straight line southwest of Ypres.

The salient -- a bulge in the lines pushing into German territory -- measured about nine miles wide and five miles deep. The Germans held the high ground and the Allied soldiers suffered their wrath below. Every Allied operation was clearly visible to the enemy. Shelling could come from any direction: front, side or even the rear. It was difficult to dig in, because one would hit water at about 18 inches down. Soldiers were left manning their positions, often knee-deep in mud. On a normal day, the Allies suffered hundreds of casualties, or thousands per day when the fighting was "hot."

Generals discussed the idea that they could evacuate the salient like a collapsing bag, pulling all of the soldiers back to a line behind Ypres. It would have straightened the line, meaning it would take fewer men to hold the line there. It would also have lessened the German advantage of holding the high ground at Ypres down the Messines Ridge. And ultimately, there would have been fewer casualties.

Why, then, did the top brass decide to hold the salient and Ypres at all costs?
 
Personally I would imagine that there were three primary reasons why the lines at Ypres were not "straightened".

Firstly, it would have been incredibly difficult to disengage the enemy subtly, and retreat successfully across a flooded and completely war torn landscape. Especially when one considers that there was no obvious defensive line to retreat to. I know the Germans managed to withdraw to the Hindenburg Line in 1917, but, and although stating the obvious, the Hindenburg line had been prepared in advance.

The second thing to bear in mind is the political, or perhaps better, the philosophical point about the conduct of the war. The Germans had occupied large chunks of France & Belgium and obviously had no wish to move. Therefore it was incumbent upon the allied powers to attack and remove the invaders. The idea of voluntarily giving up further parcels of territory was just not politically acceptable, and I would imagine that was especially the case in Belgium, as the Germans already occupied over 90% of the country.

However I suspect the main reason why Ypres was not willingly abandoned was the significance of the Belgian coastal ports. These were a major headache to the British, especially the navy. That the Germans did not make better use of them was due to poor management. However, the few forays that were mounted by German surface vessels and the constant irritation of the submarines, especially the mine-layers, caused real worries for the RN. There could be no question of abandoning any more of the coast to the Germans.

Knocking out the German bases in the triangle of Ostend, Zeebrugge and Brugge became increasingly important. Attacking along the coast would never be adequate. The higher ground immediately next to the sea could support land-based operations but further inland was the below-sea level terrain that had been flooded between Nieuport and Dixmuide. The Ypres salient offered the way to force the evacuation of the coast. By breaking out due north and heading toward Ghent, the allies would have quickly rendered the coast untenable to the Germans. This was the basis of Third Ypres, which foundered in the morass of mud and appalling weather just as the crest of Passchendaele Ridge was reached.

I think that this reason was sufficient to require the British to hang on to and mount operations from the Ypres salient.
 
Past experience at Ypres

The Allies may also have known that Ypres was a hard nut to crack, historically speaking; the British themselves had unsuccessfully besieged Ypres in the Hundred Years' War. Keeping that in mind, the generals may have maintained that Ypres was an impregnable base from which to launch offensive maneuvers. Just a thought.
 
It may have released British troops for other duties, but the same thing would have happened to the Germans.
 
Life in the salient

I look at situations more from an infantryman's point of view than from an overall strategic position. With the exception of Gen. Herbert Plumer, I don't think too many top-brass types knew what life was like in the salient and beneath the Messines Ridge. If every general, etc., would have been required to spend a two-week stint in the fire trenches, I'd be willing to bet that they would have called for a withdrawal. I tell the story of a soldier's life in the salient and down the ridges in my novel, "Wipers: A Soldier's Tale From the Great War."
 
Well Jeff.

The generals, used to handling small-scale forces in colonial warfare, had just as much to learn about a type of war for which they were almost entirely unprepared. It is not surprising that in the course of its apprenticeship the BEF had a number of bloody setbacks. What was extraordinary was that, despite this unpromising beginning, by 1918 this army of bank clerks and shop assistants, businessmen and miners should have emerged as a formidable fighting force.

In 1914-17 the defensive had a temporary dominance over the offensive. A combination of 'high tech' weapons (quick-firing artillery and machine guns) and 'low tech' defences (trenches and barbed wire) made the attacker's job formidably difficult. Communications were poor. Armies were too big and dispersed to be commanded by a general in person, as Wellington had at Waterloo a century before, and radio was in its infancy. Even if the infantry and artillery did manage to punch a hole in the enemy position, generals lacked a fast-moving force to exploit the situation, to get among the enemy and turn a retreat into a rout.

In previous wars, horsed cavalry had performed such a role, but cavalry were generally of little use in the trenches of the Western Front. In World War Two, armoured vehicles were used for this purpose, but the tanks of Great War vintage were simply not up to the job. With commanders mute and an instrument of exploitation lacking, World War One generals were faced with a tactical dilemma unique in military history.

The problem was that in 1914 tactics had yet to catch up with the range and effectiveness of modern artillery and machine guns. Warfare still looked back to the age of Napoleon. By 1918, much had changed. At the Battle of Amiens on 8 August 1918, the BEF put into practice the lessons learned, so painfully and at such a heavy cost, over the previous four years. In a surprise attack, massed artillery opened up in a brief but devastating bombardment, targeting German gun batteries and other key positions. The accuracy of the shelling, and the fact that the guns had not had to give the game away by firing some preliminary shots to test the range, was testimony to the startling advances in technique which had turned gunnery from a rule of thumb affair into a highly scientific business.

One cannot ignore the appalling waste of human life in World War One. Some of these losses were undoubtedly caused by incompetence. Many more were the result of decisions made by men who, although not incompetent, were like any other human being prone to making mistakes. Haig's decision to continue with the fighting at Passchendaele in 1917 after the opportunity for real gains had passed comes into this category. In some ways the British and other armies might have grasped the potential of technology earlier than they did. During the Somme, Haig and Rawlinson failed to understand the best way of using artillery.

Haig, however, was no technophobe. He encouraged the development of advanced weaponry such as tanks, machine guns and aircraft. He, like Rawlinson and a host of other commanders at all levels in the BEF, learned from experience. The result was that by 1918 the British army was second to none in its modernity and military ability. It was led by men who, if not military geniuses, were at least thoroughly competent commanders.
 
one should not exagerate the losses of Passendale ,which have gained some mythical importance .
British losses on the West Front (rough figures)
1914:96000
1915:297000
1916:645000
1917:778000
1918:843000
Highest monthly losses:
1)march 1918 :173721
2)april 1918:143168
3)august 1918:122272
4)october 1918:121O46
5)april 1917:12OO7O
6)october 1917:119808
7)september 1916:115O56
8)september 1918:114831
source :Axis history forum :view topic php?t=69350
 
yes, but...

While the losses at Passchendaele should not be exaggerated, it is impossible to exaggerate the poor planning and the conditions in which the soldiers had to fight. It was a complete and total foul-up and the nadir of warfare.
 
Jeff, is there eve a comfortable place to fight from, I know of only one and that's the armchair I'm sitting in!

I too deplore the waste of human life, in war as in other things, but let's look at the reality of the situation. This kind of warfare was new to the Europeans, who really didn't want to look at some of the lessons learned during the American Civil War. Generals and leaders on both sides were continually have to feel their way around new ground, how best to incorporate this new weapon, how best to equip the soldier, how best to defend the ground and exploit opportunity. Unfortunately the lessons were harsh for both sides, by the way, that glib statement cannot even come close to summing up the true conditions on the front line, but remember that the bulk of these armies were volunteers and their fighting spirit and determination are truly wonders of the human condition; they believed that they were defending their country, their homes and their families - they were willing to go through this and more to ensure success.

So while we can sit back and critique, I think that we need to remember that we all make mistakes and eventually learn by them, if hadn't I'd be half the genius that I am today!! Were there crap generals - yes, did they willfully and needlessly sacrifice men, I don't think so, I think that many just didn't understand what was going on. So whose fault is this immense waste of life - the politicians who swallowed the same kind of stiff that they spout, but coming from similar backgrounds they were more likely to believe the generals, than the common man. They are the ones that should have help the military leadership accountable and challenged them on their decisions, after all we all know who's boss -right?
 
Partisan........You say that the British or French Generals did not learn any thing from the American Civil War, then nor did the Americans for when they arrived on the Front in 1917 they used the tactics that Allies had already abandoned a year or so before. Now by shorting the line would it have saved lifes or would it put even more pressure on other parts of the line as the Germans would not have needed to keep so many men in that area.
 
In 1915 General Smith-Dorien (the man who organized the 'stop' of the German advance at Le Cateau in August 1914, arguably saving the BEF) recommended shortening the line to remove the 'Salient' he was sacked for his trouble. In 1918 as a major German attack threatened, the line was shortened, almost exactly to Smith-Dorien's proposed line, giving up all the hard won ground, but that was hundreds of thousands of casualties later and no one remembered then.

In warfare, a “salient” may represent a dangerous position threatened on three sides by the enemy, or a forward position of opportunity thrust like a dagger into the opposing lines. With their commanding view of Ypres, the Germans must have felt quite comfortable that they represented the encompassing threat that could wipe out the salient if it became necessary. (They had, of course, tried and failed in 1915 when the pesky Canadians had held them up.) Surely no-one of a sound tactical mind would use an old salient as a jumping off point for a major offensive?

British General Sir Douglas Haig, despite opinions to the contrary, did possess an adequate military mind, but like so many of his colleagues on both sides of the trenches, he seems to have been overwhelmed by the scope of the tragedy that was the Great War. If battles were won by concentrating a superior force at a vulnerable point, then couldn’t a continuation of force create the vulnerability necessary for the desired breakthrough? Haig saw Ypres as the dagger, and assumed that if pushed hard enough, long enough it must inevitably slash open the Western Front and create the war of movement that every one sought for in vain. From June to November 1917, Haig would expend over 300,000 Allied troops in an effort to make reality conform to his theories.

To be more accurate, Haig showed signs as early as September that his more grandiose objectives might be too ambitious. When he handed over the battle to General Sir Herbert Plumer, he knew he was getting a more methodical commander who believed in limited objectives to save lives. He didn’t use terms like “breakthrough” or “clearing the Belgian coast;” the flamboyant Sir Hubert Gough was supposed to deliver those. He may never have abandoned his hope of clearing a path for his dashing Calvary regiments, but political and strategic pressures were making tactical victories increasingly important.

It was with this in mind that Haig turned to an even more brilliant tactician in mid-October. Canadian General Sir Arthur Currie was likewise noted for both his meticulous attention to detail and his concern for his men. Given the order to capture Passchendaele, Currie proceeded to apply the methods already successful at Vimy Ridge and Lens: small unit training on scale models, discussion of plans down to NCO level, infiltration and mutual support tactics, and lots of carefully co-ordinated artillery fire. When Currie was given paper indents instead of the Australian guns they were meant to represent, he angrily refused to proceed until the British brought up the real thing. Red tape is for losers.
 
shortening the line

I believe that A) shortening the line would have saved lives, and B) although the Germans would have been able to send more men to other areas, so would have the Allies.
 
hm,were the casualties due to the existence of the salient,or due to the fighting in the salient;there were also many casualties on the Somme,and there,there was no salient .
 
which caused which

lljadw said:
hm,were the casualties due to the existence of the salient,or due to the fighting in the salient;there were also many casualties on the Somme,and there,there was no salient .
Click to expand...

Unlike the Somme or Verdun or the Aisne, the skirmishing at Ypres never really stopped. It only peaked at three different times (First, Second and Third Ypres). As far as the salient causing the casualties or the fighting causing the casualties, these three battles wouldn't have occurred without the existence of the salient to begin with.
 
Haig came under intense criticism both in 1917, and since, for persisting with the offensive after it became clear that a breakthrough was unlikely. Maybe the main launch pad for the attack should have been sited at Messines Ridge, captured by Plumer in June; but Haig's original plans precluded this, viewing the capture of the ridge as a necessary diversion, and he declined to modify his plans: evidence, you might say, of an inflexible strategy.

There are some factors to support the decision taken to continue the offensive into the autumn. The Russian withdrawal from the war, British vulnerability to submarine attacks launched from the Belgian coast, and weakened French morale which manifested itself in widespread mutiny, it must have seemed clear to Haig that a decisive strike must be attempted before the Allied war effort collapsed. Also the disastrous turn in the climate could not have been predicted: that the rainfall was by far the heaviest for many years.

Haig himself argued that when regarded as a battle of attrition, the German forces could less afford the loss of men than the Allies, who by this time were being supplemented by the entry into the war of the U.S.

One can question Haig's decision not to call off the offensive earlier than November, when at least a number of the core objectives had been attained, and it became clear that the French forces would remain in the field.
 
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