Why did Germany lose WW2?

Doppleganger said:
There's two ways of looking at this.

1) You believe that Moscow must be captured as quickly as possible as it would achieve several important goals. It would sever Soviet communications north to south, it would mean capture of a vital railroad hub and supply centre and it would be a huge morale blow to the Soviets, possibly even causing a general internal collapse. The war would be as good as over.

2) You believe that Moscow, whilst important, would not have a decisive impact on the course of the war as by the time you occupy it all the political and industrial apparatus has already shifted eastwards. The capture of the capital would not cripple Soviet communications and would only serve to stiffen resistance. The war would continue regardless.

The important questions are:

1) Which one of the above scenarios do you believe?
2) Is the German Army strong enough to capture Moscow even if Kiev is left alone?
3) Is the German Army strong enough hold Moscow against the expected Red Army winter counter-offensive?
4) Can the right flank of Army Group Centre be properly protected against the Soviet armies forming near Kiev while Moscow is taken?

If your answer to questions 2, 3 and 4 is no then Kiev is obviously the best choice, so long as Moscow is left to 1942.
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This is also one of the reasons I think switching the thrust south was "probably" the best move:
1) They had an opportunity to destroy an entire front, 6 Soviet Armies, something that very few nations could have replaced rapidly enough not to have caused a total collapse of the southern front.

2) Leaving a huge southern salient while driving on Moscow would have left a very over stretched front line especially when you consider a large proportion of Army Group North was tied up around Leningrad thus leaving a smaller northern bulge as well, it is entirely feasible that capturing and holding Moscow would have led to a 1941 version of Stalingrad but with Arny Group Center being cut off.


The more I look at this decision the more I believe it was the right one.
 
But the Germans used up precious resources and time. If von Bock was allowed to do what he wanted to do they would have atacked on a narrow front with full force and smashed there way into Moscow very quickly without major urban warfare. It would not have been another Stalingrad. The Russians were at the point of disintergration in July' 41. It was a different story in 42-43.

Sure it was still a gamble and I don't think it would have won them the war but I believe the Germans would have been in a stronger position than what actually occurred in 41-42.
 
errol said:
. The Russians were at the point of disintergration in July' 41. It was a different story in 42-43.
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The Russian winter counter attacks of 1941 would indicate otherwise, they damn near routed the German Army at that point.

The drive on Moscow and the failure of Army Group South and North to successfully even out the the entire front in my opinion would have been disastrous come the Soviet winter offensive of 1941 and it would have been Stalingrad on a grand scale.

While it may not be popular I do believe Hitlers call was in this case the right call in the long term.

Lunatik said:
When you ask the Greeks, Germany lost because of Greece's long(ish) resistance of about 3 weeks, which they claim forced Hitler to send reinforcements that were supposed to go elsewhere and that ultimately changed the faith of the war.
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I have long believed that the Greece/Balkans campaign cost Germany the war in Russia, bailing out the Italians on two fronts (Greece and North Africa) tied up hundreds of thousands of troops and caused a six week delay to the start of the Russian campaign.
 
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I think with hindsight, it's clear that striking directly for Moscow after Smolensk would have been a big gamble, but one that might have paid off. But a big gamble with a mass of forces sitting on your right flank. These forces were not near disintegration and with only a screening flank in place it's possible that a massive encirclement of Army Group Centre could have taken place. I don't think this would have happened if the Germans had made diversionary feints in other directions and the pressure around Moscow would have caused some of the armies near Kiev to be pulled back northeast towards the capital.

The Germans should have chosen to go after either Target Kiev OR Target Moscow. Instead they tried to achieve both which was beyond their means.
 
"For a whole month, until the 24 August, the arguments continued, with Hitler on one side and von Brauchitsch, Halder, von Bock, von Rundstedt, Guderian and Hoth on the other side. Even Jodl had now changed his mind and considered that the main thrust should be continued on Moscow and he went so far as to undertake to use his influence to try and and persuade the dictator to this end, dryly adding however, that to make the Fuhrer change his mind was going to be a very difficult task. So it turned out." from the book "The Battle for Moscow"- Col. Albert Seaton p.48..

It's strange to side against some of the best military minds Germany had to offer at the time and support Hitler on this one. Hitler was a military "lightweight" to put it mildly.

You're correct, the German Army was nearly routed in the battle of Moscow but it was December not August/September when the Germans were at their strongest.

Army Group Centre was far more powerful than Army Groups North and South, and would have "waltzed" into Moscow if Hitler hadn't ordered Armoured formations to go north and south which resulted in wearing them down before they returned for Operation Typhoon.

Hitler's idea of units keeping in touch with their neighbours as they advanced east was a disaster. This approach caused the Germans to fan out (due to the geography) and weaken their front and slow their progress towards Moscow.

As you already know, Hitler had economic and political reasons other than just military ones to go for Kiev before Moscow.
 
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Errol.

It will be harder to find a bigger Guderian fan-boy than me. However, the truth is that Moscow was a big gamble (and Guderian was a big gambler), whereas Kiev satisfied the standard German Army doctrine of focusing on destroying armies in the field first, capturing economic targets second with capturing prestige targets (Moscow) third.

Hitler may have been an amateur, having never undergone General Staff training, but his instincts were pretty good. Going for Kiev may have been the wrong decision but it was definitely an understandable one.

I am fairly sure that Moscow would have fallen had the Germans thrust for it instead of Kiev. What is debatable is whether a) the Germans could have held Moscow through the winter and b) whether the fall of Moscow would have caused an internal Soviet collapse.

Army Group Centre would also have been in danger of having their lines of communication and supply severely disrupted if not cut entirely. There was only one army (2nd Army held in reserve) available to cover Centre's right flank against 4-5 Soviet armies massing near Kiev.

A possible recipe for disaster.
 
Doppleganger said:
Errol.

It will be harder to find a bigger Guderian fan-boy than me. However, the truth is that Moscow was a big gamble (and Guderian was a big gambler), whereas Kiev satisfied the standard German Army doctrine of focusing on destroying armies in the field first, capturing economic targets second with capturing prestige targets (Moscow) third.

Hitler may have been an amateur, having never undergone General Staff training, but his instincts were pretty good. Going for Kiev may have been the wrong decision but it was definitely an understandable one.

I am fairly sure that Moscow would have fallen had the Germans thrust for it instead of Kiev. What is debatable is whether a) the Germans could have held Moscow through the winter and b) whether the fall of Moscow would have caused an internal Soviet collapse.

Army Group Centre would also have been in danger of having their lines of communication and supply severely disrupted if not cut entirely. There was only one army (2nd Army held in reserve) available to cover Centre's right flank against 4-5 Soviet armies massing near Kiev.

A possible recipe for disaster.
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Given that I believe the answer to questions a and b are no I am convinced that decision redirect forces to the south was the right one.

I am not arguing that Moscow probably would have fallen had they continued the eastward push but I believe the risks were to great to do so.
 
Never understood holocaust deniers myself but either way the I don't disagree with the sites analysis of this particular issue, I am convinced given the progress the Russian winter offensive achieved and their ability to do things on a grand scale leaving large salients to the north and south of Moscow would have been disastrous for AGC.
 
errol said:
But the Germans used up precious resources and time. If von Bock was allowed to do what he wanted to do they would have atacked on a narrow front with full force and smashed there way into Moscow very quickly without major urban warfare. It would not have been another Stalingrad. The Russians were at the point of disintergration in July' 41. It was a different story in 42-43.

Sure it was still a gamble and I don't think it would have won them the war but I believe the Germans would have been in a stronger position than what actually occurred in 41-42.
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The problem with this theory an narrow front, an army on a narrow front attack is a lot like a tight rope walker the farther out on the wire he gets the easier it is to knock him off!
 
Any Army that loses that number of men like the Germans did in Russia will soon run out out of manpwer. This was shown up when germany started to call up boys as young as 11 years old to fight for their country.
 
LeEnfield said:
Any Army that loses that number of men like the Germans did in Russia will soon run out out of manpwer. This was shown up when germany started to call up boys as young as 11 years old to fight for their country.
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You know what I find ironic about this is that had the Germans "delayed" their racial superiority crap they would have more than likely been able to raise a large enough army from anti-communist Russians to meet all of their needs. Basically they wasted untold resources and manpower to try and wipe out people that would have more than likely fought for them against the very people that beat them.
 
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when Italy and Russia and America came aboard on the Allies side, there was no hope of Germany winning the war.

It pays to keep you're friends on you're side during the war.
May be someone should of told Hitler that!
 
Hehe I am convinced Hitler should have paid Italy to stay neutral or invaded it in 1940, at least they might have got a decent size fleet out of it.
 
LeEnfield said:
In late 1940 Monty no one thought that Germany would lose the war, least of of all the Germans
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This is a question I have pondered many times. When Hitler got France and the British just escaped via Dunkirk he seemed to forget what brought him victory in the first place. What brought him victory to that point was striking the enemy at his weakest points, Striking where they were not expected. Also the German army's Kampfgruppe tactics and striking quickly, which a Danzig newspaper called Blitzkrieg or lightning war. Its just semantics or playing with words to describe enveloping and striking at the enemy quickly.
He should have taken North Africa with as many panzer division's as it would take. Only admiral Raeder saw this as the only common sense move. Rommel picked up on it later. But for some reason Hitler expressed ridiculous ideas for his next move. He was obsessed with Gibralter and he wanted France's entry into the war on Germany's side. Franco refused him and so did Petain. He should have taken the French fleet and sent troops right into Algeria and Morocco. By not taking the fleet and taking Vichy's word on their half promise of Vichy troops being allied to Germany in North Africa, this man was suddenly asking for things when before, he just took them. He suddenly lost interest in Africa and then he made his monumental mistake by attacking the Soviet Union. Then stupidly he declared war on the United States. All these things along with his mass murder of Jews and Slavs could only bring one result. The unconditional Surrender of Germany. Adolf Hitler was Germany's Achille's heel.
 
Doppleganger said:
The problem, if you like, is that Hitler fell into war; he did not really plan for it initially. Then, when he found he was at war, he tried to keep it as a limited war until after the defeat of France where his ambition finally got the better of him. Most of the German High Command were deeply surprised at the ease of their victory over France and the BEF, Hitler included.

If Germany had somehow reached a long-term agreement with the Soviet Union they would have both the time and the resources to build up both their surface and u-boot fleets under a modified Z-Plan, as well as beefing up the Luftwaffe. A long-term peace between the 2 dominant European powers would have spelled disaster for the UK. Just as well that it was as about as likely as the Catholic and Protestant churches reforming. In that scenario, if the will had been there, it would only have been a matter of time before Britain fell. But I do not believe that would ever have happened and the UK would probably have fallen into line at least to neutrality towards Nazi Germany.

It goes without saying that had the Wehrmacht managed to get a reasonable force landed on the English coast soon after Dunkirk it would have been all over bar the shouting. Especially because the BEF would have virtually no heavy equipment having left it all behind in Normandy.
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I agree that a long term peace between the Germany and Russia would have spelled doom for Britian. However, Zukhov had crafted a plan to invade Germany and Russia was preparing to implement it when German initiated Barbarossa. This IMHO is why Germany was so successful initially as the Russians were caught by surprise in their assembly areas.

I am coming late to this forum and wish to add a few more comments.

1. I believe that had Hitler allowed Hoth and Guderian to complete their attack on Moscow, before drawing down their forces to attack the Crimea, this would have significantly impacted Russias morale and ability to counterattack in the Winter.

2. Hitler placed too much faith in Goering's promise to win the Battle of Britain. The focus of the Luftwaffe should have been the destruction of the RAF, not city bombing.

3. Germany was planning Sealion as a really wide river crossing. They should have concentrated on elimiating the RAF, then the Royal Navy, then worried about Sealion.

4. Hitler should have let slip Guderians leash and allowed him to destroy the BEF at Dunkirk. Remeber that both France and the BEF were still reeling from the gains that Guderian had made. One of the reasons that Guderian was so successful was that, unlike the French and British commanders, he did not tie his armored forces to the infantry. That in addition to motorization and mechanization of supporting forces significantly added to the mobility of the formations attacking in the West.

5. Germany should have done a better job at planning Barbaroosa. After their successes in the West, Hitler and the General Staff felt that Barbarossa would be concluded before the onset of the Russian winter. They did not follow the axiom "Plan for the worst and hope for the best." If they did, their troops would have had the winterclothing and replacement parts that were needed to continue Barabarossa through the winter.
 
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