Why did Germany lose WW2?

[MontyB]

Not sure why you think that Monty but it certainly was superior to the Me-109, Spitfire Mk V and P-51a. The only reason why it did not wholly replace the Me-109 was due to the fact that Germany was embroiled in a titanic struggle with the the USSR. If there was no war against Russia then I'm certain the Fw 190 would have fully replaced the Me-109 in Luftwaffe squadrons.

I can not understand why you would think that either as even Kurt Tank only saw the FW-190 as a stop gap measure until the TA-152 came into service, one of its biggest selling points to Luftwaffe High Command was that it used a radial engine so it wouldnt affect ME-109 production.

The FW-190 while being a great fighter early on (A series) and ground attack aircraft was hopeless above 20000 feet which made it no good in an anti-bomber role and due to the requirements for more armour and firepower it became less an less manouverable in its fighter role meaning that replacing the Me-109 would have left Germany without a competitive fighter and lacking the ability to take on bombers.

Hello everyone, this my first post but have been following this thread. I think many of the reasons stated are valid points which certainly contributed to their defeat. My opinion is logistics & lack of mobility for most of the German army is what prevented a German victory. While they were masters of Blitzkrieg tactics their army was mostly unmechanized or dependent on horses for transport.

There are many notable examples of panzer units having to stop and wait for infantry support and supply to catch up. This negated some of the tactical advantages of Blitzkrieg. Had the German army been fully mechanized army with equally mobile supply then outcome could have been much different. The added mobility would have yielded even greater encirclements and gotten them closer to Moscow much sooner.

I am of this opinion as well, I think Germany became over extended and lost the focus it had in 1939-1941, couple this with a woefully inadequate logistical system and a state that wasn't full committed to war production until it was far too late and any engagement that lasted more than a few months was always going to cause them issues.

I think when you look at the 1941 Russian winter where German major supply depots reported having all the materials they needed to supply the front but had to make decisions whether to ship reinforcements, ammunition, medical supplies or winter uniforms as they could provide one but not all it becomes apparent that it just wasn't going to work without a consolidation period and some massive investment in western Russian infrastructure which is time they simply did not have.

I cant recall where I saw it but there has been a theory going around that the modern military seem to always run into logistics problems around 250 miles from their start points no matter how meticulously things are planned I wonder if there is anything in this.

 

[Doppleganger]

I can not understand why you would think that either as even Kurt Tank only saw the FW-190 as a stop gap measure until the TA-152 came into service, one of its biggest selling points to Luftwaffe High Command was that it used a radial engine so it wouldnt affect ME-109 production.

At the end of the day Monty, aircraft development became so rapid that you could argue that many designs were essentially stop-gap measures. In 1939, no-one would foresee that bombers would be able to operate at 40,000 feet in the case of the B-29. The Me-109 wouldn't have been much use against the B-29 either. What is generally agreed is that the Fw 190 was an improvement on the Me-109 in several key areas and under ideal circumstances it would have replaced more of the ME-109 squadrons, until an improved design was ready for service.

I am of this opinion as well, I think Germany became over extended and lost the focus it had in 1939-1941, couple this with a woefully inadequate logistical system and a state that wasn't full committed to war production until it was far too late and any engagement that lasted more than a few months was always going to cause them issues.

I think when you look at the 1941 Russian winter where German major supply depots reported having all the materials they needed to supply the front but had to make decisions whether to ship reinforcements, ammunition, medical supplies or winter uniforms as they could provide one but not all it becomes apparent that it just wasn't going to work without a consolidation period and some massive investment in western Russian infrastructure which is time they simply did not have.

Agreed and I've stated this many times before too. The Wehrmacht was never geared up for long engagements and suitably, their logistical and industrial structure was geared up for short, sharp wars. They severly overestimated the ability of the Soviet Union to put armies in the field and their will to resist. Operation Barbarossa, which really only lasted from June 22nd until September 30th, should have, in the German's eyes, been enough to defeat the Red Army. It wasn't and a 2nd Operation, Typhoon, was required to attempt to achieve an objective that wasn't even one of the major objectives of Barbarossa, namely the capture of Moscow.

But yeah, lack of logistical supply was one of the major factors that broke the Germany Army's hopes for victory in the East. For example, in Autumn 1941 Army Group Centre needed 30 trains worth of supplies; they were receiving around 12-20. Bureaucratic inefficiency and infighting made that situation even worse. Germany in WW2 could be summed up as follows; brilliant in the tactical and operational sense but indecisive, delusional and ineffective in the strategic sense.

I cant recall where I saw it but there has been a theory going around that the modern military seem to always run into logistics problems around 250 miles from their start points no matter how meticulously things are planned I wonder if there is anything in this.

It might in relation to fuel, or lack of it. Certainly that was the reason why the 2003 invasion of Iraq ground to a halt; it was stupendously expensive to fuel a large number of modern tanks, especially in the case of the Abrams. Lack of fuel was one of the major factors why the German thrust on Moscow failed too.

 

[Del Boy]

Germany lost WW11 because they ignored the oldest military maxim in the world :-

"You cannot hold a hot sausage in your hand".

 

[perseus]

Doppleganger

Would it have been feasible to supply the German army via the Black sea and Baltic using the various rivers that flow inland? Barges could be sailed almost directly from Germany down the Danube. The Russian navy wasn't up to scratch as far as I know.

 

[Topmaul]

I am not sure why you need a fleet of ships with the carriers, what are they going to be attacked by? Swordfish Biplanes? surely mincemeat for any fighter aircraft. The Germans already had a good supply of fuelling ships. Perhaps a mix of carriers and heavy cruisers may have been a better option. The aircraft would attack the large ships the heavy cruisers the destroyers and the Uboats the dispersed convoy.

A suitable time for invasion would have been summer 1942 especially if the USA could be kept out of the war. The FW 190 was superior to the Spitfire V as demonstrated over Dieppe and was available in suitable numbers. Of course this may have been academic since no convoys, no fuel, no ships, no aircraft.

As a sailor I can tell you that the north atlantic is not aircraft carrier friendly. Carriers of the day would have a difficult time operating most of the year. Try Feburary in the North Sea or the North Atlantic

Also what happend when the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau met HMS Glorious and 2 or 3 destroyers? We know what happened the British lost 1500 men.

HMS Glorious had 18 war planes onboard but they would have had to turn in the wind which was the same direction of the Germans in order to a launch. Also the Germans scored a direct hit early in the battle, possibly damaging the flight deck.

 

[perseus]

As a sailor I can tell you that the north atlantic is not aircraft carrier friendly. Carriers of the day would have a difficult time operating most of the year. Try Feburary in the North Sea or the North Atlantic.

The small Escort carriers managed http://www.royalnavyresearcharchive.org.uk/ESCORT/

Also what happend when the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau met HMS Glorious and 2 or 3 destroyers? We know what happened the British lost 1500 men.

Using aircraft carriers without aircraft is worse than battleships without guns, hardly a true indication of the potential of the aircraft carrier

 

[Union404]

Germany lost the war because she did not have the human and material resources to fight such a prolonged conflict compared to the economies of her enemies. John Ellis's book Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War is an excellent account of the strengths and shortcomings of both sides in the Second World War and I thoroughly recommend it if you want a clear picture of where the Allies and Axis got it wrong and right. Regrettably, I think it may now be out of print.

 

[MontyB]

Germany lost the war because she did not have the human and material resources to fight such a prolonged conflict compared to the economies of her enemies. John Ellis's book Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War is an excellent account of the strengths and shortcomings of both sides in the Second World War and I thoroughly recommend it if you want a clear picture of where the Allies and Axis got it wrong and right. Regrettably, I think it may now be out of print.

I think it is still in print as Amazon has both new and used versions for sale.

The thing about Germany's failure is that until the industrial might of both Russia and the USA became fully available in 1943 the Allies were really in no better position logistically and had things gone to plan for Germany they would have already been in control of Europe by then and had all those resources at their disposal.

 

[Topmaul]

Using aircraft carriers without aircraft is worse than battleships without guns, hardly a true indication of the potential of the aircraft carrier

I believe HMS GLORIOUS had 18 war planes onboard at the time it was sunk. And who's fault was it that it was out there with only 2 small escorts?

 

[Doppleganger]

Doppleganger

Would it have been feasible to supply the German army via the Black sea and Baltic using the various rivers that flow inland? Barges could be sailed almost directly from Germany down the Danube. The Russian navy wasn't up to scratch as far as I know.

Interesting idea but I'm guessing that the idea of using rivers as supply routes was considered and dismissed as unnecessary by Hitler and the General Staff. They expected to defeat the Red Army in 6-8 weeks so probably didn't think that setting up a system of barges was worth their while.

Would it have been feasible? Well I think it may have helped to a certain degree until the rivers froze. That's the major problem I see. In 1941 though, it may have partly helped the Germans get round the problems caused by reconfiguring the Soviet railroad system to the Western standard gauge. In 1942 it would be possible to ferry stuff down the Danube to the Black Sea and then ferry stuff up the Dnieper but it's a roundabout way of getting supplies to where the German armies were in 1942. Plus, the Dnieper freezes up in winter too (along with most Russian rivers) so that wouldn't be too helpful.

 

[errol]

It can be argued that there were in fact 2 major wars that occurred from 1939-1945. The first, a European war, lasted from September 1st, 1939 until September 30, 1941 (i.e. 2 years), which Germany decisively won. The 2nd war, which started when Hitler declared war on the USA they obviously lost, at least in the short-term. The other thing to consider is who won the war in the long term? Did Germany really lose long-term?

Anyway, the reason why Germany didn't 'win WW2' was simply because they failed to achieve a decisive victory over the Red Army in the Battle of Moscow, which started on September 30th, 1941. Had they done so it wouldn't have mattered one bit whether Hitler declared war on the USA or not. if Hitler knocks Stalin out of the war everything changes.

In fact, let's narrow it down further. There is much contention over this but the reason that Germany lost WW2 might be because of the '[SIZE=-1]Lötzen[/SIZE] Decision'.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lötzen_decision

Yes, Doppleganger I agree.

Moscow was the big one, even more significant than the disaster at Stalingrad. If Bock was able to push on to Moscow in his own time, without Hitler meddling, the whole outcome of ww2 would have turned decisively the other way.

 

[Papashah41]

In spite of what the movies may say, Patton never went up against Rommel. Rommel was sick with jaundice in Berlin. He was also pleading with Hitler to pull their forces out of North Africa. As he saw it, If Hitler refused to see the amazing benefits of adding three Armoured divisions and taking North Africa, especially Egypt and The Suez Canal in particular, then stop the waste and get out of the continent. Hitler in his usual unrealistic assesment of this campaign let General Arnim botch things further. Arnim was just damned jealous of Rommel and did everything to undo Rommel's orders. This is the man Patton was up against.

 

[Papashah41]

Why did Germany lose the war?

When Germany conquered France in such a short period of time, the Nazi high command had many incredible options opened to them. But the Nazi's prevaricated. And the situation only worsened with time. This allowed the Royal Navy to strike against the French fleet which they couldn't let fall into German hands. Hitler's thinking was provincial and his aims were very limited. Not expecting such a quick victory Hitler for some reason didn't modify or change his limited approach. But certain members of the high command did. Erich Von Manstein, the man who created the Ardenne attack plan called the Sickle Cut in the May 1940 battle, saw many options open for the German forces. He believed common sense mean't clearing the British out of North Africa. Grand Admiral Raeder saw things even more clearly. He believed that England could be destroyed without dropping one bomb on English soil. He believed that North Africa should be attacked immediately. Egypt and the Suez Canal had to be taken for the grand strategy to work. Rommel, Guderian and a few others came to the same conclusion. Production of Submarines would have to go into overtime and the North Atlantic approaches to Britain sealed with an armada of German Warships. Iceland could be taken in a few days in spite of allied activity there. If not Iceland then Greenland could be the farthest base in the Atlantic. Raeder believed that even without these bases Britain could be successfully isolated. With the loss of the Suez, Malta would soon fall. Franco would take Gibralter, and the Mediterranean would become an Axis lake. Palestine would soon fall and so would Syria if it wasn't already ruled by Vichy France. Within weeks Iran could be taken and Turkey in all likelyhood would jump onto the Axis ship. But as we all know this did not happen. And anyone who believes in democratic principles and individual liberty and freedom must be thankful Hitler was calling the shots instead of his Commanders. Germany lost the war because of Germany's Achilles Heel. Which was the mean spirited, muddled, fantasy laced mind of Adolph Hitler.

 

[Papashah41]

Chief Darkcloud, I couldn't agree with you more. The Nazi Juggernaut ran on two principles. These being Kampfgruppe and Blitzkrieg. Tanks are a great intimidater as well as a battering ram, But without Mobile artillery, mechanized infantry and mobile supply units, they may be able to take ground initially, but they can't keep it. Germany's early victories were brilliant because of two things. The ability to isolate and strike the enemy at it's weakest point and speedy surprise. Hitler may have had enough forces and armour for one area of Russia. and he should have gone all out to take Moscow. This would have snapped Soviet morale. But he went for everything and ended up with a big goose egg. Blitzkrieg tactics were useless on this front, which should have told him something. Without full mechanization Russia's great prizes of Leningrad and Moscow could be seen, but not touched. Great encircling moves were then employed but these moves were reciprocated by the Red Army. And slowly from 1942 onwards the initiative went over to the Soviets.

 

[MontyB]

Yes, Doppleganger I agree.

Moscow was the big one, even more significant than the disaster at Stalingrad. If Bock was able to push on to Moscow in his own time, without Hitler meddling, the whole outcome of ww2 would have turned decisively the other way.

I still don't agree that the transfer of forces from the drive on Moscow to Kiev was a bad idea, by doing this they effectively cut off and destroyed close to six Russian armies by any stretch of the imagination that loss of manpower should have destroyed the southern Russian front. So with that in mind I believe it was a sound military decision.

 

[errol]

I take your point Monty about destroying a huge amount of Russian forces at Kiev, it was a brilliant military achievement but the big issue was time.

They had to be in Moscow before the Russian winter set in. This they failed to achieve. By the time they reorganised for Operation Typhoon (was it???) the weather had turned against them.

Guderian understood this, and I think Bock as well. Sure there were others who agreed with the Kiev operation but I think it was fatal. The Germans had already lost time in Yugoslavia before Barbarrossa.

 

[MontyB]

I think in fact you have missed the point entirely, there is no doubt the time was an issue however the belief was that by destroying that size chunk of the red army you would expect that at the very least other areas of the front would be thinned to fill the gaps or they may have just sued for peace at that stage in either case your goals are met.

 

[errol]

Monty, the following is taken from

The Battle for Moscow by Col. Albert Seaton ,page 48....

"Halder, and to a lesser extent von Brauchitsch, had always considered that Moscow must be taken as a first priority, and had unsuccessfully pressed this course of action in the previous December. Hitler said he was convinced that Leningrad and the Ukraine were priorities and that Moscow was of no importance, being "merely a mark on the map".

"For a whole month, until the 24 August, the arguments continued, with Hitler on one side and von Brauchitsch, Halder, von Bock, von Rundstedt, Guderian and Hoth on the other side. Even Jodl had now changed his mind and considered that the main thrust should be continued on Moscow and he went so far as to undertake to use his influence to try and and persuade the dictator to this end, dryly adding however, that to make the Fuhrer change his mind was going to be a very difficult task. So it turned out."


It seems Monty that several notable military types "missed the point entirely" as well.

 

[Doppleganger]

There's two ways of looking at this.

1) You believe that Moscow must be captured as quickly as possible as it would achieve several important goals. It would sever Soviet communications north to south, it would mean capture of a vital railroad hub and supply centre and it would be a huge morale blow to the Soviets, possibly even causing a general internal collapse. The war would be as good as over.

2) You believe that Moscow, whilst important, would not have a decisive impact on the course of the war as by the time you occupy it all the political and industrial apparatus has already shifted eastwards. The capture of the capital would not cripple Soviet communications and would only serve to stiffen resistance. The war would continue regardless.

The important questions are:

1) Which one of the above scenarios do you believe?
2) Is the German Army strong enough to capture Moscow even if Kiev is left alone?
3) Is the German Army strong enough hold Moscow against the expected Red Army winter counter-offensive?
4) Can the right flank of Army Group Centre be properly protected against the Soviet armies forming near Kiev while Moscow is taken?

If your answer to questions 2, 3 and 4 is no then Kiev is obviously the best choice, so long as Moscow is left to 1942.

 

[Lunatik]

When you ask the Greeks, Germany lost because of Greece's long(ish) resistance of about 3 weeks, which they claim forced Hitler to send reinforcements that were supposed to go elsewhere and that ultimately changed the faith of the war.