Whose Side Are The Afghans On?

Team Infidel

Forum Spin Doctor
London Daily Telegraph
April 12, 2008 It took two years of fighting the Taliban to reclaim control of Musa Qala, but British troops in Afghanistan still face the daily prospect of betrayal by locals, reports Con Coughlin

It was meant to be a goodwill gesture to help improve relations between the Afghans and the British soldiers whose job it is to protect them. A couple of decorators were hired to spruce up the local school, which had fallen into a sorry state of repair during almost two years of incessant fighting between the Taliban and the British over the key strategic town of Musa Qala in Helmand - where, until recently, Prince Harry served as a forward air controller.
The decorators turned up for work as planned, and began repainting one of the classrooms. But such is the hostility of much of the population to the British soldiers encamped in the centre of their town that officers expressed concern for their safety when the time came for them to return to their home, nearly 50 miles away.
The British offered to fly the pair back by helicopter, by far the safest form of transport in an inhospitable region where the roads are regularly subjected to attack by Taliban militants. The workers declined, saying they were prepared to take their chances. But they never made it home: their convoy was ambushed by a group of Taliban fighters who, when they discovered the decorators had been working for the British, promptly hanged them.
When British forces took control of Musa Qala last December, it was hailed as a major breakthrough in their mission to stabilise the security situation throughout Helmand. Ever since the military deployed to the province in the south of Afghanistan nearly two years ago, control of the town - a Taliban stronghold and an important trading outpost for the heroin trade - has been the focus of some of the heaviest fighting in the country, and has accounted for many of Britain's 91 battlefield fatalities.
Having captured the town from the Taliban in the summer of 2006, the British handed control to tribal elders as part of a controversial deal brokered by the then commander of Nato's forces, British general David Richards. Within months, the town had been reoccupied by the Taliban, and the British had to launch yet another offensive to reclaim it.
When I visited the town this week with Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the head of Britain's Armed Forces, Musa Qala was firmly back under British control. A heavily armed garrison drawn from 16 Air Assault Brigade, one of the Army's cutting-edge infantry units, was ensuring the Taliban were kept firmly at bay.
The recapture and occupation of the town represented a key strategic breakthrough for British commanders in their attempts to bring stability and security to Helmand. But persuading the population to abandon their support for the Taliban is altogether more daunting.
Sir Jock, a former fighter pilot, is optimistic about the mission's prospects. He insisted that, while the task of rebuilding Afghanistan presents a massive challenge for the 47,000-strong Nato force, the British have already made tangible progress in securing the territory.
"When you look at the scale of what needs to be done in Afghanistan, it sometimes looks like an impossible task," he explains. "But then, when you look back at the past two years, you see that a remarkable amount has already been achieved in a relatively small period of time.
"If you are going to eat an elephant, it is advisable not to eat it all at once, but just one small piece at a time."
In strictly military terms, the British deployment has indeed achieved many of the goals set when it first arrived in Helmand two years ago. All the key towns are firmly under British control. Yet the task of assisting the Afghans with reconstruction provides a different set of challenges, not least because of the enduring hostility of much of the population to their "liberation" by the British.
Fresh-faced young Scottish soldiers from the Argylls, who have the uncomfortable task of conducting foot patrols through the narrow streets and alleyways of downtown Musa Qala, liken the experience to "Crossmaglen on steroids".
"The locals will never look you in the eye," says a young officer coming off a patrol. "They walk past you with their eyes firmly fixed to the ground.
"They don't exactly make you feel welcome, and you get the distinct impression that they are just waiting to see which way the wind blows - are we going to tough it out and stay here, or are the Taliban going to return? They don't see any point in committing themselves until they see who is going to be in control."
Sir Jock believes the key to success in Helmand - and the rest of Afghanistan - is in making tangible progress in helping Afghans reconstruct of the country. "Reconstruction and security must work together, and security must be reinforced by the Afghan people," he told me. "But we must also have realistic aspirations. We cannot promise and then not deliver."
But the Taliban are well aware how important the reconstruction programme is for the ultimate success of the British mission, and have stepped up their campaign of intimidation against any Afghans who are willing to co-operate with Nato. Relatives of contractors prepared to work for the British have been abducted and, in the neighbouring city of Kandahar, a 12-year-old boy was beheaded after being found with a torch given to him by a Nato soldier.
Our senior commanders are also concerned that their efforts to improve security beyond the confines of their base are hampered by the lack of men and equipment, particularly helicopters - a complaint that has been repeated many times since the British military first deployed to Helmand.
To get to Musa Qala from the main British base at Camp Bastion, for example, Sir Jock and his party had to fly in an ancient Sea King helicopter that had been commandeered from the Royal Navy and hurriedly pressed into service in Helmand.
Most British units have now been provided with armoured vehicles that give proper protection against roadside bombs, one of the Taliban's favoured tactics for disrupting military operations. A Warrior armoured personnel carrier based at Musa Qala was immobilised earlier this month after being blown up by such a device, but none of the soldiers inside was seriously injured. Had they been travelling in a Snatch Land Rover, which was designed for riot control in Ulster, they would have been killed or seriously hurt.
But while the senior officers serving in Britain's inadequately funded military are used to having to contend with shortages of manpower and equipment, they have less experience of dealing with the challenges of reconstruction.
One of their most significant recent successes has been to persuade several tribal elders allied to the Taliban to switch sides. Mullah Salaam, the governor in Musa Qala, is a former Taliban leader who was induced to come over to the British at the end of last year. Police and security chiefs have similarly transferred allegiances, although Nato commanders remain cautious about whose side they are really on. "It is quite possible that everything we say and everything we do goes straight back to the Taliban," admitted a senior British officer.
In the case of the two murdered decorators, British officers are convinced that police officials know the identity of the culprits, but are reluctant to take any action because they are either related to them or, worse, sympathise with their motives. The British are well aware that many Afghan leaders they have to work with may still retain links with the enemy.
But then, coming to terms with the shifting mosaic of Afghan tribal allegiances and loyalties is part and parcel of doing business in this part of the world, and the British understand that it would be unwise to take any Afghan's protestations of loyalty for granted. As another officer remarked, "There's a saying round here: you can rent an Afghan, but you can't buy him."
When I attended a meeting Sir Jock held with tribal elders in Musa Qala, one of the main topics of conversation was what the British intended to do about rebuilding the mosque, which was severely damaged during bitter fighting between the British and the Taliban.
The British proposal is to build a new mosque that can hold about 800 people, but the elders' leader complained that one that held 2,000 would be preferable.
Sir Jock politely replied that he would look into the matter and see what he could do.
But as we left, I had the distinct impression that if the Taliban came forward with a plan to build a bigger mosque, the elders would have no hesitation in switching their allegiance back to their former allies, and abandoning their erstwhile protectors to an uncertain fate.
 
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