What the axis powers did wrong?

O.W.E.G.

Active member
From my perspective I think the biggest mistake was the pearl harbor attack think the axis powers would at first defeat ussr then shift then attention to the US
 
I'd say the biggest mistake was attacking the Soviet Union.

Russia is HUGE, with endless resources, its soldiers are tough, and its winter is terrible for anyone not fully equipped for it. So in December of 1941, at the gates of Moscow, Hitler's war was lost.
 
I'd say the biggest mistake was attacking the Soviet Union.

Russia is HUGE, with endless resources, its soldiers are tough, and its winter is terrible for anyone not fully equipped for it. So in December of 1941, at the gates of Moscow, Hitler's war was lost.


Agreed. There were several massive blunders by the Nazi's throughout the war, but this one stands out to me as the biggest of them all. It kind of defeated the purpose of not opening up a two front war.
 
Actually the Axis Powers as a whole had several opportunities to possibly deal tremendous blows at Russia and Great Britain. Had Hitler not been a horrible strategist going for glory and ideological objectives they may have won the war. Several of Germany's blunders includes: not marching on Moscow when they had the chance in the Fall of '41, Not allocating resources to Rommel in North Africa so that he could take the Suez Canal and the oil fields of the Middle East, and of course prioritizing Stalingrad over the oil fields of the Russian Caucasus. Japan's fatal move was drawing the United States into the war and outstretched their military.
 
Actually the Axis Powers as a whole had several opportunities to possibly deal tremendous blows at Russia and Great Britain. Had Hitler not been a horrible strategist going for glory and ideological objectives they may have won the war. Several of Germany's blunders includes: not marching on Moscow when they had the chance in the Fall of '41, Not allocating resources to Rommel in North Africa so that he could take the Suez Canal and the oil fields of the Middle East, and of course prioritizing Stalingrad over the oil fields of the Russian Caucasus. Japan's fatal move was drawing the United States into the war and outstretched their military.

The problem is that:
A) The effect of capturing Moscow is debatable, I personally think it would have lead to the destruction of Army Group Center in late 1941 early 1942 due to the size of the salient between AG-North back at Lenningrad and AG-South even further back.

B) I think people over rate the North African campaign as it was a battle that only the British could win given that they were always falling back to their huge supply bases in South Africa and India.

C) Stalingrad was not an error in my opinion, the city was needed as a linch pin of Operation Case Blue to protect the flank of the armies heading into the southern oil fields.
They certainly made mistakes in their approach to take the city but the objective itself was the right one.

D) Japan had no option but draw America into the war, the only other scenario was that it would only attack British, French and Dutch possessions in the area but this would have left the Philippines in a strategically dominant position in the area in American hands.
 
The biggest problem with both the Japanese and the German leadership is that they were so bigoted (national and racial) and ego-centric that they felt whatever they wanted they could accomplish.
The Japanese felt after a string of victories, America would see they could not win the war and would sue for peace. They never considered that "IF"... this did happen, what would prevent America from starting a war with them two years later? The Germans could not conquer Britain, so they decided the Soviet Union would be easier? Even if the USSR was easier, did that mean the entire USSR could be conquered? Both Japan and Germany had to import most to all resources to continue to manufacture the war materials, which left them vulnerable. Finally, neither country planned on a long war.
 
The problem is that:
A) The effect of capturing Moscow is debatable, I personally think it would have lead to the destruction of Army Group Center in late 1941 early 1942 due to the size of the salient between AG-North back at Lenningrad and AG-South even further back.

B) I think people over rate the North African campaign as it was a battle that only the British could win given that they were always falling back to their huge supply bases in South Africa and India.

C) Stalingrad was not an error in my opinion, the city was needed as a linch pin of Operation Case Blue to protect the flank of the armies heading into the southern oil fields.
They certainly made mistakes in their approach to take the city but the objective itself was the right one.

D) Japan had no option but draw America into the war, the only other scenario was that it would only attack British, French and Dutch possessions in the area but this would have left the Philippines in a strategically dominant position in the area in American hands.

A)Well The road to Moscow was open for Guderian and Hoth's Panzer groups six weeks into the invasion. Seeing as Moscow was the USSR's railroad hub taking Moscow would enable the Germans to cut off North from the South and then from their position in the center turn to destroy one sector then the other, but you're right it is very debatable.

B) Well this point is also debatable seeing as the capture of the oil supplies of the Middle East would've greatly boosted the German war making capacity not to mention if the Germans drove far enough into the Middle East American Aid that was flowing to the USSR through the Middle East would've been cut off.

C) Their approach to taking Stalingrad was indeed horrid, as was their decision to divert 3 army groups to the city and 2 to the Caucasus instead of using those army groups to take the oil fields. Hitler's incompetence and irrationality forced the German Army to change primary objectives completely. I agree that they needed to take Stalingrad, however the oil fields of the Caucasus were much more vital.

D) The Japanese made a strategic error when they continued to advance instead of consolidating their gains and pull back from hard to defend possessions in the South Pacific is what i was trying to say. They didn't necessarily need to strike at Pearl Harbor and galvanize America to war when a lot of the Americans were still very much isolationist and more than likely would've opposed going to war over something sketchy like Japanese Imperialism thousands of miles away from the American mainland.
 
A)Well The road to Moscow was open for Guderian and Hoth's Panzer groups six weeks into the invasion. Seeing as Moscow was the USSR's railroad hub taking Moscow would enable the Germans to cut off North from the South and then from their position in the center turn to destroy one sector then the other, but you're right it is very debatable.

B) Well this point is also debatable seeing as the capture of the oil supplies of the Middle East would've greatly boosted the German war making capacity not to mention if the Germans drove far enough into the Middle East American Aid that was flowing to the USSR through the Middle East would've been cut off.

C) Their approach to taking Stalingrad was indeed horrid, as was their decision to divert 3 army groups to the city and 2 to the Caucasus instead of using those army groups to take the oil fields. Hitler's incompetence and irrationality forced the German Army to change primary objectives completely. I agree that they needed to take Stalingrad, however the oil fields of the Caucasus were much more vital.

D) The Japanese made a strategic error when they continued to advance instead of consolidating their gains and pull back from hard to defend possessions in the South Pacific is what i was trying to say. They didn't necessarily need to strike at Pearl Harbor and galvanize America to war when a lot of the Americans were still very much isolationist and more than likely would've opposed going to war over something sketchy like Japanese Imperialism thousands of miles away from the American mainland.

A) I am not arguing that they couldn't have captured Moscow in the initial assault I however believe doing so while having over stretched supply lines, exhausted troops and massive Russian forces to the Northwest and Southwest of Moscow would have been suicidal for Army Group Center.

B) No Matter how it is dealt North Africa was a front that would have been bigger than the Russian front and gaining in size once they got across the Suez, British resources in India and the supply bases in South Africa made it an impossible task for Rommel and probably would have been impossible for the entire German army.

C) Stalingrad had to be taken and secured to protect the North flank of Army Group A, the first mistake was to give the army a week off outside Stalingrad, the second was to bomb the city and the third and most catastrophic mistake was to continue funneling troops into the city while leaving their flanks thinly guarded by second rate troops.
 
D) The Japanese made a strategic error when they continued to advance instead of consolidating their gains and pull back from hard to defend possessions in the South Pacific is what i was trying to say. They didn't necessarily need to strike at Pearl Harbor and galvanize America to war when a lot of the Americans were still very much isolationist and more than likely would've opposed going to war over something sketchy like Japanese Imperialism thousands of miles away from the American mainland.
You have to remember, the Japanese Navy was commanded by 'battleship' admirals. They felt the US battleships were the primary threat to their conquest of the islands in the Pacific Ocean. At that point aircraft carriers were supposed to play a secondary roll to back up the battleships.
The Japanese Navy needed to put the American battleships out of the war. When one looks at the reasons Japan went to war, consolidating a few island chains would not be enough.
Japan has very few natural resources to make war material. Items such as sugar, pig iron, cotton, sugar, rice, soybeans, lumber, coal and, oil. Of all the embargoes placed upon Japan due to their expansionist policies, oil hurt the most. On December 7, 1941 Japan had six months oil reserves in the home islands. The Japanese Army would have to go and start to send home these badly needed resources. So capturing a few islands would not do. They needed to invade Formosa, the Filipine Islands to insure the trade routes from southeast Asia remain secured. If they invade the areas (now) Viet Nam, Malayia, Indonesia... Australia would not stand for that, let alone Britain, the Netherlands and, France. As you look at it, the only way Japan could go once they invaded China was to defeat the European colonies and America.
 
You have to remember, the Japanese Navy was commanded by 'battleship' admirals. They felt the US battleships were the primary threat to their conquest of the islands in the Pacific Ocean. At that point aircraft carriers were supposed to play a secondary roll to back up the battleships.
The Japanese Navy needed to put the American battleships out of the war. When one looks at the reasons Japan went to war, consolidating a few island chains would not be enough.
Japan has very few natural resources to make war material. Items such as sugar, pig iron, cotton, sugar, rice, soybeans, lumber, coal and, oil. Of all the embargoes placed upon Japan due to their expansionist policies, oil hurt the most. On December 7, 1941 Japan had six months oil reserves in the home islands. The Japanese Army would have to go and start to send home these badly needed resources. So capturing a few islands would not do. They needed to invade Formosa, the Filipine Islands to insure the trade routes from southeast Asia remain secured. If they invade the areas (now) Viet Nam, Malayia, Indonesia... Australia would not stand for that, let alone Britain, the Netherlands and, France. As you look at it, the only way Japan could go once they invaded China was to defeat the European colonies and America.

I agree with what you're saying but they did overstretch themselves when they started a campaign to try and take out Australia. Another thing though, when they invaded those areas you talked about the Europeans were already smashed by Germany. Also neither Australia nor New Zealand would've been able to stop Japanese moves into Southeast Asia or the South Pacific without substantial US support.
 
A) I am not arguing that they couldn't have captured Moscow in the initial assault I however believe doing so while having over stretched supply lines, exhausted troops and massive Russian forces to the Northwest and Southwest of Moscow would have been suicidal for Army Group Center.

B) No Matter how it is dealt North Africa was a front that would have been bigger than the Russian front and gaining in size once they got across the Suez, British resources in India and the supply bases in South Africa made it an impossible task for Rommel and probably would have been impossible for the entire German army.

C) Stalingrad had to be taken and secured to protect the North flank of Army Group A, the first mistake was to give the army a week off outside Stalingrad, the second was to bomb the city and the third and most catastrophic mistake was to continue funneling troops into the city while leaving their flanks thinly guarded by second rate troops.

A) Ah that's what you were saying, well in that case i do agree with you on that.

B) IF they had gotten across the Suez the most likely would've had smashed Montgomery's Army to get through and with that army decimated the British would be harder pressed to keep the Germans out of the areas around Iraq and Iran. Plus the front in the Middle East would definitely not have been larger than the Russian Front seeing as the Germans most likely would not have initiated a war with Saudi Arabia and simply plowed through French and British colonial possessions.

C) I am not saying that Stalingrad was unnecessary. I am simply stating that Hitler should not have ideologically focused more resources into taking Stalingrad even after the blunders that you mentioned. Stalingrad yes needed to be taken and held but i think we'll both agree that the approach and the whole change in objective was a massive blunder by the Germans, no?
 
B) IF they had gotten across the Suez the most likely would've had smashed Montgomery's Army to get through and with that army decimated the British would be harder pressed to keep the Germans out of the areas around Iraq and Iran. Plus the front in the Middle East would definitely not have been larger than the Russian Front seeing as the Germans most likely would not have initiated a war with Saudi Arabia and simply plowed through French and British colonial possessions.

But once again I think you are over looking the manpower and resources Britain had in India and South Africa, as the German front expanded and pushed away from the coastal regions it supply lines were growing while the Allies were falling back on India the country which as I recall supplied the British with the most troops of any nation.

It wasn't considered the jewel in the crown of the British Empire because of its diamonds.

C) I am not saying that Stalingrad was unnecessary. I am simply stating that Hitler should not have ideologically focused more resources into taking Stalingrad even after the blunders that you mentioned. Stalingrad yes needed to be taken and held but i think we'll both agree that the approach and the whole change in objective was a massive blunder by the Germans, no?

I am not sure what our argument is on this one any more to be honest, I don't recall a change in German objectives on the capture of Stalingrad just a very incompetent attempt at capturing it.
 
I don't see that Hitler was ideologically motivated on Stalingrad .
The whole thing was simple :the oil fields of the Caucasus had to be captured,and the east flank had to be protected (by the capture of Stalingrad) .
Both failed,due to the resistance of the Red Army .
Now,at the end of august ,the 100000$ question was :what to do ?
1)withdraw from Stalingrad ? could the Germans hold the new front ? And would a withdrawal not endanger AGA ?
2)withdraw from the Caucasus ?would this not endanger AGB at Stalingrad ?
3)withdraw by both AG's ? Politically,this was impossible .
4) to remain at Stalingrad and the Caucasus :this was adopted,a.o. because the German intelligence was not given any forecast of a major Russian attack on the Wolga.When there were indications for Uranus (in november),it was to late to retreat .
 
And,about the mythical oil fields of the ME,they were irrelevant
1)the UK did not use them:it was using the oil from the US and Central-America
2)there was NO(I repeat :NO) possibility for the Germans to use this oil.
a) the possibility to advance 4000 km from Tripoli to Bagdad was inexistent
b)the possibility to repair the oilfields (because the British would not be that stupid to leave them unhurt),was nihil
C) the possibility to transport the oil of Iraq to Damascus was nihil (unless one would assume that the British would not destroy the pipe-lines)
d) I don't see any possibility for the Germans to transport the oil from (the destroyed) harbour of Damascus to Germany ,because,to transport oil,you need tankers,and,there was a total shortage on tankers .
 
But once again I think you are over looking the manpower and resources Britain had in India and South Africa, as the German front expanded and pushed away from the coastal regions it supply lines were growing while the Allies were falling back on India the country which as I recall supplied the British with the most troops of any nation.

It wasn't considered the jewel in the crown of the British Empire because of its diamonds.



I am not sure what our argument is on this one any more to be honest, I don't recall a change in German objectives on the capture of Stalingrad just a very incompetent attempt at capturing it.

Well if i recall correctly, Hitler ordered 1 Army group to Stalingrad and 4 to the Caucasus and then halfway through the advance he changed it to 3 army groups to Stalingrad and 2 groups to the Caucasus.
 
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And,about the mythical oil fields of the ME,they were irrelevant
1)the UK did not use them:it was using the oil from the US and Central-America
2)there was NO(I repeat :NO) possibility for the Germans to use this oil.
a) the possibility to advance 4000 km from Tripoli to Bagdad was inexistent
b)the possibility to repair the oilfields (because the British would not be that stupid to leave them unhurt),was nihil
C) the possibility to transport the oil of Iraq to Damascus was nihil (unless one would assume that the British would not destroy the pipe-lines)
d) I don't see any possibility for the Germans to transport the oil from (the destroyed) harbour of Damascus to Germany ,because,to transport oil,you need tankers,and,there was a total shortage on tankers .

Yes, but by taking the Suez Canal they would've cut them off from India and forced any Allied ships to go the long way around to the North Atlantic. Another thing is though if they had pushed far enough into the ME they would've cut off a major Western supply route to the Soviet Union.
 
Yes, but by taking the Suez Canal they would've cut them off from India and forced any Allied ships to go the long way around to the North Atlantic. Another thing is though if they had pushed far enough into the ME they would've cut off a major Western supply route to the Soviet Union.

This is true however even with control of the Mediterranean end of the Suez Britain still would have had control of the Atlantic end and the Indian Ocean end
so it would have been of limited use to the Germans, it would have certainly forced the British to sail the long route to Britain but this would have had limited benefits for the Germans as it just would have made concentrating and supplying U boats more difficult by increasing their supply lines.

The only positive use for North Africa from a German point of view was the ability to link the Africa Korps to Army Group South in Russia but I think very few Germans would thought that an armoured corps could have made it that far and when it did it still would have been a drop in the bucket against Russian forces of late 1942-3 (the earliest they could have managed it even if you ignore the logistics).

The funny thing is all of this is I recall an interview with a German soldier a few years ago who said how ironic it was that they ran out of fuel in Libya, had they known what was under the ground they were driving over they would have stopped at the Egyptian boarder.
 
Yes, but by taking the Suez Canal they would've cut them off from India and forced any Allied ships to go the long way around to the North Atlantic. Another thing is though if they had pushed far enough into the ME they would've cut off a major Western supply route to the Soviet Union.
This is a wrong assumpton :since the Italian DOW(june 1940 :long before the AK was going to NA),and till may 1943,the Mediterranean was NOT used as communication to India and the Far East .The British convoys were gong the long way aound to the Southern;-)Atlantic .
 
I'd say the biggest mistake was attacking the Soviet Union.

Russia is HUGE, with endless resources, its soldiers are tough, and its winter is terrible for anyone not fully equipped for it. So in December of 1941, at the gates of Moscow, Hitler's war was lost.
I believe Hitler had to attack the Soviet Union if he had any ambition to win the war in Europe. He was probably correct to attack in 1941 too - it was something of a political victory in the sense that he caught Stalin completely by surprise. Some of the main reasons why he had to attack were that:

  1. German military planners were of the opinion that the Red Army would reach technological parity in key military areas by 1943
  2. A massive reorganisation of the Red Army was taking place in 1941, in anticipation of a possible future offensive
  3. Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia were ideologically diametrically opposed. The chance of there being lasting peace between the two is hard to fathom
It's clear that Barbarossa was a faulty plan, for several major reasons. However, an operation of some kind was necessary, by summer 1942 at the very latest. Hitler almost got the timing right, just that the plan was wrong.
 
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