Were the Russian Tank Armies skillfully used in pincer attacks on the Eastern Front?

[MontyB]

I am not arguing that the PzIV was not good tank I am arguing that it was by 1944 an obsolete tank and for any military looking at fighting a prolonged war (say into 1946) it would have been the wrong tank to have standardised on when clearly the Panther was the better vehicle and had more design life available.

If it was me I would have focused on the easier, cheaper and just as efficient jagdpanzer lines (Hetzer, IV series) as the defensive armour needed in bulk while developing the Panther series in smaller numbers as a future offensive force.

 

[Papashah41]

I am not arguing that the PzIV was not good tank I am arguing that it was by 1944 an obsolete tank and for any military looking at fighting a prolonged war (say into 1946) it would have been the wrong tank to have standardised on when clearly the Panther was the better vehicle and had more design life available.

If it was me I would have focused on the easier, cheaper and just as efficient jagdpanzer lines (Hetzer, IV series) as the defensive armour needed in bulk while developing the Panther series in smaller numbers as a future offensive force.

Again, I agree with most of everything you state.
But was the Panther the tank for a German future in a prolonged war? It's a beautiful tank and it's long barreled 75 mm 70 cal gun was almost as deadly as the 88mm pak 43, as far as AP is concerned. But, the Panther was upgradable and I'm sure the 88mm would have replaced the 75mm before long.

The only reason I bring up the power of the gun is the direction the Heavy Soviet tanks took. The IS 2 and IS 3 had massive armour protection and a 122 mm gun. The guns AP attributes were not as good as the 88mm's. But its HE rounds could be used against infantry and had the ability to knock the turret off any tank made, just with its blast and explosion effect.

Oh hell, Iguess I agree with you. You are right. The Pzkpf 4 was if not obsolete, pretty near to it.

I suppose the point I'm trying to make is Germany's Air arm needed a heart transplant and maybe that should have been their direction. There weren't any nations going too far without an airforce.

But this is all moot.

 

[MontyB]

Again, I agree with most of everything you state.
But was the Panther the tank for a German future in a prolonged war? It's a beautiful tank and it's long barreled 75 mm 70 cal gun was almost as deadly as the 88mm pak 43, as far as AP is concerned. But, the Panther was upgradable and I'm sure the 88mm would have replaced the 75mm before long.

The only reason I bring up the power of the gun is the direction the Heavy Soviet tanks took. The IS 2 and IS 3 had massive armour protection and a 122 mm gun. The guns AP attributes were not as good as the 88mm's. But its HE rounds could be used against infantry and had the ability to knock the turret off any tank made, just with its blast and explosion effect.

Oh hell, Iguess I agree with you. You are right. The Pzkpf 4 was if not obsolete, pretty near to it.

I suppose the point I'm trying to make is Germany's Air arm needed a heart transplant and maybe that should have been their direction. There weren't any nations going too far without an airforce.

But this is all moot.

Oh I agree in the end it wouldn't have mattered how many tanks Germany produced because without air cover they were screwed anyway.

In terms of the firepower required this is one of the reasons I really think they needed to develop the Jagdpanzer lines as not having a turret made them much easier to upgrade, the Jagdpanther 2 was already on the drawing board with a 128mm gun and would been more than capable of dealing with the JS2.

 

[Papashah41]

Oh I agree in the end it wouldn't have mattered how many tanks Germany produced because without air cover they were screwed anyway.

In terms of the firepower required this is one of the reasons I really think they needed to develop the Jagdpanzer lines as not having a turret made them much easier to upgrade, the Jagdpanther 2 was already on the drawing board with a 128mm gun and would been more than capable of dealing with the JS2.

Sounds like an awesome anti-tank round, but what I've read, the 88 pak 43 had better AP qualities. Though I know the 128 anti aircraft twin guns were a terror for Bomber crews.

 

[MontyB]

That being said the Jagdtiger was equipped with the 128mm Pak 44 L/55 gun and it was a horrible vehicle, however the proposed design of the Jagdpanther II significantly reduced the size and especially the height of the vehicle so it may have been a viable anti-armour weapon.

 

[errol]

I would like to get back to my earlier point, did the Russians ever really have the tactical skills that the Germans possessed with their tanks?

The Kursk battle raises an interesting point. The Germans had to eventually withraw, but the Russians took a terrible beating in the numbers of tanks they lost.

 

[Papashah41]

I would like to get back to my earlier point, did the Russians ever really have the tactical skills that the Germans possessed with their tanks?

The Kursk battle raises an interesting point. The Germans had to eventually withraw, but the Russians took a terrible beating in the numbers of tanks they lost.

It seemed to take the Soviet tankers quite the spell to get it together. But it appears they had become quite sophisticated by the end of 1944 and early 1945. But again the huge quantity advantage may have covered up tactical inferiority even at this time. Hard to say by the end of the war.

It was unfortunate for the Nazi's they even attacked the salient. Hitler's cramps should have told him something. In certain circumstances a fort or heavily defended position is nothing but a monument to the stupidity of man. Especially when mobile warfare was preferred. If the situations were reversed it made sense. It was the German's who were fighting a defensive war.

 

[Doppleganger]

It was unfortunate for the Nazi's they even attacked the salient. Hitler's cramps should have told him something. In certain circumstances a fort or heavily defended position is nothing but a monument to the stupidity of man. Especially when mobile warfare was preferred. If the situations were reversed it made sense. It was the German's who were fighting a defensive war.

For Kursk the Germans ironically went back to traditional tactics they had used in WW1 and it was the more traditional generals that did the planning. Manstein and Guderian wanted to use tactics favoured by the Mongols all those years ago, i.e. feign retreat and allow the enemy to over-extend, then counter-attack. This was also the basis of 'elastic defence'. Then they would have 2 Soviet Fronts trapped with their backs to the Sea of Azov and with nowhere to retreat. Destruction of these 2 Soviet 'Army Group sized' formations would have blown the Soviet southern front line wide open.

2 years earlier Hitler would have approved Manstein's 'backhand blow' but by this time he had lost most of his nerve.

 

[Papashah41]

For Kursk the Germans ironically went back to traditional tactics they had used in WW1 and it was the more traditional generals that did the planning. Manstein and Guderian wanted to use tactics favoured by the Mongols all those years ago, i.e. feign retreat and allow the enemy to over-extend, then counter-attack. This was also the basis of 'elastic defence'. Then they would have 2 Soviet Fronts trapped with their backs to the Sea of Azov and with nowhere to retreat. Destruction of these 2 Soviet 'Army Group sized' formations would have blown the Soviet southern front line wide open.

2 years earlier Hitler would have approved Manstein's 'backhand blow' but by this time he had lost most of his nerve.

Doppelganger, an absolutely right on assessment. With what they amassed at Kursk, they still probably wouldn't have been able to defeat the Soviets. But Stalin might have considered other options including an armistice. Maybe??

 

[Doppleganger]

Doppelganger, an absolutely right on assessment. With what they amassed at Kursk, they still probably wouldn't have been able to defeat the Soviets. But Stalin might have considered other options including an armistice. Maybe??

It is rumoured, though never confirmed as far as I know, that Stalin was trying to broker an armistice in early 1943, before Kursk. The terms of the armistice would have seen the pre-invasion borders re-established. Of course, such terms would never have been acceptable to Hitler.

IMO decisive victory for German was lost in 1941.

 

[Easy-8]

Erich von Manstein and Heinz Guderian were both masters of armored warfare. Adolf Hitler issued stupid no-withdraw orders from 1942 onwards. The victory of the II SS Panzer Korps at Kharkov was a masterwork of a counter offensive. The elastic defense Manstein wanted to employ would have worked WAY better than just "hold at all costs" which is what Hitler ordered.


When Kiev was retaken by the 1st Ukrainian Front under Nikolai Vatutin, Manstein attempted to repeat his success at Kharkov by allowed the Soviets to over extend their lines. However Valutin managed to turn it back having learned from his mistakes earlier that year. Valutin was a good commander who was very aggressive and would not allow the Germans to rest. However Manstein conducted a very skillful withdraw and fought many outstanding delaying actions. The Soviets tried a number of times to trap and destroy large German forces like they did at Stalingrad such as at the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket and Hube's Pocket but were never successful.

It is noteworthy that Operation Bagration against Army Group Center (Heeresgruppe Mitte) was even more successful than even Stalingrad - With the 4th Army, 3rd Panzer Army and 9th Army being completely destroyed (pretty much the whole Army Group. It was simply deployed too far forward and was just waiting to be crushed.

 

[errol]

Hitler refused to allow Army group centre to withdraw.

 

[MontyB]

But surely the destruction of Army Group Center was more a failure of German doctrine than a success for Russian tactics.

Had AGC had control over its actions casualties would have been much lower and a fighting withdrawal much costlier to the Russians both at the time of the operation and in later operations where the German losses were really felt.

 

[Dean]

The Russian T-34 tank was the best tank of the ww 2. But were their tank armies used with great skill, particularly in pincer movements? I believe that the Germans had the best tank commanders of the war and were far more skilled in their use of their tank divisions compared to any other adversary. Even after Stalingrad, German tank commanders still were more than a match for their Russian opponents.

What do people think about the Russian Tank commanders. Were they that good or was it a great tank with overwhelming numbers that was the deciding element?

IMHO neither side used their tanks with great skill. The early success of the German blitzkreig was due more to the fact that anti-tank weapons were so few and far between in the regions that the Germans were invading. Tank Armies were more of a blunt trauma weapon, required to bash its way though an opposing army. Remember that operations were planned on maps, and in many cases the land that the tankers had to cross was so vast that it would have been impossible for the planners to have a real appreciation of the terrain.
The idea of an armoured surgical strike came long after WW II, and I really doubt that either side saw either the possibility or even the reason for using tanks as anything other than an infantry support weapon. In pincer movements, they were used only as infantry support or as infantry transport, and they were ordered to follow the advance routes that had been designated for them. Neither side was any better in this regard. In the end, the main factor that allowed a Russian victory was the number of tanks. The Russians were making so many tanks that there was simply no way that the Germans could have destroyed them all.
Someone in this thread made a reference to greater German tank kill ratios, but he forgot one thing. It almost never happened that both sides fought a mobile armoured battle. In almost every instance where we can count, the Russians were attacking and the Germans defending. It is easier to get good ratios when you are in a prepared position, the enemy is coming straight at you and they are not sure where you are. In many instances these were the conditions in which the Germans found themselves, and they took advantage of them. If the roles had been reversed, (as they almost were at Kursk) the outcome would have been very different.

Dean.

 

[Doppleganger]

IMHO neither side used their tanks with great skill. The early success of the German blitzkreig was due more to the fact that anti-tank weapons were so few and far between in the regions that the Germans were invading. Tank Armies were more of a blunt trauma weapon, required to bash its way though an opposing army. Remember that operations were planned on maps, and in many cases the land that the tankers had to cross was so vast that it would have been impossible for the planners to have a real appreciation of the terrain.

I think you're wrong in your assessment Dean. The reason why the German Blitzkrieg was so successful in the first 3 years was down to the way the Germans used their tanks, both as an armoured fist to punch through weak points and by using their mobility to disrupt lines of communication behind the front line. It's not really down to the lack of AT weapons which, like tanks themselves, were still in the early stages of development. Static AT emplacements would have been there to be overrun anyway, even if there had been a greater emphasis on them in 1939-1942. I think you're justifying your opinion with the use of hindsight, knowing how important AT guns became for defensive operations during the latter phases of WW2.

The idea of an armoured surgical strike came long after WW II, and I really doubt that either side saw either the possibility or even the reason for using tanks as anything other than an infantry support weapon. In pincer movements, they were used only as infantry support or as infantry transport, and they were ordered to follow the advance routes that had been designated for them. Neither side was any better in this regard. In the end, the main factor that allowed a Russian victory was the number of tanks. The Russians were making so many tanks that there was simply no way that the Germans could have destroyed them all.

I'll leave the concept of surgical strikes alone as clearly they are a much more modern phenomena so I agree with you there. What I strongly disagree with is your belief that both sides saw tanks merely as infantry support weapons. Dean, one of the main reasons why the Germans were so initially successful,was because they did precisely the opposite; they grouped their tanks in panzer/panzergrenadier divisions and used them as breakout weapons. I thought this to be obvious.

The reason why the Russians beat the Germans was not really to do with the number of tanks they had. It likely had more to do with manpower. To cut a very long story short, after 1941 the Red Army had a strategic reserve, the Wehrmacht did not.

Someone in this thread made a reference to greater German tank kill ratios, but he forgot one thing. It almost never happened that both sides fought a mobile armoured battle. In almost every instance where we can count, the Russians were attacking and the Germans defending. It is easier to get good ratios when you are in a prepared position, the enemy is coming straight at you and they are not sure where you are. In many instances these were the conditions in which the Germans found themselves, and they took advantage of them. If the roles had been reversed, (as they almost were at Kursk) the outcome would have been very different.

Dean.

It might have been me that made the reference you refer to. I think you need to look at battles where the Germans were attacking and compare losses (including tank losses) on both sides; Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev, Moscow, Kursk etc. For example, the Red Army lost almost 20,000 AFVs in 1941 alone. I can see where you're coming from in that an offensive army assaulting defensive positions will suffer greater losses and certainly this was true from 1943 onwards for the Red Army in WW2. What is also true though is the vast numbers of tanks the Red Army lost in defensive operations, although admittedly many of the tank losses on both sides increasingly came from the application of air power.