Well here is a chance to explore some hypothetical

[MontyB]

scenarios.

Was Stalingrad recoverable if Hitler had allowed them to move?
In the very early days of the siege the surrounding forces were quite weak and the 6th Army should have been able to break out and Hoth's relieving forces made it to within 20 miles of the city during von Manstein's relief attempt even without roughly 1/3 of his assigned forces at which point they were within range of 6th Army's armour (which I understand only had enough fuel for a 25 mile trip at that point).

I have read a lot about the sacrifice of the 6th Army being a necessity to tie up Soviet forces and allow Army Group South to recover forces that may otherwise have been cut off further south but everything I read lately says this is untrue as the weakening of the trapped army allowed the Soviet forces to redeploy anyway.

This is really just an open question so I don't think there are any right or wrong answers.

 

[LeEnfield]

I would have thought that if the German Army in Stalingrad had fought its way south to join up with the relief force, then the greater part of the trapped army would have got out. Also had the Germans in Stalingrad had been fighting their way south then the German relief column would not have stopped twenty miles away but would have fought on to link up and then made a with drawl south

 

[Doppleganger]

Was Stalingrad recoverable if Hitler had allowed them to move?

In the very early days of the siege the surrounding forces were quite weak and the 6th Army should have been able to break out and Hoth's relieving forces made it to within 20 miles of the city during von Manstein's relief attempt even without roughly 1/3 of his assigned forces at which point they were within range of 6th Army's armour (which I understand only had enough fuel for a 25 mile trip at that point).

The siege being once the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies had collapsed and the Soviet pincers had closed the noose around the German 6th Army.

The general opinion is that 6th Army could have been withdrawn during the early stages of the siege. Much of 4th Panzer Army escaped the encirclement and could have broken the Soviet ring with a breakout by 6th Army. The trouble is that Hitler never would have allowed such a breakout to take place.

I have read a lot about the sacrifice of the 6th Army being a necessity to tie up Soviet forces and allow Army Group South to recover forces that may otherwise have been cut off further south but everything I read lately says this is untrue as the weakening of the trapped army allowed the Soviet forces to redeploy anyway.

It so happened that Stalingrad did draw in much of the Soviet strategic reserve in the South but it was never planned as an actual operational objective by the Germans. Hitler wanted to take Stalingrad because of the city's name (and all that signified) and Stalin equally could not allow the city to be taken for the same reason.

The Germans would have been far better served to do what they did at Rzhev where the Soviets launched Operation Mars. That is, dig in along natural defensive lines and allow the Soviets to come to them, allow them to overextend and then cut them off. Utilize a 'defence in depth' doctrine known to the Germans as 'elastic defence'. The Germans could have bled the Red Army white long before they ever got near Berlin.

Contrary to popular belief the Russians did not have everlasting pools of manpower and by 1945 they were beginning to run low, by Eastern Front standards. By Western Front standards they still had huge numbers of soldiers but then the Western Front was dwarfed in size by the Eastern Front in terms of manpower and equipment deployed.

 

[MontyB]

This is another area I have been looking at lately, how much more did the Russians have to throw at the Germans they must have been near breaking point in terms of manpower.

As far as Stalingrad goes it appears to me that the 6th Army had fighting chance to get out right up until January at which point even someone as nuts as Hitler must have realised they were doomed if they didn't break out which is why I am somewhat surprised that he did not give some level of support to the "thunderclap" project especially since he seemed to have little reservations about allowing the withdrawal of troops to the south and in the Kerch Peninsula.

 

[LeEnfield]

If the Russians were running low on man power they still managed to find 1.5 million men to throw at the Japanese in China. Okay some of these men did come from the German front but the Russian still kept a huge force in Europe to keep control of their unofficial gains

 

[Doppleganger]

It's hard to find reliable studies on Soviet manpower during WW2. The following articles touch upon the subject but no more. It's true that by Western standards the Soviets had huge manpower reserves right up until the end. Whilst not true it's the opinion of some that had Germany gone on the defensive after Stalingrad and adopted Elastic Defence all along the front line, the Red Army's losses would have been higher and possibly unsustainable.

http://cgi.stanford.edu/group/wais/cgi-bin/?p=24969
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/e-front.htm

 

[LeEnfield]

If they ran short of men then they would happily use women in their front line forces

 

[errol]

Unfortunately, I think the Germans learnt the wrong lessons after the battle for Moscow. To believe that the kessel at Stalingrad could be sufficiently supplied from the air was a terrible mistake. Paulus knew that they should have broken out in November, 1942.

 

[MontyB]

Initially they must have believed that sitting tight and waiting for the front to come back to them was the best option as you (Paulus) would assume that AGS would have had the ability to stabilise the front and return to the offensive and lets face it by the end of December Hoth was pretty close to relieving the pocket.

What I dont understand is even had Hitler wanted them to stay in Stalingrad why wouldn't he have at least allowed them limited offensive freedom to join up with Hoth and break the siege at least allowing the pocket to be resupplied and reinforced.

 

[bren122]

This is a mere speculation based on the conclusions of others about Hitler's style as a military leader. I am not that conversant in his personal history to say for sure.
It may be that in the situation at Stalingrad Hitler saw the potential to prove his theory of the failure of the German Army in World War One. It is a given that the Nazi mythology was based securely around the perspective that the Imperial German Army had been stabbed in the back and had in fact not been defeated- therefore if the Nazis maintained their faith in and support for the military then it should recover the initiative, regardless of the circumstances, and win the war without having to surrender any more territory than had already been lost.
I think that rather than seeing his strategies as top- down thinking it might prove of greater benefit to view it as bottom- up thinking; ie what happens when a corporal is given command of an army.

 

[Partisan]

I believe that Stalingrad was the key point for the German Army on the Eastern Front.

It controlled a major north/south artery, it was a major city, named after their enemy, but more importantly it anchored the land routes to the oilfields in the South - which were very important to the German war effort.

You can see from the attached map that although the Caucasus land bridge is narrow & possibly fairly defensible (not familiar with the terrain), but Stalingrad is an obvious linchpin in maintaining land links to the Caucasus.

http://users.telenet.be/stalingrad/maps/stalingrad_map_6.htm

Without Stalingrad, the whole resupply & removal of assets becomes a vast naval operation - not Hitlers area of expertise. I need a sanity check here but I don't think that the Germans had a great deal of naval strength, in that area & it would be fairly easy(ish) for the Allies to bottle up ships in Black sea, let the subs loose and sit back, whilst they concentrated elsewhere. This would also have seriously impinged on German Naval operations in other areas, also aimed at economic supply!

So caught between a rock and a hard place he made a bad decision, not helped by Goering whp assured him that aeriel resupply was not only achievable - it was guaranteed.

So after all that would Stalingrad have been recoverable if timely action had been taken to withdraw them - NO. The Russians would've made it even more of a nightmare to try and take; they would gain time and space to defend themselves and fortify their resources. The Sixth Army would've been saved, but the oil wells would be beyond reach.

 

[MontyB]

For the most part I agree but I am still unsure why he didn't support von Mansteins "thunderclap" command allowing the 6th Army to at least assist with Hoths attempts to break the encirclement and allow resupply.

At its furthermost point Hoth was less than 25 miles from the pocket he had 4000 tons of supplies for the 6th Army and the Russians were withdrawing troops from the surrounding ring to block him so they had a perfect opportunity to link up and yet Paulus rejected von Mansteins message to do so on Hitlers orders.

 

[Doppleganger]

So caught between a rock and a hard place he made a bad decision, not helped by Goering whp assured him that aeriel resupply was not only achievable - it was guaranteed.

I mainly agree with your post but not with the above statement, which implies that Hitler made the decision to stay in Stalingrad for purely practical reasons. It was absolutely clear to anyone with half a brain (and Hitler was very intelligent) that holding onto Stalingrad while your flanks have been destroyed was operational suicide. But Hitler did not withdraw because of 'face' and because in many ways it became a personal battle of wills between himself and Stalin. Thus when Goering claimed he could reinforce 6th Army by air Hitler grasped it like a dying man grasps a life raft. Hitler, after all, despised Goering.

 

[Partisan]

I mainly agree with your post but not with the above statement, which implies that Hitler made the decision to stay in Stalingrad for purely practical reasons. It was absolutely clear to anyone with half a brain (and Hitler was very intelligent) that holding onto Stalingrad while your flanks have been destroyed was operational suicide. But Hitler did not withdraw because of 'face' and because in many ways it became a personal battle of wills between himself and Stalin. Thus when Goering claimed he could reinforce 6th Army by air Hitler grasped it like a dying man grasps a life raft. Hitler, after all, despised Goering.

Valid, but as I said, it was only my opinion that Stalingrad was the key point and that the successful capture of the oilfields in the Causcasus depended on holding Stalingrad.

Looking at the map strategically it makes sense, but I'm not too sure about Hitlers balance at this time, so his desire to best the Untermensch Stalin could well have played into the decision matrix; I just felt that this was another way he might have justified the sacrifice of the 6th Army.