Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Atlanta Journal-Constitution
September 17, 2008
Pg. 15
By Charles J. Dunlap Jr., For the Journal-Constitution
"Tanks and armor are not a big deal -- the planes are the killers. I can handle everything but the jet fighters." This recent conversation between Taliban commanders, intercepted by U.S. intelligence officers, does much to explain the frenzied efforts of their propaganda machine to ban the use of the weapon they fear most: airpower.
Of course, not every complaint about airstrikes is Taliban propaganda. Even with the strictest rules, bombs can go awry in the chaos of combat. Each allegation must be investigated impartially, and changes made when warranted. We can never forget that every civilian death is heartbreaking.
Yet we would be naive to ignore Taliban scheming. Consider that in 1954 guerillas fighting the French in Vietnam attacked a remote fort at Dien Bien Phu. Without adequate airpower, the exhausted defenders were forced to surrender before a French relief column could reach them. The spectacle of nearly 12,000 of their troops being taken prisoner spelled defeat for France's entire war effort.
Fourteen years later, the Vietnamese tried to do the same thing to the Americans at Khe Sanh. This time, U.S. airpower pummeled the attackers, prevented them from capturing the base, and helped deliver one of the U.S.' greatest victories of the war.
It seems clear that the Taliban hope to inflict a series of mini-"Dien Bien Phu" defeats to erode public support. While the Taliban cannot yet launch the kind of large-scale assault the Viet Minh did against the French in 1954, they can exploit Afghanistan's unforgiving environment. In fact, they already have tried to take advantage of the mountainous terrain to seize isolated outposts before help could arrive.
The Taliban are keenly aware that if they can cause enough casualties or, ideally, take American or NATO prisoners as they swarm over the often sparsely manned positions, they will achieve a tremendous victory on the battlefield of public opinion.
What is frustrating them? Modern U.S. and coalition airpower. Relentless aerial surveillance and highly precise bombing turn Taliban efforts to overrun the detachments into crushing defeats. And the Taliban have virtually no weapons to stop our planes.
Instead, they are trying to use sophisticated propaganda techniques to create a political crisis that will shoot down the use of airpower as effectively as any anti-aircraft gun.
The Taliban's depraved moral code helps. They shamelessly intermingle with civilians in order to use them as human shields. Their lack of morality also gives them license to falsely allege civilian casualties when they can't orchestrate them. Unfortunately, the media seems quick to report whatever claim is made.
In truth, no force in the history of warfare has ever worked harder or spent more time and resources to limit civilian casualties than has the U.S. military and its coalition allies. Moreover, so long as they are not excessive under the circumstances, international law tolerates the tragedy of civilian deaths. Why? If attacks were forbidden simply because civilians are present, the message to warring parties would be to surround themselves with civilians to create legal "sanctuaries" -- exactly the behavior the law of war wants to prevent.
We must not reward the Taliban for deliberately putting civilians at risk; it will only encourage them -- and others -- to make increasing use of innocents as defensive shields. The world will become an even more dangerous place for the truly blameless.
The grim reality is that if our forces in the field are deprived of their most effective weapon more than just coalition troops will die. In the absence of airpower not only will the Taliban survive to kill civilians at their leisure, but the scene would be set for genocidal horror if their "Dien Bien Phu" strategy succeeds in its ultimate aim of ousting U.S. and NATO forces.
There is no perfect solution for decision-makers, but moral courage must trump the depravity of our enemies. It's up to us -- Dien Bien Phu or Khe Sanh?
Charles Dunlap is a military lawyer and an Air Force major general based in Washington. These are his personal views.
September 17, 2008
Pg. 15
By Charles J. Dunlap Jr., For the Journal-Constitution
"Tanks and armor are not a big deal -- the planes are the killers. I can handle everything but the jet fighters." This recent conversation between Taliban commanders, intercepted by U.S. intelligence officers, does much to explain the frenzied efforts of their propaganda machine to ban the use of the weapon they fear most: airpower.
Of course, not every complaint about airstrikes is Taliban propaganda. Even with the strictest rules, bombs can go awry in the chaos of combat. Each allegation must be investigated impartially, and changes made when warranted. We can never forget that every civilian death is heartbreaking.
Yet we would be naive to ignore Taliban scheming. Consider that in 1954 guerillas fighting the French in Vietnam attacked a remote fort at Dien Bien Phu. Without adequate airpower, the exhausted defenders were forced to surrender before a French relief column could reach them. The spectacle of nearly 12,000 of their troops being taken prisoner spelled defeat for France's entire war effort.
Fourteen years later, the Vietnamese tried to do the same thing to the Americans at Khe Sanh. This time, U.S. airpower pummeled the attackers, prevented them from capturing the base, and helped deliver one of the U.S.' greatest victories of the war.
It seems clear that the Taliban hope to inflict a series of mini-"Dien Bien Phu" defeats to erode public support. While the Taliban cannot yet launch the kind of large-scale assault the Viet Minh did against the French in 1954, they can exploit Afghanistan's unforgiving environment. In fact, they already have tried to take advantage of the mountainous terrain to seize isolated outposts before help could arrive.
The Taliban are keenly aware that if they can cause enough casualties or, ideally, take American or NATO prisoners as they swarm over the often sparsely manned positions, they will achieve a tremendous victory on the battlefield of public opinion.
What is frustrating them? Modern U.S. and coalition airpower. Relentless aerial surveillance and highly precise bombing turn Taliban efforts to overrun the detachments into crushing defeats. And the Taliban have virtually no weapons to stop our planes.
Instead, they are trying to use sophisticated propaganda techniques to create a political crisis that will shoot down the use of airpower as effectively as any anti-aircraft gun.
The Taliban's depraved moral code helps. They shamelessly intermingle with civilians in order to use them as human shields. Their lack of morality also gives them license to falsely allege civilian casualties when they can't orchestrate them. Unfortunately, the media seems quick to report whatever claim is made.
In truth, no force in the history of warfare has ever worked harder or spent more time and resources to limit civilian casualties than has the U.S. military and its coalition allies. Moreover, so long as they are not excessive under the circumstances, international law tolerates the tragedy of civilian deaths. Why? If attacks were forbidden simply because civilians are present, the message to warring parties would be to surround themselves with civilians to create legal "sanctuaries" -- exactly the behavior the law of war wants to prevent.
We must not reward the Taliban for deliberately putting civilians at risk; it will only encourage them -- and others -- to make increasing use of innocents as defensive shields. The world will become an even more dangerous place for the truly blameless.
The grim reality is that if our forces in the field are deprived of their most effective weapon more than just coalition troops will die. In the absence of airpower not only will the Taliban survive to kill civilians at their leisure, but the scene would be set for genocidal horror if their "Dien Bien Phu" strategy succeeds in its ultimate aim of ousting U.S. and NATO forces.
There is no perfect solution for decision-makers, but moral courage must trump the depravity of our enemies. It's up to us -- Dien Bien Phu or Khe Sanh?
Charles Dunlap is a military lawyer and an Air Force major general based in Washington. These are his personal views.
