Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Financial Times
April 2, 2008
By Demetri Sevastopulo in Washington and Alex Barker and Stephen Fidler in London
When British troops pulled out of Basra last year, UK officials claimed the Iraqi military would be capable of taking over security. But critics now point to the Iraqi government’s military operation in Basra last week as evidence that the handover was premature.
“The transition of security to the Iraqi security forces was probably, in hindsight, premature in the sense that the Iraqi forces were not ready to step into the vacuum and fully take charge,” said Michele Flournoy, a former senior Pentagon official and now president of the Center for a New American Security. “I think that a vacuum developed when the British pulled back and the militias stepped in.”
The British handover to the Iraqis came at a sensitive time for the coalition since US forces were still engaged in the military “surge” which saw an additional 30,000 troops sent to Iraq. At the time, some US officers privately griped that the UK had “lost” Basra and was “cutting and running”. Senator John McCain, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, echoed those sentiments in February, saying he “did not think it [the British move] was a good idea”.
British officials stress that their strategy was to let the Iraqis find a solution to the fighting between rival Shia groups in the southern port city, which they argued was more a political problem than security issue. One UK military official on Tuesday said critics misunderstood the nature of the conflict in Basra, which he insisted was not sectarian violence, like in Baghdad, but rival Shia groups “grappling” for power.
Some observers, however, say the British did not establish the conditions for success that would have allowed the Iraqis to pacify the unruly city. Peter Rodman, a senior Pentagon official until last March, said the conflict among the Shia factions was “latent all the time the British were there”.
“They do not seem to have done a lot to shape the political environment while they were there, and they lectured to us about…how inadequate we are on counter-insurgency,” said Mr Rodman, now at the Brookings Institution.
In launching his military operation last week, Nouri al-Maliki, Iraqi prime minister, claimed that he wanted to stamp out the criminal activity and violence in Basra. He halted the offensive, which had met fierce resistance, after six days following the decision by Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shia cleric, to order his Mahdi army followers to stop fighting.
Another former defence official said the British have been selling a “myth” with the argument that the situation in Basra was mainly a political problem, adding that they turned over security too early.
“This is fundamentally a security problem. Maliki is attempting to address that,” said the former official. “There has been a deteriorating security situation in Basra that the Iraqis at some point needed to deal with. The Brits were not going to participate”.
The 4,100 British forces left in the region are largely confined to Basra air base. According to reports from the area, what they left behind was a lawless city dominated by militia groups, some of which are little more than criminal gangs while others are fundamentalist Islamist vigilantes.
British officials argued much of the violence in Basra was directed at the occupying forces and would be reduced if the coalition pulled back. They added that removing forces from Basra city would force rival Shia groups to reach political accommodation.
Asked how Basra had fared since the British pulled out, a senior UK military official said “so far, so good”. He added that the move had been necessary to force the Iraqis to “get on with it”, adding that they would either “sink or swim”.
Some experts now say the Iraqis appear to have sunk. Mr Maliki on Tuesday called the operation a “success.” But few military officers or experts share the optimism that the campaign achieved even the stated goal of stamping out criminal elements. And others question the motives for the campaign.
“[Maliki] can’t possibly be happy with the outcome here. He has taken a huge prestige hit and he has got to be embarrassed,” said Stephen Biddle, an Iraq expert who formerly advised General David Petraeus, the top US commander in Iraq.
Mr Biddle said the British rationale that the Basra violence was national resistance was “flawed” but he dismissed suggestions that the UK troops pulling out had forced Mr Maliki into action.
“I don’t think that the violence has increased that much [since the British pulled out]…it looks a lot more to me like an opportunistic move by Maliki,” said Mr Biddle. “It looks much more like an attempt to engage in partisan political opportunism in ways that risk bringing the country down.”
Des Browne, the UK defence minister, on Tuesday said the situation in Basra would prevent the UK from proceeding with further troop reductions, confirming that earlier plans to reduce troop levels to 2,500 have been shelved.
A best-case scenario, based on conditions in Basra becoming more settled, now envisages forces being cut from about the current 4,000 to 3,300. If the security situation remains as it is, officials believe that levels cannot be brought below 4,000 without risking the US sending reinforcements, which British diplomats say would be an embarrassing “loss of face”.
The British government has staked its credibility in Iraq in part on the hope that US ground forces would not have to intervene in any of the four south-eastern provinces vacated by the British. But US commanders were forced to consider contingency plans to send in reinforcements last week as it became apparent that Mr Maliki’s offensive had met heavy resistance.
The UK military official rejected suggestions that the Iraqi campaign had been a failure. He said the Iraqis had shown they were capable of large-scale operations, but that there was clearly a lack of planning in Baghdad.
US military officials say they were only informed about the Iraqi deployments the day before the offensive began, but stressed that they were not briefed on the plan itself. However, Mr Browne on Tuesday said the Iraqis had provided advance notice of the campaign.
“When I visited Iraq three weeks ago, I was briefed in detail upon the Iraqi plan for improving security in Basra by General Mohan, the commander of the Iraqi security in Basra,” Mr Browne said.
Mr Browne said Mr Maliki announced his intention to “accelerate” implementation of the plan two weeks ago at a meeting where “both the US and the UK were represented at a very senior level.”
One senior military official familiar with the Iraqi operation said Gen Mohan had presented Mr Maliki a three-stage plan that he wanted to implement through September ahead of crucial provincial elections.
The first two stages aimed at bringing some of the rogue Shia militias into the mainstream, while the third stage consisted of a military operation to target the outliers. But the official said Mr Maliki decided to skip the first two stages and proceed straight away with the military campaign.
April 2, 2008
By Demetri Sevastopulo in Washington and Alex Barker and Stephen Fidler in London
When British troops pulled out of Basra last year, UK officials claimed the Iraqi military would be capable of taking over security. But critics now point to the Iraqi government’s military operation in Basra last week as evidence that the handover was premature.
“The transition of security to the Iraqi security forces was probably, in hindsight, premature in the sense that the Iraqi forces were not ready to step into the vacuum and fully take charge,” said Michele Flournoy, a former senior Pentagon official and now president of the Center for a New American Security. “I think that a vacuum developed when the British pulled back and the militias stepped in.”
The British handover to the Iraqis came at a sensitive time for the coalition since US forces were still engaged in the military “surge” which saw an additional 30,000 troops sent to Iraq. At the time, some US officers privately griped that the UK had “lost” Basra and was “cutting and running”. Senator John McCain, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, echoed those sentiments in February, saying he “did not think it [the British move] was a good idea”.
British officials stress that their strategy was to let the Iraqis find a solution to the fighting between rival Shia groups in the southern port city, which they argued was more a political problem than security issue. One UK military official on Tuesday said critics misunderstood the nature of the conflict in Basra, which he insisted was not sectarian violence, like in Baghdad, but rival Shia groups “grappling” for power.
Some observers, however, say the British did not establish the conditions for success that would have allowed the Iraqis to pacify the unruly city. Peter Rodman, a senior Pentagon official until last March, said the conflict among the Shia factions was “latent all the time the British were there”.
“They do not seem to have done a lot to shape the political environment while they were there, and they lectured to us about…how inadequate we are on counter-insurgency,” said Mr Rodman, now at the Brookings Institution.
In launching his military operation last week, Nouri al-Maliki, Iraqi prime minister, claimed that he wanted to stamp out the criminal activity and violence in Basra. He halted the offensive, which had met fierce resistance, after six days following the decision by Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shia cleric, to order his Mahdi army followers to stop fighting.
Another former defence official said the British have been selling a “myth” with the argument that the situation in Basra was mainly a political problem, adding that they turned over security too early.
“This is fundamentally a security problem. Maliki is attempting to address that,” said the former official. “There has been a deteriorating security situation in Basra that the Iraqis at some point needed to deal with. The Brits were not going to participate”.
The 4,100 British forces left in the region are largely confined to Basra air base. According to reports from the area, what they left behind was a lawless city dominated by militia groups, some of which are little more than criminal gangs while others are fundamentalist Islamist vigilantes.
British officials argued much of the violence in Basra was directed at the occupying forces and would be reduced if the coalition pulled back. They added that removing forces from Basra city would force rival Shia groups to reach political accommodation.
Asked how Basra had fared since the British pulled out, a senior UK military official said “so far, so good”. He added that the move had been necessary to force the Iraqis to “get on with it”, adding that they would either “sink or swim”.
Some experts now say the Iraqis appear to have sunk. Mr Maliki on Tuesday called the operation a “success.” But few military officers or experts share the optimism that the campaign achieved even the stated goal of stamping out criminal elements. And others question the motives for the campaign.
“[Maliki] can’t possibly be happy with the outcome here. He has taken a huge prestige hit and he has got to be embarrassed,” said Stephen Biddle, an Iraq expert who formerly advised General David Petraeus, the top US commander in Iraq.
Mr Biddle said the British rationale that the Basra violence was national resistance was “flawed” but he dismissed suggestions that the UK troops pulling out had forced Mr Maliki into action.
“I don’t think that the violence has increased that much [since the British pulled out]…it looks a lot more to me like an opportunistic move by Maliki,” said Mr Biddle. “It looks much more like an attempt to engage in partisan political opportunism in ways that risk bringing the country down.”
Des Browne, the UK defence minister, on Tuesday said the situation in Basra would prevent the UK from proceeding with further troop reductions, confirming that earlier plans to reduce troop levels to 2,500 have been shelved.
A best-case scenario, based on conditions in Basra becoming more settled, now envisages forces being cut from about the current 4,000 to 3,300. If the security situation remains as it is, officials believe that levels cannot be brought below 4,000 without risking the US sending reinforcements, which British diplomats say would be an embarrassing “loss of face”.
The British government has staked its credibility in Iraq in part on the hope that US ground forces would not have to intervene in any of the four south-eastern provinces vacated by the British. But US commanders were forced to consider contingency plans to send in reinforcements last week as it became apparent that Mr Maliki’s offensive had met heavy resistance.
The UK military official rejected suggestions that the Iraqi campaign had been a failure. He said the Iraqis had shown they were capable of large-scale operations, but that there was clearly a lack of planning in Baghdad.
US military officials say they were only informed about the Iraqi deployments the day before the offensive began, but stressed that they were not briefed on the plan itself. However, Mr Browne on Tuesday said the Iraqis had provided advance notice of the campaign.
“When I visited Iraq three weeks ago, I was briefed in detail upon the Iraqi plan for improving security in Basra by General Mohan, the commander of the Iraqi security in Basra,” Mr Browne said.
Mr Browne said Mr Maliki announced his intention to “accelerate” implementation of the plan two weeks ago at a meeting where “both the US and the UK were represented at a very senior level.”
One senior military official familiar with the Iraqi operation said Gen Mohan had presented Mr Maliki a three-stage plan that he wanted to implement through September ahead of crucial provincial elections.
The first two stages aimed at bringing some of the rogue Shia militias into the mainstream, while the third stage consisted of a military operation to target the outliers. But the official said Mr Maliki decided to skip the first two stages and proceed straight away with the military campaign.