Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Washington Times
October 3, 2008
Pg. 4
By Henri J. Barkey
The United States and Iraq are close to concluding a deal on the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from major population centers by the end of June and from the rest of Iraq by 2011.
By most accounts this pact is the result of the Maliki government's increasing confidence in Iraq's armed forces and U.S. domestic pressure for withdrawal.
There is, however, a gaping hole in this deal: It has no strategy to contend with Iraq's neighbors - some of whom are capable and willing to undermine Iraqi stability.
Without a political strategy that counteracts their influence or engages them in the process, a withdrawal agreement is not worth the paper on which it is printed.
Iraq's neighbors are not just bystanders: almost all have specific interests and, through surrogates, have been actively involved in Iraq. These activities have often been at odds with U.S. and Iraqi government wishes.
A withdrawal plan, which creates a political vacuum, invites intervention by Iraq's neighbors to shape the nation's internal evolution in accordance with their own security considerations.
This, of course, is not as easy as it seems. Two of Iraq's neighbors, Iran and Syria, have been at loggerheads with Washington. Lines of communication are all but closed and replaced by complete mistrust.
Tehran and Damascus firmly suspected that regime change in Baghdad would extend to them as well. Washington consistently has accused both countries of supporting Iraq's insurgency; and in the case of Iran, accusations include the transfer of arms and training for insurgents.
By contrast, the other four neighbors - Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait - are long-standing allies of the U.S.
Iran and the Saudis are eyeing each other nervously in Iraq. Riyadh, already unnerved by Iran's nuclear program, sees Iran attempting to use a Shia-dominated Baghdad as an ally in its quest for regional dominance. Tehran, in turn, fears Saudi-supported Sunni jihadist movements and the emergence of a pro-U.S. Iraq aligning itself against Iran.
Turks, Iranians and Syrians would like to see the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) subjugated to Baghdad's control, if not disappear altogether. In their minds, a Kurdish province in an Iraqi federal state could inspire secessionist impulses among their own much-maligned Kurdish populations.
Saudis and other Arabs are unsympathetic to federalism, believing that Kurdish aspirations will one day lead them to secede and carve out another non-Arab country in the region or the Shia will create a superfederal region of their own.
The U.S. and Iraq's neighbors, however, do share one common goal: Iraq's territorial integrity. Where they disagree is on the internal arrangements. This provides a foundation on which Washington can begin a diplomatic initiative to construct a regionwide understanding.
The most important first step is to work with the allies individually to unscramble conflicting U.S. and Iraqi concerns on one side and Turkish, Saudi, Jordanian and Kuwaiti ones on the other.
Once progress is made, Washington can bring Iraq and the four neighbors together to constitute an informal front. Such a strategy would strengthen United States' weak hand and make it easier to engage the Iranians and Syrians.
Washington should urge the Saudis to stop their nationals from joining the fight in Iraq and also halt the transfer of Saudi petrodollars to jihadist networks all over the world.
The Saudis, in exchange, may require new security understandings from the United States, confirmation of Iraq's place in the Arab fold and agreement between Iraq and the Persian Gulf countries on security arrangements against Iran.
Iraq will want the Saudis to use their considerable influence over Sunni tribes to get them to commit to working with the central government after a U.S. withdrawal.
Similarly, among Turkey, the Iraqi Kurds and Baghdad, there is a deal to be made.
Iraqi Kurds want assurances from Turkey that it will not intervene in Iraqi domestic matters against them and that Ankara will ensure their access to European markets for their oil and other products.
Turks want the Turkish Kurdish insurgent group, the PKK, to be forced out of northern Iraq and for the KRG not to take the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. These are hard but not impossible problems to resolve.
However, it would require a diplomatic game plan that puts together the elements of a win-win strategy for all involved. The United States should want the KRG to become an institutionalized part of Iraq and not an independent state.
For this to happen, the Turks must recognize the KRG, while Iraqi Kurds must work with the United States if the PKK is to be forced out of northern Iraq. Turkey must act as a reliable conduit for Iraq Kurds to sell their products to international markets.
Finally, a peaceful and legitimate resolution of the multiple claims to the oil-rich city of Kirkuk has to emerge without the intervention of outside powers.
Henri J. Barkey is a nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Professor and Chair of the International Relations Department at Lehigh University.
October 3, 2008
Pg. 4
By Henri J. Barkey
The United States and Iraq are close to concluding a deal on the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from major population centers by the end of June and from the rest of Iraq by 2011.
By most accounts this pact is the result of the Maliki government's increasing confidence in Iraq's armed forces and U.S. domestic pressure for withdrawal.
There is, however, a gaping hole in this deal: It has no strategy to contend with Iraq's neighbors - some of whom are capable and willing to undermine Iraqi stability.
Without a political strategy that counteracts their influence or engages them in the process, a withdrawal agreement is not worth the paper on which it is printed.
Iraq's neighbors are not just bystanders: almost all have specific interests and, through surrogates, have been actively involved in Iraq. These activities have often been at odds with U.S. and Iraqi government wishes.
A withdrawal plan, which creates a political vacuum, invites intervention by Iraq's neighbors to shape the nation's internal evolution in accordance with their own security considerations.
This, of course, is not as easy as it seems. Two of Iraq's neighbors, Iran and Syria, have been at loggerheads with Washington. Lines of communication are all but closed and replaced by complete mistrust.
Tehran and Damascus firmly suspected that regime change in Baghdad would extend to them as well. Washington consistently has accused both countries of supporting Iraq's insurgency; and in the case of Iran, accusations include the transfer of arms and training for insurgents.
By contrast, the other four neighbors - Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait - are long-standing allies of the U.S.
Iran and the Saudis are eyeing each other nervously in Iraq. Riyadh, already unnerved by Iran's nuclear program, sees Iran attempting to use a Shia-dominated Baghdad as an ally in its quest for regional dominance. Tehran, in turn, fears Saudi-supported Sunni jihadist movements and the emergence of a pro-U.S. Iraq aligning itself against Iran.
Turks, Iranians and Syrians would like to see the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) subjugated to Baghdad's control, if not disappear altogether. In their minds, a Kurdish province in an Iraqi federal state could inspire secessionist impulses among their own much-maligned Kurdish populations.
Saudis and other Arabs are unsympathetic to federalism, believing that Kurdish aspirations will one day lead them to secede and carve out another non-Arab country in the region or the Shia will create a superfederal region of their own.
The U.S. and Iraq's neighbors, however, do share one common goal: Iraq's territorial integrity. Where they disagree is on the internal arrangements. This provides a foundation on which Washington can begin a diplomatic initiative to construct a regionwide understanding.
The most important first step is to work with the allies individually to unscramble conflicting U.S. and Iraqi concerns on one side and Turkish, Saudi, Jordanian and Kuwaiti ones on the other.
Once progress is made, Washington can bring Iraq and the four neighbors together to constitute an informal front. Such a strategy would strengthen United States' weak hand and make it easier to engage the Iranians and Syrians.
Washington should urge the Saudis to stop their nationals from joining the fight in Iraq and also halt the transfer of Saudi petrodollars to jihadist networks all over the world.
The Saudis, in exchange, may require new security understandings from the United States, confirmation of Iraq's place in the Arab fold and agreement between Iraq and the Persian Gulf countries on security arrangements against Iran.
Iraq will want the Saudis to use their considerable influence over Sunni tribes to get them to commit to working with the central government after a U.S. withdrawal.
Similarly, among Turkey, the Iraqi Kurds and Baghdad, there is a deal to be made.
Iraqi Kurds want assurances from Turkey that it will not intervene in Iraqi domestic matters against them and that Ankara will ensure their access to European markets for their oil and other products.
Turks want the Turkish Kurdish insurgent group, the PKK, to be forced out of northern Iraq and for the KRG not to take the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. These are hard but not impossible problems to resolve.
However, it would require a diplomatic game plan that puts together the elements of a win-win strategy for all involved. The United States should want the KRG to become an institutionalized part of Iraq and not an independent state.
For this to happen, the Turks must recognize the KRG, while Iraqi Kurds must work with the United States if the PKK is to be forced out of northern Iraq. Turkey must act as a reliable conduit for Iraq Kurds to sell their products to international markets.
Finally, a peaceful and legitimate resolution of the multiple claims to the oil-rich city of Kirkuk has to emerge without the intervention of outside powers.
Henri J. Barkey is a nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Professor and Chair of the International Relations Department at Lehigh University.