Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
New York Times
November 15, 2007
Pg. 1
This article is by Helene Cooper, Mark Mazzetti and David Rohde.
WASHINGTON, Nov. 14 — Almost two weeks into Pakistan’s political crisis, Bush administration officials are losing faith that the Pakistani president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, can survive in office and have begun discussing what might come next, according to senior administration officials.
In meetings on Wednesday, officials at the White House, State Department and the Pentagon huddled to decide what message Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte would deliver to General Musharraf — and perhaps more important, to Pakistan’s generals — when he arrives in Islamabad on Friday.
Administration officials say they still hope that Mr. Negroponte can salvage the fractured arranged marriage between General Musharraf and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. But in Pakistan, foreign diplomats and aides to both leaders said the chances of a deal between the leaders were evaporating 11 days after General Musharraf declared de facto martial law.
Several senior administration officials said that with each day that passed, more administration officials were coming around to the belief that General Musharraf’s days in power were numbered and that the United States should begin considering contingency plans, including reaching out to Pakistan’s generals.
More than a dozen officials in Washington and Islamabad from a number of countries spoke on condition of anonymity because of the fragility of Pakistan’s current political situation. The doubts that American officials voiced about whether General Musharraf could survive were more pointed than any public statements by the administration, and signaled declining American patience in advance of Mr. Negroponte’s trip.
Officials involved in the discussions in Washington said the Bush administration remained wary of the perception that the United States was cutting back-room deals to install the next leader of Pakistan. “They don’t want to encourage another military coup, but they are also beginning to understand that Musharraf has become part of the problem,” said one former official with knowledge of the debates inside the Bush administration.
That shift in perception is significant because for six years General Musharraf has sought to portray himself, for his own purposes, as the West’s best alternative to a possible takeover in Pakistan by radical Islamists.
While remote areas in northwestern Pakistan remain a haven for Al Qaeda and other Islamic militants, senior officials at the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon now say they recognize that the Pakistani Army remains a powerful force for stability in Pakistan, and that there is little prospect of an Islamic takeover if General Musharraf should fall.
If General Musharraf is forced from power, they say, it would most likely be in a gentle push by fellow officers, who would try to install a civilian president and push for parliamentary elections to produce the next prime minister, perhaps even Ms. Bhutto, despite past strains between her and the military.
Many Western diplomats in Islamabad said they believed that even a flawed arrangement like that one was ultimately better than an oppressive and unpopular military dictatorship under General Musharraf.
Such a scenario would be a return to the diffuse and sometimes unwieldy democracy that Pakistan had in the 1990s before General Musharraf seized power in a bloodless coup.
But the diplomats also warned that removing the general might not be that easy. Army generals are unlikely to move against General Musharraf unless certain “red lines” are crossed, such as countrywide political protests or a real threat of a cutoff of American military aid to Pakistan.
Since he invoked emergency powers on Nov. 3, General Musharraf has successfully used a huge security crackdown to block large-scale protests. Virtually all major opposition politicians have been detained, as well as 2,500 party workers, lawyers and human rights activists, and on Wednesday, a close aide to General Musharraf said the Pakistani leader remained convinced that emergency rule should continue.
Pakistan’s cadre of elite generals, called the corps commanders, have long been kingmakers inside the country. At the top of that cadre is Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, General Musharraf’s designated successor as army chief. General Kayani is a moderate, pro-American infantry commander who is widely seen as commanding respect within the army and, within Western circles, as a potential alternative to General Musharraf.
General Kayani and other military leaders are widely believed to be eager to pull the army out of politics and focus its attention purely on securing the country.
Senior administration officials in Washington said they were concerned that the longer the constitutional crisis in Pakistan continued, the more diverted Pakistan’s army would be from the mission the United States wants it focused on: fighting terrorism in the country’s border areas.
The officials said there was growing worry in Washington that the situation unfolding in the mountainous region of Swat, where Islamic militants sympathetic to the Taliban and Al Qaeda are battling Pakistan’s Army, was a sign that General Musharraf — and the Pakistani Army — might be too busy jailing political opponents to fight militants.
The administration officials said they were also dismayed that General Musharraf last week released 25 militants in exchange for 213 soldiers captured by militants in August, and agreed to withdraw soldiers from certain areas of South Waziristan.
Since spring, concern has been growing in the armed forces that General Musharraf’s battle to remain in power and his recent political blunders have cost him popularity with the public and damaged the reputation of the armed forces, Western and Pakistani military analysts say.
The army’s poor performance battling militants in the country’s rugged tribal areas in the northwest has placed enormous strain on the army as well. Hundreds of soldiers have died, dozens have surrendered without a fight and militants have carried out beheadings to demoralize the force.
“The army is getting more and more concerned and worried and disturbed,” said Talat Masood, a retired general and political analyst. “They have a genuine engagement in the tribal belt of Frontier Province and Baluchistan,” he said, referring to armed clashes. “And now they have such a major confrontation between the military and civil sectors of society, and the lines are getting sharper.”
While the military supports the emergency, it is doing so with caution, and there are red lines the army will not cross, Western military officials in Pakistan said. “Kayani is loyal to Musharraf,” said one Western military official. “But also to Pakistan.”
One red line the military would probably not be prepared to cross would be if it were called on to maintain internal security anywhere beyond the areas of the insurgency. If widespread political protests were to emerge, the army could be called out to enforce law and order.
While no large-scale protests have emerged since the emergency was declared, the apparent collapse over the last week of American-backed talks to create a power-sharing deal between Ms. Bhutto and General Musharraf could lead to more street confrontations, diplomats said.
As General Musharraf has refused to lift his emergency declaration, lawmakers in Washington have stepped up threats to freeze aid payments to Islamabad.
“There is widespread disapproval in Congress of these actions,” said Representative Nita M. Lowey, a New York Democrat who is on the House Appropriations Committee. “As long as the emergency rule continues, I don’t know if we can provide direct cash assistance to the Musharraf government.”
But other top Democrats say they are wary about endorsing cuts in aid, citing concern that it could undermine efforts to fight Al Qaeda in Pakistan. And the Western military official in Pakistan warned that an aid cutoff could anger Pakistan’s army.
Other experts argue that pressure could build on General Musharraf if the corps commanders believed that the president’s actions threatened the $1 billion in annual aid Washington provides to Pakistan’s military.
“The military is pretty demoralized right now,” said Christine Fair, a Pakistan analyst in Washington. “But what keeps Musharraf in the position he is in with the military is the huge largess from the United States.”
David Rohde and Carlota Gall reported from Islamabad, Pakistan, and Thom Shanker contributed from Washington.
November 15, 2007
Pg. 1
This article is by Helene Cooper, Mark Mazzetti and David Rohde.
WASHINGTON, Nov. 14 — Almost two weeks into Pakistan’s political crisis, Bush administration officials are losing faith that the Pakistani president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, can survive in office and have begun discussing what might come next, according to senior administration officials.
In meetings on Wednesday, officials at the White House, State Department and the Pentagon huddled to decide what message Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte would deliver to General Musharraf — and perhaps more important, to Pakistan’s generals — when he arrives in Islamabad on Friday.
Administration officials say they still hope that Mr. Negroponte can salvage the fractured arranged marriage between General Musharraf and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. But in Pakistan, foreign diplomats and aides to both leaders said the chances of a deal between the leaders were evaporating 11 days after General Musharraf declared de facto martial law.
Several senior administration officials said that with each day that passed, more administration officials were coming around to the belief that General Musharraf’s days in power were numbered and that the United States should begin considering contingency plans, including reaching out to Pakistan’s generals.
More than a dozen officials in Washington and Islamabad from a number of countries spoke on condition of anonymity because of the fragility of Pakistan’s current political situation. The doubts that American officials voiced about whether General Musharraf could survive were more pointed than any public statements by the administration, and signaled declining American patience in advance of Mr. Negroponte’s trip.
Officials involved in the discussions in Washington said the Bush administration remained wary of the perception that the United States was cutting back-room deals to install the next leader of Pakistan. “They don’t want to encourage another military coup, but they are also beginning to understand that Musharraf has become part of the problem,” said one former official with knowledge of the debates inside the Bush administration.
That shift in perception is significant because for six years General Musharraf has sought to portray himself, for his own purposes, as the West’s best alternative to a possible takeover in Pakistan by radical Islamists.
While remote areas in northwestern Pakistan remain a haven for Al Qaeda and other Islamic militants, senior officials at the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon now say they recognize that the Pakistani Army remains a powerful force for stability in Pakistan, and that there is little prospect of an Islamic takeover if General Musharraf should fall.
If General Musharraf is forced from power, they say, it would most likely be in a gentle push by fellow officers, who would try to install a civilian president and push for parliamentary elections to produce the next prime minister, perhaps even Ms. Bhutto, despite past strains between her and the military.
Many Western diplomats in Islamabad said they believed that even a flawed arrangement like that one was ultimately better than an oppressive and unpopular military dictatorship under General Musharraf.
Such a scenario would be a return to the diffuse and sometimes unwieldy democracy that Pakistan had in the 1990s before General Musharraf seized power in a bloodless coup.
But the diplomats also warned that removing the general might not be that easy. Army generals are unlikely to move against General Musharraf unless certain “red lines” are crossed, such as countrywide political protests or a real threat of a cutoff of American military aid to Pakistan.
Since he invoked emergency powers on Nov. 3, General Musharraf has successfully used a huge security crackdown to block large-scale protests. Virtually all major opposition politicians have been detained, as well as 2,500 party workers, lawyers and human rights activists, and on Wednesday, a close aide to General Musharraf said the Pakistani leader remained convinced that emergency rule should continue.
Pakistan’s cadre of elite generals, called the corps commanders, have long been kingmakers inside the country. At the top of that cadre is Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, General Musharraf’s designated successor as army chief. General Kayani is a moderate, pro-American infantry commander who is widely seen as commanding respect within the army and, within Western circles, as a potential alternative to General Musharraf.
General Kayani and other military leaders are widely believed to be eager to pull the army out of politics and focus its attention purely on securing the country.
Senior administration officials in Washington said they were concerned that the longer the constitutional crisis in Pakistan continued, the more diverted Pakistan’s army would be from the mission the United States wants it focused on: fighting terrorism in the country’s border areas.
The officials said there was growing worry in Washington that the situation unfolding in the mountainous region of Swat, where Islamic militants sympathetic to the Taliban and Al Qaeda are battling Pakistan’s Army, was a sign that General Musharraf — and the Pakistani Army — might be too busy jailing political opponents to fight militants.
The administration officials said they were also dismayed that General Musharraf last week released 25 militants in exchange for 213 soldiers captured by militants in August, and agreed to withdraw soldiers from certain areas of South Waziristan.
Since spring, concern has been growing in the armed forces that General Musharraf’s battle to remain in power and his recent political blunders have cost him popularity with the public and damaged the reputation of the armed forces, Western and Pakistani military analysts say.
The army’s poor performance battling militants in the country’s rugged tribal areas in the northwest has placed enormous strain on the army as well. Hundreds of soldiers have died, dozens have surrendered without a fight and militants have carried out beheadings to demoralize the force.
“The army is getting more and more concerned and worried and disturbed,” said Talat Masood, a retired general and political analyst. “They have a genuine engagement in the tribal belt of Frontier Province and Baluchistan,” he said, referring to armed clashes. “And now they have such a major confrontation between the military and civil sectors of society, and the lines are getting sharper.”
While the military supports the emergency, it is doing so with caution, and there are red lines the army will not cross, Western military officials in Pakistan said. “Kayani is loyal to Musharraf,” said one Western military official. “But also to Pakistan.”
One red line the military would probably not be prepared to cross would be if it were called on to maintain internal security anywhere beyond the areas of the insurgency. If widespread political protests were to emerge, the army could be called out to enforce law and order.
While no large-scale protests have emerged since the emergency was declared, the apparent collapse over the last week of American-backed talks to create a power-sharing deal between Ms. Bhutto and General Musharraf could lead to more street confrontations, diplomats said.
As General Musharraf has refused to lift his emergency declaration, lawmakers in Washington have stepped up threats to freeze aid payments to Islamabad.
“There is widespread disapproval in Congress of these actions,” said Representative Nita M. Lowey, a New York Democrat who is on the House Appropriations Committee. “As long as the emergency rule continues, I don’t know if we can provide direct cash assistance to the Musharraf government.”
But other top Democrats say they are wary about endorsing cuts in aid, citing concern that it could undermine efforts to fight Al Qaeda in Pakistan. And the Western military official in Pakistan warned that an aid cutoff could anger Pakistan’s army.
Other experts argue that pressure could build on General Musharraf if the corps commanders believed that the president’s actions threatened the $1 billion in annual aid Washington provides to Pakistan’s military.
“The military is pretty demoralized right now,” said Christine Fair, a Pakistan analyst in Washington. “But what keeps Musharraf in the position he is in with the military is the huge largess from the United States.”
David Rohde and Carlota Gall reported from Islamabad, Pakistan, and Thom Shanker contributed from Washington.