Tony Blair: Military a key part of Britain's foreign policy

Kirruth

Active member
A key-note lecture given by Tony Blair yesterday on the role of the military. I have had to heavily edit it to post it here. Full text is at:
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page10735.asp



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Ten years into Government, we are presently conducting a review into every major aspect of policy to set a unified platform and policy direction for the future. Recently, we debated around the Cabinet table, the paper on Britain's foreign policy over the past decade.

Essentially there have been three defining aspects to it.

First, it has been governed as much by values as interests; indeed has attempted to suggest that it is by furthering our values that we further our interests in the modern era of globalisation and interdependence.

Secondly, it has had, at its foundation, two major alliances, with America on the one hand and Europe on the other.

And thirdly, it has combined, almost uniquely, "hard" and "soft" power.

But it is fair to say that the "hard" power has been considerably more controversial than the "soft".

Since [World War II], the proportion of defence spending to national income, with some ups and downs, has declined. If we add in the extra funding for Iraq and Afghanistan, then since 1997 it has remained constant at roughly around 2.5% of GDP, incidentally one of the highest levels still in the world. But in the ten years prior to 1997 it fell by over a quarter.

The army has only declined in size by a very small amount since 1997. Numbers in training have risen by 15% since Sep 05. At 1 Oct 2006, the Regular Armed Forces were 96.6% manned.

But it is true that operational commitments are at a higher level than originally planned. Service personnel are working harder and for longer than intended.

There has been a lot of publicity about reported cuts to the Royal Navy.
We did, of course, need to modernise the Navy. The era dominated by anti-submarine patrols requiring large numbers of frigates was over. Today's Navy needs to be versatile. It does different things. It supports expeditionary forces, in Sierra Leone, Iraq and elsewhere. It helps in disaster relief, in counter terrorism, in evacuating UK citizens from the Lebanon.

So we have made a huge effort to equip the Navy for this task. We have made a massive boost to Britain's amphibious capabilities, such as this extraordinary ship on which we are standing now.

And there is a further, massive ship-building programme ahead, a programme that is likely to be worth some £14 billion over the next 10-15 years. The Type 45 destroyers - a generation ahead of the Type 42; new aircraft carriers - twice as big as our existing vessels; new attack submarines now being built.

So much of what is written distorts the truth or greatly embellishes it.
But what is true is that the context for all these issues has dramatically altered.

Today we face a situation, which yet again changes the paradigm within which military, politics and public opinion interact with each other.
Put simply, September 11 2001 changed everything. Three thousand people died on the streets of New York. They did so as a result of a terrorist, suicide mission. The mission was planned and organised by the Al Qaida group out of a failed state, Afghanistan, thousands of miles away. The state was run by a fanatical, religiously motivated dictatorship, the Taleban. Even now, the bald facts of what happened are utterly extraordinary.

But though September 11 did indeed change the way we look at the world, the profound nature of the change for our armed forces was not immediately apparent.

What was unclear then but is very clear now is that what we were and are confronted with, is of a far more fundamental character than we supposed. September 11 wasn't the incredible action of an isolated group, a one-off strike masterminded by Osama Bin Laden. It was the product rather of a world-wide movement, with an ideology based on a misreading of Islam, whose roots were deep, which had been growing for years and with the ability to mount a radically different type of warfare requiring a radically different type of response. What we face is not a criminal conspiracy or even a fanatical but fringe terrorist organisation. We face something more akin to revolutionary Communism in its early and most militant phase. It is global. It has a narrative about the world and Islam's place within it that has a reach into most Muslim societies and countries. It adherents may be limited. Its sympathisers are not. It has states or at least parts of the governing apparatus of states that give it succour.
Its belief system may be, indeed is, utterly reactionary. But its methods are terrifyingly modern.

It has realised two things: the power of terrorism to cause chaos, hinder and displace political progress especially through suicide missions; and the reluctance of western opinion to countenance long campaigns, especially when the account it receives is via a modern media driven by the impact of pictures.

Yet to retreat in the face of this threat would be a catastrophe. It would strengthen this global terrorism; proliferate it; expand its circle of sympathisers.

So from the perspective of our Armed Forces, how do we define this new situation? The battle will be long. It has taken a generation for the enemy to grow. It will, in all probability take a generation to defeat.

Our Armed Forces will be deployed in the lands of other nations far from home, with no immediate threat to our territory, in environments and in ways unfamiliar to them.

They will usually fight alongside other nations, in alliance with them; notably, but probably not exclusively with the USA.

Hardest of all, in fighting terrorism embedded in failed or failing states, against terrorists indifferent to their own lives as well as the lives of others, our forces will suffer casualties. Their families will be back home, anxious, worried, never knowing whether it will be them who receive the dreaded call.

The battle will be conducted in a completely new world of modern communication and media.

The risk here - and in the US where the future danger is one of isolationism not adventurism - is that the politicians decide it's all too difficult and default to an unstated, passive disengagement, that doing the right thing slips almost unconsciously into doing the easy thing.
Many countries are already in this position. But the consequences for Britain are hugely significant. Before we know it and without anyone ever really deciding it, in a strategic way, the "hard" part of British foreign policy could be put to one side; the Armed Forces relegated to an essentially peacekeeping role and Britain's reach, effect and influence qualitatively reduced.

The reason I am against this case, is that for me "hard" and "soft" power are driven by the same principles. The world is interdependent. That means we work in alliance with others. But it also means problems interconnect. Poverty in Africa can't be solved simply by the presence of aid. It needs the absence of conflict. Failed states threaten us as well as their own people. Terrorism destroys progress. Terrorism can't be defeated by military means alone. But it can't be defeated without it.

So my choice is for Armed forces that are prepared to engage in this difficult, tough, challenging campaign, to be warfighters as well as peacekeepers; for a British foreign policy keeps our American alliance strong and is prepared to project hard as well as soft power; and for us as a nation to be as willing to fight terrorism and pay the cost of that fight wherever it may be, as we are to be proud champions of the causes of peace in the Middle East, action against poverty, or the struggle to halt the degradation of our environment.

However, if we make that choice, then, recognising this is a new situation for our Armed Forces, there are new commitments necessary to make it work and make it fair.

For our part, in Government, it will mean increased expenditure on equipment, personnel and the conditions of our Armed Forces; not in the short run but for the long term.

On the part of the military, they need to accept that in a volunteer armed force, conflict and therefore casualty may be part of what they are called upon to face.

On the part of the public, they need to be prepared for the long as well as the short campaign, to see our participation alongside allies in such conflict not as an atavistic, misguided attempt to recapture past glories, but as a necessary engagement in order for us to protect our security and advance our interests and values in the modern world.

It is not easy to have this debate with the swirl of recent publicity about the conditions of our Armed Forces - however wrong or exaggerated it might be; or when we are in the middle of two deeply controversial engagements of our troops. Yet this is the right time to debate and decide it precisely because of such stormy argument.

The reason for the storm is not this or that grievance or conflict. Its origin is the new situation we face. The post Cold War threat is now clear. The world has changed again. We must change with it. I have set out the choice I believe we should make. I look forward to the debate.
 
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