Time for something new --- Lend Lease...

. Could they really have afforded to divert even a small percentage of their industrial capacity to make trucks and locomotives?

Doppleganger

Depends what you mean. If Germany was effectively defeated in the winter of 41/42 as some historians believe it would only have prolonged the war, in fact the Allies might have got to Berlin first since they would have more trucks. In the later stages of the war this would certainly have been the case since Germany was no threat to Russia herself after the summer of 1944 because the fuel ran out.
 
Doppleganger

Depends what you mean. If Germany was effectively defeated in the winter of 41/42 as some historians believe it would only have prolonged the war, in fact the Allies might have got to Berlin first since they would have more trucks. In the later stages of the war this would certainly have been the case since Germany was no threat to Russia herself after the summer of 1944 because the fuel ran out.

Haha I was just about to make a similar post, it has been argued that Germany could no longer win the war after it failed to take Moscow, Russia was not declared eligible for lend lease aid until November 7 1941 and the first shipments (mainly food) arrived while the battle of Moscow was underway.


I can accept that lend lease allowed Russian industry to concentrate on the production of fighting vehicles which had to have helped there war aims but if the process did not start until after the German chance to win the war had passed then surely its effects cannot be considered crucial.


I suppose a great deal of Britain's aid would have been squandered in bombing raids and supporting the soft underbelly strategy. It must have also included a fair proportion of expensive high tech equipment and military hardware. Russia's aid consisted of a great deal of trucks, food and raw materials, the bread and butter of building a military machine.

I am going to agree with Churchill on this one, the bomber offensive was a second front.

When you consider: (estimated figures)
- 55000 anti-aircraft guns including 70% of the 88mm production was dedicated to air defence over the Reich (this also consumed huge quantities of ammunition that would otherwise have been shooting at Russian tanks.
- 2 million men were tied up defending against the bombers.
- Over half the Luftwaffe's fighters were assigned to anti-bomber duties.

This does not take into account the damage done by the bombers which some estimate as having cost the Germans 30% of their production a large proportion of which would have been very handy on the Eastern front.

Therefore I would hardly say that the bomber offensive squandered any resources.
 
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I am going to agree with Churchill on this one, the bomber offensive was a second front.

When you consider: (estimated figures)
- 55000 anti-aircraft guns including 70% of the 88mm production was dedicated to air defence over the Reich (this also consumed huge quantities of ammunition that would otherwise have been shooting at Russian tanks.
- 2 million men were tied up defending against the bombers.
- Over half the Luftwaffe's fighters were assigned to anti-bomber duties.

This does not take into account the damage done by the bombers which some estimate as having cost the Germans 30% of their production a large proportion of which would have been very handy on the Eastern front.

Therefore I would hardly say that the bomber offensive squandered any resources.

I know someone who would disagree on this one, interesting to hear your sources on this one! I don't entirely disagree though, but if we are talking about the effectiveness of lend lease we must be talking about 1942 i.e. pre Stalingrad. Where sufficient resources diverted from the Eastern front during this period? When increased fighter production was proposed didn't Goering say something like what do we do with all these fighters?

Wouldn't the resources have been better employed on maritime duties during this period?
 
Most of the information came from two books:
- The Luftwaffe over Germany: Defense of the Reich by Caldwell and Muller
- Germany and the Second World War Vol VII - The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia by Boog, Krebs and Vogel.
 
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