Thoughts on the Russo-Ukranian War?

[I3BrigPvSk]

The Russian army has a problem to equip their soldiers which force them to issue their soldiers with slightly older equipment.

 

[MontyB]

The Russian army has a problem to equip their soldiers which force them to issue their soldiers with slightly older equipment.

Latest Russian body armour?


Given the level of ridicule they have reached in a little over a year I am not sure why they persist in threatening to drive all the way to London, the oxen towing the trebuchets would take decades to get there.

 

[I3BrigPvSk]

Latest Russian body armour?


Given the level of ridicule they have reached in a little over a year I am not sure why they persist in threatening to drive all the way to London, the oxen towing the trebuchets would take decades to get there.

Yep, I have been thinking about the Ukrainian spring offensive and trying to predict where they will launch it. I guess north of Bakhmut, south from Zaporizhzhiza toward Crimea. If this one is successful, the Ukrainian forces may cross the river around Kherson. One option might be between Melitopol and Mariupol to cut off the Russian supply lines between Donbass and Crimea

 

[I3BrigPvSk]

I am not surprised by what these victorious generals are saying .They all claim victory for them while neglecting the role of the opponent .
German historiography is still doing it for Fall Gelb
US and UK historiography do it for Overlord and for Barbarossa . and for Stalingrad and the U Boats,etc,

Do you imagine Schwartzkopf saying that the role of the DIA and NSA was much exaggerated ? This would be a suicide .
And Sun Tzu is not a serious source .
The outcome of a war is essentially decided by the strength relation of both sides ,not by deception .
The same for the outcome of a campaign,of of a battle .
US won the Battle of the Ardennes, although they were surprised by the German attack .
The defender has to be stronger than the attacker, much stronger ,as the attacker can chose where to attack,while the defender can not chose the sectors he will defend .

The intelligence is a vital part of warfare when it provides with information about the opponent, his planning, where is assemble his forces. Deception can play a vital part, see Mincemeat and Fortitude.

It is actually the opposite. The attacker must be stronger than the defender where he decide to attack. The attacker can use deception to force the defender to deploy forces somewhere else

 

[MontyB]

Yep, I have been thinking about the Ukrainian spring offensive and trying to predict where they will launch it. I guess north of Bakhmut, south from Zaporizhzhiza toward Crimea. If this one is successful, the Ukrainian forces may cross the river around Kherson. One option might be between Melitopol and Mariupol to cut off the Russian supply lines between Donbass and Crimea

The problem with the Mariupol idea is that Russia can still supply forces west of that axis from Crimea and east from current supply lines and it leaves Ukraine with two active fronts to maintain with a much smaller force, my preference would be to cross the river at Kherson forcing Russia to supply its front via Crimea and the east and make use of its precision long range artillery to thin out resupply efforts.

I guess we will find out what Ukraine has planned soon enough.

The intelligence is a vital part of warfare when it provides with information about the opponent, his planning, where is assemble his forces. Deception can play a vital part, see Mincemeat and Fortitude.

It is actually the opposite. The attacker must be stronger than the defender where he decide to attack. The attacker can use deception to force the defender to deploy forces somewhere else

My understanding is that the recommended ratio is a five to one advantage to the attacker but that doesn't take into account the quality of the respective forces I guess.

 

[I3BrigPvSk]

The problem with the Mariupol idea is that Russia can still supply forces west of that axis from Crimea and east from current supply lines and it leaves Ukraine with two active fronts to maintain with a much smaller force, my preference would be to cross the river at Kherson forcing Russia to supply its front via Crimea and the east and make use of its precision long range artillery to thin out resupply efforts.

I guess we will find out what Ukraine has planned soon enough.

The Ukrainians will get problems to protect their flanks if they attack between Melitopol and Mariupol. To simultaneously attack along the eastern shores of Dnepr and across it in Kherson can divide the Russian defense while smashing the Russian logistics in the south while the Russians are deploying forces into the meat grinder around Bakhmut.

 

[MontyB]

The Ukrainians will get problems to protect their flanks if they attack between Melitopol and Mariupol. To simultaneously attack along the eastern shores of Dnepr and across it in Kherson can divide the Russian defense while smashing the Russian logistics in the south while the Russians are deploying forces into the meat grinder around Bakhmut.

The benefit of pushing out of Kherson is that it would cause issues for Putin given the close proximity to Crimea he will want to defend it as Ukraine even getting a foothold on Crimean territory would be very embarrassing for him.

The big problem here is that I am guessing, I don't even have the experience to back those guesses but I assume if there was a chance of Ukrainian forces getting back on Crimean soil Putin would move troops to prevent it which should give secondary fronts an easier time.

 

[I3BrigPvSk]

The benefit of pushing out of Kherson is that it would cause issues for Putin given the close proximity to Crimea he will want to defend it as Ukraine even getting a foothold on Crimean territory would be very embarrassing for him.

The big problem here is that I am guessing, I don't even have the experience to back those guesses but I assume if there was a chance of Ukrainian forces getting back on Crimean soil Putin would move troops to prevent it which should give secondary fronts an easier time.

Crimea is more vulnerable than Donbass if the Ukrainians are able to isolate it from the Russian supply lines. There are several ifs and maybes with it, but if the Ukrainians are able to destroy the Kerch bridge and to reduce the Russian supplies in Crimea it will be harder for the Russians to defend it.

 

[BritinBritain]

The intelligence is a vital part of warfare when it provides with information about the opponent, his planning, where is assemble his forces. Deception can play a vital part, see Mincemeat and Fortitude.

It is actually the opposite. The attacker must be stronger than the defender where he decide to attack. The attacker can use deception to force the defender to deploy forces somewhere else

Churchill said, ''The truth is so precious it must be protected by a bodyguard of lies''

I see Russia is making threats to Sweden and Finland that if they join NATO, Finland and Sweden will become "targets" for Moscow if they join NATO, warned the Russian ambassador in Stockholm.

After their accession, "the total length of the borders between Russia and NATO will almost double", Ambassador Viktor Tatarintsev said on Tuesday.

"If it still seems to anyone that this will somehow improve Europe's security, rest assured that the new members of the hostile bloc will become a legitimate target for Russian retaliatory measures, including those of a military nature", he added.

Russia has repeatedly threatened the Nordic pair after they submitted bids to join the western military alliance last May, following the outbreak of war in Ukraine.

 

[MontyB]

Churchill said, ''The truth is so precious it must be protected by a bodyguard of lies''

I see Russia is making threats to Sweden and Finland that if they join NATO, Finland and Sweden will become "targets" for Moscow if they join NATO, warned the Russian ambassador in Stockholm.

After their accession, "the total length of the borders between Russia and NATO will almost double", Ambassador Viktor Tatarintsev said on Tuesday.

"If it still seems to anyone that this will somehow improve Europe's security, rest assured that the new members of the hostile bloc will become a legitimate target for Russian retaliatory measures, including those of a military nature", he added.

Russia has repeatedly threatened the Nordic pair after they submitted bids to join the western military alliance last May, following the outbreak of war in Ukraine.

Russia seems to have a hard-on for nuclear threats, the problem is that they are largely meaningless.
If they fire them the human world is done, automated response renders Russia's much vaunted hypersonic missiles a waste of money as they will die 10-15 minutes after the west but they will still end up radioactive vapour so they will get a very short victory party.

As for NATO admission, it seems Finland will be accepted on Thursday as Hungary passed them yesterday and Turkey votes today, Sweden will most likely wait until after Turkish elections.

 

[lljadw]

The intelligence is a vital part of warfare when it provides with information about the opponent, his planning, where is assemble his forces. Deception can play a vital part, see Mincemeat and Fortitude.

It is actually the opposite. The attacker must be stronger than the defender where he decide to attack. The attacker can use deception to force the defender to deploy forces somewhere else

Fortitude is a bad example .The same for Mincemeat .The Germans were obliged to defend Sardinia and Greece,otherwise the Allies could easily land there .
Besides, there is no proof that Husky would have failed without the Mincemeat deception .
It is the same for Fortitude .The defense of Sicily was the mission of the Italians ,the Germans had not the needed forces available to defend Sicily ,even without Mincemeat .
And intelligence as such is not a benefit unless ..you have the manpower to exploit it .
And ,it is the opposite of what you are claiming :the defender must be stronger than the attacker,not where the attacker attacks, but everywhere,as the attacker can attack everywhere .
If Germany had reinforced Sicily at the expense of Greece and Sardinia, the Allies would have attacked in Greece and Sardinia .
It is the same for Barbarossa :the GRU (military Cheka ) has been unjustified blamed for the initial German successes .But the James Bond fans forget that having adequate information and insufficient forces does not help you .

 

[lljadw]

Russia seems to have a hard-on for nuclear threats, the problem is that they are largely meaningless.
If they fire them the human world is done, automated response renders Russia's much vaunted hypersonic missiles a waste of money as they will die 10-15 minutes after the west but they will still end up radioactive vapour so they will get a very short victory party.

As for NATO admission, it seems Finland will be accepted on Thursday as Hungary passed them yesterday and Turkey votes today, Sweden will most likely wait until after Turkish elections.

Sweden will have to wait on the consent of Turkey AND of Hungary .
If Hungary said NO,Sweden will not become a member of NATO .

 

[lljadw]

About Fortitude : on 6 June 7th Army had 12 ID and 15th Army 10 ( not counted the forces in Belgium and the Netherlands ),this was not caused by Fortitude, but because 7th Army needed more forces as there was no Atlantik Wall in its sector .
Til August divisions of 15th Army were not transported to Normandy, because these (most fortress) divisions without motorized transport were useless in Normandy .
Without the Atlantik Wall the fortress divisions were useless and without the fortress divisions the fortifications could not repel an allied attack,even an attack from only one division .
On D Day, 2SSPzD (Das Reich ) stationed near Toulouse ,some 1000 km away from Normandy received the order to go to the front ( it took DR a month to arrive in Normandy ) ,the reason of this order was not that the OKW was convinced that Overlord was the principal attack, but that Germany had not enough forces to repel 2 attacks : the first attack,even if it was a feint,had to be eliminated before an other attack would be launched and where these 2 attacks would happen,was not important .
Source for the strength of 7th and 15th Armies : Chester Wilmot :the Struggle for Europe .
The location of the PZD of HGB was determined by logistical reasons and these divisions did not belong to 7th or 15th armies and are thus not included in the strength of these 2 armies .

 

[Tuan]

Without going off-topic, I would say in our discussions about the thoughts on the Russo-Ukrainian war; we stay focused on how to counter the present-day Russian resurgence, which has allied with Chinese aggression, not focused on past military histories because there are specific threads in this forum for military historians. But that's not the purpose of this particular thread.

Hence we should focus on the present day, which is at stake, and how future warfare will take shape. Against this backdrop, if I may suggest, we focus on the future without going backward like the Russians. I want to discuss what NATO defines "interoperability" as the ability of Allies to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. I am fascinated by how the US military-industrial complex has invented the F-35A Lightning II, for instance. When I say "interoperability," I mean when the world's most lethal battle tanks, battleships, and fighter jets are interlinked by satellites and become game changers and shaping future warfare.

For instance, this article piques my curiosity and ponders the improbable.

F-35: The Most Advanced Node in the 21st Century Warfare

In the highly-contested 21st century battlespace, success is determined by the ability to securely connect and share information across domains – air, land, sea, space and cyber.

Enter the 5th Generation F-35: the most advanced node in a 21st Century Warfare network-centric architecture.

The F-35 is already redefining the modern battlespace by sensing and fusing data, and in the near future sharing multi-source data seamlessly across networks. This unmatched capability reduces decision timelines for the joint warfighters and enables sensor-to-shooter connectivity with unprecedented situational awareness across the Joint All Domain Operations (JADO) battlespace.

5th Generation Capabilities Enable Joint Battlespace Operations

The F-35 is more than a fighter jet, it’s a powerful force multiplier with advanced sensors and communications suites operating close to the battlefield and from an elevated position significantly enhancing the capabilities of networked airborne, maritime, space, surface and ground-based platforms. This significantly enhances situational awareness and survivability for the pilot – and the entire joint force – and equips the commanders with critical capabilities and information in seconds.

This game-changing capability has been successfully proven during a series of flight test and exercises, most recently as part of Project Hydra, Northern Edge, Orange Flag and Flight Test-6.

During the recent Flight Test-6 exercise, a Lockheed Martin PAC-3 missile successfully intercepted a surrogate cruise missile threat at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), New Mexico, using F-35 as an elevated sensor. This U.S. Army flight test marks a first in one flight test – F-35 data contributing to the global track used by the U.S. Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS) to live fire a PAC-3.

Enhancing Missile Defense Capabilities

Unlike any other fighter before it, the F-35 offers integrated capabilities that can significantly enhance U.S. missile defense capabilities. There are three areas in which the F-35 can potentially support missile defense – today and in the future:

1. Left of Launch: The best way to stop an incoming missile is to ensure it is never launched in the first place. The F-35’s stealth and advanced sensors allow it to enter contested air space, find, track and destroy missile threats before they are even launched, including mobile threats. The F-35’s delivered today are capable of executing high end, strategic attack missions that can be leveraged to stop missile attacks before they launch.

2. Sensor Node: The F-35 is more than a fighter jet, it’s a powerful force multiplier with an advanced sensor and communications suite that is able to significantly enhance the capabilities and range of networked airborne, surface and ground-based platforms. In the missile defense arena, F-35s can detect and track missile threats at a much closer distance – and are able to connect sensor information between aircraft and queue existing missile defense systems to engage an incoming threat. This enables missile defense systems to see, track and destroy threats sooner and safer. This capability has been demonstrated successfully in various exercises and in order to deliver advanced threat detection to the battlefield, additional work is critical to ensuring F-35s and networked missile defense assets are able to communicate securely and seamlessly.

3. Direct Engagement: The Pentagon’s Missile Defense Review (MDR) states that, “the F-35 Lightning II, can track and destroy adversary cruise missiles today and, in the future, can be equipped with a new or modified interceptor capable of shooting down adversary ballistic missiles in their boost phase.” This mission would require F-35s to be within sensor range of a launching missile threat, while equipped with advanced air-launched interceptors capable of tracking, engaging and defeating a ballistic missile. We look forward to working with the Pentagon to identify the technology roadmap and concept of operations to deliver this critical capability.

Outpacing Emerging Threats

While the F-35 offers unmatched capabilities today, the platform is poised to continue to mature and the F-35 Enterprise will continue to integrate new technologies and capabilities into the F-35 to outpace emerging threats.

The F-35 Advanced Capability Insertion program is enabled by rapid, continuous software upgrades that have already delivered the life-saving Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System (Auto GCAS) to the F-35 fleet – seven years earlier than previously planned. Capability insertion is included in the upgraded sensor fusion capability in F-35 Production Lot 13 and beyond; integrating enhanced voice and data interoperability in Lot 14, and delivering Tech Refresh 3 (TR-3) in Lot 15.

 

[I3BrigPvSk]

Fortitude is a bad example .The same for Mincemeat .The Germans were obliged to defend Sardinia and Greece,otherwise the Allies could easily land there .
Besides, there is no proof that Husky would have failed without the Mincemeat deception .
It is the same for Fortitude .The defense of Sicily was the mission of the Italians ,the Germans had not the needed forces available to defend Sicily ,even without Mincemeat .
And intelligence as such is not a benefit unless ..you have the manpower to exploit it .
And ,it is the opposite of what you are claiming :the defender must be stronger than the attacker,not where the attacker attacks, but everywhere,as the attacker can attack everywhere .
If Germany had reinforced Sicily at the expense of Greece and Sardinia, the Allies would have attacked in Greece and Sardinia .
It is the same for Barbarossa :the GRU (military Cheka ) has been unjustified blamed for the initial German successes .But the James Bond fans forget that having adequate information and insufficient forces does not help you .

Fortitude and Mincemeat are good examples of how to use deception.

https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/d-days-parachuting-dummies-and-inflatable-tanks

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Army-Press-Online-Journal/documents/2020/CARMINATI-1.pdf

https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-war-on-paper-operation-mincemeat

https://www.plymouth.ac.uk/discover/what-was-operation-mincemeat

There is a more modern example about how to use deception. The Ukrainians did it when the fouled the Russian to increase the amount of troops around Kherson prior the offensive in the Charkiv region.

The ratio between the attacker and the defender is usually 3 to 1 in favor of the attacker to be successful and it seems you have changed your opinion about it now. If you try to defend everything, you are actually defending nothing. To deploy all your forces evenly you will prevent smuggling, but tactically and strategically it is not vise to do so.

It is always useful to have the intelligence working for you to get information about the opponent.

 

[I3BrigPvSk]

Without going off-topic, I would say in our discussions about the thoughts on the Russo-Ukrainian war; we stay focused on how to counter the present-day Russian resurgence, which has allied with Chinese aggression, not focused on past military histories because there are specific threads in this forum for military historians. But that's not the purpose of this particular thread.

Hence we should focus on the present day, which is at stake, and how future warfare will take shape. Against this backdrop, if I may suggest, we focus on the future without going backward like the Russians. I want to discuss what NATO defines "interoperability" as the ability of Allies to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. I am fascinated by how the US military-industrial complex has invented the F-35A Lightning II, for instance. When I say "interoperability," I mean when the world's most lethal battle tanks, battleships, and fighter jets are interlinked by satellites and become game changers and shaping future warfare.

For instance, this article piques my curiosity and ponders the improbable.

F-35: The Most Advanced Node in the 21st Century Warfare

That's the latest RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) How air, naval, and ground forces are linked to each other. NATO's military doctrine has evolved since the 1980s (Air Land Battle)

The F-35 is an awesome aircraft, but the stealth technology doesn't make it undetectable, it makes it harder for the air defense to detect it. How the air component will look like in the future? Hard to know, but I guess the air forces will be using drones more and more

 

[lljadw]

Fortitude and Mincemeat are good examples of how to use deception.

https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/d-days-parachuting-dummies-and-inflatable-tanks

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Army-Press-Online-Journal/documents/2020/CARMINATI-1.pdf

https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-war-on-paper-operation-mincemeat

https://www.plymouth.ac.uk/discover/what-was-operation-mincemeat

There is a more modern example about how to use deception. The Ukrainians did it when the fouled the Russian to increase the amount of troops around Kherson prior the offensive in the Charkiv region.

The ratio between the attacker and the defender is usually 3 to 1 in favor of the attacker to be successful and it seems you have changed your opinion about it now. If you try to defend everything, you are actually defending nothing. To deploy all your forces evenly you will prevent smuggling, but tactically and strategically it is not vise to do so.

It is always useful to have the intelligence working for you to get information about the opponent.

Not always :intelligence/deception is useful only when you have the forces to exploit the results of intelligence/deception . Something which the Germans had not .
For Mincemeat and Fortitude the Allies would have succeeded also without deception,because the Germans were forced to use the tactic of robbing Peter to pay Paul and deception had no determining influence on their decisions .
That it is tactically and strategically not wise to deploy your forces evenly is correct, but in wartime,armies do not do what is theoretically correct, but what is possible .
Panzerlehr was the strongest unit in the West, but on D Day,its second tank battalion was going east because the Eastern Front needed desperately reinforcements .
A few days after D Day 2 weak SS Pz divisions were leaving the eastern front for Normandy,although they were needed in the East, because they were more needed in the West ,not because the OKW was convinced that the landing in Normandy was the decisive landing .
In September 1950 US forces landed at the coast of Korea (Incheon ) and surprised the North Koreans, but if these were not surprised, the landing would still be successful,as NK had not the needed forces to repel the US forces .
In last instance it was not deception that made Incheon a success,but the inability of NK to defend Incheon .
Deception is only decisive if without deception the operation will fail .

 

[lljadw]

There is a more modern example about how to use deception. The Ukrainians did it when the fouled the Russian to increase the amount of troops around Kherson prior the offensive in the Charkiv region.

NO : there is no proof that the offensive in the Charkiv region succeeded because the Russians were taught that there would be an offensive around Kherson .
The truth is that the Russians had not the forces to defend successfully and Kherson and the Kharkiv region .
If the Russians reinforced the Charkiv region there would be an attack against Kherson .
If they reinforced Kherson there would be an attack against Charkiv .
Russian strategy is not determined by speculation or even knowledge where the Ukrainians would/could attack, but by the fact that they can't defend everything successfully and by the fact that they must defend everything .
The Russians can not strip Charkiv from forces even if they know that there will be an Ukrainian attack against Kherson and the opposite .

 

[I3BrigPvSk]

NO : there is no proof that the offensive in the Charkiv region succeeded because the Russians were taught that there would be an offensive around Kherson .
The truth is that the Russians had not the forces to defend successfully and Kherson and the Kharkiv region .
If the Russians reinforced the Charkiv region there would be an attack against Kherson .
If they reinforced Kherson there would be an attack against Charkiv .
Russian strategy is not determined by speculation or even knowledge where the Ukrainians would/could attack, but by the fact that they can't defend everything successfully and by the fact that they must defend everything .
The Russians can not strip Charkiv from forces even if they know that there will be an Ukrainian attack against Kherson and the opposite .

There are proof of it

https://mwi.usma.edu/the-kherson-ruse-ukraine-and-the-art-of-military-deception/

https://cove.army.gov.au/article/ukrainian-kharkiv-counter-offensive-and-information-operations

 

[lljadw]

I am not convinced by what is saying the MWI/ISW ( besides :do you know who is Jack Keane ? )
They said that Ukraine used deception,something no one denies, but they are unable to prove that Ukraine would have failed without deception and that the Russians fortified Kherson because they were thinking that the Ukrainians would attack there .
And the article is full of mistakes, as the claim that the Germans fortified the Pas de Calais because they were convinced that the Allies would land at the Pas de Calais .