Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Washington Times
July 11, 2008
Pg. 23
Thinking through the endgame
By Daniel L. Davis
After five years of combat, over 4,100 U.S. military deaths and an expenditure of over $650 billion, the vast majority of Americans understandably want to see a resolution to the war in Iraq. There are generally two schools of thought on how best to resolve this complex problem: 1) Continue reinforcing the gains made over the past year until Iraq is stable and secure, and 2) Withdraw the troops as quickly and safely as possible. Elements of both ideas have clear positive components. But each likewise contains real risk. There is a third way that embodies the best advantages of each, minimizes some of the most critical risk and makes possible a successful conclusion to the war for both the government of Iraq and the United States.
Few realize that there is much more at stake for the United States in Iraq than simply measuring the effectiveness of the Iraqi Armed Forces or counting how many benchmarks the their government has achieved: Every day our Army remains deployed in Iraq, its ability to respond effectively to serious threats to America's vital national interests diminishes. We must find a way to reverse this trend while not placing at unnecessary risk the Iraq gains we've paid such a high price to achieve.
This plan acknowledges that we have made notable progress in the past year. That progress is not yet fully self-sustaining and recognizes that we must ensure our armed forces regain and then maintain the ability to respond to the toughest missions they could be given. Specifically, I recommend that, first, 18 months from the inauguration of the next administration, a methodical, well-coordinated and organized redeployment of the Army's main fighting formations (the Brigade Combat Teams, or BCTs) begin. Second, this redeployment will be executed over a 24-month period, using a cascading scale which allows the BCTs to return to their home bases in a systematic, coordinated method so that the last brigade closes on its home station on the last day of the 24th month.
Third, following this three-and-a-half year period, the military will provide logistical support, intelligence support, combat aviation support, and mentor/training support for the Iraqi military to ensure their nascent forces continue progress toward a self-sustaining, independent military organization. Fourth, for some number of years following the completion of the redeployment of the final BCT, the United States will also keep a robust Heavy Brigade Combat Team in the region as a quick reaction force (QRF) to respond to any crisis that exceeds the capability of the Iraqi armed forces to handle. The location of this force will be jointly determined by the United States and Iraq in consultation with other nations in the region.
By providing Iraq an additional 18 months of full military support before any redeployment begins, we do not jeopardize the gains we've worked so hard to achieve. By taking 24 months to complete the redeployment, we ensure that Iraq will continue to have robust American military support while the Iraqi government and military continue to strengthen the gains they have made.
At the same time, however, this approach provides sharp focus to Iraqi civilian and military leaders that our commitment is not without end and that it is their responsibility to take advantage of this extended period of support to fully prepare themselves mentally and physically to take control of their future. While virtually all of the public focus on the war has centered on events occurring within Iraq, the United States military - and the Army in particular - faces a growing problem as a result of what it has not done.
Since the insurgency began in the summer of 2003, our ground forces have conducted virtually none of the maneuver training necessary to ensure their success should they have to execute a new, unexpected conventional war. The more time passes with our troops remaining engaged exclusively in Iraq and Afghanistan - training only on low-intensity, small-scale warfare - the greater the risk that we will not be ready should we need to engage in an unexpected conventional war. What a tragedy it would be if we became the global masters at conducting counterinsurgency warfare, but then proved unable to handle even a moderately difficult ground war.
Though it may be considered unpatriotic to even suggest, I contend that it is conceivable that as great a military power as we are, the United States could lose a conventional fight if we enter it unprepared. Technological advantage alone will not overcome insufficient training. Getting the bulk of our combat forces responsibly out of Iraq so they can address this current imbalance will go a long way toward ensuring the unthinkable never happens.
Maj. Daniel L. Davis is a cavalry officer in the United States Army who fought in Desert Storm and served in Afghanistan.
July 11, 2008
Pg. 23
Thinking through the endgame
By Daniel L. Davis
After five years of combat, over 4,100 U.S. military deaths and an expenditure of over $650 billion, the vast majority of Americans understandably want to see a resolution to the war in Iraq. There are generally two schools of thought on how best to resolve this complex problem: 1) Continue reinforcing the gains made over the past year until Iraq is stable and secure, and 2) Withdraw the troops as quickly and safely as possible. Elements of both ideas have clear positive components. But each likewise contains real risk. There is a third way that embodies the best advantages of each, minimizes some of the most critical risk and makes possible a successful conclusion to the war for both the government of Iraq and the United States.
Few realize that there is much more at stake for the United States in Iraq than simply measuring the effectiveness of the Iraqi Armed Forces or counting how many benchmarks the their government has achieved: Every day our Army remains deployed in Iraq, its ability to respond effectively to serious threats to America's vital national interests diminishes. We must find a way to reverse this trend while not placing at unnecessary risk the Iraq gains we've paid such a high price to achieve.
This plan acknowledges that we have made notable progress in the past year. That progress is not yet fully self-sustaining and recognizes that we must ensure our armed forces regain and then maintain the ability to respond to the toughest missions they could be given. Specifically, I recommend that, first, 18 months from the inauguration of the next administration, a methodical, well-coordinated and organized redeployment of the Army's main fighting formations (the Brigade Combat Teams, or BCTs) begin. Second, this redeployment will be executed over a 24-month period, using a cascading scale which allows the BCTs to return to their home bases in a systematic, coordinated method so that the last brigade closes on its home station on the last day of the 24th month.
Third, following this three-and-a-half year period, the military will provide logistical support, intelligence support, combat aviation support, and mentor/training support for the Iraqi military to ensure their nascent forces continue progress toward a self-sustaining, independent military organization. Fourth, for some number of years following the completion of the redeployment of the final BCT, the United States will also keep a robust Heavy Brigade Combat Team in the region as a quick reaction force (QRF) to respond to any crisis that exceeds the capability of the Iraqi armed forces to handle. The location of this force will be jointly determined by the United States and Iraq in consultation with other nations in the region.
By providing Iraq an additional 18 months of full military support before any redeployment begins, we do not jeopardize the gains we've worked so hard to achieve. By taking 24 months to complete the redeployment, we ensure that Iraq will continue to have robust American military support while the Iraqi government and military continue to strengthen the gains they have made.
At the same time, however, this approach provides sharp focus to Iraqi civilian and military leaders that our commitment is not without end and that it is their responsibility to take advantage of this extended period of support to fully prepare themselves mentally and physically to take control of their future. While virtually all of the public focus on the war has centered on events occurring within Iraq, the United States military - and the Army in particular - faces a growing problem as a result of what it has not done.
Since the insurgency began in the summer of 2003, our ground forces have conducted virtually none of the maneuver training necessary to ensure their success should they have to execute a new, unexpected conventional war. The more time passes with our troops remaining engaged exclusively in Iraq and Afghanistan - training only on low-intensity, small-scale warfare - the greater the risk that we will not be ready should we need to engage in an unexpected conventional war. What a tragedy it would be if we became the global masters at conducting counterinsurgency warfare, but then proved unable to handle even a moderately difficult ground war.
Though it may be considered unpatriotic to even suggest, I contend that it is conceivable that as great a military power as we are, the United States could lose a conventional fight if we enter it unprepared. Technological advantage alone will not overcome insufficient training. Getting the bulk of our combat forces responsibly out of Iraq so they can address this current imbalance will go a long way toward ensuring the unthinkable never happens.
Maj. Daniel L. Davis is a cavalry officer in the United States Army who fought in Desert Storm and served in Afghanistan.