Structuring the Military

[Spartacus]

One of the books I am currently reading, How Wars are Won, discusses the need to restructure the Army to better meet the needs of todays battlegrounds. It seems to suggest that overall the Army is still structured for a large direct confrontation with an enemy who fights a regular type of war. As a civilian, and one with limited knowledge of the actuality of the situation, from what I have seen, this seems to be true. The speed and decisiveness with which we took down the regular troops supported by the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq seems to demonstrate our ability to fight a conventional war, one with established objectives and fronts.

This level of success has not been reflected by our stay-behind force. I am not saying that I think we are losing, or even that we arent doing any good, I am simply saying that perhaps there are other methods that may be more successful in dealing with an enemy who is unwilling to fight a regular war. The book discusses a method in which the Army isnt structured with such a top-heavy hierarchy, one with military brass making frontline decisions. It gives more independance to small unit commanders to make decisions regarding their AO. I believe they called it a Pod system. Basically, a couple of platoon strength units would form a pod, and these pods could assemble quickly to perform an attack, and then disperse, making themselves less of a target.

The way I understand it, each pod, or smaller groups, would have a specific area in which they would operate. They would then A) be less of a target, B)be able to better locate and identify enemy targets. They could coordinate with other pods, whether it be air support or ground troops, and quickly strike a target, then quickly redisperse and look for more targets.

I dont know if this strategy is applicable in the context of our current engagement, particularly with the amount of time needed to make such a fundamental change in the structure of the Army. I was just wondering if perhaps those with a more intimate knowledge of our tactics and strategies would see any disadvantages to our current mode of operation, and perhaps see ways to make it better.

 

[LeEnfield]

Most of these books are based on what is regarded as proper wars, in which I mean you have a known enemy, a known objective and once you had defeated the enemy the war was over and every thing went back to normal. Since the end of WW2 there have been countless battles with terrorist, you don't have a known enemy, you can't conquerer his territory as he does not have any, they don't wear any uniform and after attacking you will they will just blend in with the local population. Which leaves some one fighting a very long and bloody war with no end in sight. does this remind you of any thing.

 

[Spartacus]

Most of these books are based on what is regarded as proper wars, in which I mean you have a known enemy, a known objective and once you had defeated the enemy the war was over and every thing went back to normal. Since the end of WW2 there have been countless battles with terrorist, you don't have a known enemy, you can't conquerer his territory as he does not have any, they don't wear any uniform and after attacking you will they will just blend in with the local population. Which leaves some one fighting a very long and bloody war with no end in sight. does this remind you of any thing.

Which is why I posed the question I did. HOW do we retool the military to cope with the changing face of warfare, or more aptly called conflict.

 

[LeEnfield]

You don't, you have to treat each and every one in a different manner You can't always work to a fixed plan on these sort of things. This one of Americas weaknesses that they always want a fixed plan to deal with a problem and this does not always work. The thing is you got to give junior officers far more responsibility to take action and follow it through.

 

[Whispering Death]

The idea I have had would be to create a new branch of the millitary that is designed specifically for peacekeeping. This branch would be reservists who would be trained much like police and SWAT officers. I imagine many of its NCOs as being active SWAT-type members.

There would be a need to learn a foreign language also with the idea being that in any platoon you have a few people who can communicate at least in a rudimentary fassion anywhere on the globe. So some guys would learn russian, others would learn koran and others farci... not fluently but enough to get by if deployed.

You could then arrange a low-intensity combat situation where the reserve corps beefs up indigenous police and nat'l guard units as the scalpel and the army retains its job as the broad sword.

 

[Craftsman]

... you have to treat each and every one in a different manner You can't always work to a fixed plan on these sort of things. This one of Americas weaknesses that they always want a fixed plan to deal with a problem and this does not always work.

I agree with this, there is no quick fix or easy soloution to deal with our modern armies inadequacies against terrorists. However i believe a reorg of modern infantry structure IS long overdue. I know Australia has something new in the works, replacing its 9 man sections with 4 man ones. Where 4 men has a greater advantage in urban combat and recon style tasks etc.. and two 4 man sections can easily combine to form a patrol.

you don't have a known enemy, you can't conquerer his territory as he does not have any, they don't wear any uniform and after attacking you will they will just blend in with the local population. Which leaves some one fighting a very long and bloody war with no end in sight.

This is the bottom line. I doubt there is any way a conventional military force can completely defeat a guerilla style force on their own ground, short of annihilating entire populations.

 

[Forrest_Gump]

An ongoing project since about 1997 is "Army After Next", which deals with pretty much all of the issues mentioned above. The Army is changing, and if placed in a historical context, changing rather quickly, even if it does not seem so in our 7 second sound bite world. "AAN" papers and such are spread far and wide over the internet, and most of it is pretty dry and or technical, but its worth a read if you want to know what is going on. Here are a couple of the thousands of links:
http://www.dod.gov/execsec/adr98/army.html

http://cpof.ida.org/PARAMETERS,%20US%20Army%20War%20College%20Quarterly%20-%20Autumn%201998.htm

http://migrate-anteon.anteon.com/offer/Functional_Solutions/Transformation/index.aspx?id=502

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/docs/astmp98/index.html

 

[PJ24]

The idea I have had would be to create a new branch of the millitary that is designed specifically for peacekeeping. This branch would be reservists who would be trained much like police and SWAT officers. I imagine many of its NCOs as being active SWAT-type members.

There would be a need to learn a foreign language also with the idea being that in any platoon you have a few people who can communicate at least in a rudimentary fassion anywhere on the globe. So some guys would learn russian, others would learn koran and others farci... not fluently but enough to get by if deployed.

You could then arrange a low-intensity combat situation where the reserve corps beefs up indigenous police and nat'l guard units as the scalpel and the army retains its job as the broad sword.

This sounds kind of like the B movie version of US Army Special Forces groups. Their bread and butter mission is FID (forgien internal defense). What that means is they go in, get some good rapport going and help train local militia, military and security forces. Population security is also a mission of theirs, once the local security forces are trained they assist them in suppressing insurgencies and with counter-terror missions. They're also well trained in UW(unconventional warfare) and DA (direct action). All are NCOs and all have been to DLI to learn a target language.

There is also the Army's new Asymmetrical Warfare Group.

 

[Whispering Death]

Yeah, the idea is similar to what the green berets do but it's less intense and more broad in mission. Like how the green berrets learn 2 or 3 foreign languages fluently a guy in this reserve corps would only need to learn one decently enough to make communication.

Think of this corps more like a middle ground between police officer and soldier. They would be the guys on the street corners of baghdad to respond to looting while the army is smashing insurgent strongholds in Fallujah and stopping foreign fighters on the syrian boarder. They would also have a smaller footprint so you don't have bradley's and M1A2s roaming around the neighborhood.

This corps wouldn't be a long-deployed force either. It's more something that's designed to give a larger force presance, keep the peace, and endear the local populace to our side. I think the idea of having the "nice" americans who keep the peace and the "badass" army that kills insurgents and eats them for breakfast would also help keep the peace instead of forcing hard-nosed grunts to try and be ambassadors one day and trained killers the next.

 

[Insight]

I see what you mean. Have guys trained in police work, civil affairs, and trained to interact with the local community and culture, all the while still trained to fight and be part of the military structure.

Oh, wait.......

 

[Whispering Death]

Yes, but as you well know, one active duty infantryman costs the government as much as 8 reservists. The idea is to have a large pool of specialist peacekeepers come in to increase the force presence in post-war while leaving a smaller negative footprint in a relatively cost-effective manner.

 

[Insight]

The average active duty member is usually worth about 8 reservists, in my experience.

 

[RnderSafe]

Yeah, the idea is similar to what the green berets do but it's less intense and more broad in mission. Like how the green berrets learn 2 or 3 foreign languages fluently a guy in this reserve corps would only need to learn one decently enough to make communication.

Think of this corps more like a middle ground between police officer and soldier. They would be the guys on the street corners of baghdad to respond to looting while the army is smashing insurgent strongholds in Fallujah and stopping foreign fighters on the syrian boarder. They would also have a smaller footprint so you don't have bradley's and M1A2s roaming around the neighborhood.

This corps wouldn't be a long-deployed force either. It's more something that's designed to give a larger force presance, keep the peace, and endear the local populace to our side. I think the idea of having the "nice" americans who keep the peace and the "badass" army that kills insurgents and eats them for breakfast would also help keep the peace instead of forcing hard-nosed grunts to try and be ambassadors one day and trained killers the next.

Green berets are hats and I have yet to see one speak one language, much less two or three. :-D

Army SF soldiers learn one target language - you would be hard pressed to find many SF soldiers fluent in more than one language unless they knew one coming in or are rather far in their careers. You will find men with a short vocabulary for different languages, however.

Each SFG is assigned a specific AOR so you will find 7th grp soldiers speaking Spanish as opposed to Arabic.

Your idea sounds more fitting for a private military company rather than the US military. The problem being is that you want the best of both worlds - a military mind set and a civilian police officer mind set. This is difficult to accomplish.

As for this group not being long deployed, impossible. It takes quite a bit of time to built the trust needed to become an influential part of these people's lives. Not to mention the skills you want them to have are parishable.....reservists will not have the opportunity nor the time to refine their skills. Our National Guard SF groups pull this off quite well, but their pipeline is as long as their active duty counterparts and they spend a great deal of time deployed in support of operations.

We have many groups within the US military who are trained to win the hearts and minds of the population as it is. I am not sure creating a new reserve group with such a broad spectrum of tasks would be the best idea. Remember, the more broad they are the less likely they are to become proficient at any one tasking.

If we had a civilian agency to augment military tasks your idea may work, but I wouldn't want them training in any tactics nor would I want them engaging in military operations with or without the indigenous forces.

 

[msgtmedleyusmc]

As for this group not being long deployed, impossible. It takes quite a bit of time to built the trust needed to become an influential part of these people's lives.

I agree. While such a group may be attractive and using reservists would be less expensive, I think the long deployment would make it unworkable for reservists. It is hard enough these days to get reservists (except those who have no choice for a while). Putting this into the mix would make it much more difficult.

I think that the US military has made great strides in this area over the years. The changes I saw during my time were huge and from what I see from the outside these days, the pace has only accelerated.

 

[03USMC]

a military mind set and a civilian police officer mind set. This is difficult to accomplish.

Speaking from experiance there is such a wide gulf between Military Operations and Civil LE operations even in the Spec Op's arena of LE that training one unit to be both is a recipe for failure. You are ethier a solider or a cop.

 

[Spartacus]

When I posed this question, I wasnt really posing a question as to whether or not we should create a new unit which would be better suited to the task at hand, although that is a possibility. I was more asking, being since large-scale conventional/regular warfare seems virtually extinct, is there a need for an army in which its strength relies in numbers and heavy weapons? With modern military technology, large bodies of concentrated troops are just asking to be destroyed, be it from long range-missiles, smart bombs, nukes, etc.



Think about how WWII was fought. On the whole, lines were set, fronts established, and specific objectives were in place. It was more of a matter of determining an enemies weakness in a specific area and exploiting it to greatest advantage. If we were to attempt to fight such a war in todays technological context, the body count would have been astronomically higher than it was, at least on the military side of things. Perhaps the accuracy of todays missiles and ordinance would have reduced the number of civilian casualties, but the ability to strike an enemies position would also have been greatly enhanced. It would be unfruitful and even wastefull to position large bodies of troops, merely to have them wiped out by precision ordiance.



I am not suggesting creating a new branch to cope with the changes as muc has I am suggesting restructuring the Army as a whole. However, I am also not suggesting completely eliminating the "regular" elements of it either. What I am suggesting is perhaps it is time to reevaluate our position on how the Army should be organized. I do not believe that conventional warfare is dead, although it seems it is well on its way. It seems logical that our enemies, once they discover they cannot defeat us on a linear battlefield, would devise other ways in which to be more successful. The methods would most likely involve a guerrilla style war, one in which their objective is simply to inflict casualties and wear down the moral, not so much of the troops but more of the home populous. I think it goes to say that the conflicts in which we have been/are/will be involved in will probably take on this new face, since there are few nations who could field an army capable of fighting a convention war on such a large scale.

What I am asking is if it makes more sense to reorganize the Army into smaller, more independant units who are able to coordinate between each other, combine to attack a major target, then break back into the small-unit.

Basically, it seems as though the days of conventional warfare are almost over. Since the face of war is taking more of a turn towards guerilla and unconventional methods, perhaps restructuring the Army into a pattern meant to better deal with such tactics, rather than continue to develop the current conventional structure.

I personally do not have the experience or qualifications on the matter, for all I really know is from what I read, and we know what the power of the press is worth. Thats why I posed this question here, to see what people with first-hand experience, not just in battlefield experience, but also in stuctural and organizational knowledge have to say on the matter. My hope is to gain a greater understanding so that I may serve better when I join.

 

[PJ24]

What I am asking is if it makes more sense to reorganize the Army into smaller, more independant units who are able to coordinate between each other, combine to attack a major target, then break back into the small-unit.

Basically, it seems as though the days of conventional warfare are almost over. Since the face of war is taking more of a turn towards guerilla and unconventional methods, perhaps restructuring the Army into a pattern meant to better deal with such tactics, rather than continue to develop the current conventional structure.

My opinion? No. Bad idea. We already have groups that specialize in COIN and UW, I don't think structuring the entire force around this is a good idea. It is asking for trouble. Conventional warfare poses just a big a threat to US forces today as it did 30 years ago. We have to maintain the highest readiness for high intensity conflict and that means we have to keep our major force primarily conventional.

What we do need, IMO is more influence of those in the "know" at command levels. The material and the training is there and available for conventional units, most of the tactical skills our forces have can carry over into UW. What isn't there are commanders willing to take advantage of it or willing to think outside of the box. Leaders like LTG Boykin or Mattis need to be put at the front, instead of being black balled. We don't have to restructure our entire force to add a few new items to our black bag of tactics.

We must continue to possess the forces and systems we need to provide conventional deterrence and, if deterrence fails, to win decisively.

 

[msgtmedleyusmc]

We must continue to possess the forces and systems we need to provide conventional deterrence and, if deterrence fails, to win decisively.

I agree. There are still a lot of bad actors out there with big armies (and even decent navies). We can't afford to ignore them. A military optimized for low intensity conflicts will make them relatively more powerful.

 

[Craftsman]

Originally posted by 03USMC
Speaking from experiance there is such a wide gulf between Military Operations and Civil LE operations even in the Spec Op's arena of LE that training one unit to be both is a recipe for failure. You are ethier a solider or a cop.

What about MPs? They pretend to be both.

Originally posted by PJ24
I don't think structuring the entire force around this is a good idea. It is asking for trouble. Conventional warfare poses just a big a threat to US forces today as it did 30 years ago. We have to maintain the highest readiness for high intensity conflict and that means we have to keep our major force primarily conventional.

Originally posted by msgtmedleyusmc
I agree. There are still a lot of bad actors out there with big armies (and even decent navies). We can't afford to ignore them. A military optimized for low intensity conflicts will make them relatively more powerful.

I don't think you are grasping the question laid out by Spartacus.

What I am asking is if it makes more sense to reorganize the Army into smaller, more independant units who are able to coordinate between each other, combine to attack a major target, then break back into the small-unit.

No where does he ask if you should reconfigure the entire army around guerilla warefare. A smaller basic unit is a fantastic idea in my opinion. Like I stated before, a group of 4 men has numerous advantages over that of one twice it's size or more, and can easily combine with another when a task requires.

Now i don't know much about USA infantry structure, but ours is along the lines of:
9 men to a section.
3 sections to a platoon.

Where is the problem of breaking the structure down one more time for tasks that so require?

 

[Whispering Death]

Now i don't know much about USA infantry structure, but ours is along the lines of:
9 men to a section.
4 sections to a platoon.

Where is the problem of breaking the structure down one more time for tasks that so require?

We actually do.

4 men to a fireteam
2 fireteams + 1 squad leader to a squad
~3 squads to a platoon (add headquarters and other personel)
3 platoons to a company (add HQ etc.)

And the army now teaches very advanced MOUT where you might move with "reinforced fireteams" and then break off into 2 man teams to clear rooms and corridors.