The Soviet-German War, 1941-1945: Myths and Realities

MontyB

All-Blacks Supporter
I have been watching this video by COL (Ret) David M. Glantz that I stumbled on a couple of days ago.

I found it interesting.

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Clz27nghIg&feature=player_detailpage"]The Soviet-German War, 1941-1945: Myths and Realities - YouTube[/ame]
 
The myths still are dominating the reality,because the history of the war in the east was written by the losers (the Germangenerals),who,all,said after the war :it is the fault of Adolf .

The Soviet history of the war was as bad:it only was propaganda.

Other myths are:the importance of the weather (it was only cold on the Germanside),the importance of the so called decisive battles(Moscow,Stalingrad,Kursk,Bagration),the importance of the tanks,of Lend Lease,etc
 
lljadw

Do you not think the weather had quite a big impact on German offensive operations in the Fall/Winter of 1941? Whether the testimony of German generals is flawed or not, there is abundant photographic evidence to show otherwise. Napoleon was also seriously hindered by the autumn rasputitsa and its effect on an advancing army cannot be understated. Not to mention the winter that followed. You also ignore the fact that bad weather will affect an offensive army far more than a defensive one. You can certainly say that the Germans were unprepared to cope with the Russian weather but you cannot say it's importance was a myth.

Coming to the battles I'll give you that Stalingrad, Kursk and Bagration were not decisive in the sense that they changed the outcome of the war. But seriously, you don't think Moscow wasn't decisive? Whether you believe the Germans had any chance at all isn't the point. What is relevant is that Moscow was the only real opportunity they had and they failed. After that, they would not be favoured to win a war of attrition. How is that not decisive? It's up for argument but had the Germans a) focused the schwerpunkt only through AGC and b) had built up greater reserves of fuel they might have taken Moscow. It was lack of fuel that really stalled the German advance in the end.
 
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I am still not convinced that they needed to take Moscow at all, I am almost of the opinion that everything the Germans needed to take was in the South.

I understand that Moscow was a communications hub but looking at road, rail and river lines I am of the opinion that the loss of Moscow would have been insurmountable or even a major hindrance for the Russians.
 
The weather problem is a false problem ,because it had no influence on the German failure .
The Germans failed in the summer:the introduction of Barbarossa stipulated that the war had to be won in a quick and short campaign,but at the end of the summer,the Germans had lost more than 400000 men,and ....the Soviet Union had not collapsed . It was over.
All that happened afterwards (Typhoon) had no chance to succeed .
As the Germans failed in good weather,the argument that if there was no winter,they could win,is not valid .
 
I am still not convinced that they needed to take Moscow at all, I am almost of the opinion that everything the Germans needed to take was in the South.

I understand that Moscow was a communications hub but looking at road, rail and river lines I am of the opinion that the loss of Moscow would have been insurmountable or even a major hindrance for the Russians.

Sorry :no
1)The Germans conquered the south,and ...lost the war

2)From a German POV (and here Adolf and his generals agreed)Moscow,Leningrad,etc,were irrelevant .

The aim of Barbarossa was to destroy the Soviet forces on the border,which would result in the collaps of the SU,and than,to advance as quickly as possible,to the AA line,which would happen without bitter fighting .

If the Germans had to fight to conquer Moscow,the war was lost :it would mean that in october,1000 km from the supply depots,the WM still was opposed by an undefeated Soviet Army .

The goal was:the Red Army,the rest would follow.

It also was so for Typhoon:the Germans attacked DIRECTION Moscow,because they hoped that the Soviets would concentrate the rests of their army in the Moscow region,to defend the capital .

No one at the OKW/OKH dared to think on the possibility that the Red Army would not fight for Moscow,which would mean that Typhon would be useless
 
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If the Germans had taken Moscow would it have made any difference to the war, well Napoleon took Moscow and the war just continued, just the same as it would have done had the Germans captured Moscow
 
If the Germans had taken Moscow would it have made any difference to the war, well Napoleon took Moscow and the war just continued, just the same as it would have done had the Germans captured Moscow

I agree I don't think Moscow was all that important, it was a transport hub but it was only a transport hub to places further west that they had captured already.

As for the goal of Barbarossa being the destruction of the Russian military it is hard not to agree with the comment but isn't that the goal of all invasions?
 
On a lot of forums,a lot of people are unable to grasp the reality of 1941,being educated with things as C3,Desert Storm,wars without big casualties,covered by CNN,with wargames,etc .

The Germans were realistic :it was impossible to conquer European Russia in a long campaign (even in 1944,the Allies needed 10 months to eliminate Germany):in a long war,the SU could mobilize millions,what Germany could not ,and,this would be the decisive factor .
The only possibility was to destroy in a short campaign,the standing Soviet forces,which were located in the western parts of European Russia,hoping that,meanwhile,the SU could not mobilize and send to the front new units.
After this short campaign,which,following the Germans,would result in the collaps of the SU,light armed and mobile units would advance as quickly as possible to the A-A line,only hindered by sporadic resistance of local fanatics,the A-A line had to be reached before the winter,even before the autumn.The Germans had to be in Moscow before september,because,what some people do not grasp,Moscow is not located in the middle of the SU,it is a city located in the western part of European Russia:the distance from Brest-Litowsk to Moscow is some 1000 km,and from Moscow to the A-A line ...also 1000 km,and from the AA line to the Urals ...again 500 km. Imagine the allies arriving (after 10 months of bitter fighting )at Berlin (Paris Berlin :1000 km) and discovering that they still had to go 1500 km eastwards .


As such;the importance of Moscow was minor .
Transposed to 6 june 1944 ,the Allied strategy would be :destroy in a few weeks the German armies in Normandy,and than,full speed not to Berlin ,but to East Prussia,the goal being to be in Berlin before september,in East Prussia,before november .
All this in the hope/assumption/wishfull thinking that meanwhile the Germans could not mobilize new units,but that in the summer the Third Reich would fall apart,and that there only would be local resistance from fanatical Hitlerjugend boys.
 
The weather problem is a false problem ,because it had no influence on the German failure .
The Germans failed in the summer:the introduction of Barbarossa stipulated that the war had to be won in a quick and short campaign,but at the end of the summer,the Germans had lost more than 400000 men,and ....the Soviet Union had not collapsed . It was over.
All that happened afterwards (Typhoon) had no chance to succeed .
As the Germans failed in good weather,the argument that if there was no winter,they could win,is not valid .
I don't follow your argument that the war was over at the end of summer 1941. If you are rigidly sticking to the initial guidelines of Barbarossa then you might be correct but the reality is that the Germans were deep in European Russia, still with significant forces available to them and an army in front of them that was desperately trying to plug the gaps. That isn't failure, yet - Moscow was still there to be taken. How important you think capturing Moscow was is another argument entirely.

Typhoon had a chance to succeed; what stopped it was:

a) the autumn rasputitsa that slowed down the German advance at critical junctures
b) the failure to ensure that adequate winter supplies were on hand that greatly exacerbated German losses
c) an inadequate logistical supply chain
d) a critical lack of fuel in the final stages - it was lack of fuel that mainly stopped 2nd Panzer Army from capturing Tula
e) the failure of Kluge to support the 2nd phase of Typhoon with 4th Army
f) several pockets were not fully closed by German forces, allowing trapped Soviet forces to escape (I'm not sure about the importance of this one)

It should be noted that the Red Army was almost powerless to stop the German advance during this time. The Germans greatly assisted towards their own failure as they did all through the Ostfront. Barbarossa was deeply flawed from the start but had they captured Moscow who knows. That's why a Soviet strategic victory here was so important and why it's probably the most decisive battle of WW2.
 
Hm:I think that we disagree
about the question what the aim of Typhoon was :it never was the capture of Moscow:it was the elimination of what the Germans thought to be the last Soviet reserves,what would following the Germans result in the collapsof the SU :Typhoon was a baby Barbarossa/a light Barbarossa .

Had it (with the usual hindsight) any chance to succeed : NO

At the start of Typhoon,the Germans were weaker than in june,and the Soviets were stronger:the enormous Soviet losses at Wiazma/Briansk did indicate that the Soviets had still enormous reserves.

a)there is no proof that the slowing down of the Germans by the rasputitza,was important :in plain English :there is no proof that the Germans would have advanced faster without the Rasputitza;

there also is no proof that this advance would have been decisive

b)the problem of the winter supplies is irrelevant for Typhoon :
- Typhoon failed in the autumn
-The "winter" losses wre marginal (a few %) because the winter was not that harsh,and most soldiers had winter supplies (see :Winterkleidung oder munition,)

c)the importance of the logistical problems is much exaggerated :the Ostheer was holding out in the winter,with bigger logistical problems

d) that is what Guderian claimed,but,whatever;there is no proof that the capture of Tula would result in the collaps of the Red Army

e)the failure of von Kluge also is a post war story spreaded by Guderian

f)the failure to close the pockets was inevitable,due to the lack of motorisation of the German army,and,it started in the summer


That the Soviets were incapable to stop the German advance is irrelevant ,because to advance never was the German goal:when they were at the suburbs of Moscow,the Germans had advanced 1000 km in 5 months,and were still 1000 km away from the A-A line ......
The big point is that between 22 june and the end of november,the Soviets were able to send every month 1 million men to the front,and the Germans ....100000 men .

The only possibility for Barbarossa to succeed was in the summer,and,at the end of august,the Red Army still was there,undefeated,and stronger than before .
 
The aim of Typhoon was not specifically Moscow, but there's no doubt that the capture of Moscow became the focal point. The Germans indeed intended to eliminate the last Soviet field armies that opposed them and did not expect the Red Army to have the ability to put new armies in the field so quickly. Plainly they underestimated the Red Army and the will of the Soviet soldier to resist. They forgot that whilst the average soldier would not die for Stalin, they certainly would die for their country as any nationalist would.

You don't think the Germans would have advanced faster had there been no rasputitsa? Sorry, I find this argument rather difficult to understand and logically it doesn't make much sense. The comparative lack of paved roads in Russia at the time turned unpaved roads (not to mention the steppes) into seas of mud during the rasputitsa seasons, which would have been made worse by the actions of thousands of vehicles and men marching over them. This would have severely hampered offensive operations and cannot be in doubt.

As far as the severity of the weather I direct you to this link, which has useful information regarding the temperature during the winter of 1941. If you look you'll see information that backs up the opinion that the Russian winter of 1941 was one of the coldest of the 20th century. I think you even posted on the thread (assuming you are the same person) so you should know.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=55&t=182049

You say that "the importance of the logistical problems is much exaggerated :the Ostheer was holding out in the winter,with bigger logistical problems."

I don't understand this reasoning, given that the logistical problems that the Germans faced, if anything, is somewhat overlooked by most. It's patently obvious that the whole supply chain for the Ostheer was barely adequate for its intended purpose. For example, German doctrine laid down that a Panzer division should have 600m2 of fuel in order to advance 100km and conduct offensive operations. Very rarely was this achieved and most Panzer divisions had half this amount or less. These shortcomings were repeated all the way through the various parts of the supply chain. In summary, the logistics for Barbarossa and then Typhoon were just about adequate if things went well, which they didn't at the end of 1941.

I don't think Guderian or anyone else claimed that capturing Tula would cause the capture of Moscow. I've never seen that claimed or written. What was important was the fact that Tula was in the path of 2nd Panzer Army and between it and Moscow. It was simply another city to be captured on the way. Nor have I seen any evidence that Guderian claimed that Kluge failed to support the 2nd phase of Typhoon. Please come up with some evidence for this. The failure to close pockets is in fact criticism of operational tactics of Guderian and others, nothing to do with lack of motorised forces for the job.

You said this. "The only possibility for Barbarossa to succeed was in the summer,and,at the end of august,the Red Army still was there,undefeated,and stronger than before."

Oh really?? Undefeated?? Stronger than ever?? Not in August 1941 mate, no way hosé. In 1941, the Red Army was in large parts an untrained rabble with poor training, officers that lacked leadership abilities and under-equipped troops. It was an army that reacted and lurched from crisis to crisis. Sure they had their successes and came away with a major victory at the end of 1941 but not in August. By 1945, the Red Army was the most powerful army in the world but in August 1941 it was a rabble. Sorry, it's the truth.
 
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About the weather : you can't have both : you can't say and that the winter was very harsh and that there was a big shortage on winterclothing,because we know that the "winter" losses were marginal : only a few %.

If it was that cold,and only a fewhad winterclothing,NO ONE would have survived .

Winterclothing does not protect against minus 40 C ,it is only limiting the casualties of minus 20/30,temperatures which were not uncommon in eastern Germany.

The only logical conclusion is that
a) the winter was not that cold as has been claimed : you do not survive with winterclothing at minus 40

b)that amost every one had winterclothing : without winterclothing,you do not survive at minus 15


About the Russian army in august :the facts are that at the end of august,Barbarossa had failed(the SU had not collapsed) and that the Germans were faced with a strategic crisis : from Leningrad to the Black Sea ,they were stopped and the Soviets were counterattacking.

In june,the Germans lost 41087 men,=4565 a day

In july,the Germans lost 166818 men,=5560 a day

In august,the Germans lost 195725 men a day =6313 a day


Was the Red army in august an untrained rabble ? If it was,the Germans would be in september in Moscow .



About the rasputitza : no,one can not claim that the Rasputitza was stopping the Germans;
there was no rasputitza in the summer,and the Germans failed.

if there was no rasputitza in the autumn,the Germans also would fail .

I know that after Wiazma/Briansk,the German pursuit was hindered by the weather,during a few hours,but,this never was deciding,even without Rasputitza,the distance to Moscow still would be the same,and,without rasputitza,the Soviet reserves would arrive .
 
Thanks Op for posting that vid, Glanz makes some very good points about the effectivness of the red army. from the start of the campaign.
 
Every German commander commented on the need to get the Russian rail network up and running and the Germans never did. The Soviet Union had the most extensive rail network in the world next to the U.S. The railroad are critical in Russia given the distances and the weather. The Russian roads were a bad joke as the Germans soon learned.
As the Russians retreated they destroyed the railroads. The Germans did not have the capacity to repair them, to replace the rolling stock or to deal with the difference in gauge between the Soviet and German rail gauge.
There were of course, other factors in the German failure. They had a very narrow window in which to achieve a victory and they lost it for variety of reasons, but logistics weighs heavily in the account and the railroads were a critical element.
 
Thanks Op for posting that vid, Glanz makes some very good points about the effectivness of the red army. from the start of the campaign.

Indeed I found it a very interesting video and given Glanz's reputation as a historian thought it worth posting.

Every German commander commented on the need to get the Russian rail network up and running and the Germans never did. The Soviet Union had the most extensive rail network in the world next to the U.S. The railroad are critical in Russia given the distances and the weather. The Russian roads were a bad joke as the Germans soon learned.
As the Russians retreated they destroyed the railroads. The Germans did not have the capacity to repair them, to replace the rolling stock or to deal with the difference in gauge between the Soviet and German rail gauge.
There were of course, other factors in the German failure. They had a very narrow window in which to achieve a victory and they lost it for variety of reasons, but logistics weighs heavily in the account and the railroads were a critical element.

I have for a while believed that the biggest failing of the German war machine was its logistics, we hear rather horrific tales of how poorly it ran.

However there is also the fact the the German army remained an effective fighting force right to the very end of the war because of its abilities to adapt and move troops to where they needed to be on very short notice they were without a doubt very good battlefront "firefighters" and had their logistics been as bad as believed I find it hard to believe they could have done this as fluently as they did.
 
It's interestin how soon after the germans attacked in 41, russia were able to plan and execute whole army concenttation on one spot and take ground back for 2 weeks. Then immeaditly do the same thing on a front a thousand miles away and continually do this until germany could no longer orginizse a response (incursion into the hungarian second armies lines at battle of stalingrad)
 
The Red army had more reserves and more equipment from the moment the Germans crossed the border in the summer of 41 (the Red army was 6 million men from day 1 and was 6 million men at the end in 45) they maintained a (2:1) superiority in numbers throughout most of the conflict on the Eastern front. It was the Germans tactics and ability to come up with superior weapons when needed that gave them the edge despite the ever increasing amount of T34's and artery pieces made available to the Red army. The Reds just didn't use them as effectively “in general”.
Unless Hitler stepped in which case the result were usually disastrous. He delayed the attach on Moscow by several months in which time the army did suffer terrible due the worst Russian winter in year, as the lubricants for the vehicles froze up as well. This might not have won the war if the Germans occupied Moscow but it would have been a terrible blow to the Stalin’s and the Soviets prestige. Then Hitler refused to allow the 6th army at Stalingrad to breakout. The Red army easy defeated the satellite armies at the shoulders leaving the 6th army doomed. Then he determined he needed a giant offensive in the summer of 43 at Kurst against the advice of his staff. The Soviets new all about it and this time played there card and stayed on the defense building countless defenses in the salient. After the largest single battle in History the Germans lost as Hitler pulled troops for the Sicily invasion. It was here that Germans were on the run and despite his commanders desire to use they greatest strength mobility and tactics, Hitler denied this to the Wehrmacht with the ridiculous no retreat and stay and die to the last man order.
Let use not forget by 43 the Russians could readily move there large armies using the 1000’s of American built 6 wheelers. The best trucks in the war.
 
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