Slow learners - Page 2




 
--
 
January 31st, 2010  
rattler
 
 
monty, you are right there; Decentralization worked, even though the area bomb period, it had the "hardening" effect described, and - while it destroyed infrastructure for the civilians to an unknown before extent - did not really harm production numbers.

Production was much more influenced by denial of critical materials.

Rattler
February 1st, 2010  
MontyB
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by rattler
monty, you are right there; Decentralization worked, even though the area bomb period, it had the "hardening" effect described, and - while it destroyed infrastructure for the civilians to an unknown before extent - did not really harm production numbers.

Production was much more influenced by denial of critical materials.

Rattler
Exactly even in 1945 German production was on track to match 1944 which was pretty impressive given the resource and territorial losses they had sustained by 1945, this is not the sign of a country bombed into submission.

The simple reality is that area bombing was a failure for the Luftwaffe in 1940-41 and it was a failure for the RAF from 1943-1945 and given the manpower lost in these exercises it was an almost criminal failure, Harris should have learnt from the failure of the London blitz but he was too busy extracting revenge no matter what the cost.
February 1st, 2010  
LeEnfield
 
 
Try working on the fact they about 4 million slaves working in their factories drawn from all over Europe. Also that they built underground factories and work from small sheds all over the country. By the end of the war production was down to a trickle as nearly every bit of infrastructure had been smashed.
--
February 2nd, 2010  
franzmaximilian
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by koalaburger
Some events in wars keep being repeated with nothing learnt or changed. The ones I am thinking of are:

1. How many times did the germans have to invade through the Ardenne before the allies realised it was possible.

2. The bombing of Stalingrad, Monte Cassino Monastery and Caen after D Day showed that all that was achieved was to give excellent cover for streetfighting defenders and to block streets to vehicles. They still continued doing it.

Any additions welcome.
3. The Eleven Battles of Isonzo, June 1915 - September 1917. Eleven offensives that involved about the half of the Italian Army strenght each, caused houndreds of thousands casualties, worn out Army's materials and moral and gained onfy a few miles of spoiled land in total. No one, including the King, ever criticized General Cadorna (chief of staff), who had nearly dictatorial powers and was in total and absolute control of the whole country at war. Strange enough, after showing his dumb incompetence for over two years, he performed surprisingly well at managing the retreat after the collapse at the Twelveth Battle, saving the Army before Allied forces could be operative in support.
February 3rd, 2010  
koalaburger
 
 
I have always felt that the bombing caused the Germans to take a lot of 88's off the front line for Ack ack defence of cities. A fair few troops as well. I have no figures so I wonder whether the numbers made it a significant effect on the front line battles.
February 3rd, 2010  
LeEnfield
 
 
There were over a million people involved in Ack Ack Batteries through out Germany trying to beat off the attacks from the air. This was the only second front we could affect until we were strong enough to cross the channel. By the time Allies had landed in Normady the German air force had been greatly reduced to a fraction of what it had been.
February 3rd, 2010  
MontyB
 
 
I am not saying that the bombing of Germany was uncalled for nor am I saying it had no effect on their war effort I am saying that the bombing of civilian populations as a method of altering the war effort and demoralising the populace failed just as it did in China and Britain earlier.

If you analyse the effectiveness of the USAF's campaign over Germany against that of the RAF you will see that American attempts at precision bombing had a far greater effect on German combat efficiency than that of the RAF.
February 4th, 2010  
LeEnfield
 
 
In 1942 the RAF found that most of their bombs were falling up to five miles away from their target, so they went over to area bombing. By 1944 with airborne radar and radio positioning they could drop their bombs on any area the size of a tennis court in Germany.
The bombing by the Americans altough courages was also a form of area bombing as each plane did not line up to drop its bombs, they watched the bomb leader and the group would all then drop their bombs, hoping to plaster the whole area. If the bomb leader got it wrong then so did every other plane.
February 21st, 2010  
AVON
 

Topic: Re: Slow learners


Quote:
Originally Posted by MontyB
Exactly even in 1945 German production was on track to match 1944 which was pretty impressive it was a failure for the RAF from 1943-1945 and given the manpower lost in these exercises it was an almost criminal failure
While some places the bombing did slow down certain forms of production (oil, etc.), many other areas it did not help much because it forced the Germans to moved their centralized production to many small production faciclities spread over a large area.
Do you feel the convoy system across the Altantic Ocean was a waste of manpower? Shipping goods by convoys was far more costly in human lives and material than the air bombing campaign!
It was a British economist that first proposed to the RAF, that to destroy seven large railroad choke points would be the most effective way to hurt German war production. The bombing that hurt the Germans the most, was the crippling of the railroad infrastructure! The result was many Me-262s were produced but, could not be mated to the many engines that had been produced but, had no way to shipped the engines to where they were needed the most, at the airfields. There are many examples of this type of problem once the railroads were no longer effective.
Bombers were used as bait! Bait to get the Luftwaffe fighters to come up and fight the Allied escort fighters. If the Allied fighters went down to strife enemy airfields, many experienced Allied fighter pilots would get shot down by flak. (Only a few USAAF 'aces' were shot down by Luftwaffe fighters, all the rest were shot down by flak!) Killing the Luftwaffe in the air prevented the Luftwaffe from being a problem on D-Day or the days after that.

Quote:
Originally Posted by MontyB
Harris should have learnt from the failure of the London blitz but he was too busy extracting revenge no matter what the cost.
The failure of the Luftwaffe in its efforts to defeat the RAF, was not that they attempted to destroy the RAF but rather, the lack of intelligence and many tactical mistakes.
The efforts to destroy the radar stations and quit before eliminating enough radar stations to put a real hole in the detection network. Destroying the airfields and then stopped before that task was complete. Resulted in the RAF remained an effective fighting unit.

Quote:
Originally Posted by MontyB
If you analyse the effectiveness of the USAF's campaign over Germany against that of the RAF you will see that American attempts at precision bombing had a far greater effect on German combat efficiency than that of the RAF.
Yes, the USAAF was a little more accurate and.... they paid a higher price in aircraft and air crew losses.

Also keep in mind, until the invasion in North Africa, later Sicily and, Normandy.... there were many days when the Western Allies did nothing to take the pressure of the Russians fighting on the eastern front other than the air campaign!
February 21st, 2010  
LeEnfield
 
 
Now why does every one only quote the Bomber raids in Europe, what about the bombing raids on Japan. They where far more deadly than any thing that went on in Europe.
 


Similar Topics
Dassault Aviation to slow production - report
Gators hoping to slow down McFadden
Compensation for wartime losses going slow
Anger at slow aid to Guatemala mudslide village
Iran Quake Survivors Complain of Slow Aid Effort (Reuters)