About major Schreiber : why did he use as sources
The German Generals talk
The Rommel Papers
Everyone knows that these are totally worthless and contain only lies and propaganda written by someone with dubious motives .
Why is Schreiber not using Italian sources, as it were the Italians who were responsible for the transports from Europe to Africa ?
Why is Schreiber totally ignoring the Italians?The Italians did not only the transports,but were fighting as much as the Germans ?
We all know the reason :US and especially US military were /are in total awe for the exploits of the WM and have only contempt for the Italians . It is the same in Britain,where Rommel is admired ,while Graziani is considered as an incompetent general .
And, about logistics : there is NO proof, NO proof at all that Rommel was running out of fuel .All we have are the claims of Rommel and Liddel Hart .
NO ONE has been able to give the number of supplies, especially fuel that arrived at the Axis front . The only thing we have is the number of supplies that arrived at the Libyan ports,but supplies in Tripoli are not supplies in Gazala .
That means also that the fall of Malta would not change the situation, as only more supplies could arrive in Tripoli ,but what could Rommel do with more supplies in Tripoli .What would be the benefit for Montgomery in January 1943 if more supplies arrived at Alexandria ?
Major Schreiber would have done better if he was writing a paper about the logistical impact on the operations of the British forces in NA, but, curiously (?) no one has done this ,the only thing we have since 70 years are the usual attempts to convince people that if Rommel had done what the US did,he would have won ,but ending mostly with the sarcastic mention that the Germans were not good in logistics . Something which is totally wrong .
The Germans did not lose in NA because Rommel made mistakes, but because Britain was stronger .
The following figures are from Douglas Austin ( of the Malta lobby ) P 164 of ''Malta and British Strategic Policy 1925-1943 )
Axis supplies sent and arriving to NA ( I give rough figures )
June sent 41000 tons ,arrived 32000 tons
July sent 97000,arrived 91000
August sent 77000 ,arrived 51000
September sent 96000,arrived 77000
October sent 83000 ,arrived 46000
November sent 85000,arrived 63000
December sent 12000,arrived 6000
To Tunisia
November 34000 and 34000
December 84000 and 60000
January 88000 and 70000
February 77000 and 60000
March 77000 and 49000
April 48000 and 28000
May 14000 and 3000
5 observations
1 the number of supplies sent/arriving had no impact on the outcome of the fighting
2 the fall of Malta would not mean that more supplies could/would be sent
3 it is very questionable that the ports of NA could handle more supplies
4 it is very questionable that the axis transport system could handle more supplies in NA AND in Europe
5 it is more than possible that in August more supplies arrived at the front than in July,because more supplies that were sent do not mean more supplies that arrived and more supplies arriving in Tripoli are not more supplies at the front .
It was the same situation for the Allies : if in February 1945 more supplies arrived in Antwerp than in January, this does not mean that the front units would have more supplies .The conclusion is that the importance of Antwerp was also very much exaggerated .

Originally Posted by BritinAfrica

You are a bigger idiot than I thought you were.

I did NOT say Rommel ran out of fuel, his demands did not match the fuel he received. My German Shepherd has more idea about logistics then you do. I was trained and detailed to carry out supply and demand regarding logistics for many years. Your inane comments shows that you have no idea whatsoever.

I hate having a battle of wits with an unarmed person.

I suggest that you read the URL that Monty posted, although I have no doubt that you will say its wrong.

The funny thing is that I sort of agree with him but as usual he takes the most extreme stance on everything, one major aspect in these discussions that continually gets overlooked is that the allies had exactly the same logistical problems which means it comes down to who handled them better.

I am convinced that the problem with Rommel's Afrika Korps was more Rommel's disinterest in logistics than the availability of supplies themselves.

To this end I will give you one more link that I agree with and of course lljadw will disagree with.

https://www.nationalww2museum.org/wa...-korps-1941-43

Originally Posted by MontyB

The funny thing is that I sort of agree with him but as usual he takes the most extreme stance on everything, one major aspect in these discussions that continually gets overlooked is that the allies had exactly the same logistical problems which means it comes down to who handled them better.

I am convinced that the problem with Rommel's Afrika Korps was more Rommel's disinterest in logistics than the availability of supplies themselves.

To this end I will give you one more link that I agree with and of course lljadw will disagree with.

https://www.nationalww2museum.org/wa...-korps-1941-43

We disagree fundamentally : logistic problems do not cause defeats or failures, but are caused by defeats or failures .
The British withdrawal from Dunkirk was not caused by a decision of Hitler ,or by German logistic problems, but by the fact that the BEF /the French were not collapsing,but stopped the Germans . If the BEF was running away, there would be no escape from Dunkirk.
It was the same a year later for Barbarossa :the Soviets stopped the Germans,if they were running away, the Germans would go to the Volga with a few divisions .
It was the same for Compass :the WDF was stopped NOT by the decision to send forces to Greece,but by the resistance of the Italians : without this, Wavell would agree to a proposal of O' Çonnor to go to Tripoli with a few batallions .
But as usual,hurt pride prevented to accept this . It was better for the moral to say that some one on British side screwed the whole thing .
It was the same for Market Garden : the Allies did not lose at Arnhem,but the Germans won .
It was the same for Rommel : he was stopped 2 times by Britain(Summer of 1941 and of 1942 ) but refused to acknowledge this and searched for a scapegoat : the Italians .If after First Alamein 8th Army had collapsed, the logistical problems used as an excuse ,would not have existed: Rommel would have gone to the Canal with was available.
To use logistics as an excuse for a failure/a defeat is hiding the fact that one is unwilling to accept that one was defeated by the enemy .
The decision from Hitler and Mussolini ( not from Rommel ) to go to Alexandria/the Canal and NOT to capture Malta, was very logical and the ''better '' one ,because the alternative was worse, much worse .
The fall of Malta would not result in the fall of Alexandria ,but there was a big possibility that the fall of Alexandria would result in the fall of Malta .Besides there is no proof tat the fall of Malta would result in more supplies for the Axis and that this would result in a victory of the Axis .
The war in NA was,from a military point of view,a burden and a wast for Germany ,but from a political point of view,it was a need .
This war had to be finished,as soon as possible,and Herkules would not finish the war in NA .
The longer the war was lasting, the less the chance for Germany to win him .Thus,when there was a possibility to go to the Canal,it would be stupid not to use it .
Thus ,going east was the correct decision : the Axis had to take risks because they were the weakest side; by remaining defensive, they could not win .
Herkules would only delay defeat .

Originally Posted by MontyB

The funny thing is that I sort of agree with him but as usual he takes the most extreme stance on everything, one major aspect in these discussions that continually gets overlooked is that the allies had exactly the same logistical problems which means it comes down to who handled them better.

I am convinced that the problem with Rommel's Afrika Korps was more Rommel's disinterest in logistics than the availability of supplies themselves.

To this end I will give you one more link that I agree with and of course lljadw will disagree with.

https://www.nationalww2museum.org/wa...-korps-1941-43

On some points I agree with Citino, on other points I disagree, when he fails to see the big picture .

Originally Posted by lljadw

We disagree fundamentally : logistic problems do not cause defeats or failures, but are caused by defeats or failures .
The British withdrawal from Dunkirk was not caused by a decision of Hitler ,or by German logistic problems, but by the fact that the BEF /the French were not collapsing,but stopped the Germans . If the BEF was running away, there would be no escape from Dunkirk.
It was the same a year later for Barbarossa :the Soviets stopped the Germans,if they were running away, the Germans would go to the Volga with a few divisions .

Not entirely true, Paulus would still be fighting it out at Stalingrad had he not run out of men and material and the Romans would still be parked outside Masada had they not had the logistics capability to build a ramp so logistics plays a part in all military results.

The war in NA was,from a military point of view,a burden and a wast for Germany ,but from a political point of view,it was a need .
This war had to be finished,as soon as possible,and Herkules would not finish the war in NA .
The longer the war was lasting, the less the chance for Germany to win him .Thus,when there was a possibility to go to the Canal,it would be stupid not to use it .
Thus ,going east was the correct decision : the Axis had to take risks because they were the weakest side; by remaining defensive, they could not win .
Herkules would only delay defeat .

I agree that NA was a pointless military venture for the Germans as it would have been a campaign with no end, they would have been required to capture two continents to drive the allies out and that would have required a little more than three divisions.

Originally Posted by MontyB

Not entirely true, Paulus would still be fighting it out at Stalingrad had he not run out of men and material and the Romans would still be parked outside Masada had they not had the logistics capability to build a ramp so logistics plays a part in all military results.




I agree that NA was a pointless military venture for the Germans as it would have been a campaign with no end, they would have been required to capture two continents to drive the allies out and that would have required a little more than three divisions.

I was not talking about Stalingrad but about the Summer of 1941,when Barbarossa failed .If at the end of July 1941 the Red Army collapsed,followed by the Soviet state, there would be no logistical problems for the Germans,as they would go to the Volga non with 150 divisions ,but with 30 divisions . The logistical problems for Typhoon existed only because Barbarossa had failed .No failure of Barbarossa means no Typhoon .
It was the same for NA: if after the capture of Tobruk 8th Army had collapsed, Rommel would have no logistical problems to go to the Canal ,if there was no fuel for a PzD,he would have gone to Alexandria with Pz batallions .
If the enemy is defeated, there are no logistical problems,if he is not defeated, the advance is blocked .
Aftter Alamein, Montgomery advanced to Tripoli.Why ? Not because he had sufficient fuel,there is always sufficient fuel, but because the Axis was defeated . A year before,Auchinleck was not going to Tripoli,because ...the Axis was not defeated .

And what would Rommel have achieved if he had made it to the canal?
Britain and the commonwealth mainly India and South Africa still had significant resources capable of making Rommel's life a misery, NA was a no win situation for the Germans no matter what happened.

The Suez Canal was no prize as the Allied convoys couldn't use the Mediterranean safely and preferred to take the longer safer route around the cape and the Germans couldn't use it because the Allies controlled everything on the other side.

Originally Posted by MontyB

And what would Rommel have achieved if he had made it to the canal?
Britain and the commonwealth mainly India and South Africa still had significant resources capable of making Rommel's life a misery, NA was a no win situation for the Germans no matter what happened.

The Suez Canal was no prize as the Allied convoys couldn't use the Mediterranean safely and preferred to take the longer safer route around the cape and the Germans couldn't use it because the Allies controlled everything on the other side.

That's why I said that from a military point of view,the war in NA was a wast,but it was also a burden for Germany,and the sooner it was over,the better .
Hitler hoped that the fall of Alexandria would be the end of the war in NA ( of course it was an illusion,but Germany's situation was already that bad in 1942, that they were forced to use illusions and self wishes as foundations for their strategy : Blau (going for the oil of the Caucasus ) was founded on the illusionary hope that without this oil the USSR would collapse,but still it was better than anything else, or better the alternatives were worse : it was the same for the decision to go to the Canal:remaining defensive and going for Malta would only delay the defeat .
NA was a no win situation : YES. But to abandon NA was no option, thus remained : expel the British or remain at Tobruk .
In 1941 they remained at Tobruk and Auchinleck started a successful counter offensive .
In 1942,they were weaker and Britain was stronger.
The capture of Malta would not weaken Britain and would not strengthen the Axis .

Originally Posted by MontyB

The funny thing is that I sort of agree with him but as usual he takes the most extreme stance on everything, one major aspect in these discussions that continually gets overlooked is that the allies had exactly the same logistical problems which means it comes down to who handled them better.

I am convinced that the problem with Rommel's Afrika Korps was more Rommel's disinterest in logistics than the availability of supplies themselves.

To this end I will give you one more link that I agree with and of course lljadw will disagree with.

https://www.nationalww2museum.org/wa...-korps-1941-43

Without proper logistic control battles are doomed to fail, besides which Rommel was losing fuel, equipment and supplies he could not afford to lose. Length of supply lines also have an effect on the outcome of any battle.

Of course lljadw will disagree with anything that does not gel with his ludicrous agenda. Some said to me privately, "Give it up, you cannot convince an idiot he's wrong."

As I mentioned previously I was trained and took part in military logistic for many years, I have a far better idea regarding the subject then lljadw will ever have.

Originally Posted by BritinAfrica

Without proper logistic control battles are doomed to fail, besides which Rommel was losing fuel, equipment and supplies he could not afford to lose. Length of supply lines also have an effect on the outcome of any battle.

Of course lljadw will disagree with anything that does not gel with his ludicrous agenda. Some said to me privately, "Give it up, you cannot convince an idiot he's wrong."

As I mentioned previously I was trained and took part in military logistic for many years, I have a far better idea regarding the subject then lljadw will ever have.

That Rommel was losing fuel,equipment and supplies that he could not afford to lose is not a serious argument for remaining at Tobruk and adopting a defensive strategy : with such a strategy you can't win . Besides,by remaining defensive he also would lose fuel,equipment and supplies he could not afford to lose .
In 1941,he remained defensive and the result was that he had to withdraw.And the importance of the length of supply lines on the outcome of a battle is
a exaggerated
b does not apply here ,because Rommel never planned to fight at Alamein : he was forced to fight at Alamein because 8 th Army was still intact ,and this caused the failure of Rommel at Alamein. not the 494 km distance between Tobruk and Alamein .
Rommel could be at Alexandria ONLY if there was no battle between Tobruk and Alamein .After Tobruk,Rommel could not afford another battle,even if he won that battle .
It was the same for Blau (the Caucasus offensive ): Blau could succeed only if the Soviets were defeated after one week, were running away,and did not recover .
It was the same for all German battles and offensives in both WWs : Germany could only win if the battles it won were decisive . And they were never decisive .Germany was doomed to attack ,always looking for the decisive battle which would give it victory .
But there were no decisive battles in WWI or WWII .
After Tobruk,the choice was to risk everything in a desperate pursuit of a hopefully defeated enemy,or waiting til the moment one had to flee to Tripoli. Remaining at Tobruk was impossible : the choice was Tripoli or Alexandria .Or Rommel would be at Alexandria or Montgomery would be at Tripoli .
The choice of Rommel was logical .