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After 1957 the US nuclear deterrent was a bluff:after 1957 US would not use nuclear weapons as first. That's why De Gaulle wanted his own nuclear force,because he did not trust the US any more . And Adenauer and Strauss wanted the same as De Gaulle .De Gaulle and Adenauer were convinced that the US nuclear deterrent was a bluff . NATO had NO nuclear forces : US had nuclear forces . Tactical nukes toward military targets in East Europe and the Western part of the SU would kill millions of people and would be followed by Soviet strategical attacks on the US who would kill millions of Americans . US would not sacrific their survival to stop a Soviet conventional attack . |
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By August 1942, luck was running out for Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s vaunted Afrika Korps, and the tables were turning in favor of the hard-pressed British Eighth Army. That month, a third of Rommel’s supplies and almost half his fuel were lost in the Mediterranean, thanks to convoy attacks by Royal Air Force (RAF) medium bombers and Royal Navy submarines. Nevertheless, against the advice of his staff, the “Desert Fox” decided to gamble on an attack. I served in Malta, have you been to Malta, do you even know where it is? |
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That you have served at Malta after the war,does not make you an expert on Malta during the war .
The number of supplies for the Axis ( not for the Germans ) that were lost in August is irrelevant for the outcome of Alamein in November . There are several reasons for this : 1 you don't know for whom these supplies were destined : the front troops or the supply forces . 2 What was deciding was not what was lost underway, not what arrived at the ports,but what arrived at the front .In August 77,224 GRT were transported to Africa,of which 51,655 arrived at the ports, but no one knows when and how many arrived at the front . There is no proof that if there were no losses more supplies would have arrived at the front . 51,655 was low, but the amount of supplies that arrived in March 1942,was even lower= 47,588.And this did not prevent Rommel from launching a new attack against the British forces .In February 1942 the front was at Gazala . Other point : your meaningless claim that the Axis lost almost half of its fuel during the transport to Africa ,is not correct . The following fuel was sent in August For the Italians : 22,167 GRT of which 9,802 arrived For the Germans :16,307 of which .of which 12,698 arrived total :38,474 of which 22,500 arrived = 58,5 % ,thus 41,5 % was lost ,and 41,5 % is NOT almost the half . In June 5,568 tons of fuel arrived In July 23,901 In August 22,500 In September 31,061 These figures had no deciding influence on the outcome of the fighting . About the losses : the ''irony '' is that the more fuel was sent to NA, the more arrived, something that indicates that the results of the attacks from Malta and Egypt were, as happened at all fronts and for all sides,very exaggerated . |
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Those figures had no deciding influences on the outcome of the fighting? Are you a complete moron? Rommel was running out of fuel, therefore without fuel he couldn't fight. As usual you whitter on about something you know absolutely nothing about, you are a total inept idiot who argues for the sake of arguing. |
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![]() Rommel was not running out of fuel and Rommel continued to fight : maybe you don't know , but the fighting in NA did not stop in August ,when, following your strange claims Rommel had no longer any fuel , but : it lasted til May 1943 . And, if general Fredendall was still alive,he would say that you are withering about something you don't know, because, FYI, Fredendall was defeated by the same Rommel,who was without fuel following you, in February 1943 at the Kasserine Pass.And , Rommel used Tiger tanks, who need fuel . And, to go from Alamein to Kasserine, Rommel's trucks and tanks needed also fuel, unless his tanks and trucks used potatoes. |
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Just out of interest here is a 1998 Naval War College paper on Rommels Desert War: The Impact of Logistics on Operational Art.
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a348413.pdf |
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I did NOT say Rommel ran out of fuel, his demands did not match the fuel he received. My German Shepherd has more idea about logistics then you do. I was trained and detailed to carry out supply and demand regarding logistics for many years. Your inane comments shows that you have no idea whatsoever. I hate having a battle of wits with an unarmed person. I suggest that you read the URL that Monty posted, although I have no doubt that you will say its wrong. |
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Rommel was running out of fuel,therefore without fuel he could not fight . The truth is that he was not running out of fuel and that he was fighting : Alamein III. And, I know very well the URL that Monty posted, but I am not impressed by this URL. Because it was written more than 50 years AFTER the events, by an American,living in an other world,where logistics were more important than in 1942 in NA .American military are giving logistics too much importance, because their army is motorized on a scale that did not exist in WWII,and is thus much more depending on logistics than were the armies of WWII .The armies of Rommel and Montgomery were NOT the present American army,were motorized only on a low level and most soldiers were advancing/retreating on foot . The story (hype ) of Rommel losing only because of logistics is a post war invention from the German generals and Liddel Hart to blame the Italians for the defeat of the genial Rommel. The truth is very simple :it was impossible for the Axis to operate with stronger forces in NA,because these forces did not exist ,and even with stronger forces,they would lose . Besides,it would be irrelevant if they ''won ':the war in NA was for the Axis only a side show. To send more forces to NA would only be a wast . |
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