Originally Posted by lljadw

NO : the capture of Malta would not help the Axis : the Italian merchant navy lost 15 % ( not all by Malta )of the goods they transported to NA .But, more goods would not have helped Rommel,because the problem was not the crossing of the Mediterranean ,but the transport of the goods from the ports to the front .
And for Japan : if it had captured India ( impossible ) ,where would its navy obtain the fuel to sail from Calcutta to the Canal ,a canal that would have been blocked by Britain ( it happened in 1967 and in 1973 )?

While I dont agree that Malta was a priority, its capture early on would not have hindered the North African campaign and may have made their life a little easier, but certainly supplies arriving in Africa were less of an issue for the Axis than is commonly thought, I cant recall where I read it but essentially it was taking 1.5 tanker loads of fuel to get 1 tanker load to the front that was causing the most problems.

As for the Indian discussion I do not know why the IJN would have gone to India as they would have invaded (as they did) overland from Burma.

Originally Posted by MontyB

While I dont agree that Malta was a priority, its capture early on would not have hindered the North African campaign and may have made their life a little easier, but certainly supplies arriving in Africa were less of an issue for the Axis than is commonly thought, I cant recall where I read it but essentially it was taking 1.5 tanker loads of fuel to get 1 tanker load to the front that was causing the most problems.

As for the Indian discussion I do not know why the IJN would have gone to India as they would have invaded (as they did) overland from Burma.

If we look at the number of supplies that were sent and lost ( there is also the number of MV/war ships lost,but that is something different ),we have the following figures from Sadkovich '' The Italian Navy in WWII P 344 "

1941 : sent: 1,016,442 Arrived : 853,193
1942 : sent : 925,573 Arrived : 778,985
Only a minority was for the Germans and not all for the front .
About the transport of fuel from Tripoli to the front,it was not only that this transport consumed a lot of fuel, but that the number of goods was limited by the number of trucks and by the amount of time that was needed for the transport .
Would more trucks transport more goods in the same time ? This is questionable .
And, if there was more fuel arriving at Tripoli, how to transport more fuel ? By using more trucks, but for using more trucks, more trucks must be coming and more fuel is needed .
Losses suffered by transports are only ONE of the elements that are determining/limiting the amount of supplies that arrive at the front .And, it is not so that less losses during the transport means more supplies arriving at the front .

Originally Posted by lljadw

If we look at the number of supplies that were sent and lost ( there is also the number of MV/war ships lost,but that is something different ),we have the following figures from Sadkovich '' The Italian Navy in WWII P 344 "

1941 : sent: 1,016,442 Arrived : 853,193
1942 : sent : 925,573 Arrived : 778,985
Only a minority was for the Germans and not all for the front .
About the transport of fuel from Tripoli to the front,it was not only that this transport consumed a lot of fuel, but that the number of goods was limited by the number of trucks and by the amount of time that was needed for the transport .
Would more trucks transport more goods in the same time ? This is questionable .
And, if there was more fuel arriving at Tripoli, how to transport more fuel ? By using more trucks, but for using more trucks, more trucks must be coming and more fuel is needed .
Losses suffered by transports are only ONE of the elements that are determining/limiting the amount of supplies that arrive at the front .And, it is not so that less losses during the transport means more supplies arriving at the front .

The only way for both sides to have resolved the logistics issues would have been to have enlarged the North African ports between Cairo and Tripoli.

It is ironic that the Germans had similar issues in Russia with the need to prioritise what it shipped to the front, I remember listening to an interview where they spoke of having to decide wither to send ammunition, reinforcements/replacements or winter equipment, they could send one but not all three.

Originally Posted by MontyB

The only way for both sides to have resolved the logistics issues would have been to have enlarged the North African ports between Cairo and Tripoli.

It is ironic that the Germans had similar issues in Russia with the need to prioritise what it shipped to the front, I remember listening to an interview where they spoke of having to decide wither to send ammunition, reinforcements/replacements or winter equipment, they could send one but not all three.

To enlarge the ports would help, but would still remain insufficient,because there would still remain the problem of the absence of railways in Libya, which hindered also the British advance in the winter of 1940/41 and 1942/43 .

There was a New Zealand Railway Construction Group operating in North Africa .

Originally Posted by lljadw

There was a New Zealand Railway Construction Group operating in North Africa .

Given the state of New Zealand railways do you mind if I ask who's side they were on?
😊

Originally Posted by lljadw

To enlarge the ports would help, but would still remain insufficient,because there would still remain the problem of the absence of railways in Libya, which hindered also the British advance in the winter of 1940/41 and 1942/43 .

The Germans relied on a single railway line in Russia and by all accounts it was more of a problem than it was worth, there are numerous references to the logistics issues it caused.

I think had they (allied or axis) been able to get Tobruk harbour fully operational it would have made a significant difference.

The Italians were desperate to get fuel to Tripoli because of Malta's interdiction. They even loaded large amount of fuel in barrels on the decks of 2 Cruisers. They became torches when detected by RN ships.

From June to September (included ) 1942,112,304 tons of oil were dispatched to NA (of which 52,164 for the Germans ). 83,030 tons arrived ( 73,9 % ) .
If more oil had arrived to NA ( = in Tripoli ) this would not have
benefited to the Axis, as oil in Tripoli is not oil on the front and as there was no way to transport more oil from Tripoli to the front .
Besides : it is more than questionable that,without Malta, the Italians could have sent more oil to NA,as they had no oil from their own and as their oil had to come from Germany (by rail ) and Romania ( by ship ? )and as the Italian forces in the Balkans ( superior to those in NA ) also had to be supplied..by ship .
The whole supply system was a chain ,where what was decisive was what arrived, not what was lost .And, any problem in the chain had negative results elsewhere .
As one could expect, he problems started not in the ''convoys '' ,but at the beginning of the chain : the Ruhr ( for the Germans ) and Milan ( for the Italians ) .
It was the same for the Atlantic convoys, but the opposite for Antwerp in 1945 .

Originally Posted by lljadw

From June to September (included ) 1942,112,304 tons of oil were dispatched to NA (of which 52,164 for the Germans ). 83,030 tons arrived ( 73,9 % ) .
If more oil had arrived to NA ( = in Tripoli ) this would not have
benefited to the Axis, as oil in Tripoli is not oil on the front and as there was no way to transport more oil from Tripoli to the front .
Besides : it is more than questionable that,without Malta, the Italians could have sent more oil to NA,as they had no oil from their own and as their oil had to come from Germany (by rail ) and Romania ( by ship ? )and as the Italian forces in the Balkans ( superior to those in NA ) also had to be supplied..by ship .
The whole supply system was a chain ,where what was decisive was what arrived, not what was lost .And, any problem in the chain had negative results elsewhere .
As one could expect, he problems started not in the ''convoys '' ,but at the beginning of the chain : the Ruhr ( for the Germans ) and Milan ( for the Italians ) .
It was the same for the Atlantic convoys, but the opposite for Antwerp in 1945 .

This I agree with, looking at the distances involved in North Africa the problem of supply become apparent.
Dusseldorf to Taranto is 1800km
Taranto to Tripoli is 1000km
Tripoli to El Alamein is another 1800km
All up roughly 4600km (2800 miles)

Dusseldorf to Stalingrad is roughly 3000km or 1900 mile.

Most people look at North Africa as a sideshow but in logistical terms it dwarfed the Russian campaign, the cost of shipping material in support of both of these campaigns was phenomenal.

One point to the capture of Malta is that it would have forced the Royal Navy back to Cairo thus eroding it's effectiveness in Mediterranean and possibly making the Axis use of smaller ports like Tobruk safer.