Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
New York Times
March 30, 2008
Pg. 12
News Analysis
By Sabrina Tavernise and Solomon Moore
The most intense fighting in Iraq in months had the ring of the familiar. Another battle against followers of a rebel Shiite cleric. Fighting in the south that spread to other cities.
But as the week came to a close, it was clear that the current fighting in the southern city of Basra and the clashes in Baghdad had some fundamental differences from the battles in Najaf and Baghdad that plagued the American military in 2004.
For starters, the Shiite rebels are fighting mainly Iraqi soldiers, rather than Americans. Their leader, Moktada al-Sadr, is not defending against attacks from a redoubt inside the country’s most sacred shrine, but is issuing edicts with a tarnished reputation from an undisclosed location, possibly outside the country. And Iraq’s prime minister, a Shiite whom Americans had all but despaired would ever act against militias of his own sect, is taking them on fiercely.
The differences represent a shift in the war, whose early years were punctuated by uprisings against Americans by a vast, devoted group of Mr. Sadr’s followers, who were largely respected by Shiites. As their tactics veered into protection rackets, oil smuggling and other scams, Mr. Sadr’s followers too began to resemble mafia toughs more than religious warriors, splintering and forming their own gangs and networks, many beyond Mr. Sadr’s direct control.
Even some Sadrists seemed to understand the toll their methods were taking on their popular appeal, which has become increasingly important as provincial elections draw near.
“We are interested in civic issues more than military issues,” Said Harith al-Ethani, a Sadr representative in Basra, said in February. “We are helping with blood donations; we are providing volunteers for the hospitals; we are handing out gas and food rations,” he continued, sounding more like an old political machine operative than a religious insurgent.
But while Mr. Ethani was offering up the Mahdi Army, Mr. Sadr’s militia, as a kind of Iraqi Salvation Army, Basra residents were groaning under daily assassinations and kidnappings and a wholesale policy of intimidation. By the time the fighting started in Basra on Tuesday, that discontent had spread to a large swath of Iraqi society — including some of its largely Shiite army and police. The shift opened up a space for Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki to move against the Mahdi Army. And while it is far from clear that his effort will succeed — reports of soldier and police surrenders abound — the mere fact that he is trying is new.
Mr. Maliki’s motives are mixed. He wants to take back Basra, a city that has some of the country’s biggest oil revenues, which for years have fed violent Shiite gangs, a portion of them associated with Mr. Sadr. But Mr. Maliki’s strongest backer is the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, a Shiite political party that rivals Mr. Sadr’s and would like nothing better than to see him weakened before the coming provincial elections.
He also risks losing face within his increasingly discontented coalition and with the Iraqi public, which deeply distrust the United States and could see Mr. Maliki as its lackey. The move could as well antagonize Iran, which is an influential sponsor of many of the southern Shiite groups.
Still, a strong note of support for Mr. Maliki’s actions could be heard in the words of some Iraqis interviewed this week, who cast his success as crucial to the future of their country.
“If Mahdi Army wins this war, that means Iraqi will be destroyed,” said a Shiite businessman from Baghdad. “That means Moktada will be president and it will be a stick in the eye of the Americans. It will be a religious country, an extreme country.”
The Mahdi Army’s image is considerably changed from 2004, when its members were seen as Shiite Robin Hoods, protecting undefended neighborhoods, helping distribute cooking gas, and standing up to what many Shiites saw as an act of American aggression, when tanks rolled into Sadr City, a Shiite neighborhood in Baghdad. But during the sectarian violence and terror of the ensuing years, the militia began breaking down into a patchwork of groups, some involved in death squads, others in theft and corruption.
A Western official with knowledge of Iraq’s security forces said the current situation differed from earlier stand-offs because the Iraqi Army finally has the resources to take on the militiamen.
The official said Mr. Sadr’s followers “overplayed their hand” and may have fatally damaged his credibility. Mr. Sadr’s lack of control, the official said, has forced Mr. Maliki to act, and to act decisively.
“The militia was indifferent to the cease-fire. They didn’t do what Sadr told them to do, to hold peaceful demonstrations only and no attacks,” he said. “They just didn’t do that, and they’re making him look like he’s out of control.”
Still, few observers in Iraq seem to believe that Mr. Maliki intended such a bold stroke. Rather, many say the notoriously cautious politician stumbled into a major assault.
“Maliki miscalculated,” said a senior Western official in Baghdad who spoke on condition of anonymity. The official said Iraqi generals had no intention of starting such a wide-scale operation that would last even 48 hours. “From all I hear, Maliki’s trip was not intended to be the start of major combat operations right there, but a show of force.”
“There were some heated exchanges between him and the generals, who out of hurt pride or out of calculation or both then insisted on him taking responsibility,” the official said.
He added that as Mr. Maliki and Mr. Sadr battle in Basra, it is the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq that may emerge the victor.
“The hope is that the fighting is reinforcing the image of the Sadrists as irresponsible, radical, violent,” the official said.
In any case, Mr. Maliki has closely, and repeatedly, tied his personal reputation to the assault’s success, vowing that he will see the fight through until the Sadrists are driven out. That would be a different result from past clashes, which often ended in negotiated compromises but no real resolution. But an all-out battle carries its own risk.
A former political adviser to the American military in Baghdad, Matthew Sherman, cautioned that the conflict could easily lead to a situation similar to that in Lebanon in 2006, when Hezbollah claimed victory in a war of perceptions against Israel even after a bombing campaign had weakened it militarily. “The Sadrists will likely view their survival as victory,” he said.
“Is it really possible to completely eliminate the Sadrists?” he said. “They are not going to go away or be beaten by military means alone.”
March 30, 2008
Pg. 12
News Analysis
By Sabrina Tavernise and Solomon Moore
The most intense fighting in Iraq in months had the ring of the familiar. Another battle against followers of a rebel Shiite cleric. Fighting in the south that spread to other cities.
But as the week came to a close, it was clear that the current fighting in the southern city of Basra and the clashes in Baghdad had some fundamental differences from the battles in Najaf and Baghdad that plagued the American military in 2004.
For starters, the Shiite rebels are fighting mainly Iraqi soldiers, rather than Americans. Their leader, Moktada al-Sadr, is not defending against attacks from a redoubt inside the country’s most sacred shrine, but is issuing edicts with a tarnished reputation from an undisclosed location, possibly outside the country. And Iraq’s prime minister, a Shiite whom Americans had all but despaired would ever act against militias of his own sect, is taking them on fiercely.
The differences represent a shift in the war, whose early years were punctuated by uprisings against Americans by a vast, devoted group of Mr. Sadr’s followers, who were largely respected by Shiites. As their tactics veered into protection rackets, oil smuggling and other scams, Mr. Sadr’s followers too began to resemble mafia toughs more than religious warriors, splintering and forming their own gangs and networks, many beyond Mr. Sadr’s direct control.
Even some Sadrists seemed to understand the toll their methods were taking on their popular appeal, which has become increasingly important as provincial elections draw near.
“We are interested in civic issues more than military issues,” Said Harith al-Ethani, a Sadr representative in Basra, said in February. “We are helping with blood donations; we are providing volunteers for the hospitals; we are handing out gas and food rations,” he continued, sounding more like an old political machine operative than a religious insurgent.
But while Mr. Ethani was offering up the Mahdi Army, Mr. Sadr’s militia, as a kind of Iraqi Salvation Army, Basra residents were groaning under daily assassinations and kidnappings and a wholesale policy of intimidation. By the time the fighting started in Basra on Tuesday, that discontent had spread to a large swath of Iraqi society — including some of its largely Shiite army and police. The shift opened up a space for Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki to move against the Mahdi Army. And while it is far from clear that his effort will succeed — reports of soldier and police surrenders abound — the mere fact that he is trying is new.
Mr. Maliki’s motives are mixed. He wants to take back Basra, a city that has some of the country’s biggest oil revenues, which for years have fed violent Shiite gangs, a portion of them associated with Mr. Sadr. But Mr. Maliki’s strongest backer is the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, a Shiite political party that rivals Mr. Sadr’s and would like nothing better than to see him weakened before the coming provincial elections.
He also risks losing face within his increasingly discontented coalition and with the Iraqi public, which deeply distrust the United States and could see Mr. Maliki as its lackey. The move could as well antagonize Iran, which is an influential sponsor of many of the southern Shiite groups.
Still, a strong note of support for Mr. Maliki’s actions could be heard in the words of some Iraqis interviewed this week, who cast his success as crucial to the future of their country.
“If Mahdi Army wins this war, that means Iraqi will be destroyed,” said a Shiite businessman from Baghdad. “That means Moktada will be president and it will be a stick in the eye of the Americans. It will be a religious country, an extreme country.”
The Mahdi Army’s image is considerably changed from 2004, when its members were seen as Shiite Robin Hoods, protecting undefended neighborhoods, helping distribute cooking gas, and standing up to what many Shiites saw as an act of American aggression, when tanks rolled into Sadr City, a Shiite neighborhood in Baghdad. But during the sectarian violence and terror of the ensuing years, the militia began breaking down into a patchwork of groups, some involved in death squads, others in theft and corruption.
A Western official with knowledge of Iraq’s security forces said the current situation differed from earlier stand-offs because the Iraqi Army finally has the resources to take on the militiamen.
The official said Mr. Sadr’s followers “overplayed their hand” and may have fatally damaged his credibility. Mr. Sadr’s lack of control, the official said, has forced Mr. Maliki to act, and to act decisively.
“The militia was indifferent to the cease-fire. They didn’t do what Sadr told them to do, to hold peaceful demonstrations only and no attacks,” he said. “They just didn’t do that, and they’re making him look like he’s out of control.”
Still, few observers in Iraq seem to believe that Mr. Maliki intended such a bold stroke. Rather, many say the notoriously cautious politician stumbled into a major assault.
“Maliki miscalculated,” said a senior Western official in Baghdad who spoke on condition of anonymity. The official said Iraqi generals had no intention of starting such a wide-scale operation that would last even 48 hours. “From all I hear, Maliki’s trip was not intended to be the start of major combat operations right there, but a show of force.”
“There were some heated exchanges between him and the generals, who out of hurt pride or out of calculation or both then insisted on him taking responsibility,” the official said.
He added that as Mr. Maliki and Mr. Sadr battle in Basra, it is the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq that may emerge the victor.
“The hope is that the fighting is reinforcing the image of the Sadrists as irresponsible, radical, violent,” the official said.
In any case, Mr. Maliki has closely, and repeatedly, tied his personal reputation to the assault’s success, vowing that he will see the fight through until the Sadrists are driven out. That would be a different result from past clashes, which often ended in negotiated compromises but no real resolution. But an all-out battle carries its own risk.
A former political adviser to the American military in Baghdad, Matthew Sherman, cautioned that the conflict could easily lead to a situation similar to that in Lebanon in 2006, when Hezbollah claimed victory in a war of perceptions against Israel even after a bombing campaign had weakened it militarily. “The Sadrists will likely view their survival as victory,” he said.
“Is it really possible to completely eliminate the Sadrists?” he said. “They are not going to go away or be beaten by military means alone.”