Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Wall Street Journal
July 11, 2008
Pg. 4
Veteran of Hot Spots Says Commanders Made Critical Errors
By Yochi J. Dreazen
WASHINGTON -- When U.S. military bases in the restive Sunni city of Tikrit, Iraq, first came under insurgent mortar attack five years ago, American commanders sharply disagreed about how to respond.
The brigade commander told his forces to minimize the use of heavy artillery to avoid civilian casualties. Then-Lt. Col. Nathan Sassaman felt the order endangered his own troops. Breaking military law, he decided to disregard it.
"Screw brigade," Col. Sassaman yelled during a mortar attack in August 2003. "Return fire. Now!"
The tale of a renegade soldier ignoring a direct order from a higher-ranking officer didn't come to light during a Pentagon investigation or congressional probe. It was relayed in a new book by Col. Sassaman, "Warrior King."
The book -- personal, strident and angry -- is the first by a retired officer to explicitly blame other commanders, many of whom remain on active duty, for errors in judgment and leadership. That crosses a line many in military circles consider sacrosanct.
The book, written with free-lance writer Joe Layden, also hints at a broader debate that continues to rage within the military about the Iraq war's early stumbles and what that means for the military's future. The school of thought led by Gen. David Petraeus, with its focus on counterinsurgency tactics, economic development and political reconciliation, is currently ascendant. But there is a small number of officers who think that the military has moved too far from its core competency -- fighting wars -- and that the U.S. erred by not taking a hard enough approach in Iraq.
"The simple, somewhat barbaric truth is that we had to convince the Iraqi people that they should fear us more than they feared the insurgents," Col. Sassaman writes. He says the military should have responded to insurgent attacks with heavy artillery and should have destroyed any building, including private homes, used by insurgents.
Col. Sassaman isn't a perfect spokesman for his cause. He received a formal reprimand that ended his military career after a 2004 incident in which some of Col. Sassaman's men forced two Iraqi detainees to jump off of a bridge. His conduct was "wrongful, criminal and will not be tolerated," the reprimand said.
Col. Sassaman's commander in Tikrit, Gen. Frederick Rudesheim, then a lieutenant colonel, is painted in a particularly harsh light. Col. Sassaman believes his former boss helped push him out of the military after the detainee case. The general is an "arrogant, uncaring, aloof" officer who preferred to stay "back in the comfort of his elegantly appointed office" rather than accompanying troops on nighttime raids, Col. Sassaman wrote.
Gen. Rudesheim said in an email that Col. Sassaman's battalion "was a very good unit that distinguished itself" during its year-long tour in Iraq. He said he appreciates the service of Col. Sassaman.
He added: "Combat operations are very tough and I made the difficult decisions that I felt were necessary." He didn't comment on his former subordinate's specific allegations.
The pivotal events in Col. Sassaman's military career took place in Samarra, a restive Sunni city that was long effectively a no-go area for U.S. forces.
Col. Sassaman's troops were sent to the city in December 2003 to relieve the Army's 1-66 Armor battalion, which was led by then-Lt. Col. Ryan Gonsalves. Col. Sassaman is unsparing in his criticism of 1-66 Armor's tenure, describing it as an "unmitigated disaster" that "appeased the Iraqis and generally avoided fighting the insurgency."
Col. Gonsalves, who has since been promoted, didn't reply to multiple requests for comment.
Col. Sassaman and his unit adopted a strict curfew and nightly raids. In his book, he also argues that the Golden Dome in Samarra, a revered Shiite shrine whose destruction by Sunni militants fueled the country's civil war, should have been demolished by U.S. forces when insurgents began using it as a base to fire rocket-propelled grenades and machines guns.
Fighting between the military and the insurgents soon escalated sharply.
On Jan. 2, 2004, a mortar attack killed Capt. Eric Paliwoda, Col. Sassaman's closest friend and favorite officer. "The rage and grief boiled over instantly, and I lost it," he writes.
The following night, one of Col. Sassaman's patrols stopped a white truck that violated the evening curfew. The soldiers handcuffed the two men, drove them to the Tigris River and forced them to jump six feet into the water. One of the Iraqis, Marwan Fadel Hassoun, later told investigators that his cousin, Zaidoon Fadel Hassoun, drowned.
Col. Sassaman says his troops initially told him both Iraqis survived. He says he feared the incident, which he believed at the time to be a harmless prank, would destroy the careers of many of his men. In the book, he recounts telling one of his subordinate officers to give investigators an incomplete account of the incident.
"Don't say anything about the water," he recalls saying.
In the end, after a military investigation and several trials, two of Col. Sassaman's soldiers received short prison sentences for their roles. Col. Sassaman received the written reprimand. He retired in 2005.
A former West Point football star, Col. Sassaman now runs the activities program of a high school in Colorado and works for a company that runs seminars and drills for high-school football players around the country. He often thinks about the incident on the bridge in Samarra and remains convinced his men did little wrong.
"I still maintain there was no criminal intent," he says. "What happened that night was pretty unfortunate. But you know what? War is unfortunate."
July 11, 2008
Pg. 4
Veteran of Hot Spots Says Commanders Made Critical Errors
By Yochi J. Dreazen
WASHINGTON -- When U.S. military bases in the restive Sunni city of Tikrit, Iraq, first came under insurgent mortar attack five years ago, American commanders sharply disagreed about how to respond.
The brigade commander told his forces to minimize the use of heavy artillery to avoid civilian casualties. Then-Lt. Col. Nathan Sassaman felt the order endangered his own troops. Breaking military law, he decided to disregard it.
"Screw brigade," Col. Sassaman yelled during a mortar attack in August 2003. "Return fire. Now!"
The tale of a renegade soldier ignoring a direct order from a higher-ranking officer didn't come to light during a Pentagon investigation or congressional probe. It was relayed in a new book by Col. Sassaman, "Warrior King."
The book -- personal, strident and angry -- is the first by a retired officer to explicitly blame other commanders, many of whom remain on active duty, for errors in judgment and leadership. That crosses a line many in military circles consider sacrosanct.
The book, written with free-lance writer Joe Layden, also hints at a broader debate that continues to rage within the military about the Iraq war's early stumbles and what that means for the military's future. The school of thought led by Gen. David Petraeus, with its focus on counterinsurgency tactics, economic development and political reconciliation, is currently ascendant. But there is a small number of officers who think that the military has moved too far from its core competency -- fighting wars -- and that the U.S. erred by not taking a hard enough approach in Iraq.
"The simple, somewhat barbaric truth is that we had to convince the Iraqi people that they should fear us more than they feared the insurgents," Col. Sassaman writes. He says the military should have responded to insurgent attacks with heavy artillery and should have destroyed any building, including private homes, used by insurgents.
Col. Sassaman isn't a perfect spokesman for his cause. He received a formal reprimand that ended his military career after a 2004 incident in which some of Col. Sassaman's men forced two Iraqi detainees to jump off of a bridge. His conduct was "wrongful, criminal and will not be tolerated," the reprimand said.
Col. Sassaman's commander in Tikrit, Gen. Frederick Rudesheim, then a lieutenant colonel, is painted in a particularly harsh light. Col. Sassaman believes his former boss helped push him out of the military after the detainee case. The general is an "arrogant, uncaring, aloof" officer who preferred to stay "back in the comfort of his elegantly appointed office" rather than accompanying troops on nighttime raids, Col. Sassaman wrote.
Gen. Rudesheim said in an email that Col. Sassaman's battalion "was a very good unit that distinguished itself" during its year-long tour in Iraq. He said he appreciates the service of Col. Sassaman.
He added: "Combat operations are very tough and I made the difficult decisions that I felt were necessary." He didn't comment on his former subordinate's specific allegations.
The pivotal events in Col. Sassaman's military career took place in Samarra, a restive Sunni city that was long effectively a no-go area for U.S. forces.
Col. Sassaman's troops were sent to the city in December 2003 to relieve the Army's 1-66 Armor battalion, which was led by then-Lt. Col. Ryan Gonsalves. Col. Sassaman is unsparing in his criticism of 1-66 Armor's tenure, describing it as an "unmitigated disaster" that "appeased the Iraqis and generally avoided fighting the insurgency."
Col. Gonsalves, who has since been promoted, didn't reply to multiple requests for comment.
Col. Sassaman and his unit adopted a strict curfew and nightly raids. In his book, he also argues that the Golden Dome in Samarra, a revered Shiite shrine whose destruction by Sunni militants fueled the country's civil war, should have been demolished by U.S. forces when insurgents began using it as a base to fire rocket-propelled grenades and machines guns.
Fighting between the military and the insurgents soon escalated sharply.
On Jan. 2, 2004, a mortar attack killed Capt. Eric Paliwoda, Col. Sassaman's closest friend and favorite officer. "The rage and grief boiled over instantly, and I lost it," he writes.
The following night, one of Col. Sassaman's patrols stopped a white truck that violated the evening curfew. The soldiers handcuffed the two men, drove them to the Tigris River and forced them to jump six feet into the water. One of the Iraqis, Marwan Fadel Hassoun, later told investigators that his cousin, Zaidoon Fadel Hassoun, drowned.
Col. Sassaman says his troops initially told him both Iraqis survived. He says he feared the incident, which he believed at the time to be a harmless prank, would destroy the careers of many of his men. In the book, he recounts telling one of his subordinate officers to give investigators an incomplete account of the incident.
"Don't say anything about the water," he recalls saying.
In the end, after a military investigation and several trials, two of Col. Sassaman's soldiers received short prison sentences for their roles. Col. Sassaman received the written reprimand. He retired in 2005.
A former West Point football star, Col. Sassaman now runs the activities program of a high school in Colorado and works for a company that runs seminars and drills for high-school football players around the country. He often thinks about the incident on the bridge in Samarra and remains convinced his men did little wrong.
"I still maintain there was no criminal intent," he says. "What happened that night was pretty unfortunate. But you know what? War is unfortunate."