Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
New York Times
January 15, 2007
By James Glanz
BAGHDAD, Jan. 14 — As part of its latest plan to stabilize Iraq, the United States intends to more than double the number of regional reconstruction teams and to add nearly 400 specialists for existing and new teams, in fields from politics and the rule of law to agribusiness and veterinary care, according to an official outline of the plan.
The document calls for the measures to be taken swiftly, in three phases, with waves of new teams and personnel expected to be put in place in March, June and September. The teams are to carry out rebuilding and governance projects from small offices all over Iraq.
The document, provided to The New York Times by a critic of the plan, lays out what an American official familiar with its contents calls simply “the playbook,” giving detailed estimates of the costs to be incurred by various teams as a result of the changes. About $250,000, for example, is set aside for new office furnishings for a team in the southern city of Basra, which is supposed to receive 25 additional specialists.
While the plan does call for the creation of about a dozen new reconstruction teams around Iraq, most of the new personnel will be added to existing teams, the plan indicates. While 400 may sound like a small number compared with the plan to increase the number of troops by more than 20,000, the existing 10 reconstruction teams have, at most, a total of about 100 civilian specialists, and recruiting that many has been difficult, officials say.
Whether it is wise to increase the staffing of the teams by a factor of five is likely to be questioned by existing team members, the American official said.
That is because extremely restrictive security regulations have made it difficult for the specialists already on the provincial reconstruction teams, often called P.R.T.’s, to leave their bases and work with Iraqis, the official said, adding that the cumbersome rules must be followed even in relatively safe areas in the northern and central parts of Iraq. “Across the board they have to follow the same security rules,” the official said. “So the P.R.T.’s that could be successful still can’t get out in the field.”
In addition, because oversight agencies have previously reported that the existing teams have had trouble equipping themselves with items as essential as pencils and other office supplies, a fresh wave of officials could find it more difficult than expected to begin their work for reasons other than security.
The teams also have been criticized for relying heavily on uniformed personnel whose skills are poorly matched with specialized needs in the field. That concern has repeatedly come up because the State Department has had great difficulty persuading civilian officials to accept jobs at the dangerous, isolated and uncomfortable bases in the Iraqi provinces.
The document does not explain how so many additional government officials with the specialized skills called for will be recruited when the State Department has found it so difficult to bring a much smaller number to Iraq in the past.
United States officials have previously disclosed elements of the plans outlined in the document, which is dated Jan. 14. Among those elements are the request for $414 million in additional State Department financing for 2007 and the likely need to search for officials with a range of technical specialties to accept the jobs.
But the new document makes clear that detailed plans have progressed far beyond those numbers. There are indications that the United States plans to add six teams in Baghdad, apparently scattered around the city, and three in western Anbar Province. Each has one team now.
Together, Anbar and Baghdad account for more than 140 of the projected additional specialists. They are to include political advisers, economics experts, medical personnel and specialists in city management, engineering and business.
The other new personnel are to be scattered around the country; for instance, the little office in Diyala Province, now staffed with no more than a handful of Americans, would receive 33 more. For perspective, an entire American Embassy in a small country might have fewer American officials than the number planned for Diyala Province.
A summary at the beginning of the document indicates that beyond their purely civil duties, the teams will also be expected to support the counterinsurgency efforts by the United States military. There is no description of how that support would be carried out.
Nonmilitary duties relegated to the teams, according to the document, would be to promote moderate political groups and to further reconciliation in Iraqi society.
They would also be asked to help by “fostering economic development” and “building capacity” at the provincial level. “Capacity” is a bureaucratic term meaning skill in technical, managerial and other areas.
Some of the projected costs may raise eyebrows. Around the country, for example, the United States plans to spend more than $2 million in office furnishings alone as part of the plan. More than $7 million is budgeted for information technology, apparently including computers. Some of that money may be used to support existing team members.
The new plans could become a windfall for more than computer and furniture companies.
The document’s last page gives a hint of the likely financing requests in support of the teams in fiscal year 2008, suggesting that protection alone may require $400 million.
January 15, 2007
By James Glanz
BAGHDAD, Jan. 14 — As part of its latest plan to stabilize Iraq, the United States intends to more than double the number of regional reconstruction teams and to add nearly 400 specialists for existing and new teams, in fields from politics and the rule of law to agribusiness and veterinary care, according to an official outline of the plan.
The document calls for the measures to be taken swiftly, in three phases, with waves of new teams and personnel expected to be put in place in March, June and September. The teams are to carry out rebuilding and governance projects from small offices all over Iraq.
The document, provided to The New York Times by a critic of the plan, lays out what an American official familiar with its contents calls simply “the playbook,” giving detailed estimates of the costs to be incurred by various teams as a result of the changes. About $250,000, for example, is set aside for new office furnishings for a team in the southern city of Basra, which is supposed to receive 25 additional specialists.
While the plan does call for the creation of about a dozen new reconstruction teams around Iraq, most of the new personnel will be added to existing teams, the plan indicates. While 400 may sound like a small number compared with the plan to increase the number of troops by more than 20,000, the existing 10 reconstruction teams have, at most, a total of about 100 civilian specialists, and recruiting that many has been difficult, officials say.
Whether it is wise to increase the staffing of the teams by a factor of five is likely to be questioned by existing team members, the American official said.
That is because extremely restrictive security regulations have made it difficult for the specialists already on the provincial reconstruction teams, often called P.R.T.’s, to leave their bases and work with Iraqis, the official said, adding that the cumbersome rules must be followed even in relatively safe areas in the northern and central parts of Iraq. “Across the board they have to follow the same security rules,” the official said. “So the P.R.T.’s that could be successful still can’t get out in the field.”
In addition, because oversight agencies have previously reported that the existing teams have had trouble equipping themselves with items as essential as pencils and other office supplies, a fresh wave of officials could find it more difficult than expected to begin their work for reasons other than security.
The teams also have been criticized for relying heavily on uniformed personnel whose skills are poorly matched with specialized needs in the field. That concern has repeatedly come up because the State Department has had great difficulty persuading civilian officials to accept jobs at the dangerous, isolated and uncomfortable bases in the Iraqi provinces.
The document does not explain how so many additional government officials with the specialized skills called for will be recruited when the State Department has found it so difficult to bring a much smaller number to Iraq in the past.
United States officials have previously disclosed elements of the plans outlined in the document, which is dated Jan. 14. Among those elements are the request for $414 million in additional State Department financing for 2007 and the likely need to search for officials with a range of technical specialties to accept the jobs.
But the new document makes clear that detailed plans have progressed far beyond those numbers. There are indications that the United States plans to add six teams in Baghdad, apparently scattered around the city, and three in western Anbar Province. Each has one team now.
Together, Anbar and Baghdad account for more than 140 of the projected additional specialists. They are to include political advisers, economics experts, medical personnel and specialists in city management, engineering and business.
The other new personnel are to be scattered around the country; for instance, the little office in Diyala Province, now staffed with no more than a handful of Americans, would receive 33 more. For perspective, an entire American Embassy in a small country might have fewer American officials than the number planned for Diyala Province.
A summary at the beginning of the document indicates that beyond their purely civil duties, the teams will also be expected to support the counterinsurgency efforts by the United States military. There is no description of how that support would be carried out.
Nonmilitary duties relegated to the teams, according to the document, would be to promote moderate political groups and to further reconciliation in Iraqi society.
They would also be asked to help by “fostering economic development” and “building capacity” at the provincial level. “Capacity” is a bureaucratic term meaning skill in technical, managerial and other areas.
Some of the projected costs may raise eyebrows. Around the country, for example, the United States plans to spend more than $2 million in office furnishings alone as part of the plan. More than $7 million is budgeted for information technology, apparently including computers. Some of that money may be used to support existing team members.
The new plans could become a windfall for more than computer and furniture companies.
The document’s last page gives a hint of the likely financing requests in support of the teams in fiscal year 2008, suggesting that protection alone may require $400 million.