The real reason for D-Day

Doppleganger

Active member
The over-arching reason for D-Day was not, I suggest, the liberation of Western Europe for its own sake, but to prevent Soviet expansion westward if they won their war against Germany.

It is common knowledge that Stalin demanded a 2nd front opened up by the Allies, ever since the German invasion in June 1941. It was his main political aim after 1941 and he succeeded in getting his way. I suggest that by 1943 it was clear that Germany would eventually be ground down by the Soviet Union and thus the Western Allies feared what would happen to the rest of Europe once Germany had been defeated.

Overlord had 2 purposes of which the first is well known. That is to destroy the German armies in the field and to liberate occupied territories seized by the Germans and then to occupy Germany and force an unconditional surrender. However, the 2nd purpose was to ensure that the Red Army did not a) wholly occupy Germany and b) continue westwards until they reached the Atlantic.

The Allies even drew up a plan of Soviet conquest, called Operation Unthinkable. However, the plan was never implemented because the American and British planners came to the conclusion that they would do no better (and probably a lot worse) than the Wehrmacht did in 1941. The main architect of this plan was Churchill, who envisaged that up to 100,000 soldiers of the former Wehrmacht would be deployed alongside allied armies.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=/archive/1998/10/01/nwar101.html
http://www.history.neu.edu/PRO2/
 
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Doppleganger: We have been discussing the bombing strategy of Germany on the other thread. I have often theorised that if the Western allies had an effective bombing strategy prior to D day they would be reluctant to use it prior to the ground invasion of West Europe since it would only help the Soviets. In fact once German defeat was almost inevitable after Stalingrad it may have been in the West's interests not to hurt Germany too much. If you look at the statistics, the German petroleum supplies for only began to dwindle from June 44 after the synthetic plants started to be hit. Do you think this is suspicious and justifies Stalin's suspicions, or was it merely the consequence of obtaining air bases in Southern Italy around this time that allowed these plants to be hit? After the oil went it was only a matter of time.
 
That Churchill sure played good chess !

I used to play in a chess club. One day one of the younger members brought in another board game in which there were three sides. We spent some time attempting to work out the best strategy, of course it is was for two weaker sides to gang up on the stronger opponent. However as your strong opponent gets stuffed, at what point do you switch sides and how do you allow for bloody mindedness and principle? I except WW2 was a bit like that with a lot of complicated politics thrown in. Hitler was hoping until his last days that the Soviets and the West would start fighting one another, in fact Patton wanted to didn't he?
 
If this was the D Day strategy then why did not the Allies make their main drive towards the North and North East. It was Montgomerie's aim to head off the Russians but the American Leadership thought that Uncle Joe as he called him was a nice guy and that he could control him. It was squabble between Montgomery and Patton over resources that did the damage on this front
 
Doppleganger: We have been discussing the bombing strategy of Germany on the other thread. I have often theorised that if the Western allies had an effective bombing strategy prior to D day they would be reluctant to use it prior to the ground invasion of West Europe since it would only help the Soviets. In fact once German defeat was almost inevitable after Stalingrad it may have been in the West's interests not to hurt Germany too much. If you look at the statistics, the German petroleum supplies for only began to dwindle from June 44 after the synthetic plants started to be hit. Do you think this is suspicious and justifies Stalin's suspicions, or was it merely the consequence of obtaining air bases in Southern Italy around this time that allowed these plants to be hit? After the oil went it was only a matter of time.
Undoubtedly it was suspicious. The speed at which the Red Army was driving westwards after Kursk and (especially) after the Battle of Bagration I'm sure must have filled Allied war planners and leaders with dread. The Western Allies were desperate to get to Berlin before the Red Army and this was one reason why Operation Market Garden was launched. Thus the Western Allies were faced with having to defeat one enemy and plan for a possible conflict with a new enemy. However, I do not believe that the Western Allies were 'holding back' as such, rather that some very senior figures had one eye on the aftermath, when Germany was finally defeated.

@Lee Enfield. There were factions within the US Government of the time that were deeply favourable towards the Soviet Union. Harry Hopkins, a key architect of Lend Lease and FDR's unofficial emissary towards Churchill and Stalin was very pro-Soviet. Thus there was a great deal of political influence that saw Stalinist Russia in a good light. That might partly explain why Stalin won so many concessions that, in hindsight, were not strictly necessary. It can be argued that FDR was hoodwinked by both Uncle Joe and some of his own closest advisers. It can also be argued that many senior British and American politicians were war-weary and did not want to do anything that pushed or provoked Stalin in any way.
 
As I know planning and preparing of Operation Overlord started in summer 1943, about battle of Kursk. Of course, allies did not want the USSR defeating the Germans alone because they understood that victory of USSR will result in political changes in territories which Soviets will gain. So allies decided to make their own move and take as much territory in their own control as they could.

All sides waited till opponents and/or concurrents exhaust themselves. USSR waited for the outcome of `phony war` in 1939/1940, so the allies waited the result of USSR-German fight and planned to attack the moment, when opponents will be exhausted and less able to resist and concurrents will be too exhausted to affect the political map after the war.
 
It is very true that attitudes at that time before and after were strongly held and changed completely.

No doubt Le will remember that the media presented Stalin to us as Uncle Joe, bit of a saviour (which he may well have been actually), image a bit like father Xmas. I recall mainstream dailies with political cartoons showing depicting a kindly old Uncle Joe tucked up with his pipe, and the slogan - 'Let's give Uncle Joe the atom bomb for Xmas'! (atom secrets).

A couple of years later top American magazines showed glossy full page adverts depicting a table with an overturned goblet, spilled and leaking a green liquid - poison obviously - very impressive. The slogan in capitals read -A LITTLE COMMUNISM IS A BAD THING!
 
The over-arching reason for D-Day was not, I suggest, the liberation of Western Europe for its own sake, but to prevent Soviet expansion westward if they won their war against Germany.

It is common knowledge that Stalin demanded a 2nd front opened up by the Allies, ever since the German invasion in June 1941. It was his main political aim after 1941 and he succeeded in getting his way. I suggest that by 1943 it was clear that Germany would eventually be ground down by the Soviet Union and thus the Western Allies feared what would happen to the rest of Europe once Germany had been defeated.

Overlord had 2 purposes of which the first is well known. That is to destroy the German armies in the field and to liberate occupied territories seized by the Germans and then to occupy Germany and force an unconditional surrender. However, the 2nd purpose was to ensure that the Red Army did not a) wholly occupy Germany and b) continue westwards until they reached the Atlantic.

The Allies even drew up a plan of Soviet conquest, called Operation Unthinkable. However, the plan was never implemented because the American and British planners came to the conclusion that they would do no better (and probably a lot worse) than the Wehrmacht did in 1941. The main architect of this plan was Churchill, who envisaged that up to 100,000 soldiers of the former Wehrmacht would be deployed alongside allied armies.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=/archive/1998/10/01/nwar101.html
http://www.history.neu.edu/PRO2/

The problem with this is that it doesn't take into account the Italian campaign, if the plan was to prevent Soviet expansion then surely reinforcing the Italian front in 1943 and strengthening operation Anvil/Dragoon was a more secure option as they already had large supply bases in Italy and Sicily and it gave them a land route into France, Austria and Yugoslavia.
 
The problem with this is that it doesn't take into account the Italian campaign, if the plan was to prevent Soviet expansion then surely reinforcing the Italian front in 1943 and strengthening operation Anvil/Dragoon was a more secure option as they already had large supply bases in Italy and Sicily and it gave them a land route into France, Austria and Yugoslavia.

Monty: The Italian campaign was a sideshow and a serious distraction from the invasion of NW Europe as far as the Americans were concerned. That both the Africa and Italian campaigns were entertained at all demonstrates the influence the British and Churchill still had it the middle part of the war. Logistically it was a nightmare for the Allies, and a major victory for the Germans who put a fraction of the resources into the defence of the Italian peninsula. With regards to land routes the allies had little chance of getting through the Alpine passes before Germany was virtually finished, a cul de sac if there was ever one.
 
I should have added that the whole African and Italian theatre had Churchill's fingerprints all over it. In the early stages it was to secure the shipping routes (for the British Empire) hence American suspicion, in the later stages Churchill hoped to encourage a Balkan uprising, although perhaps he invaded the wrong country. It did however provide air bases for the 12th that targeted Ploesti, Vienna, and Budapest, along with the synthetic petroleum plants in Silesia in Poland, and the Sudetenland. The Eighth Air Force did not launch a mission against the oil targets until June 18, when fifteen combat wings of B-17 s attacked eleven oil installations in northwestern Germany. Of course it could, and was claimed they were busy with D-Day before this.
 
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Perseus..........Now if Mark Clark had followed orders and had cut off the Germans retreating from Monte Casino instead of going into Rome for a big Parade the Italian Campaign would have over there and then. Instead he sent a small blocking force which the Germans destroyed. the Germans then took another of defence that meant the war in that area just kept going and going.
 
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