Julie
Active member
War is in principle a waste of human life. But sometimes you have to sacrifice 100 good men so that 1000 men later can benefit from the experience and survive. Forget about your morals and ethics. War is a dirty profession.
The Raid At Dieppe
samneanderthal
Active member
Stalingrad is one of the best examples of defenses collapsing because of airplane depletion and relocation (to Africa because of torch). For lack of Ju-52 and fighters to protect them, Stalingrad ran out of ammuniton, food, supplies, spares (your mechanical failures) and reinforcements and for lack of Stukas, Bf-109s Zhukov could attack successfully and use 13,000 cannon to shell the Germans.
Only when the Soviets gained air superiority over Stalingrad could they defeat it.
Like I said, without air superiority, the Texas could not have destroyed the tanks and the destruction of the railroads, truck convoys, etc, by planes ensured that the German tanks, reinforcements, artillery, ammunition, etc, arrived at the. front.
The most powerful navy is useless without planes to protect it as proven time and again in Norway, France, Greece (especially Crete), Singapore, and later in the Japanese navy in Samar, indonesia, etc,), the sinking of the formidable Musashi and Yamato, etc,
The Germans were stopped only because they attacked the huge USSR with a fraction of the planes they used in France, so the ground support was lousy. Guderian received a laughable cartoon of support in Yelnya, compared to that in the sickle cut.
Having started with few planes (and tanks, artillery, trucks, etc,) at the end of Barbarossa there were extremely few planes, tanks et, and when Zhukov showed up with nearly 1,000 tanks and planes from Siberia he pushed back the Germans.
Only when the Soviets gained air superiority over Stalingrad could they defeat it.
Like I said, without air superiority, the Texas could not have destroyed the tanks and the destruction of the railroads, truck convoys, etc, by planes ensured that the German tanks, reinforcements, artillery, ammunition, etc, arrived at the. front.
The most powerful navy is useless without planes to protect it as proven time and again in Norway, France, Greece (especially Crete), Singapore, and later in the Japanese navy in Samar, indonesia, etc,), the sinking of the formidable Musashi and Yamato, etc,
The Germans were stopped only because they attacked the huge USSR with a fraction of the planes they used in France, so the ground support was lousy. Guderian received a laughable cartoon of support in Yelnya, compared to that in the sickle cut.
Having started with few planes (and tanks, artillery, trucks, etc,) at the end of Barbarossa there were extremely few planes, tanks et, and when Zhukov showed up with nearly 1,000 tanks and planes from Siberia he pushed back the Germans.
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84RFK
Active member
So I am the one not reading here?
Did you notice what I wrote about the situation in Narvik?
The Germans was loosing, they were practicly beaten, even though the allies didn't have the air superiority!
samneanderthal
Active member
Yet they abandoned Narvik instead of securing it to prevent Germany from getting iron and installing submarine bases and although the German navy had been nearly wiped out. All this only because their situation in Norway was completely untenable, since they could not supply their troops with the enemy planes ruling the sea.
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samneanderthal
Active member
Hi Julie,
War is indeed a series of sacrifices. However, while Germany and Japan sacrificed troops to gain territory and defeat large forces from 1939 to 1941, Italy, the USSR and Britain sacrificed a lot of forces to lose battle after battle, simply because Churchill, Mussolini and Stalin refused to learn the lesson that without air superiority it doesn't matter how many tanks or troops you have, you will be beaten every time.
Even the incompetent Hitler realized that he could not invade Britain without air superiority, hence the BoB. Luckily fro Britain Göring conducted the BoB in a most incompetent way and Britain won with fewer planes and Hitler called off the invasion, rather than waste thousands of lives without hope of success.
By the way, in Libya 30,000 British troops defeated and captured over 100,000 men and lots of cannon and ammunition (which were given to Greece to defeat the Italian invasion), because Mussolini invaded Egypt without air superiority (against his generals' advice).
War is indeed a series of sacrifices. However, while Germany and Japan sacrificed troops to gain territory and defeat large forces from 1939 to 1941, Italy, the USSR and Britain sacrificed a lot of forces to lose battle after battle, simply because Churchill, Mussolini and Stalin refused to learn the lesson that without air superiority it doesn't matter how many tanks or troops you have, you will be beaten every time.
Even the incompetent Hitler realized that he could not invade Britain without air superiority, hence the BoB. Luckily fro Britain Göring conducted the BoB in a most incompetent way and Britain won with fewer planes and Hitler called off the invasion, rather than waste thousands of lives without hope of success.
By the way, in Libya 30,000 British troops defeated and captured over 100,000 men and lots of cannon and ammunition (which were given to Greece to defeat the Italian invasion), because Mussolini invaded Egypt without air superiority (against his generals' advice).
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42RM
Banned
Ask those who lead soldiers into battle, and they'll tell you right away: "Logistics wins wars." History supports their claim. Again and again, battles' outcomes have depended on getting supplies and weapons to the right place at the right time. It's been this way since before Hannibal crossed the Alps with his elephants to claim victory.
samneanderthal
Active member
That is precisely the strength of aviation. It is impossible to transport badly needed supplies when airplanes are detroying your ships, barges, trains, trucks, horses, etc,
In Barbarossa thousands of Soviet tanks were lost because they ran out of fuel, ammo, oil, water, spares, etc, because the LW destroyed thousands of trucks, trains, etc, fuel and ammo depots, etc, every day and the abundant planes of the Red air force were obsolete and powerless to stop them.
Each German division in Normandy required 350 tons per day and they were not going to get it if the 12,000 allied tactical planes plus thousands of strategic planes were blowing the bridges, trains, trucks, etc, before and after D-day. Not to mention reinforcements, etc,
between D-day and the end of the war, P-47s alone destroyed 68,000 trucks, 86,000 RR cars and 9,000 RR engines.
In Barbarossa thousands of Soviet tanks were lost because they ran out of fuel, ammo, oil, water, spares, etc, because the LW destroyed thousands of trucks, trains, etc, fuel and ammo depots, etc, every day and the abundant planes of the Red air force were obsolete and powerless to stop them.
Each German division in Normandy required 350 tons per day and they were not going to get it if the 12,000 allied tactical planes plus thousands of strategic planes were blowing the bridges, trains, trucks, etc, before and after D-day. Not to mention reinforcements, etc,
between D-day and the end of the war, P-47s alone destroyed 68,000 trucks, 86,000 RR cars and 9,000 RR engines.
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MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
But now you are getting into a chicken and egg argument though as aircraft can not destroy the opposition without bombs, fuel and ammunition so it still comes down to logistics.
You can have the most troops, the best tanks, ships and planes but without a functioning logistics system you will lose.
You can have the most troops, the best tanks, ships and planes but without a functioning logistics system you will lose.
84RFK
Active member
Seems like you missed the point again.
I wrote: The Germans was loosing, they were practicly beaten.
The Wehrmacht with support from Luftwaffe was pushed back by allied forces with only some naval artillery support and a few planes, the bulk of the operations was done with only infantry and light mountain artillery.
The allies didn't suffer any major supply problem, except the lack of efficient planes and the British winter-equipment, they had plenty.
The reason they withdrew was that the mighty French army was taken by surprise and chased away by a German invasion.
Seems like Churchill knew better than fighting a war on two fronts...
samneanderthal
Active member
The only surprise was that the Germans didn't invade before May 10, 1940. They knew it was comming.
Moreover, like I wrote squadron 263 was sent back to Norway with some Hurricanes to reinforce them on May 21, 1940, 11 days after the invasion of France they were still interested in winning in Norway. But Churchill realized their situation was untenable both in Norway and in France and may even become so in Britain if they lost the air battle.
Hi MontyN,
Supplying the carriers is only possible if there is air superiority all along the supply route, just as on land, as evidenced in the Mediterranean. This is why the Americans spent a lot of resources and time capturing otherwise useless islands in the Pacific (thanks to air support, which also allowed naval support). Likewise supplying the invasion was possible when airplanes in transatlantic and costal flights wiped out the submarines, this had not occurred at the time of Dieppe.
Had the Japs taken Hawaii on Dec 7, 1941 the US would have been unable to operate in the central Pacific with long range enemy planes so close to the US coast, unless they gained local air superiority with carriers.
Summing up, the US could have built all the ships, tanks, trucks, cannon, etc, but without air superiority (320,000 planes) it would all have been useless, as were all the British campaigns before el Alamein 1 and 2, where air superiority stopped Rommel. On the other side of the coin, had Italy and France not wasted fortunes building huge Navies that were pretty useless and France building the Maginot line, but built or bought more planes they would have been more successful. Similarly, had Hitler not wasted a fortune building Bismarck, Tirpitz, two 800 mm cannon, etc, and wasted 2,000 planes in the BoB, but built more Stukas, Bf-109s, Ju-88s, Pz IV and 88 mm cannon and attacked the USSR with more planes, etc, he would have taken Moscow, which would have caused the Japs to invade the USSR instead of forcingthe US into the war.
Moreover, like I wrote squadron 263 was sent back to Norway with some Hurricanes to reinforce them on May 21, 1940, 11 days after the invasion of France they were still interested in winning in Norway. But Churchill realized their situation was untenable both in Norway and in France and may even become so in Britain if they lost the air battle.
Hi MontyN,
Supplying the carriers is only possible if there is air superiority all along the supply route, just as on land, as evidenced in the Mediterranean. This is why the Americans spent a lot of resources and time capturing otherwise useless islands in the Pacific (thanks to air support, which also allowed naval support). Likewise supplying the invasion was possible when airplanes in transatlantic and costal flights wiped out the submarines, this had not occurred at the time of Dieppe.
Had the Japs taken Hawaii on Dec 7, 1941 the US would have been unable to operate in the central Pacific with long range enemy planes so close to the US coast, unless they gained local air superiority with carriers.
Summing up, the US could have built all the ships, tanks, trucks, cannon, etc, but without air superiority (320,000 planes) it would all have been useless, as were all the British campaigns before el Alamein 1 and 2, where air superiority stopped Rommel. On the other side of the coin, had Italy and France not wasted fortunes building huge Navies that were pretty useless and France building the Maginot line, but built or bought more planes they would have been more successful. Similarly, had Hitler not wasted a fortune building Bismarck, Tirpitz, two 800 mm cannon, etc, and wasted 2,000 planes in the BoB, but built more Stukas, Bf-109s, Ju-88s, Pz IV and 88 mm cannon and attacked the USSR with more planes, etc, he would have taken Moscow, which would have caused the Japs to invade the USSR instead of forcingthe US into the war.
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BritinBritain
Per Ardua Ad Astra
If I remember correctly a Norwegian rifle club held up a German Parachute Regiment causing so many casualties that the German Para's had to pull back and regroup.
84RFK
Active member
Perhaps a bit exaggerated, but the myth is partially based on a true story, or stories.
Rifle clubs were found all over the country, and they were a part of "the voluntary shooting association" founded by the government in 1893, it was a civilian association but recieved a great deal of support from the military, and it was based upon the idea that the members would be better trained for military service and defense of the country.
The grain of truth mentioned here is from the "battle of Midtskogen" where elements of the 1. Royal Guards Company and volunteers from the local rifle club set up a roadblock and fought a sucsessfull battle against a "company" (about 100 soldiers) of German Fallschirmjäger.
But the rifle clubs did pull their load on several other places too, Valdres is one palce often mentioned, but Narvik was the place where the "regiment" of German paratroopers entered the story.
As many of the soldiers in the Norwegian 6. division was locals, most of them was naturally attached to a local rifle club, and many of them brought their own rifle when they were mobilized.
It should be noted here that both the army and the organized rifle clubs were using the same primary weapon, the Krag Jørgensen rifle in cal. 6,5x55.
The only difference being that the rifle clubs often sported more accurate sights, and the owners knew their rifle like the back of their hand.
Taken into consideration here that target-shooting, both practise and competition, back in those days was done on dostances ranging from 200 to 600 meters, depending on what discipline they were competing in, the number of long-distance head-shots became remarkable high on the Narvik front.
And the Germans was forced to pull back and regroup a number of times, the last incident being when the commander, general Dietl, had to face the possibility that he had to either surrender, or withdraw his force over the Swedish border and risk being interned by the Swedes.
Der Alte
Banned
The first point that must be made is that the British did not sacrificed Canadian troops rather than their own,the blame, if blame there is, rests on a Canadian commander, not the British. In England in the winter of 1942 the acting commander of the Canadian Corps, Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar, had learned of the raid and insisted that his men get the job, and he persuaded the British to select the 2nd Canadian Division.
But what went wrong?
Many Dieppe veterans still today maintains that the Germans had known the raid was coming. There is no evidence in the German military archives that the Germans knew a raid on Dieppe was planned. Bad weather cancelled the attack in July and the troops dispersed back to their bases and many blabbed to their girlfriends and pubmates. Should the German intelligence not have pick up that information? Well, apparently they did not, and if they did, would the Germans expect such a foolish violation of elementary military good sense that the same troops would be used against the same target the next month? That, we do not know. What likely doomed the raid to failure was when the flotilla ran into a German coastal convoy in the English Channel and the German coastal defences went to a heightened state of alert and the disembarking troops became easy targets.
What lessons Dieppe have taught!
The need for heavy air and naval support was recognized, as well as the requirement for better intelligence, better ship-to-shore communications, more specialized assault training for the attacking forces, and better tanks and landing craft. And certainly all these were essential for D-Day's success.
Let us be clear, however. Assaults from the sea were nothing new in 1942. The United States Marine Corps had a developed doctrine for such attacks, and the British themselves had staged seaborne attacks in the Great War. At Gallipoli in 1915 the operation failed because of inadequate covering fire, hostile cliffs, and failure to use sufficient capital ships in the narrow Dardanelles strait. The same elements of failure were present in the Dieppe. How many men have to die before planners learn a lesson? Must such lessons be relearned with each generation?
More to the point, what fool decided to attack Dieppe? No one who has stood on the stony beach in front of Dieppe, as hundreds of thousands of British vacationers must had done for a century before 1942, could have failed to notice the cliffs that commanded the Canadians' landing areas. Where else would the Germans have placed their weaponry? And by what planning principles did the staff decide that a relative handful of aircraft could provide air support and that eight destroyers could give sufficient covering fire?
When Lord Louis Mountbatten took over Combined Operations in March he envisioned commando-style raids on either side of Dieppe. Army representative Gen. Bernard Montgomery was in favour of a frontal attack. He then departed for North Africa, disenchanted with a scenario that was becoming more confused with each passing week. The original concept went down the drain when commanders picked up choice bits, but rejected anything that interfered with their personal agendas. The army still opted for a tank landing on a beach where the stones were like baseballs, whereas Bomber Command head Sir Arthur Harris rejected it, maintaining that his bombers could not provide the precision necessary to bomb the waterfront and not create chaos in Dieppe and the navy would provide no major firepower because the admiralty refused to send major ships into the relatively narrow coastal waters. Mistakes happen in planning and strategy. War always leads to deaths in action and many inevitably occur as a result of blunders. Yes, there were lessons learned from Dieppe, but most of them should have been obvious.
For the Canadians there was great courage and unspeakable horror in a few hours. Dieppe was a failure of intelligence, a gross lapse in command sense and leadership. But let us no longer wallow in conspiracy theses and in seeking to blame the British or this commander and that senior officer. The Canadians wanted to get into action, as Victoria Cross winner Lieutenant-Colonel Merritt said after the war. "We were very glad to go, we were delighted". Taken prisoner during the raid, Merritt recalled, "We were up against a very difficult situation and we didn't win; but to hell with this business of saying the generals did us dirt." His judgment was and remains the most sensible assessment of the tragedy of Dieppe.
But what went wrong?
Many Dieppe veterans still today maintains that the Germans had known the raid was coming. There is no evidence in the German military archives that the Germans knew a raid on Dieppe was planned. Bad weather cancelled the attack in July and the troops dispersed back to their bases and many blabbed to their girlfriends and pubmates. Should the German intelligence not have pick up that information? Well, apparently they did not, and if they did, would the Germans expect such a foolish violation of elementary military good sense that the same troops would be used against the same target the next month? That, we do not know. What likely doomed the raid to failure was when the flotilla ran into a German coastal convoy in the English Channel and the German coastal defences went to a heightened state of alert and the disembarking troops became easy targets.
What lessons Dieppe have taught!
The need for heavy air and naval support was recognized, as well as the requirement for better intelligence, better ship-to-shore communications, more specialized assault training for the attacking forces, and better tanks and landing craft. And certainly all these were essential for D-Day's success.
Let us be clear, however. Assaults from the sea were nothing new in 1942. The United States Marine Corps had a developed doctrine for such attacks, and the British themselves had staged seaborne attacks in the Great War. At Gallipoli in 1915 the operation failed because of inadequate covering fire, hostile cliffs, and failure to use sufficient capital ships in the narrow Dardanelles strait. The same elements of failure were present in the Dieppe. How many men have to die before planners learn a lesson? Must such lessons be relearned with each generation?
More to the point, what fool decided to attack Dieppe? No one who has stood on the stony beach in front of Dieppe, as hundreds of thousands of British vacationers must had done for a century before 1942, could have failed to notice the cliffs that commanded the Canadians' landing areas. Where else would the Germans have placed their weaponry? And by what planning principles did the staff decide that a relative handful of aircraft could provide air support and that eight destroyers could give sufficient covering fire?
When Lord Louis Mountbatten took over Combined Operations in March he envisioned commando-style raids on either side of Dieppe. Army representative Gen. Bernard Montgomery was in favour of a frontal attack. He then departed for North Africa, disenchanted with a scenario that was becoming more confused with each passing week. The original concept went down the drain when commanders picked up choice bits, but rejected anything that interfered with their personal agendas. The army still opted for a tank landing on a beach where the stones were like baseballs, whereas Bomber Command head Sir Arthur Harris rejected it, maintaining that his bombers could not provide the precision necessary to bomb the waterfront and not create chaos in Dieppe and the navy would provide no major firepower because the admiralty refused to send major ships into the relatively narrow coastal waters. Mistakes happen in planning and strategy. War always leads to deaths in action and many inevitably occur as a result of blunders. Yes, there were lessons learned from Dieppe, but most of them should have been obvious.
For the Canadians there was great courage and unspeakable horror in a few hours. Dieppe was a failure of intelligence, a gross lapse in command sense and leadership. But let us no longer wallow in conspiracy theses and in seeking to blame the British or this commander and that senior officer. The Canadians wanted to get into action, as Victoria Cross winner Lieutenant-Colonel Merritt said after the war. "We were very glad to go, we were delighted". Taken prisoner during the raid, Merritt recalled, "We were up against a very difficult situation and we didn't win; but to hell with this business of saying the generals did us dirt." His judgment was and remains the most sensible assessment of the tragedy of Dieppe.
MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
I think you are being overly generous towards the leadership and planning of the Gallipoli campaign or at the very least understated.
But that is for another thread.
Der Alte
Banned
One should, as a German, be a little cautious when discussing British failures in wartime. :wink:I think you are being overly generous towards the leadership and planning of the Gallipoli campaign or at the very least understated.
But that is for another thread.
Many times I have heard: "Who won the bloody war anyway."
BritinBritain
Per Ardua Ad Astra
I found Der Alte's post extremely interesting and informative.
In my simplistic opinion, the Dieppe raid was carried out due to the constant pressure from Stalin for a second front, despite being told time and time again that the Western Allies were not ready.
In my simplistic opinion, the Dieppe raid was carried out due to the constant pressure from Stalin for a second front, despite being told time and time again that the Western Allies were not ready.
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Der Alte
Banned
That's what I love about you Brits.Guilty as charged.
You have the ability to be rude in a pleasant way.
MontyB
All-Blacks Supporter
Fortunately I am a Kiwi we don't have to be nice about British failures because they usually cost us or the Australians dearly.