ScarabVenom
Active member
I've been reading about the war for a while and I have a bunch of questions about what really has most of the talking in this war. Which is "The Gap" or "The Israeli pocket" which is basically the Israeli forces between the 2 Egyptian field armies in the Deversoir region and the Israeli forces across the canal.
I'm going to talk about the situation after the two failed attacks against Suez and Ismailia by Israel. According to some Egyptian general - my apologies, I don't remember the name - he said,
"[FONT="]It was essential that the Israeli command protect its forces in a limited sector west of the canal by dispersing them over a wider area. Consequently more troops were sent west of the canal. The outcome was untenable strategically for several reasons. One, Israel now had a large force (about six or seven brigades) in a very limited area of land, surrounded from all sides either by natural or man-made barriers, or by the Egyptian forces. This put it in a weak position. Moreover, there were the difficulties in supplying this force, in evacuating it, in the lengthy communication lines, and in the daily attrition in men and equipment. Two, to protect these troops, the Israeli command had to allocate other forces (four or five brigades) to defend the entrances to the breach at the Deversoir. Three, to immobilize the Egyptian bridgeheads in Sinai the Israeli command had to allocate ten brigades to face the Second and Third army bridgeheads. In addition, it became necessary to keep the strategic reserves at their maximum state of alert. Thus, Israel was obliged to keep its armed force-and consequently the country-mobilized for a long period, at least until the war came to an end, because the ceasefire did not signal the end of the war. There is no doubt that this in total conflict with its military theories."
Then comes the Israeli general Dayan he said something similar about that same situation,
"[/FONT][FONT="]The cease-fire existed on paper, but the continued firing along the front was not the only characteristic of the situation between October 24, 1973 and January 18, 1974. This intermediate period also held the ever-present possibility of a renewal of full-scale war. There were three variations on how it might break out, two Egyptian and one Israeli. One Egyptian plan was to attack our units west of the canal from the direction of Cairo. The other was to cut-off our canal bridgehead by a link-up of the Second and Third Armies on the east bank. Both plans were based on massive artillery pounding of our forces, who were not well fortified and who would suffer heavy casualties. It was therefore thought that Israel would withdraw from the west bank, since she was most sensitive on the subject of soldier's lives. Egypt, at the time had a total of 1,700 first-line tanks on both sides of the canal front, 700 on the east bank and 1,000 on the west bank. Also on the west bank, in the second line, were an additional 600 tanks for the defense of Cairo. She had some 2,000 artillery pieces, about 500 operational aircraft, and at least 130 SAM missile batteries positioned around our forces so as to deny us air support."
Was Israel west of the canal really in such a position at the end of the war? Remarking that both generals admitted that the cease-fire wasn't the end.
Also some Israelis have admitted some interesting things about the war....
[/FONT][FONT="]General Ishio Javitch
"For Israel, the war ultimately ended without our being able to break up the Arab armies, neither Egypt's nor Syria's. We scored no victories. Nor did we succeed in restoring the deterrent power of the Israeli army. If we assess achievements against targets, we will find that the Arabs' victory was the more decisive." -- Symposium on the October War, Jerusalem, 16 September 1974
[/FONT][FONT="]David Elazar
"As for the third army, in spite of our encircling them they resisted and advanced to occupy in fact a wider area of land at the east. Thus, we can not say that we defeated or conquered them."[/FONT]
I find this quote by Elazar to be kinda...awkward since Shazly who's an Egyptian general admitted that the situation of that Third Army was a "catastrophe" and I believe him in that because during the negotiations Israel could basically achieve what they wanted from Egypt such as the Israeli POWs and some Israeli spy I can't recall his name. And all of this, in return of non-military supplies delivered to the Egyptian Third Army.
My questions are....
1) If supposedly that situation the Israeli army west of the canal was in is true. Why does Israel claim victory??
2)Israel could basically hold Egypt from the neck and the Egyptian command had to do everything the Israelis wanted from them because of the Third Army's situation then, why does Egypt claim victory??
Probably, I would agree with Trevor N Dupuy when he said "Thus, if war is the employment of military force in support of political objectives, there can be no doubt that in strategic and political terms the Arab States - and particularly Egypt - won the war, even though the military outcome was a stalemate permitting both sides to claim military victory."
Please discuss.
I'm going to talk about the situation after the two failed attacks against Suez and Ismailia by Israel. According to some Egyptian general - my apologies, I don't remember the name - he said,
"[FONT="]It was essential that the Israeli command protect its forces in a limited sector west of the canal by dispersing them over a wider area. Consequently more troops were sent west of the canal. The outcome was untenable strategically for several reasons. One, Israel now had a large force (about six or seven brigades) in a very limited area of land, surrounded from all sides either by natural or man-made barriers, or by the Egyptian forces. This put it in a weak position. Moreover, there were the difficulties in supplying this force, in evacuating it, in the lengthy communication lines, and in the daily attrition in men and equipment. Two, to protect these troops, the Israeli command had to allocate other forces (four or five brigades) to defend the entrances to the breach at the Deversoir. Three, to immobilize the Egyptian bridgeheads in Sinai the Israeli command had to allocate ten brigades to face the Second and Third army bridgeheads. In addition, it became necessary to keep the strategic reserves at their maximum state of alert. Thus, Israel was obliged to keep its armed force-and consequently the country-mobilized for a long period, at least until the war came to an end, because the ceasefire did not signal the end of the war. There is no doubt that this in total conflict with its military theories."
Then comes the Israeli general Dayan he said something similar about that same situation,
"[/FONT][FONT="]The cease-fire existed on paper, but the continued firing along the front was not the only characteristic of the situation between October 24, 1973 and January 18, 1974. This intermediate period also held the ever-present possibility of a renewal of full-scale war. There were three variations on how it might break out, two Egyptian and one Israeli. One Egyptian plan was to attack our units west of the canal from the direction of Cairo. The other was to cut-off our canal bridgehead by a link-up of the Second and Third Armies on the east bank. Both plans were based on massive artillery pounding of our forces, who were not well fortified and who would suffer heavy casualties. It was therefore thought that Israel would withdraw from the west bank, since she was most sensitive on the subject of soldier's lives. Egypt, at the time had a total of 1,700 first-line tanks on both sides of the canal front, 700 on the east bank and 1,000 on the west bank. Also on the west bank, in the second line, were an additional 600 tanks for the defense of Cairo. She had some 2,000 artillery pieces, about 500 operational aircraft, and at least 130 SAM missile batteries positioned around our forces so as to deny us air support."
Was Israel west of the canal really in such a position at the end of the war? Remarking that both generals admitted that the cease-fire wasn't the end.
Also some Israelis have admitted some interesting things about the war....
[/FONT][FONT="]General Ishio Javitch
"For Israel, the war ultimately ended without our being able to break up the Arab armies, neither Egypt's nor Syria's. We scored no victories. Nor did we succeed in restoring the deterrent power of the Israeli army. If we assess achievements against targets, we will find that the Arabs' victory was the more decisive." -- Symposium on the October War, Jerusalem, 16 September 1974
[/FONT][FONT="]David Elazar
"As for the third army, in spite of our encircling them they resisted and advanced to occupy in fact a wider area of land at the east. Thus, we can not say that we defeated or conquered them."[/FONT]
I find this quote by Elazar to be kinda...awkward since Shazly who's an Egyptian general admitted that the situation of that Third Army was a "catastrophe" and I believe him in that because during the negotiations Israel could basically achieve what they wanted from Egypt such as the Israeli POWs and some Israeli spy I can't recall his name. And all of this, in return of non-military supplies delivered to the Egyptian Third Army.
My questions are....
1) If supposedly that situation the Israeli army west of the canal was in is true. Why does Israel claim victory??
2)Israel could basically hold Egypt from the neck and the Egyptian command had to do everything the Israelis wanted from them because of the Third Army's situation then, why does Egypt claim victory??
Probably, I would agree with Trevor N Dupuy when he said "Thus, if war is the employment of military force in support of political objectives, there can be no doubt that in strategic and political terms the Arab States - and particularly Egypt - won the war, even though the military outcome was a stalemate permitting both sides to claim military victory."
Please discuss.
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