Question on great Generals of WW II

[Doppleganger]

4) Even had the allied air force stayed away any German counter offensive within 10 miles of the beach was going to be met with naval gun fire.

This point is precisely why German panzer formations should have been based inland. The counter-attack ideally for the Germans wouldn't have come anywhere near the coast. The idea was that 2 armoured pincers would engage when the Allies neared Paris, in a large-scale envelopment reminiscent of the encirclements in 1941 and 1942 on the Eastern Front.

Tanks are not beach weapons. By sticking them on such a surface you basically relegate them to mobile pillboxes. The best use the Germans could have made of their forces, regardless of air supremacy from the Allies or not, was to use their concept of Elastic Defence in Depth to suck in the Allies and then counter them as described above. Disasters for the Germans such as the Falaise Pocket would probably never have occurred.

 

[MontyB]

Hehe I didn't actually mean run them down to the water line and start shooting, the problem I have with the "let them get ashore and then engage them on our terms" approach is that (and I know I am repeating myself here) allied air superiority would have meant disaster.

Lets face it the scenario you are talking about is similar to the Ardennes Offensive, no allied air power and no naval support and a slightly stronger German army with easier ground to travel over. However I believe the result would have been the same 2 days to a week of hard fought slow advances and then the armour would have been decimated in open ground by the allied air force.

Essentially I guess what I am saying is that much like every war thats ever been fought since WW2 if you do not control the air you may as well give up as you are not going to win. Without the Luftwaffe to support and defend the armour any attack was going to be met with eventual destruction hence the reason I agree with Rommel on this D-Day had to be stopped at the shore in Normandy not Paris.

 

[Doppleganger]

Much stronger forces than were available for the Battle of the Bulge but yeah, you're right, tactical air power over modern battlefields is so important and I think it would probably have been decisive over France in 1944 no matter what the Germans did.

 

[MontyB]

It would have been interesting to see how things would have gone had the Luftwaffe been able to compete even at a weakened level, I guess had that been the case D-Day may never have gone ahead at all and the French would have been speaking Russian.

 

[Doppleganger]

I think events on the Eastern Front in 1943, plus the political pressure Stalin was putting on the Western Allies, more or less guaranteed a D-Day in 1944 at some point. If we can hypothesize that the Luftwaffe was able to maintain a least some parity in tactical air support and fighter cover then the task of the Western Allies would have been much more difficult. If D-Day had never gone ahead then possibly the July bomb plot wouldn't have happened either. With only one front to fight on and Hitler still allowing some military judgement to prevail the Germans could have eventually stalled the Soviet advance. Historically the Red Army was beginning to run short of manpower in 1945 and the Germans had ever shortening supply lines and defensive fronts that would have made things easier for them. Of course, they'd need to hold on to the Ploesti oilfields in Romania to have any chance.

The Germans really seemed to make things hard for themselves. They had the best tactical and operational organisation in the world but their upper command structure was a mess of bureaucracy, secrecy and mistrust. Too many chiefs basically and Hitler making all the decisions.

 

[perseus]

Of course, they'd need to hold on to the Ploesti oilfields in Romania to have any chance.

These were bombed in conjunction with the synthetic refineries. As a result German petroleum production dwindled and their ability to fight any prolonged war would have been impossible anyway. Interesting then that the petroleum sources were really devastated only after D day. A total collapse of the Eastern front followed by problems of the Western Allies making headway in Normandy would have indeed meant a Iron Curtain advancing to the English Channel. I am surprised why historians haven't discussed this more.

 

[MontyB]

The Germans really seemed to make things hard for themselves. They had the best tactical and operational organisation in the world but their upper command structure was a mess of bureaucracy, secrecy and mistrust. Too many chiefs basically and Hitler making all the decisions.

I think this is something the world should be grateful about to, things may have turned out totally different had Hitler just played at being a politician instead of god.

 

[Doppleganger]

I think this is something the world should be grateful about to, things may have turned out totally different had Hitler just played at being a politician instead of god.

Indeed. We are lucky that Hitler was his own worst enemy. However, Nazi Germany would never have achieved the things they did, good or bad, without his influence. In many ways, Hitler was a great man. Unfortunately, he also condoned acts of great evil to take place.

 

[MontyB]

You're absolutely right Monty. Rommel, and to a lesser extent Rundstedt, Kesselring and Model etc have all taken all the headlines, primarly as they fought against the Western Allies from 1943 onwards. Guderian and Manstein are known to people who have looked into things a little more but there are plenty of commanders who deserve to be mentioned yet are almost unknown to most people. Aside from the excellent generals you already mentioned you could add the likes of Hoepner, Balck, [SIZE=-1]Schweppenburg, Eberbach, Dietrich[/SIZE], Bock, Leeb. I could go on and on. I think the German system of Auftragstaktik, where commanders were given mission-style orders by their superiors and given a great deal of autonomy in achieving those orders, developed commanders who were quick to use initiative and think for themselves. This system created and nurtured some excellent commanders. It is notable that as soon as Hitler started micro-managing the Wehrmacht much of its ability and dash disappeared. Even so, NCOs and upwards were still encouraged to think for themselves and is one reason why even the 1944-45 Wehrmacht was still a very effective combat force, albeit on the defensive.

Ok so in a head to head battle who do you rate best von Arnim or Rommel?

They both fought in the same region and separately and they both had very different ideas on the way things should have been done with von Arnim being the more cautious.

 

[Doppleganger]

Good question. Arnim came up through the ranks under Guderian, although he got injured in the opening days of Barbarossa and thereafter Guderian's influence was lost to him. I just don't know enough about Arnim's DAK career to say one way or the other. What I do know is that Rommel took the freedom that mobile warfare allowed him to extremes which might have spelt disaster on the Eastern Front say. Even Guderian was quick to ensure that his flanks were protected when advancing. From that perspective Arnim was probably the more rounded commander but without the flashes of genuis that Rommel had.

 

[MontyB]

The impression I get of both Rommel and von Arnim is that they were good at some of the aspects required for the campaign but neither had all that was required.

I am left wondering whether putting both commanders together under a more senior leader (stationed within the theater) would not have produced better results, it seems to me that Rommel was pretty much left to it and he just wasn't up to it.

 

[Doppleganger]

Interestingly, according to Guderian, he proposed that Germany look seriously into the North African theatre (to deny British interests) as soon as possible after the defeat of France, with possibly himself as the overall commander. Guderian would have been the ideal commander to 'look after' Rommel and certainly DAK would have been more like Deutsch Armeegruppe instead of just a single Korps. Hitler turned the proposal down of course.

 

[MontyB]

I have to wonder why they would have had that level of interest in the North Africa, the oil fields were a long way off and while important the cost of trudging through the entire middle east to get to them would have been prohibitive, theoretically they already controlled a sizable proportion of the Mediterranean or at least enough to minimise the Suez canal advantage.

Once again I have a feeling that German involvement in the region was more to bail out Italian failings (as was the Greek campaign) than for any real strategic value.

 

[Somalia]

I believe that had Hitler committed sufficient ground units and panzer corps, with air support and supplies Rommel would have been able to overran the British in Egypt before the Americans came into that theater.

Rommel was more than competent enough to handle and over see the Afrika Korps as was proven in his early crushing defeats against the British in which his nickname "The Desert Fox" came to prominent use when he was sent to take over that theater after the Italian army began to falter against the British. He made a complete turn around on that theater for the Axis powers and now it was the British that were being folded on all fronts in the battle instead of Italians.

What handicapped Rommel and eventually lead to his defeat was I truely believe 3 factors: One, the Axis powers lost air superiority in that theater due to hitler assigning luftwaffe priority to the faltering Russian front and against London; two, the Axis powers also lost naval superiority in that theater which limited the movement of what little supplies and men Hitler provided for that theater, this was due to the Italian navy being assigned guardianship of the Mediterranean sea since it had the largest naval presence of the Axis , thus when it failed to hold superiority it sealed Rommel to doom since air superiority was already lost to, so Rommels men and supplies began to dwindle and moral declined. Three, the Italians troops under him fought half-heartedly and would retreat or surrender in the first signs of stiff British resistance and what little German soldiers he had was not enough to make up for the Italians poor performance.

Rommel though not the best WW2 general was without a doubt amongst the best however. Being put in a handicapped situation due to the reasons I mentioned above made him seem less talented than he really was, had he had the basic necessities to fight a modern war such as men, supplies and some sort of air and naval support I believe Rommel would have undoubtedly crushed the British in North Africa. I credit him for his ingenuity specially in mechanized warfare and desert warfare.

 

[MontyB]

I have a couple of problems with your argument.

1) It was Rommel that failed to follow orders and stay within Libya until his Korps was at full strength where his limited African based air support would have been effective when combined with support from Sicilian based aircraft.

2) It was Rommel that failed to understand his supply requirements by not taking important ports such as Tobruk he alone effectively doubled the length of his supply lines and split his forces at a time when he needed both available.

The problem with the argument that had he been given everything he wanted then he would have won is that given everything they wanted anyone could have won.

In the end I personally do not believe Rommel was the right man for the North African campaign but I do believe he was right with his Normandy plan.

 

[Young Winston]

Well in the German Army of WW2, the rank of Field Marshall was directly equivalent to a 5 Star General in the US Army, although operationally it was probably more akin to a 4 Star General. There are many grades of General and Rommel attained the highest field rank in the German Army regardless.

Your answer is typical of someone who has not done a great deal of reading on WW2. Rommel was a good general but one of the best? I think that is being a bit generous. His military achievements certainly don't stand up compared to his reputation. As far as Zhukov goes another fine commander but he certainly wasn't solely responsible for Russia's eventual victory, far from it. Russia was always going to win eventually when the Germans failed to knock them out quickly in 1941.

I would have to agree with you mate. He had a lot of daring but on numerous occassions overran is supply line in the desert. Hitler probably didn't help. Rommel was a great tactician but I have doubts about his strategy at times.:rock:

 

[Doppleganger]

I have to wonder why they would have had that level of interest in the North Africa, the oil fields were a long way off and while important the cost of trudging through the entire middle east to get to them would have been prohibitive, theoretically they already controlled a sizable proportion of the Mediterranean or at least enough to minimise the Suez canal advantage.

Once again I have a feeling that German involvement in the region was more to bail out Italian failings (as was the Greek campaign) than for any real strategic value.

Guderian's idea was basically to go into Africa in 1940 with 5 to 6 strong panzer divisions, link up with the Italian forces in Abyssinia and proceed to wipe out the British presence in North Africa. German paratroopers at the same time would seize Malta. His argument was that it was far better to do this in 1940 as a coordinated campaign rather than in 1941 to bail out the Italians. This would mean that panzer divisions in DAK (and their assigned Luftflotte) could then be freed up for use in Russia in 1941. He also argued that it would more difficult for the British to reinforce their forces in North Africa in 1940. With hindsight, it would have been far more preferable for Germany to adopt Guderian's plans for North Africa compared to what happened historically.

 

[MontyB]

Guderian's idea was basically to go into Africa in 1940 with 5 to 6 strong panzer divisions, link up with the Italian forces in Abyssinia and proceed to wipe out the British presence in North Africa. German paratroopers at the same time would seize Malta. His argument was that it was far better to do this in 1940 as a coordinated campaign rather than in 1941 to bail out the Italians. This would mean that panzer divisions in DAK (and their assigned Luftflotte) could then be freed up for use in Russia in 1941. He also argued that it would more difficult for the British to reinforce their forces in North Africa in 1940. With hindsight, it would have been far more preferable for Germany to adopt Guderian's plans for North Africa compared to what happened historically.

The problem I see with this option is that it would have taken a huge number of troops and had no real end point.

If you were just going to drive the British out of North Africa great but what about the ones in the Middle East, if then you decided to drive them out of North Africa and the Middle East well thats a bigger operation but ok then what about the ones in India, Kenya, South Africa etc. basically without a campaign to conquer the whole of the African and Asian continents you were always going to have a front with the British/Commonwealth in the region so they were always going to have the capacity to strike back and without a reliable Ally to cover your arse you are going to have large numbers of troops tied down on garrison duty.

 

[Doppleganger]

The problem I see with this option is that it would have taken a huge number of troops and had no real end point.

If you were just going to drive the British out of North Africa great but what about the ones in the Middle East, if then you decided to drive them out of North Africa and the Middle East well thats a bigger operation but ok then what about the ones in India, Kenya, South Africa etc. basically without a campaign to conquer the whole of the African and Asian continents you were always going to have a front with the British/Commonwealth in the region so they were always going to have the capacity to strike back and without a reliable Ally to cover your arse you are going to have large numbers of troops tied down on garrison duty.

I think it was Guderian's aim to deal with the Mediterranean and North African areas initially. He may have also anticipated that further operations against wider British targets might have been neccessary but he doesn't go into his plans in any great detail in his book. Remember too that at the time Guderian proposed them Barbarossa was still a year away and hadn't even been formally planned yet. Guderian was not to know that in a year's time 3.5 million German soliders would be marching into Russia and with that knowledge any extended African campaign would obviously not have been possible.

 

[MontyB]

In all honesty I think had the Germans thought about it a little longer they would have stayed out of Africa altogether and encouraged the Italians to sit on their hands as well, they already controlled much of the Atlantic end of the Mediterranean via bases in Sicily thus forcing convoys to take the longer route around Africa while still letting them pick off Malta convoys in a war of attrition.
Essentially the only way Germany could have taken Britain and the Commonwealth out of the war was to cut it off at the head and invade and defeat Britain.

In the end the best thing Germany could have done would have been to boot the Italians into the Allied camp as they were little more than a liability.