https://www.popularmechanics.com/mil...W1U_X7ryhMo7JQ

With the ease the Ukranians are knocking out Russian tanks, I don't know if thats a good idea or not. Even Abrams and Challenger tanks are capable of being knocked out.

Originally Posted by BritinBritain

With the ease the Ukranians are knocking out Russian tanks, I don't know if thats a good idea or not. Even Abrams and Challenger tanks are capable of being knocked out.

I think the role of armour on the battlefield has gone full circle back to its WW1 and pre-WW2 role of infantry support, certainly the idea of armoured spearheads leading campaigns must be relegated to wishful thinking now.

The war in Ukraine has showed what modern artillery and AT weapons do to tanks. But the Russians are using their tanks and other units wrong. Mechanized units have nothing to do in urban areas. That is the job for the infantry. How they drove right into urban areas and elsewhere got me to questioning the Russian military training.

The Russian tactical battle groups are designed to meet similar battle groups and not infantry with effective AT weapons. There are indications the Chinese military doctrine has changed now from having tanks as the major component in their battlegroups to have them in a supportive role instead. Maybe that is the lesson from the war in Ukraine

Originally Posted by I3BrigPvSk

The war in Ukraine has showed what modern artillery and AT weapons do to tanks. But the Russians are using their tanks and other units wrong. Mechanized units have nothing to do in urban areas. That is the job for the infantry. How they drove right into urban areas and elsewhere got me to questioning the Russian military training.

The Russian tactical battle groups are designed to meet similar battle groups and not infantry with effective AT weapons. There are indications the Chinese military doctrine has changed now from having tanks as the major component in their battlegroups to have them in a supportive role instead. Maybe that is the lesson from the war in Ukraine

Notwithstanding what the tank lobby still is telling us,in WW2 tanks had in the East only a supportive role and it was not much different in the West .
The Russians committed a lot of tanks ( too many ) in Ukraine because they lacked the needed number of infantry . They hoped that 10 tanks would provide more firepower and mobility than an infantry battalion . The tanks could not provide more firepower and there was no need for more mobility .Their mechanized units fought in urban areas because there was not enough infantry .And because the Russian tanks were only efficient on short distances,if they did not fight in urban areas, what else could they do ?

Originally Posted by lljadw

Notwithstanding what the tank lobby still is telling us,in WW2 tanks had in the East only a supportive role and it was not much different in the West .
The Russians committed a lot of tanks ( too many ) in Ukraine because they lacked the needed number of infantry . They hoped that 10 tanks would provide more firepower and mobility than an infantry battalion . The tanks could not provide more firepower and there was no need for more mobility .Their mechanized units fought in urban areas because there was not enough infantry .And because the Russian tanks were only efficient on short distances,if they did not fight in urban areas, what else could they do ?

When you say "East" I assume you mean the Japanese campaign?
What else could they have done?
Well if they had a shortage of infantry they could have limited the number of fronts they attacked on instead of multiple lines of advance, they could have focused on Eastern Ukraine, alternatively if they thought taking Kyiv would force a surrender they could have made a single drive on Kyiv.
Instead they don't appear to have had a plan that extended beyond crossing the border.

Originally Posted by MontyB

When you say "East" I assume you mean the Japanese campaign?
What else could they have done?
Well if they had a shortage of infantry they could have limited the number of fronts they attacked on instead of multiple lines of advance, they could have focused on Eastern Ukraine, alternatively if they thought taking Kyiv would force a surrender they could have made a single drive on Kyiv.
Instead they don't appear to have had a plan that extended beyond crossing the border.

East is the war in the USSR ,Barbarossa:in June 1941 the Germans attacked with 150 divisions ( their allies not included ) ,3 million men,of which 17 Panzer divisions 3000 tanks ,and after a few weeks of victories,it was already over, Halder was forced to admit in August 1941 already that they had failed .These 3000 tanks failed to give the Germans a decisive victory and very soon Guderian was whining that it was the fault of the infantry divisions of Kluge .
The Russians OTOH had on 21 June a big numerical tank superiority ,more than 10000 tanks ,but that did not help them : they were forced to disband their tank divisions, most of these had been destroyed, a lot of them by non combat losses .And in the Autumn of 1941 the Russians did better wit a small number of tanks .
This proves that tanks were not decisive during Barbarossa .
And in 1940, the German tanks failed to capture Dunkirk,because there was not enough artillery and infantry available .
We see now that history repeats itself .
I also think that the Russians had no plan for war if the war continued after crossing the border, but I suspect that the reason is that they knew that they could not win if the war continued after crossing the border .Thus, as the Germans in 1941,they made every effort for a short war and refused to admit that this could fail .
Why not a single drive on Kiev ? Maybe because this was logistically not possible with 2000 tanks . Tanks need space .
An other reason could be that they feared that a single drive to Kiev could result in a new Stalingrad .
And, would the fall of Kiev result in the fall of Ukraine, or would it be the opposite ?

Originally Posted by lljadw

East is the war in the USSR ,Barbarossa:in June 1941 the Germans attacked with 150 divisions ( their allies not included ) ,3 million men,of which 17 Panzer divisions 3000 tanks ,and after a few weeks of victories,it was already over, Halder was forced to admit in August 1941 already that they had failed .These 3000 tanks failed to give the Germans a decisive victory and very soon Guderian was whining that it was the fault of the infantry divisions of Kluge .
The Russians OTOH had on 21 June a big numerical tank superiority ,more than 10000 tanks ,but that did not help them : they were forced to disband their tank divisions, most of these had been destroyed, a lot of them by non combat losses .And in the Autumn of 1941 the Russians did better wit a small number of tanks .
This proves that tanks were not decisive during Barbarossa .
And in 1940, the German tanks failed to capture Dunkirk,because there was not enough artillery and infantry available .
We see now that history repeats itself .
I also think that the Russians had no plan for war if the war continued after crossing the border, but I suspect that the reason is that they knew that they could not win if the war continued after crossing the border .Thus, as the Germans in 1941,they made every effort for a short war and refused to admit that this could fail .
Why not a single drive on Kiev ? Maybe because this was logistically not possible with 2000 tanks . Tanks need space .
An other reason could be that they feared that a single drive to Kiev could result in a new Stalingrad .
And, would the fall of Kiev result in the fall of Ukraine, or would it be the opposite ?

Ok for arguments sake let's assume that you are right.
The Russians initiated a war with no operational plan, inadequate forces and at the wrong time of the year, three months later armour could have operated off road and it would have made Ukraine's ambush ATGM teams job much harder.

So we are back to the original argument, was it incompetence or arrogance that led to this.
Let's face it the Germans at least had a plan and compensated for the lack of men and material with training and tactical innovation.

About tank losses
1 The German writer Hartmut Schustereit gives the following tank losses for June-July 1941 in his book Vabanque
Germany : some 600 ( VaBanque P 91 )
Soviets : some 8000 ( Yes : 8000 ) ( VaBanque P 103 )
We know that on both sides,the majority of the tank losses were non combat losses ,created by accidents, maintenance and supply problems and not by ATW .
2 For Ukraine :the pro Ukrainian Oryx gives Russian tank losses as some 1400,the figures of the Ukrainian MOD are 2300.
One of both is lying, or both . I have as much trust in Oryx as in the Ukrainian MOD .
Oryx said that at least 550 Russian tanks had been abandoned and were not destroyed by ATW ,but not all destroyed tanks were destroyed by ATW. Thus we can assume that almost 40 % of lost Russian tanks were not lost by ATW (tanks, aircraft, artillery, mines, Javelins ,etc.. )
For the Ukrainian tank losses ( 300 or more ) ,I have seen the claim that 50 % of them were lost also by non combat causes .
I think that we may conclude that the role of the Javelins,etc, has been very much exaggerated by our media who were only copycatting the claims of the producers of the Javelins, for obvious reasons .
More ATW do not result in more tank losses . For more tank losses are needed
a ATW where they are needed
b men who can use the ATW
c the presence of tanks where the enemy can detect them
d the possibility to use the ATW
c the impossibility for the enemy to stop the ATW or to hide/evacuate his tanks .
This brings us to the question if tanks advancing off road are less vulnerable than tanks advancing on road . Problem which I will comment later .

Originally Posted by lljadw

About tank losses
1 The German writer Hartmut Schustereit gives the following tank losses for June-July 1941 in his book Vabanque
Germany : some 600 ( VaBanque P 91 )
Soviets : some 8000 ( Yes : 8000 ) ( VaBanque P 103 )
We know that on both sides,the majority of the tank losses were non combat losses ,created by accidents, maintenance and supply problems and not by ATW .
2 For Ukraine :the pro Ukrainian Oryx gives Russian tank losses as some 1400,the figures of the Ukrainian MOD are 2300.
One of both is lying, or both . I have as much trust in Oryx as in the Ukrainian MOD .
Oryx said that at least 550 Russian tanks had been abandoned and were not destroyed by ATW ,but not all destroyed tanks were destroyed by ATW. Thus we can assume that almost 40 % of lost Russian tanks were not lost by ATW (tanks, aircraft, artillery, mines, Javelins ,etc.. )
For the Ukrainian tank losses ( 300 or more ) ,I have seen the claim that 50 % of them were lost also by non combat causes .
I think that we may conclude that the role of the Javelins,etc, has been very much exaggerated by our media who were only copycatting the claims of the producers of the Javelins, for obvious reasons .
More ATW do not result in more tank losses . For more tank losses are needed
a ATW where they are needed
b men who can use the ATW
c the presence of tanks where the enemy can detect them
d the possibility to use the ATW
c the impossibility for the enemy to stop the ATW or to hide/evacuate his tanks .
This brings us to the question if tanks advancing off road are less vulnerable than tanks advancing on road . Problem which I will comment later .

In VaBanque doesn't Schustereit claim that Germany invaded the Soviet Union in order to defeat Great Britain and that Goering tried to talk Hitler out of it (p181).
Again I won't argue with his statistics just the conclusions he draws from them.

I think you look at things far too literally, ATGMs do not have to have a 100% kill rate to be effective, I would argue that just the thought of an ATGM crew in an area will cause poorly trained armour crews to get nervous and change the way they operate.
Much like the rumour of a PzKpfw-VI caused allied troops consternation the psychological effect of the Tiger was far greater than its battlefield impact but that impact was effective in pushing the enemy out of its normal operating environment and increased casualties and material loss.

With regard to the current ATGMs in Ukraine I disagree entirely with your conclusions, my knowledge and understanding of the use of these things is rudimentary at best and I am not going to argue tactics or kill rates as I don't know them but what I will argue is human nature, if Ukrainian service frontline personnel did not see a value in these weapons they would not take them.

I am prepared to bet that rather than hump a bulky 22kg Javelin or 12.5kg NLAW around a battlefield if they thought they were useless they would either not take them and load up on items they thought they would need or dump them at the first available opportunity.

I am also prepared to argue that Ukraine would not have been calling for more of them if they were just being dumped on the side of the road because soldiers weren't using them, what the continued demand for them tells us is that the soldiers using them see vale in them and that is all that really matters.