Paper in Progress- Input welcome




 
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November 20th, 2005  
deerslayer
 
 

Topic: Paper in Progress- Input welcome


I'm working on a paper right now which uses thermodynamics to help understand how an operating doctrine can be developed. It's only partially completed, but I'm looking for input from a military-oriented community.

First, what would you consider most important in responding to a terrorist attack within the first few hours? Days? etc.

Second, what current methodology or theory (Clausewitz, Boyd, Sun Tzu, etc) would you consider best adapted for homeland defense, and which methodology would be best suited to actively combatting a fourth-generation threat?

Here's a look at the paper in its beginnings-



Perpetuating Destruction: Application of Thermodynamics to
Fourth Generation Warfare- Definition of Operational Theory And Methodology


In “The Bureaucratic Bungle” I tackled the task of expounding on the current accepted views and theories of “Fourth Generation Warfare”, or 4GW. As this previous paper stated, 4GW remains a looming nonlinear threat, which can be combated with relative diplomatic immunity by a stable and sound government with level-headed leaders. However, previous works and further research into the subject found that a clear operating methodology or “Standard Operating Procedure” for dealing with 4GW was almost nonexistent. Rather than having a clear, concrete definition of dealing with the proliferation of guerilla or low-intensity conflict (“L.I.C.”). The purpose of this paper is to define, using an easily understood scientific concept, an SOP for the current guerilla or extremist threat.
Thermodynamics refers to the scientific study of the relations between mass and energy conservation. Its two most basic concepts are those of “mass conservation” (the Law of Conservation of Mass) and “entropy” (the Law of Entropy). Thermodynamics provides such a good reference and analogy to 4GW because it defines an almost perpetuating system whose concepts refer to both constant variables and changing ones.
The Law of Conservation of Mass states that matter can neither be created nor destroyed. The amount of matter at the beginning of Earth has remained constant throughout its approximate 4.6 billion years of existence. The analogy can be made, therefore, that guerilla conflict has been in use since the existence of mankind; we are only seeing a greater proliferation of it in recent times and in developing or lower socioeconomic-class countries. From the standpoint of an industrialized nation, L.I.C. does not “add up”. Speaking in generalities, we do not understand the extremist or liberationist mind-set. This concept has been stated in “The Bureaucratic Bungle”.
Entropy is a somewhat more difficult concept to grasp, maybe more so in the analogy used in this paper. However, for the sake of connecting to the previous analogy, entropy describes the loss of functionality in a system due to usable energy being lost as heat.

As the above graphic illustrates, the quality and success of any military operation in a fourth-generation environment are inversely proportionate to the amount of friction and entropy within the system. It is possibly best to gather these internal and external frictions under an umbrella acronym which is easily recognizable, OPSEC.
OPSEC, or OPerational SECurity, is used to describe the overall protection and security of an internal process, be it in business, conventional or unconventional warfare.
OPSEC is essentially an umbrella term under which both external and internal frictions of conflict are grouped. It can be defined as the ultimate depository for all Clausewitzian frictions. Think of OPSEC as a machine operating on basic mechanical principles of kinetic and potential energy While taking into account the extraordinary amount of potential energy (friction) it must expend a much larger amount of kinetic energy (process of action) to keep friction at a manageable level.
In this perpetuating action, we see a great deal of wasted or lost energy and initiative. This is what is meant by entropy. OPSEC therefore has three distinct functions in the warfare community: Friction control, energy expenditure and conservation, and keeping entropy at manageable and semi-efficient levels. Refer back to the military as a system. This system can either be open (a high-profile/publicized/funded/self-perpetuating- the basis of the military in general) or closed (smaller organization, more agile decision making, complete or partial loss of internal sanctioning- a field unit or special-operations detachment). Therefore, in this context, we see an increase of entropy and friction as the system opens itself upward through the chain of command.
Friction and entropy control is the basis of this paper- Clausewitz defined it in his own time, but as warfare gradually changes and the fourth-generation mind-set is gradually realized within our own government, his thinking will probably be pushed more towards a “homeland defense” connotation. As a result, new methodologies must be developed from scratch or adapted from previous works. Sun Tzu’s use of friction against the enemy is probably most suited for this purpose. In his “Art of War”, Sun Tzu adheres to the best defense being a good offense. Keep at the enemy, overpower him militarily, politically, and attempt change in his thinking, and he will be deterred from acts of violence. President Bush seemed to understand this in the initial days leading to war, but initiative has been lost as public disdain for warfare and a slew of scandals and economic problems have arisen. In short, friction has overwhelmed our home support for war.

Note that in all graphics, friction is inversely proportionate to its counterpart of security.

Having defined the main Clausewitzian influence in this writing, the major use of Clausewitz as a driving force in offensive doctrine will no longer be mentioned, except for defining the enhancement of operational security. But to offer background to the uninitiated, Clausewitz’s ideas form the backbone of U.S. military fighting doctrine. His principles are based around a balance of political force and military muscle. As stated earlier, he wishes to diminish his frictions as much as possible. Certainly, these ideas are wonderful when writing methodology for a concrete, declared opponent. However, political expediency and balance in a conflict such as Afghanistan has little room for application.
Wait just a minute, thinks the reader. Clausewitz, the greatest influence on our military doctrine and operational methods, was incorrect? Not quite; while his ideas will be criticized and critiqued throughout this writing, his main ideas will be retained when creating a theoretical operating system for fourth generation warfare. More specifically, his ideas will be retained while adding core concepts of his counterparts in the field of military theory, chiefly Sun Tzu. In order to design or assemble any new doctrine, key requirements (a sort of doctrinal TO&E) must be assembled. They are as follows:

Definition of Requirements in a Stable SOP

Requisite # 1: Time

In the third generation of conflict, we see a particular influence in battle through the concept of time. Recall that fourth generation conflict is nonlinear in regards to both geographics and time. Sensibly, then, time should not be an essential factor in the conduct of a fourth generation war, should it? The answer is no. On the contrary, time is a key factor in the success of a fourth generation mission, chiefly because of socio-political factors. Henceforth, public opinion and redundant bureaucratic actions become Opponent # 1, because they conflict with the first requirement of this doctrine. By keeping public support for war in manageable and sustainable limits, it is possible to have the support base to both keep morale high and maintain a healthy image of military life for future recruitment opportunities.
In responding to an outside threat or stimulus, the factor of time is the most critical asset. At the very least some form of intelligence, at least RUMINT, should start being dissected within the first few hours.
November 20th, 2005  
Missileer
 
 
Some good reading so far. I found your post late in the day and will be out of town tomorrow but look forward to taking a shot at dissecting some of your analogies and information as soon as I return. I am intrigued by your thermodynamics analogy to LIC although I tend to think in terms of electronics. (both constant variables and changing ones. ) This term bothers me as I'm not comfortable with theoretical constants, K, having variable qualities.

Talk with you soon.
November 20th, 2005  
deerslayer
 
 
listen, catch me on AIM at thepaintedballer

the premise of the paper expounds on a previous work of mine on 4GW. It's basically a distillation and expansion of current thoughts on the subject. I'm also working on a SOP that specifically targets the homeland and offensive side.

so I'm essentially writing two doctrines with a one-man staff.

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Alright, here's about 90% of my definition of time. Gotta hang it up for the night.

Definition of Requirements in a Stable SOP

Requisite # 1: Time

In the third generation of conflict, we see a particular influence in battle through the concept of time. Recall that fourth generation conflict is nonlinear in regards to both geographics and time. Sensibly, then, time should not be an essential factor in the conduct of a fourth generation war, should it? The answer is no. On the contrary, time is a key factor in the success of a fourth generation mission, chiefly because of socio-political factors. Henceforth, public opinion and redundant bureaucratic actions become Opponent # 1, because they conflict with the first requirement of this doctrine. By keeping public support for war in manageable and sustainable limits, it is possible to have the support base to both keep morale high and maintain a healthy image of military life for future recruitment opportunities.
In responding to an outside threat or stimulus, the factor of time is the most critical asset. At the very least some form of intelligence, at least RUMINT, should start being dissected within the first few hours. It should, in an ideal world, be a matter of hours, not days, before a reaction begins to an event.
When dealing with a variety of time-periods within time periods, as you shall soon see, it becomes necessary to define for simplicity the various periods of a terrorist event. To further clarify the appropriate actions, they can be gathered in the order they occur into an OODA Loop to provide a visual guide I have done so as follows:

A Preceding Phase- Time period occurring before actual threat becomes a reality. Can be measured in days, months, years, etc.

B Warning Phase- Time period between proceeding and the Event Phase. In this period, the terrorist action to take place (if any information concerning it has been delivered) has a definite list of possible targets and times. Preparations in the way of emergency response, civilian warning, and top-level notification should begin here. The Warning Phase may not be an applicable part of the time periods discussed here, depending on available intelligence.

C Event Phase (EP)- The actual time at which a terrorist attack occurs. This is the time envelope between the occurrence of the event and the initial response.

D Inititial Response Phase (IRP)- The IRP is the single most critical time phase following a terrorist event. The need to get emergency personnel scrambled to the scene of an event is critical to minimalize loss of life and prevent further degradation of internal stability. In the IRP, the following should occur:

1. Emergency response should be mobilized

2. Any information surrounding the event should be gathered and dissected

3. Any executive members should be notified and a more accurate and detailed emergency response plan should be developed based on incoming information.

4. Any casualties resulting from EP should be assessed and treated.

E Source Response Phase- This is the interim phase between the usual military reaction abroad and the IRP. Here, planning for a national or transnational response occurs.


Is it bad when a cat who's still in high school can develop a doctrine with a staff of 1?


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sorry to keep reposting, but it helps to have information in one place

Requisite # 2: Operational security

This has already been defined, but the next few paragraphs of this paper will deal with the
ability of a military or governmental organization to increase or decrease its OPSEC at will and action.
Recall that neither entropy nor operational security can attain a hypothetical (i.e. open to debate) value of either 0 or 100 percent on the frictional ratio scale, as demonstrated in Fig. 1.
Operational security, as stated, is a hypothetical value. It exists merely to demonstrate the relationship between a quality system and the myriad factors which attempt to destroy it. It is not, however, hypothetical in its practice and use. In order to reduce the amount of bungling within an operation, administration, or other battlefield-involved group, dependence on or overt attraction to these values must be kept to a minimum.
Operational security is the Clausewitzian motivator of this paper. Useful friction, by contrast, constitutes the influence of John Boyd and Sun Tzu. Dependence on one or the other creates a military which leans primarily toward active conflict or active defense. Balance is key to anti(proactive)terrorism. Without balance, the administration is between a rock and hard place with counter(reactive)terrorism.
Before discussing how to balance the Clausewitzian and Boyd sides of this doctrine, it is important to examine the likely military results stemming from over-reliance on either system of beliefs.
Clausewitz, remember, offered a system of political balance and believed in radically reducing his friction as much as possible. However, close to nothing is written on the nature of increasing the friction of the opponent in a conflict. In short, it is good reading for the defensive strategist. Therefore, it can be readily ascertained that a set of beliefs founded solely on the “Clausewitz theory”, as it will be henceforth referred, will result in a military system that is readily capable of a mediocre system of defense in the event of a terrorist action or hostile invasion. The world scenario developing as it is, the former is the more likely occurrence, and September 11, 2001, fatally proved what the Clausewitz Theory is capable and incapable of.

mod edit: do not double post. Use the edit button to add to a current post
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December 2nd, 2005  
gladius
 
I like your point about creating friction.

I did and still beleive that the war in Iraq drew just about every terrorist radical in the region toward Iraq.

Rather than coming to the States and do damage we were more than likely eliminate a good number of them over there. Iraq being the path of least resistance for those terrorist willing to take a shot at America rather than coming over to the US.
December 14th, 2005  
deerslayer
 
 
Ok. I've expanded my work a little bit (computer science class gives me at least 2 hours each day to do it) and I've come up with the following.

The entire doctrine is based strictly around three basic premises:

1. The Postulates of Inverse Proportions
2. The Pillars of A Military System
3. The relationship between friction and operational success.

I don't have the time to post everythign at the moment, but I'll put it up when I can. So far, do these definitions sound good to develop a doctrine around?
December 14th, 2005  
bulldogg
 
 
Deerslayer, have you got the FM's from TRADOC on current Army doctrine? If not I would say before you go further you get to an Army surplus store and buy them and read them.
December 14th, 2005  
deerslayer
 
 
I'll keep doing research on our current doctrine. I'll look into the printed manuals while I'm at it, thanks. So far, what do you think?
December 14th, 2005  
bulldogg
 
 
I am not a "strategic" thinker so its hard for me to pick holes out in theory unless they are big huge gaping obvious craters you could lose Monica Lewinsky's arse in so... I don't see any gross errors in your work.
December 14th, 2005  
deerslayer
 
 
Ok. I"ll have the synopsis of those three points up tomorrow, when i'm not dead tired and dont' have a 150 point project due.