Operation Market Garden - Was it a Tactical Disaster? - Page 3




 
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July 30th, 2009  
tomtom22
 
 
The lack of, or failure to use available intelligence played a very important part also.
July 30th, 2009  
03USMC
 
 
Yeah. To me it appears that the intel that was accepted was the intel that dove tailed nicely with the OPLAN. That, that didn't fit was rejected out of hand.
July 30th, 2009  
George
 
Made a simular comment on this somewhere in these Forums. At the end of the book "A bridge too far" A Dutch Gen. makes the comment I see you failed the final exam, then goes on to explain that the Final exam @ the Duttch military academy at the time was to plan an invasion from the direction that The Allies came from. Any one trying it like we did fails the exam. Seems we never bothered to ask the Dutch Gen.s in England how to invade thier own Country.
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July 31st, 2009  
GreatestAlive
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by tomtom22
The lack of, or failure to use available intelligence played a very important part also.

Yeah really, good intel but Monty wanted the glory. They were expecting too much for a horribly planned invasion led by (and this is just my opinion) an incomptent general who didnt know how to use Airborne forces properly.
July 31st, 2009  
MontyB
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by GreatestAlive
Yeah really, good intel but Monty wanted the glory. They were expecting too much for a horribly planned invasion led by (and this is just my opinion) an incomptent general who didnt know how to use Airborne forces properly.
I disagree clearly the airborne forces took their objectives and held them for longer than was expected which to me means that despite the presence of strong German forces in the area there was nothing wrong with the airborne planning, where it all went wrong was XXX Corps trundling at the speed of a retarded snail failed to achieve its goals.

There are some fairly strong arguments to say that Market Garden would have been a resounding success had they use and American armoured corps instead of XXX corps.
July 31st, 2009  
03USMC
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by MontyB
I disagree clearly the airborne forces took their objectives and held them for longer than was expected which to me means that despite the presence of strong German forces in the area there was nothing wrong with the airborne planning, where it all went wrong was XXX Corps trundling at the speed of a retarded snail failed to achieve its goals.

There are some fairly strong arguments to say that Market Garden would have been a resounding success had they use and American armoured corps instead of XXX corps.
Given the terrian , the bad intel that resulted in 30 Corps dealing with ambushes and making a fighting advance on the first day in an area where they were confined to improved roads and virtually unable to breakout in a classic armor advance. The Son River Bridge not being captured intact at Eindhoven. The 82nd failing to take the Nijmegan Bridge on that resulted in the boat assault. The Guards Division was actually might have reached Arnhem had the 82nd secured the bridge at Nijmegan on time, but then what? The 231st Infantry Brigade (50th Northumbrians) and the 4th Armour Brigade had been detached around Eindhoven due to continuing german assaults the resulting "fire brigade fighting caused the 231st & 4th's vehicles to clogg the roads and delay 30 Corps follow on units and reinforcements, so the Guards would have been on their own and without log trains and reinforcements themselves.I don't see, given the circumstances a US Armor Division doing any better, alot of the delay's suffered by 30 Corps were not of their own doing but can be laid back on the planning and intel.

Seems to me that that theory maybe more anti-Montgomery and pro-Patton than anything else.


Quote:
Originally Posted by GreatestAlive
Yeah really, good intel but Monty wanted the glory. They were expecting too much for a horribly planned invasion led by (and this is just my opinion) an incomptent general who didnt know how to use Airborne forces properly.
Airborne forces given what airborne forces were and are, light infantry with minimal support dropped in to hold ground until follow on forces arrive did remarkably well, especially the 1st British Airborne, Glider Pilot Regt, and Polish Airborne in and around Arnhem. It was a proper use of Airborne Assets, what was improper was the follow-on support, whether hamstrung by intel, planning or weather.
July 31st, 2009  
A Can of Man
 
 
I can't remember the proper term for it but when dealing with roads and routes knowing the volume of traffic the road can take and just how much traffic it can take before it is reduced to a strip of mud is essential. Taking what was in many places a one lane road all the way up to Arnhem was just a bad idea overall.

Considering the disaster the airborne troops faced in Arnhem (loss of communications, loss of transport) their achievement was nothing short of remarkable.
August 1st, 2009  
GreatestAlive
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by 03USMC
Given the terrian , the bad intel that resulted in 30 Corps dealing with ambushes and making a fighting advance on the first day in an area where they were confined to improved roads and virtually unable to breakout in a classic armor advance. The Son River Bridge not being captured intact at Eindhoven. The 82nd failing to take the Nijmegan Bridge on that resulted in the boat assault. The Guards Division was actually might have reached Arnhem had the 82nd secured the bridge at Nijmegan on time, but then what? The 231st Infantry Brigade (50th Northumbrians) and the 4th Armour Brigade had been detached around Eindhoven due to continuing german assaults the resulting "fire brigade fighting caused the 231st & 4th's vehicles to clogg the roads and delay 30 Corps follow on units and reinforcements, so the Guards would have been on their own and without log trains and reinforcements themselves.I don't see, given the circumstances a US Armor Division doing any better, alot of the delay's suffered by 30 Corps were not of their own doing but can be laid back on the planning and intel.

Seems to me that that theory maybe more anti-Montgomery and pro-Patton than anything else.




Airborne forces given what airborne forces were and are, light infantry with minimal support dropped in to hold ground until follow on forces arrive did remarkably well, especially the 1st British Airborne, Glider Pilot Regt, and Polish Airborne in and around Arnhem. It was a proper use of Airborne Assets, what was improper was the follow-on support, whether hamstrung by intel, planning or weather.

The forces were depleted though, as he kept them on the front line when the infantry was supposed to relieve them after the op...
August 1st, 2009  
03USMC
 
 
Still not an improper use of airborne. Goes back to improper planning and failing to get the follow on forces there.
August 2nd, 2009  
LeEnfield
 
 
Okay we took a pasting at Arnhem, and yes there were planning errors not by Montgomery but by the people in the Airborne forces. Two things went wrong and biggest thing was that a few days before the drop an Armored Division of SS soldiers were brought to Arnhem for a period of rest and to re equipped. The other big error was the RAF as they would only drop the troops well out of town about 10 miles away in fact which allowed the Germans a chance the get their men into position. You could go on for ever with ifs and buts but that fickle finger of fate decided to help the Germans this time, had this raid taken place two weeks earlier then it would have been a walk over.