A good read and very interesting
New Tactics Yield Solid Victory in Gaza
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By David Eshel
Since the inconclusive Second Lebanon War of 2006, the Israeli army has been developing tactics and adding equipment and capabilities to fight more effectively in asymmetric conflicts. The recent success of “Operation Cast Lead” in the densely populated Gaza Strip shows that an industrial military that coordinates operations among land, air and sea units, makes effective use of advanced technology, and shares intelligence and leads from the front can decisively defeat an asymmetric enemy.
In this 22-day battle (Dec. 27, 2008-Jan. 18) the asymmetric enemy was, of course, Hamas, a militant group of fundamentalists that controls the Gaza Strip and has been launching crude but deadly rockets into Israel for years. Israel’s stated goal was to stop the rocket offensive. Before it could do that, forces had to fight decisively on urban battlefields that were full of traps.
Since taking over Gaza two years ago, Hamas has turned the area into a fortress. Weapon and ammunition depots were everywhere—even in mosques. Israeli intelligence pinpointed more than six mosques in Gaza City that were ar*senals, a fact confirmed by huge secondary explosions after they were attacked.
Underground shelters, some built into fortified but occupied homes, were used to hide hundreds of rockets that Hamas planned to launch against Israel. Almost every apartment building in the suburbs was boobytrapped or held arms caches rigged to be set off by explosives if Israeli soldiers entered. Many streets and alleyways concealed a labyrinth of bunkers and tunnels, also boobytrapped.
Israel used a variety of tactics to outflank and defeat Hamas in its own territory. These included long-term planning, meticulous intelligence-gathering, deception and disinformation. Although the attack had been prepared for weeks, operational security and a well-planned deception campaign took Hamas by surprise when it finally happened, despite Israel’s repeated warnings that the rocket attacks would trigger a war.
Operation Cast Lead began with devastating air strikes. The Israel Air Force (IAF) hammered targets in the Gaza Strip with jets and helicopters.
Prime targets were the Rafah tunnels under the Egyptian border, through which Hamas smuggled weapons and money, much of it from Iran (DTI February, p. 43). The IAF used sophisticated weapons including earth-penetrating bombs to destroy the “tunnel city.”
Among those weapons was the new PB500A1 from Israel Military Industries, a laser-guided hard-target penetration bomb based on the 1,000-lb. Mk-83 “dumb” bomb. It is reportedly capable of penetrating 2 meters (6.5 ft.) of reinforced concrete. Unconfirmed reports claim the IAF used Boeing’s GBU-39 small-diameter bomb for the first time. High-precision weapons were also deployed throughout the battle to destroy bunkers and weapon depots.
Following a week of precision bombing, the ground campaign opened with three infantry brigade task forces simultaneously entering the Gaza Strip from several directions. Four brigade commanders, all colonels, fought on the front lines with their troops throughout the two-week ground offensive in the northern Gaza Strip: Herzi Levy of the paratroopers brigade; Avi Peled of the Golani brigade; Ilan Malka of the Givati brigade; and Yigal Slovick of the 401st armored brigade.
The infantry brigades approached their objectives from unexpected directions, avoiding previously used routes in which Hamas created boobytrapped bunkers and tunnels. Slovick’s armored brigade, fielding the latest Merkava Mk4 main battle tank, raced unopposed to block access from Rafah and Khan Yunis to Gaza City, cutting supply lines to Hamas from the south.
Cast Lead was the first Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operation in which unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), helicopters and fighter jets were allocated to ground forces directly without IAF central command authorizing sorties. This went even further, with air-support controller teams operating alongside brigade commanders at the front, passing along whatever surveillance data from UAVs and other assets they needed.
Each brigade combat team was assigned a UAV squadron for close support, with ground-control operators at forward headquarters calling in air strikes from standby attack helicopters and, if necessary, identifying targets to fixed-wing assets cruising over the combat zone. Aerial surveillance from Heron and Hermes 450 UAVs and Apache attack helicopters provided an unprecedented level of real-time close air support in response to time-critical targets. A high degree of situational awareness was achieved by maintaining at least a dozen UAVs in flight over Gaza at all times. These aircraft saved the lives of Israeli soldiers and civilians by detecting Hamas ambushes and rocket launch sites and directing aircraft, tanks and artillery to the targets.
Another first that reduced casualties was the unprecedented level of interservice cooperation between IDF land forces and Israel’s internal security agency (ISA). This was evident in command posts as well as on the battlefield. ISA operatives attached to forward units assisted in gathering information and intelligence from the field and rapidly turning it into targeting data for strikes against time-critical targets.
Precision attacks were initiated by aircraft, ground elements like snipers and tanks and by Spike LR (long-range) antiarmor missiles modified with antistructure warheads. Using UAVs and sophisticated electronics, the fusion of intelligence-gathering capabilities was able to pinpoint explosive caches and boobytraps and provide troops with real-time intelligence.
This cooperation substantially shortened the sensor-to-shooter cycle. During Operation Cast Lead, intelligence sources say that F-15 and F-16 aircraft could identify and fire air-to-ground missiles within 30 sec. of data transmission to take out fleeing targets.
The Israeli navy attacked Hamas coastal targets and boats. Records of the attacks published by the navy indicate that for the first time vessels are equipped with Rafael’s Spike ER electro-optically guided missiles. Two of these were shown on Israeli TV. The Spike ER missiles, with a range of 8 km. (5 mi.), have been fired from helicopters, land vehicles and ground positions, and are now employed on gunboats, most likely Super Dvora fast-attack craft with Rafael’s Typhoon stabilized gun mount. Videos of an attack showed precision hits from the boat’s Typhoon gun despite a rolling sea.
The army anticipated high casualties in attacks on the fortified refugee camps. To deal with this, a senior medical officer says the IDF reduced the aerial evacuation time of wounded soldiers from the Gaza Strip by more than 50% from the Second Lebanon War, to 45 min. on average. In many cases evacuation was done under fire, with helicopter pilots landing within combat zones. The IDF medical corps has been using new state-of-the-art equipment to treat wounds. One device added to field units is QuikClot Combat Gauze from Z-Medica Corp. of Wallingford, Conn., which uses a hemostatic coagulant to stop bleeding.
One life-saving element was the elite Yahalom (diamond) combat engineering unit, which faced a challenging task in defeating efforts by Hamas to capture Israeli soldiers. Hamas dug tunnels in boobytrapped houses to kidnap soldiers for use as bargaining chips. Yahalom soldiers were dispersed throughout the brigades and battalions and armed with new equipment and weapons that received their first operational use during the fighting. These included miniature robots like Elbit Systems’ VIPeR, and wall-breaching munitions like Simon and Matador, which became indispensable for troops fighting through booby-trapped buildings (DTI February, p. 8).
Retired general and Knesset member Yizhak Ben Israel says the operation was so successful that it could become part of the historic memory of Middle East nations for years. The IDF not only restored its deterrence vis-a-vis Hamas, Ben Israel says, but against other enemies such as Hezbollah and the Iran-Syria axis.
While sporadic rocket fire continues from Gaza, leaders of Hamas—and Hezbollah—will have to take into account that the IDF could strike again with even greater force. Experts say it is doubtful that people in these areas will be willing to absorb another blow.
Link
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/gene...s Yield Solid Victory in Gaza&channel=defense
New Tactics Yield Solid Victory in Gaza
Mar 11, 2009 #content td div img { padding-right:10px; padding-bottom:2px } html.ie6 #content td div img { padding-right:10px; padding-bottom:0px; } div.storyContent p { margin-top: 2px; margin-bottom: 14px; } html.ie6 div.storyContent p { margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 10px; } #mainNav { margin-top:0px; } a { color: #224e9c; text-decoration: none; } a:hover { color: #224e9c; text-decoration: underline; }
By David Eshel
Since the inconclusive Second Lebanon War of 2006, the Israeli army has been developing tactics and adding equipment and capabilities to fight more effectively in asymmetric conflicts. The recent success of “Operation Cast Lead” in the densely populated Gaza Strip shows that an industrial military that coordinates operations among land, air and sea units, makes effective use of advanced technology, and shares intelligence and leads from the front can decisively defeat an asymmetric enemy.
In this 22-day battle (Dec. 27, 2008-Jan. 18) the asymmetric enemy was, of course, Hamas, a militant group of fundamentalists that controls the Gaza Strip and has been launching crude but deadly rockets into Israel for years. Israel’s stated goal was to stop the rocket offensive. Before it could do that, forces had to fight decisively on urban battlefields that were full of traps.
Since taking over Gaza two years ago, Hamas has turned the area into a fortress. Weapon and ammunition depots were everywhere—even in mosques. Israeli intelligence pinpointed more than six mosques in Gaza City that were ar*senals, a fact confirmed by huge secondary explosions after they were attacked.
Underground shelters, some built into fortified but occupied homes, were used to hide hundreds of rockets that Hamas planned to launch against Israel. Almost every apartment building in the suburbs was boobytrapped or held arms caches rigged to be set off by explosives if Israeli soldiers entered. Many streets and alleyways concealed a labyrinth of bunkers and tunnels, also boobytrapped.
Israel used a variety of tactics to outflank and defeat Hamas in its own territory. These included long-term planning, meticulous intelligence-gathering, deception and disinformation. Although the attack had been prepared for weeks, operational security and a well-planned deception campaign took Hamas by surprise when it finally happened, despite Israel’s repeated warnings that the rocket attacks would trigger a war.
Operation Cast Lead began with devastating air strikes. The Israel Air Force (IAF) hammered targets in the Gaza Strip with jets and helicopters.
Prime targets were the Rafah tunnels under the Egyptian border, through which Hamas smuggled weapons and money, much of it from Iran (DTI February, p. 43). The IAF used sophisticated weapons including earth-penetrating bombs to destroy the “tunnel city.”
Among those weapons was the new PB500A1 from Israel Military Industries, a laser-guided hard-target penetration bomb based on the 1,000-lb. Mk-83 “dumb” bomb. It is reportedly capable of penetrating 2 meters (6.5 ft.) of reinforced concrete. Unconfirmed reports claim the IAF used Boeing’s GBU-39 small-diameter bomb for the first time. High-precision weapons were also deployed throughout the battle to destroy bunkers and weapon depots.
Following a week of precision bombing, the ground campaign opened with three infantry brigade task forces simultaneously entering the Gaza Strip from several directions. Four brigade commanders, all colonels, fought on the front lines with their troops throughout the two-week ground offensive in the northern Gaza Strip: Herzi Levy of the paratroopers brigade; Avi Peled of the Golani brigade; Ilan Malka of the Givati brigade; and Yigal Slovick of the 401st armored brigade.
The infantry brigades approached their objectives from unexpected directions, avoiding previously used routes in which Hamas created boobytrapped bunkers and tunnels. Slovick’s armored brigade, fielding the latest Merkava Mk4 main battle tank, raced unopposed to block access from Rafah and Khan Yunis to Gaza City, cutting supply lines to Hamas from the south.
Cast Lead was the first Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operation in which unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), helicopters and fighter jets were allocated to ground forces directly without IAF central command authorizing sorties. This went even further, with air-support controller teams operating alongside brigade commanders at the front, passing along whatever surveillance data from UAVs and other assets they needed.
Each brigade combat team was assigned a UAV squadron for close support, with ground-control operators at forward headquarters calling in air strikes from standby attack helicopters and, if necessary, identifying targets to fixed-wing assets cruising over the combat zone. Aerial surveillance from Heron and Hermes 450 UAVs and Apache attack helicopters provided an unprecedented level of real-time close air support in response to time-critical targets. A high degree of situational awareness was achieved by maintaining at least a dozen UAVs in flight over Gaza at all times. These aircraft saved the lives of Israeli soldiers and civilians by detecting Hamas ambushes and rocket launch sites and directing aircraft, tanks and artillery to the targets.
Another first that reduced casualties was the unprecedented level of interservice cooperation between IDF land forces and Israel’s internal security agency (ISA). This was evident in command posts as well as on the battlefield. ISA operatives attached to forward units assisted in gathering information and intelligence from the field and rapidly turning it into targeting data for strikes against time-critical targets.
Precision attacks were initiated by aircraft, ground elements like snipers and tanks and by Spike LR (long-range) antiarmor missiles modified with antistructure warheads. Using UAVs and sophisticated electronics, the fusion of intelligence-gathering capabilities was able to pinpoint explosive caches and boobytraps and provide troops with real-time intelligence.
This cooperation substantially shortened the sensor-to-shooter cycle. During Operation Cast Lead, intelligence sources say that F-15 and F-16 aircraft could identify and fire air-to-ground missiles within 30 sec. of data transmission to take out fleeing targets.
The Israeli navy attacked Hamas coastal targets and boats. Records of the attacks published by the navy indicate that for the first time vessels are equipped with Rafael’s Spike ER electro-optically guided missiles. Two of these were shown on Israeli TV. The Spike ER missiles, with a range of 8 km. (5 mi.), have been fired from helicopters, land vehicles and ground positions, and are now employed on gunboats, most likely Super Dvora fast-attack craft with Rafael’s Typhoon stabilized gun mount. Videos of an attack showed precision hits from the boat’s Typhoon gun despite a rolling sea.
The army anticipated high casualties in attacks on the fortified refugee camps. To deal with this, a senior medical officer says the IDF reduced the aerial evacuation time of wounded soldiers from the Gaza Strip by more than 50% from the Second Lebanon War, to 45 min. on average. In many cases evacuation was done under fire, with helicopter pilots landing within combat zones. The IDF medical corps has been using new state-of-the-art equipment to treat wounds. One device added to field units is QuikClot Combat Gauze from Z-Medica Corp. of Wallingford, Conn., which uses a hemostatic coagulant to stop bleeding.
One life-saving element was the elite Yahalom (diamond) combat engineering unit, which faced a challenging task in defeating efforts by Hamas to capture Israeli soldiers. Hamas dug tunnels in boobytrapped houses to kidnap soldiers for use as bargaining chips. Yahalom soldiers were dispersed throughout the brigades and battalions and armed with new equipment and weapons that received their first operational use during the fighting. These included miniature robots like Elbit Systems’ VIPeR, and wall-breaching munitions like Simon and Matador, which became indispensable for troops fighting through booby-trapped buildings (DTI February, p. 8).
Retired general and Knesset member Yizhak Ben Israel says the operation was so successful that it could become part of the historic memory of Middle East nations for years. The IDF not only restored its deterrence vis-a-vis Hamas, Ben Israel says, but against other enemies such as Hezbollah and the Iran-Syria axis.
While sporadic rocket fire continues from Gaza, leaders of Hamas—and Hezbollah—will have to take into account that the IDF could strike again with even greater force. Experts say it is doubtful that people in these areas will be willing to absorb another blow.
Link
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/gene...s Yield Solid Victory in Gaza&channel=defense
