Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Financial Times
March 24, 2009
By James Blitz, London
Standing in the main police station in the town of Lashkar Gar, Captain Abdul Kareen stood before some 20 soldiers and policemen from the Afghan National Security Forces and barked out an order. In an instant, the officers in green khaki stood to attention, raised their automatic guns and saluted the visiting deputy governor of Helmand province.
Such a scene might seem unremarkable in the capital of Helmand, a region the size of Northern Ireland with a population of some 750,000. Yet less than 24 hours before this meeting, a Taliban suicide bomber came within a few yards of where they stood and blew himself up, killing at least half a dozen of these soldiers’ colleagues.
British troops operating in Helmand province last week: the advent of US reinforcements will be a 'real gamechanger', according to Nato commanders.
“It is a good thing that the security forces have all turned out for this meeting,” said Captain Kareen. “We want to show we won’t be intimidated.”
In Helmand, Taliban terrorist attacks are now a regular occurrence. For the past three years some 5,000 British troops have been fighting the Taliban, trying to keep them out of Lashkar Gar and around half a dozen other towns so that local people can go about their normal business unintimidated.
But because of its significance for poppy production – which provides the Taliban with about half its funding – the Taliban has long deemed Helmand to be the heart and lungs of its insurgency against the Afghan national government and badly stretched Nato forces. To date, 152 British soldiers and countless Afghans have died in the war.
In the next few weeks, Nato is set to increase significantly its deployment of troops in the region. Some 8,000 US troops are to be deployed in Helmand, part of the 17,000 who are coming to the south as part of the first uplift by Barack Obama, US president.
“It’s going to be a real game changer,” says General Mart de Kruif, the commander of Nato’s entire southern region, as he contemplates the rise in forces under his command from 23,000 to 40,000. “The combination of more boots on the ground and more helicopter capability will mean we will put much more pressure on the insurgency.”
The 8,000 US marines will operate to the south of the UK task force, patrolling the border between Helmand and the Pakstani tribal areas. They aim to stop the traffic in illegal weapons from Baluchistan – a key source of funding for the insurgency – into the central Helmand belt. They will also allow the UK force to concentrate more closely on its security role there.
“The US are going to have a considerable disruptive effect on cross-border movement,” says Brigadier Gordon Messenger, commander of UK forces in Helmand. “It is going to have a psychological effect on the insurgency ... .They will feel squeezed, they will feel contained, they have had this open flank they can exploit for quite a while now.”
Even so, the brigadier is cautious about predicting immediate success. “We need to be careful about seeing them [the US troops] as a panacea here,” he says, noting that many of the US troops coming into the province would be providing logistics. Even with a greater number of guards on the ground, the vastness of the southern border makes it impossible to seal completely. The Taliban will simply find other routes from the tribal areas into central Helmand.
Above all, military and political analysts say the complexity of Helmand’s problems – the power of the narco barons, widespread political corruption and the difficulty in developing the Afghan National army – all make it treacherous to predict success. “The Americans are not coming in on the overwhelming scale where the Taliban says ‘game over’. It is bound to help but it will not get us to some mythical tipping point by the end of 2009,” says the brigadier.
The ability of the Taliban to confront British forces in Helmand is clearly weakening. “At the end of 2005, the Taliban were on the cusp of being able to pose a strategic threat to the control of Helmand,” says Hugh Powell, who is the senior UK figure in the south and is in charge of reconstruction and development in the province.
“That has been taken away from them. Over the last 14 months, you only need to look at what influence the Taliban have lost here.” He lists a string of towns – Musa Qala, Garmsir, Nadi Ali – that are now under the control of UK and Afghan national forces.
In Kandahar, General de Kruif says the Taliban’s crude terrorist tactics are also alienating the Afghan population. He says some 70 per cent of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are now turned in by local nationals.
Even so, Helmand is immensely difficult terrain in which to make progress. No initiative can be mounted in the field of reconstruction and development without blanket security. A visit by the FT to the Lashkar Gar police station was an elaborate security exercise, involving travel at speed in a heavily armed convoy.
Success here – as elsewhere in Afghanistan – ultimately depends on a range of other factors connected to national and international politics.
The first and most critical driver of success is the development of the Afghan national security forces. The US and Nato are committed to doubling the size of the Afghan National Army. But for the time being, the numbers in both the Afghan military and police in Helmand are well below what is desirable.
“What affects peoples’ perceptions is who is going to end up in control of the region and the country, not who is in control now,” says Mr Powell. “So the real driver of popular perception is Afghan capacity not Nato capacity.”
The second driver of success will be the state of Afghan politics at the national level. Britain has long praised Gulab Mangal, the governor of Helmand, as a progressive leader who is prepared to face down both the Taliban and political corruption. But he is constantly at loggerheads with the government of Hamid Karzai.
Finally, there is the degree to which the insurgency in Helmand – as elsewhere in Afghanistan – is fundamentally an AfPak problem, a phenomenon supported from within the Pakistani tribal areas. Mr Powell says there is direct link between the insurgents in Helmand and the Quetta Shura group of Taliban leaders in Baluchistan, which is believed to play a significant role in stirring violence in southern Afghanistan.
“It is a pretty well organised insurgency,” he says. “It is an organisation with a linear command chain and you can track the implementation of direction from the Quetta Shura down to the ground here.” In his view, getting the Pakistani government to stop the Quetta Shura’s activities is a key requirement. “That would be my one big ask and it seems to me to be within their gift to constrain it,” he says.
Few believe Pakistan will agree to these demands any time soon. But for now, Nato is plotting a major offensive against Taliban strongholds across the south, using the new forces and assets at its disposal.
“There will be a significant spike in incidents,” says General de Kruif, as he surveys the next phase of military operations across Helmand and Kandahar. “We will go into areas where we have never been before, putting pressure on the insurgency and on its safe havens.”
March 24, 2009
By James Blitz, London
Standing in the main police station in the town of Lashkar Gar, Captain Abdul Kareen stood before some 20 soldiers and policemen from the Afghan National Security Forces and barked out an order. In an instant, the officers in green khaki stood to attention, raised their automatic guns and saluted the visiting deputy governor of Helmand province.
Such a scene might seem unremarkable in the capital of Helmand, a region the size of Northern Ireland with a population of some 750,000. Yet less than 24 hours before this meeting, a Taliban suicide bomber came within a few yards of where they stood and blew himself up, killing at least half a dozen of these soldiers’ colleagues.
British troops operating in Helmand province last week: the advent of US reinforcements will be a 'real gamechanger', according to Nato commanders.
“It is a good thing that the security forces have all turned out for this meeting,” said Captain Kareen. “We want to show we won’t be intimidated.”
In Helmand, Taliban terrorist attacks are now a regular occurrence. For the past three years some 5,000 British troops have been fighting the Taliban, trying to keep them out of Lashkar Gar and around half a dozen other towns so that local people can go about their normal business unintimidated.
But because of its significance for poppy production – which provides the Taliban with about half its funding – the Taliban has long deemed Helmand to be the heart and lungs of its insurgency against the Afghan national government and badly stretched Nato forces. To date, 152 British soldiers and countless Afghans have died in the war.
In the next few weeks, Nato is set to increase significantly its deployment of troops in the region. Some 8,000 US troops are to be deployed in Helmand, part of the 17,000 who are coming to the south as part of the first uplift by Barack Obama, US president.
“It’s going to be a real game changer,” says General Mart de Kruif, the commander of Nato’s entire southern region, as he contemplates the rise in forces under his command from 23,000 to 40,000. “The combination of more boots on the ground and more helicopter capability will mean we will put much more pressure on the insurgency.”
The 8,000 US marines will operate to the south of the UK task force, patrolling the border between Helmand and the Pakstani tribal areas. They aim to stop the traffic in illegal weapons from Baluchistan – a key source of funding for the insurgency – into the central Helmand belt. They will also allow the UK force to concentrate more closely on its security role there.
“The US are going to have a considerable disruptive effect on cross-border movement,” says Brigadier Gordon Messenger, commander of UK forces in Helmand. “It is going to have a psychological effect on the insurgency ... .They will feel squeezed, they will feel contained, they have had this open flank they can exploit for quite a while now.”
Even so, the brigadier is cautious about predicting immediate success. “We need to be careful about seeing them [the US troops] as a panacea here,” he says, noting that many of the US troops coming into the province would be providing logistics. Even with a greater number of guards on the ground, the vastness of the southern border makes it impossible to seal completely. The Taliban will simply find other routes from the tribal areas into central Helmand.
Above all, military and political analysts say the complexity of Helmand’s problems – the power of the narco barons, widespread political corruption and the difficulty in developing the Afghan National army – all make it treacherous to predict success. “The Americans are not coming in on the overwhelming scale where the Taliban says ‘game over’. It is bound to help but it will not get us to some mythical tipping point by the end of 2009,” says the brigadier.
The ability of the Taliban to confront British forces in Helmand is clearly weakening. “At the end of 2005, the Taliban were on the cusp of being able to pose a strategic threat to the control of Helmand,” says Hugh Powell, who is the senior UK figure in the south and is in charge of reconstruction and development in the province.
“That has been taken away from them. Over the last 14 months, you only need to look at what influence the Taliban have lost here.” He lists a string of towns – Musa Qala, Garmsir, Nadi Ali – that are now under the control of UK and Afghan national forces.
In Kandahar, General de Kruif says the Taliban’s crude terrorist tactics are also alienating the Afghan population. He says some 70 per cent of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are now turned in by local nationals.
Even so, Helmand is immensely difficult terrain in which to make progress. No initiative can be mounted in the field of reconstruction and development without blanket security. A visit by the FT to the Lashkar Gar police station was an elaborate security exercise, involving travel at speed in a heavily armed convoy.
Success here – as elsewhere in Afghanistan – ultimately depends on a range of other factors connected to national and international politics.
The first and most critical driver of success is the development of the Afghan national security forces. The US and Nato are committed to doubling the size of the Afghan National Army. But for the time being, the numbers in both the Afghan military and police in Helmand are well below what is desirable.
“What affects peoples’ perceptions is who is going to end up in control of the region and the country, not who is in control now,” says Mr Powell. “So the real driver of popular perception is Afghan capacity not Nato capacity.”
The second driver of success will be the state of Afghan politics at the national level. Britain has long praised Gulab Mangal, the governor of Helmand, as a progressive leader who is prepared to face down both the Taliban and political corruption. But he is constantly at loggerheads with the government of Hamid Karzai.
Finally, there is the degree to which the insurgency in Helmand – as elsewhere in Afghanistan – is fundamentally an AfPak problem, a phenomenon supported from within the Pakistani tribal areas. Mr Powell says there is direct link between the insurgents in Helmand and the Quetta Shura group of Taliban leaders in Baluchistan, which is believed to play a significant role in stirring violence in southern Afghanistan.
“It is a pretty well organised insurgency,” he says. “It is an organisation with a linear command chain and you can track the implementation of direction from the Quetta Shura down to the ground here.” In his view, getting the Pakistani government to stop the Quetta Shura’s activities is a key requirement. “That would be my one big ask and it seems to me to be within their gift to constrain it,” he says.
Few believe Pakistan will agree to these demands any time soon. But for now, Nato is plotting a major offensive against Taliban strongholds across the south, using the new forces and assets at its disposal.
“There will be a significant spike in incidents,” says General de Kruif, as he surveys the next phase of military operations across Helmand and Kandahar. “We will go into areas where we have never been before, putting pressure on the insurgency and on its safe havens.”