Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
London Daily Telegraph
March 31, 2008
Pg. 18
Nato leaders gather for a crucial summit in Romania this week with the alliance's credibility at stake. The campaign in Afghanistan confronts Nato with its greatest test since the Cold War.
The mission is dogged by a shortage of troops and the refusal of most Nato members to allow their forces to deploy in southern Afghanistan, where the fight against the Taliban is fiercest.
Britain, America, Canada and the Netherlands have been left carrying the brunt of the campaign in the south. Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, has given warning of a "two-tier alliance" with "some allies willing to fight and die to protect people's security, and others who are not".
Meanwhile, Afghanistan's Government under President Hamid Karzai is mired in corruption and deeply suspicious of its western allies.
Billions of pounds of aid have not produced the expected gains for the Afghan people. Taliban insurgents have grown more extreme, turning to urban terrorism against western targets.
America and Britain believe that Nato must step up its campaign and that other members must send troops to the most dangerous areas of southern Afghanistan. David Blair, our Diplomatic Editor, met key officials, military leaders and aid workers in Kabul.
Westerners have disppeared from the streets of Kabul and every official building hides behind a fortress of grey walls, blast barriers and barbed wire.
The tension in Afghanistan's capital is greater now than at any time since the Taliban's downfall in 2001.
Despite a six-year military campaign, with 7,800 British troops now deployed, and £7.5 billion of western aid, President Hamid Karzai's Government controls only 30 per cent of Afghanistan, according to an official American assessment. The Taliban are estimated to run 10 per cent of the country.
Last year was Afghanistan's bloodiest since the Taliban's overthrow. This rising tide of violence has forced western governments to look afresh at their military, diplomatic and humanitarian policies.
General Dan McNeill, Nato's commander in Afghanistan, summarised the key military problem in one phrase. He told The Daily Telegraph that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), charged with stabilising Afghanistan, was "under-resourced".
Gen McNeill commands 43,000 troops from 40 countries, while another 12,000 US soldiers conduct separate anti-terrorism operations.
Yet to fight insurgents in a country of Afghanistan's size and population, Gen McNeill said that US military textbooks would recommend "well over" 400,000 soldiers. "We're not likely to ever get to a force level that size," he added.
Moreover, many of Gen McNeill's troops are prohibited from performing tasks deemed too dangerous. France and Germany have deployed more than 4,700 soldiers, yet they are confined to relatively safe areas, far from the battlefronts in the south.
America has urged other Nato countries to send more troops and lift these "national caveats". Even if this happens, Gen McNeill's goal is relatively modest.
Rather than utterly defeat the Taliban, he said that ISAF was "simply a force to buy space and time while we build Afghan national capacity and that's going to take a little while".
The aim is to hold the line against the Taliban and bring as much stability as possible until the Afghan National Army (ANA), trained by Nato, and the new police force can secure the country.
On paper, the ANA is approaching its required force level of 70,000 troops. But so far, no Afghan unit is capable of operating independently, although Gen McNeill said that some may be ready by the summer.
Meanwhile, the police are in far worse shape. Zamarai Bashiri, a spokesman for the interior ministry, said more recruits were coming forward and training had improved but "there are districts where we don't have any police, where we don't have law enforcement".
As for holding the line against the Taliban, the ISAF has inflicted heavy casualties on the insurgents. The fighting claimed at least 6,000 lives last year - most were Taliban and perhaps 190 were commanders. The movement probably came off worse every time it fought foreign troops.
Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, the British ambassador in Kabul, said these battlefield defeats, many of them inflicted by British soldiers, had prevented the Taliban from holding territory or capturing towns.
"The Taliban have had a very bad year and they know it and their command is in disarray wondering what went wrong. The territorial insurgency is being relentlessly, remorselessly pushed back," said Sir Sherard.
This has forced the Taliban to change tactics. Frontal assaults on western troops have largely been abandoned. Instead, the insurgents have turned to urban terrorism, symbolised by the attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul in January, which killed eight staff and guests.
Sir Sherard added: "In a way, that is more frightening for ordinary people than the big territorial battles, which the Taliban have lost so comprehensively. Objectively, it's much less of a threat to the security of the state. The state can withstand that. But it is much more damaging to confidence," he said.
Speaking on a mobile phone from an undisclosed location, a Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, admitted that his movement had suffered heavily. "But we did not lose senior leaders only in 2007. We have been losing commanders since late 2001 when the invasion started and the foreigners are also losing their men year by year," he said.
"The loss of commanders has given us faith to fight. The number of Taliban has increased and the anger among the civilians against the foreign forces and especially Americans has increased."
Mr Mujahid disclosed that Taliban gunmen had ambushed a convoy carrying the interior minister, Zarar Ahmad Moqbel, a few hours earlier - a fact that was later confirmed by the authorities.
The attack, which inflicted no casualties, took place only 30 miles east of Kabul. "Does this show whether we are strong or weak?" asked Mr Mujahid. "You can decide."
Yet the Taliban is no longer a united movement. Afghanistan's insurgency is centred on the country's largest ethnic group, the Pashtun. Most of the violence happens in the south and east where they form the majority.
Three broad groups of insurgents, each divided into factions, are responsible for most of the fighting.
In the south, especially where British troops are deployed in Helmand province, the original Taliban fighters are still active, guided by a "shura", a council of leaders based in the Pakistani city of Quetta. But the gunmen are also linked to organised crime, notably drug smuggling.
In the east, where American forces bear the brunt of the fighting, their enemies come from a network founded by a veteran extremist, Jalaluddin Haqqani, and now led by his son, Sirajuddin.
This group strikes from the lawless tribal areas lining the border with Pakistan and probably has close links to al-Qa'eda's core leadership. Although the Taliban claimed responsibility for the Serena attack, the Haqqani network was probably to blame.
Nearby, American forces are combating the third group, styling itself "Hizb-i-Islami" and led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an extreme jihadist who was briefly Afghanistan's prime minister in the 1990s.
Pakistan's own wing of the Taliban sends weapons and volunteers across the border.
With every passing month, the insurgents become more fragmented and extreme. But they are running great risks. By adopting a more extreme path, the gunmen risk splitting their own ranks and alienating local support.
By abandoning large-scale attacks on Nato troops, the Taliban and their allies have effectively given up trying to seize towns or capture territory.
They are also finding command and control increasingly difficult.
Western intelligence monitors their mobile and satellite phones, forcing the insurgents to communicate by messenger. If Nato deployed more troops and lifted all restrictions on how they might operate, the insurgents would be vulnerable to a general offensive.
Under present conditions, however, they would simply retreat into Pakistan. Any victory would be short-lived unless Pakistan closed these havens.
Despite intense fighting, costing the lives of about 1,000 Pakistani soldiers, Islamabad seems no closer to securing the seven tribal areas, particularly the militant strongholds of Bajaur and North and South Waziristan.
Even if the insurgents suffer a decisive military defeat, Afghanistan's government has prime responsibility for the country's future. Mr Karzai's behaviour has caused mounting concern.
Relations with Britain have been strained by the president's rejection of Lord Ashdown, the former Liberal Democrat leader, as the new UN envoy in Kabul. Mr Karzai has also criticised the performance of British troops in Helmand.
Yet his Government is ineffectual and Mr Karzai appears a weakened figure, unwilling or unable to act against corrupt ministers.
He listens to bizarre conspiracy theories suggesting that Britain is behind the insurgency and London aims to sow chaos in Afghanistan.
Mr Karzai's term ends next year. After a period of indecision, he has told allies that he will seek re-election. But holding a credible poll may prove impossible.
Mr Karzai and his allies can boast real achievements. Last week, about 6.2 million Afghan children enrolled at school for the new academic year, up from only two million in 2001.
Some 85 per cent of the population benefit from primary health care. Large areas of Kabul, once scarred by war, have been rebuilt.
But Matt Waldman, a policy adviser to Oxfam, said that half of all Afghan children were still malnourished and that 20 per cent died before the age of five.
While £7.5 billion of aid has reached Afghanistan, the world had pledged £12.5 billion. And the authorities cannot show how 30 per cent of the aid has been spent.
"There has been progress, but it has been slow and it has not met expectations," said Mr Waldman. "Time is running out. In any country where there is a massive foreign influence, there will be a diminishing willingness to tolerate that presence."
The central question is whether western governments can contain the insurgency and rebuild the country fast enough to satisfy their own electorates and the Afghan population. They can still succeed. But everything hangs in the balance.
March 31, 2008
Pg. 18
Nato leaders gather for a crucial summit in Romania this week with the alliance's credibility at stake. The campaign in Afghanistan confronts Nato with its greatest test since the Cold War.
The mission is dogged by a shortage of troops and the refusal of most Nato members to allow their forces to deploy in southern Afghanistan, where the fight against the Taliban is fiercest.
Britain, America, Canada and the Netherlands have been left carrying the brunt of the campaign in the south. Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, has given warning of a "two-tier alliance" with "some allies willing to fight and die to protect people's security, and others who are not".
Meanwhile, Afghanistan's Government under President Hamid Karzai is mired in corruption and deeply suspicious of its western allies.
Billions of pounds of aid have not produced the expected gains for the Afghan people. Taliban insurgents have grown more extreme, turning to urban terrorism against western targets.
America and Britain believe that Nato must step up its campaign and that other members must send troops to the most dangerous areas of southern Afghanistan. David Blair, our Diplomatic Editor, met key officials, military leaders and aid workers in Kabul.
Westerners have disppeared from the streets of Kabul and every official building hides behind a fortress of grey walls, blast barriers and barbed wire.
The tension in Afghanistan's capital is greater now than at any time since the Taliban's downfall in 2001.
Despite a six-year military campaign, with 7,800 British troops now deployed, and £7.5 billion of western aid, President Hamid Karzai's Government controls only 30 per cent of Afghanistan, according to an official American assessment. The Taliban are estimated to run 10 per cent of the country.
Last year was Afghanistan's bloodiest since the Taliban's overthrow. This rising tide of violence has forced western governments to look afresh at their military, diplomatic and humanitarian policies.
General Dan McNeill, Nato's commander in Afghanistan, summarised the key military problem in one phrase. He told The Daily Telegraph that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), charged with stabilising Afghanistan, was "under-resourced".
Gen McNeill commands 43,000 troops from 40 countries, while another 12,000 US soldiers conduct separate anti-terrorism operations.
Yet to fight insurgents in a country of Afghanistan's size and population, Gen McNeill said that US military textbooks would recommend "well over" 400,000 soldiers. "We're not likely to ever get to a force level that size," he added.
Moreover, many of Gen McNeill's troops are prohibited from performing tasks deemed too dangerous. France and Germany have deployed more than 4,700 soldiers, yet they are confined to relatively safe areas, far from the battlefronts in the south.
America has urged other Nato countries to send more troops and lift these "national caveats". Even if this happens, Gen McNeill's goal is relatively modest.
Rather than utterly defeat the Taliban, he said that ISAF was "simply a force to buy space and time while we build Afghan national capacity and that's going to take a little while".
The aim is to hold the line against the Taliban and bring as much stability as possible until the Afghan National Army (ANA), trained by Nato, and the new police force can secure the country.
On paper, the ANA is approaching its required force level of 70,000 troops. But so far, no Afghan unit is capable of operating independently, although Gen McNeill said that some may be ready by the summer.
Meanwhile, the police are in far worse shape. Zamarai Bashiri, a spokesman for the interior ministry, said more recruits were coming forward and training had improved but "there are districts where we don't have any police, where we don't have law enforcement".
As for holding the line against the Taliban, the ISAF has inflicted heavy casualties on the insurgents. The fighting claimed at least 6,000 lives last year - most were Taliban and perhaps 190 were commanders. The movement probably came off worse every time it fought foreign troops.
Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, the British ambassador in Kabul, said these battlefield defeats, many of them inflicted by British soldiers, had prevented the Taliban from holding territory or capturing towns.
"The Taliban have had a very bad year and they know it and their command is in disarray wondering what went wrong. The territorial insurgency is being relentlessly, remorselessly pushed back," said Sir Sherard.
This has forced the Taliban to change tactics. Frontal assaults on western troops have largely been abandoned. Instead, the insurgents have turned to urban terrorism, symbolised by the attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul in January, which killed eight staff and guests.
Sir Sherard added: "In a way, that is more frightening for ordinary people than the big territorial battles, which the Taliban have lost so comprehensively. Objectively, it's much less of a threat to the security of the state. The state can withstand that. But it is much more damaging to confidence," he said.
Speaking on a mobile phone from an undisclosed location, a Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, admitted that his movement had suffered heavily. "But we did not lose senior leaders only in 2007. We have been losing commanders since late 2001 when the invasion started and the foreigners are also losing their men year by year," he said.
"The loss of commanders has given us faith to fight. The number of Taliban has increased and the anger among the civilians against the foreign forces and especially Americans has increased."
Mr Mujahid disclosed that Taliban gunmen had ambushed a convoy carrying the interior minister, Zarar Ahmad Moqbel, a few hours earlier - a fact that was later confirmed by the authorities.
The attack, which inflicted no casualties, took place only 30 miles east of Kabul. "Does this show whether we are strong or weak?" asked Mr Mujahid. "You can decide."
Yet the Taliban is no longer a united movement. Afghanistan's insurgency is centred on the country's largest ethnic group, the Pashtun. Most of the violence happens in the south and east where they form the majority.
Three broad groups of insurgents, each divided into factions, are responsible for most of the fighting.
In the south, especially where British troops are deployed in Helmand province, the original Taliban fighters are still active, guided by a "shura", a council of leaders based in the Pakistani city of Quetta. But the gunmen are also linked to organised crime, notably drug smuggling.
In the east, where American forces bear the brunt of the fighting, their enemies come from a network founded by a veteran extremist, Jalaluddin Haqqani, and now led by his son, Sirajuddin.
This group strikes from the lawless tribal areas lining the border with Pakistan and probably has close links to al-Qa'eda's core leadership. Although the Taliban claimed responsibility for the Serena attack, the Haqqani network was probably to blame.
Nearby, American forces are combating the third group, styling itself "Hizb-i-Islami" and led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an extreme jihadist who was briefly Afghanistan's prime minister in the 1990s.
Pakistan's own wing of the Taliban sends weapons and volunteers across the border.
With every passing month, the insurgents become more fragmented and extreme. But they are running great risks. By adopting a more extreme path, the gunmen risk splitting their own ranks and alienating local support.
By abandoning large-scale attacks on Nato troops, the Taliban and their allies have effectively given up trying to seize towns or capture territory.
They are also finding command and control increasingly difficult.
Western intelligence monitors their mobile and satellite phones, forcing the insurgents to communicate by messenger. If Nato deployed more troops and lifted all restrictions on how they might operate, the insurgents would be vulnerable to a general offensive.
Under present conditions, however, they would simply retreat into Pakistan. Any victory would be short-lived unless Pakistan closed these havens.
Despite intense fighting, costing the lives of about 1,000 Pakistani soldiers, Islamabad seems no closer to securing the seven tribal areas, particularly the militant strongholds of Bajaur and North and South Waziristan.
Even if the insurgents suffer a decisive military defeat, Afghanistan's government has prime responsibility for the country's future. Mr Karzai's behaviour has caused mounting concern.
Relations with Britain have been strained by the president's rejection of Lord Ashdown, the former Liberal Democrat leader, as the new UN envoy in Kabul. Mr Karzai has also criticised the performance of British troops in Helmand.
Yet his Government is ineffectual and Mr Karzai appears a weakened figure, unwilling or unable to act against corrupt ministers.
He listens to bizarre conspiracy theories suggesting that Britain is behind the insurgency and London aims to sow chaos in Afghanistan.
Mr Karzai's term ends next year. After a period of indecision, he has told allies that he will seek re-election. But holding a credible poll may prove impossible.
Mr Karzai and his allies can boast real achievements. Last week, about 6.2 million Afghan children enrolled at school for the new academic year, up from only two million in 2001.
Some 85 per cent of the population benefit from primary health care. Large areas of Kabul, once scarred by war, have been rebuilt.
But Matt Waldman, a policy adviser to Oxfam, said that half of all Afghan children were still malnourished and that 20 per cent died before the age of five.
While £7.5 billion of aid has reached Afghanistan, the world had pledged £12.5 billion. And the authorities cannot show how 30 per cent of the aid has been spent.
"There has been progress, but it has been slow and it has not met expectations," said Mr Waldman. "Time is running out. In any country where there is a massive foreign influence, there will be a diminishing willingness to tolerate that presence."
The central question is whether western governments can contain the insurgency and rebuild the country fast enough to satisfy their own electorates and the Afghan population. They can still succeed. But everything hangs in the balance.