The second test was conducted over a period of seven months. It was designed to provide updated fragmentation damage data for modem armored fighting vehicles and tanks. An M109 howitzer fired 155-mm HE ammunition with PD and VT fuzes. One round was fired at a time, and a detailed analysis was completed on the effects of a direct or near hit of each round.
A direct hit with an HE round with a PD fuze consistently destroyed the various target vehicles. Near hits damaged or destroyed road wheels, tracks, main gun sights and vision blocks. Aerial bursts of HE rounds with VT fuzes damaged or destroyed gun barrels, vision blocks, antennas, sights and engines and destroyed anything stored on the outside of the vehicle. (See Figure 2.)
The third test was against a simulated US mechanized infantry team in defensive positions. The target area consisted of a forward defense area with a tank ditch 250 meters long, minefields and wire obstacles. The infantry was dismounted and had prepared positions with overhead cover. The fighting vehicles and tanks were in supporting positions, dug in with both "hull down" and "turret down" positions.
For this test, a 24-gun 155-mm battalion was used to achieve the Soviet criteria of 50 percent destruction. To accomplish these effects, the fire plan for each of the three iterations of the test required 2,600 HE rounds with a mix of PD and VT fuzes. In each iteration, 50 percent of the infantry fighting positions were destroyed and about 50 percent of the personnel were wounded or killed.
The physiological and psychological effects on personnel could not be measured as Army regulations prohibit using humans or animals in this type of testing. However, research conducted in the first phase of the test documented battles of World War I and II where unmotivated or poorly trained soldiers did not stand up to large concentrations of artillery fire. This finding was confirmed during Operation Desert Storm
in the Gulf in 1990 with the mass surrenders of enemy soldiers. The soldiers' will to fight was worn down by fire support from multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS), cannons and air strikes.
In addition, during the third test, 50 percent of the infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and tanks suffered damage that would have prevented them from moving or firing, thus taking them out of the battle (Figure 3). Smoke and dust caused by the HE rounds would have reduced the IFV and tank crews' ability to engage targets at maximum range.
This test demonstrated that an artillery attack using standard HE fragmentation projectiles is much more lethal against tanks and armored vehicles than US effectiveness data estimates had predicted. Based on the data provided in the second test, the modeling predictions were closer to the actual results but remained on the low side of the actual damage and destruction.
Artillerymen need to understand that databases used to drive force-on-force models are not always accurate. Many of the models have not been updated, and their databases do not reflect all aspects of lethality.
The SAE tests clearly demonstrated that force-on-force models have not been portraying the effects of artillery fires properly. Near and direct hits cause significant damage to armored vehicles and tanks. The test results confirmed the validity of the published Soviet's report on the lethality of artillery (Figure 4).
Even with an updated database, force-on-force models tend to be conservative. The models are not capable of measuring the complete effects of artillery fire, such as smoke, dust, weapons sights effects and the physiological and psychological effects on humans. The SAE live-fire tests proved that HE fragmentation rounds are very effective against the most modern US and Soviet stationary armored systems.
Artillery Lethality Myths. Because the databases in force-on-force simulations/models have not accurately portrayed the effects of artillery fires for a number of years, several myths have arisen. The SAE results dispell the following five myths.
Myth #1--It requires a direct hit with an artillery round to damage or destroy an armored vehicle. Not true; 155-mm rounds that impact within 30 meters cause considerable damage (Figure 5). Air bursts using VT or dual-purpose improved conventional munitions
(DPICM) can strip away communications, sights, vision blocks and anything stored on the outside of the vehicle. These air. bursts are especially effective against soft targets such as multiple-rocket launchers (MRLs). (See Figure 6.)
Myth #2--It takes 50 artillery rounds to destroy or damage a tank. Not true. It takes one round (Figure 7). If an artillery battalion engages an armored formation (54 rounds), more than one tank will be destroyed or damaged.
Myth #3--Artillery cannot engage moving targets. It is difficult, but it can be done. The issue is not lethality, but the tactics, techniques and procedures to hit the moving target. Units must train to shift fires.
Myth #4--Modern armor cannot be defeated by artillery. Tanks are designed to kill tanks, and most of the armor is designed to protect against direct fire. HE rounds. with VT or delayed fuze and DPICM are very capable of defeating "modern" armor (Figure 8).
Myth #5--Armored vehicles can button up and drive through artillery fire. Yes, they can. But as soon as they button up, their ability to see is reduced by approximately 40 percent. And as they drive through the artillery fire, there is a high probability they will have mobility and firepower damage or that the formation will change its direction of attack. The results are delay and suppression of armor.
Conclusion. The Field Artillery earned its reputation as "The Greatest Killer on the Battlefield" during World War II. That reputation was built on the artillery's ability to mass fires and respond with rapid, accurate fires for maneuver plus the belief that the artillery could destroy any target on the battlefield. The same capability exists today.
It is the responsibility of every Field Artilleryman to know the branch capabilities--to reject the myths about artillery effectiveness against armor--and ensure the force commander makes the most of his firepower assets in combat.
Major (Retired) George A. Durham has been Deputy Director of the Depth and Simultaneous Attack (D&SA) Battle Lab at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, since May 1992. His previous assignment was as Director of the Soviet Artillery Effects Study in the Directorate of Combat Developments in the Field Artillery School, also at Fort Sill. George Durham was the Executive Officer for a Department of the Army Special Action Team for Corps Support Weapons Systems, developing the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). Before retiring from the Army, he served as the Executive Officer of the 4th Battalion, 4th Field Artillery, Ill Corps Artillery at Fort Sill and commanded two batteries. He's a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
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