Several questionable things ,as :the harshness of the 41/42 winter,the impact of this winter on the war,the role of the Siberian divisions,the role of Sorge (an invention),the failure of TYphoon/

About the 41/42 winter: it was one of the coldest since 1881,but,the story of the -40 C can not be used to measure the harshness of the winter .

The following are the average temperatures at StPetersburg for the months december/january/february:

41:42 :-13.8
1892-93 : -13.3
1939/40: -11
1955/56:-11.9
1978/79:-10.4
196/66 and 67/68 : -10


The Bulletin of the American Meteorological society (P 623) is giving slightly different figures for St Petersburg :39/40:-11.7, 41/42:-14.6.
Given that the figures of the 19th century are not very reliable,one should say that 41/42 was one of the coldest,but the margin is small ,besides,the average temperature of december 41 was -11.8,of 15 -12.2,of december 55:-12.9,of december 78:-13.1.

About the -40C: I know the story,but the fact that during ONE night at an airfield at Army Group Center temperatures were down to -40,proves nothing .
Some years ago,we had in Belgium a very cold start of december,with temperatures of minus 10,and the result was a very warm winter .
Besides,the fact that someone was able to get out in such a cold to measure the temperature of -40 proves that the impact of such cold temperatures is much exaggerated .


Later more .

Originally Posted by lljadw

Several questionable things ,as :the harshness of the 41/42 winter,the impact of this winter on the war,the role of the Siberian divisions,the role of Sorge (an invention),the failure of TYphoon/

About the 41/42 winter: it was one of the coldest since 1881,but,the story of the -40 C can not be used to measure the harshness of the winter .

The following are the average temperatures at StPetersburg for the months december/january/february:

41:42 :-13.8
1892-93 : -13.3
1939/40: -11
1955/56:-11.9
1978/79:-10.4
196/66 and 67/68 : -10


The Bulletin of the American Meteorological society (P 623) is giving slightly different figures for St Petersburg :39/40:-11.7, 41/42:-14.6.
Given that the figures of the 19th century are not very reliable,one should say that 41/42 was one of the coldest,but the margin is small ,besides,the average temperature of december 41 was -11.8,of 15 -12.2,of december 55:-12.9,of december 78:-13.1.

About the -40C: I know the story,but the fact that during ONE night at an airfield at Army Group Center temperatures were down to -40,proves nothing .
Some years ago,we had in Belgium a very cold start of december,with temperatures of minus 10,and the result was a very warm winter .
Besides,the fact that someone was able to get out in such a cold to measure the temperature of -40 proves that the impact of such cold temperatures is much exaggerated .


Later more .

So the overall temperature of the winter of 41-42 was only say 2 or 3 degrees colder, with perhaps a 1 day extreme of -40 degrees. That is interesting although I've never heard it described that way before. However it is believable since the average winter temperature of Moscow is nowhere near -40 degrees. What about the photos of the Ostheer all frozen and trying to warm their equipment with fires, even -13 degrees could be fatal without the proper attire?
I'm just repeating what I've read and seen on the documentaries.The pictures clearly show the soldiers of the Ostheer without heavy winter clothing, at least for the early part of the winter Late Nov - Dec, which is when the Soviet counter offensive took place "Dec 5th and 6th".

About the impact of this winter :

1) there is no proof that general winter was hindering the Germans,it is the opposite : there was a lot of snow,which was hindering the advancing Soviets,while the Germans were retreating .

2) a lot of people are equalizing a harsh winter with a lot of additional non-combat losses = freezing cases.But,the number of additional non combat losses,which were NOT all freezings was very limited:in the autumn (september,october,november),the non combat losses were some 196000,while in the winter(december,january,february,march) they were some 366000 ,on a total of 4 million men = 9 %.And,most of them were freezings of the first degree,the number of amputations and deceases was less than 40000 = less than 1 % of the total of the Ostheer .

What was happening? If the Ostheer had to receive its winter clothing before the winter,the trains with winter clothing had to leave Germany at last in the second half of october .Due to Typhoon and other causes,they were to late,with as result that the Ostheer received its winter clothing to late,in january .But,because december was not that cold ,the late deliveries of winter clothing had not the catastrophic results a lot of people are claiming .Most of the freezings occured after december,when it was cold .Besides,even if every one had received winter clothing before the start of the winter,there still should be freezings .

Other point : -20 C was (and is) not uncommon in Germany and most soldiers had already winter clothing from home and knew how to protect against the cold .

The fact is that more than 90 % of the Germans were not hurt by the winter,which means that almost every one had winter clothing and that the impact of the winter was only marginal .

Originally Posted by lljadw

About the impact of this winter :

1) there is no proof that general winter was hindering the Germans,it is the opposite : there was a lot of snow,which was hindering the advancing Soviets,while the Germans were retreating .

2) a lot of people are equalizing a harsh winter with a lot of additional non-combat losses = freezing cases.But,the number of additional non combat losses,which were NOT all freezings was very limited:in the autumn (september,october,november),the non combat losses were some 196000,while in the winter(december,january,february,march) they were some 366000 ,on a total of 4 million men = 9 %.And,most of them were freezings of the first degree,the number of amputations and deceases was less than 40000 = less than 1 % of the total of the Ostheer .

What was happening? If the Ostheer had to receive its winter clothing before the winter,the trains with winter clothing had to leave Germany at last in the second half of october .Due to Typhoon and other causes,they were to late,with as result that the Ostheer received its winter clothing to late,in january .But,because december was not that cold ,the late deliveries of winter clothing had not the catastrophic results a lot of people are claiming .Most of the freezings occured after december,when it was cold .Besides,even if every one had received winter clothing before the start of the winter,there still should be freezings .

Other point : -20 C was (and is) not uncommon in Germany and most soldiers had already winter clothing from home and knew how to protect against the cold .

The fact is that more than 90 % of the Germans were not hurt by the winter,which means that almost every one had winter clothing and that the impact of the winter was only marginal .

I find this very interesting. Perhaps the Nazi propaganda played up this winter thing to deflect the defeat? I must admit I have many books that claim the winter saved Moscow. This would be interesting if a Nazi myth has persisted to this day.

It is obvious that the German propaganda was blaming the winter for the failure of Barbarossa ,they were following the exemple of Napoleon .

2 other points (source is German casualties in operation Barbarosa on the AHF)

1)The following figures are (first) the combat losses and second the non combat losses of the Ostheer in 1941


July : CL : 165000 / NCL:17000

August:190000 /34000

September:132000/57000

October:114000/66000

November :84000/73000

December:77000/91000

January:87000/128000

February:88000/85000

March :105000/63000


Comments : the months with the biggest losses were :august (224000) and january:215000

:there was not that much fighting in the winter:the CL of january and february were on the level of november


:the decisive month was august,when the Ostheer lost 190000 KIA/WIA and MIA


2)93% of the NCL were again fit for action after ONE month,which means that the importance of the freezing cases were marginal .


Only 56 % of the CL became again fit,and only after THREE months .

Simplified : of 10 WIA,only 6 returned to the front,after 3 months,while of 10 sick,after 1 month 9 returned to the front .

Originally Posted by JOC

I find this very interesting. Perhaps the Nazi propaganda played up this winter thing to deflect the defeat? I must admit I have many books that claim the winter saved Moscow. This would be interesting if a Nazi myth has persisted to this day.

It's not just a Nazi myth, it's been the assumption of lazy western historians, some of whom have been swayed by the romantic notion of the German professional soldier, fighting against the numberless Russian hordes. Thus it's a myth that's become fact over time. The memoirs of prominent Nazi generals such as Guderian and Manstein have also been a major propagator of these same myths.

Don't get me wrong. Conditions on the Ostfront once the Raspituta and then the ice/snow set in were often very difficult. Both armies were affected by it. The Raspituta probably had more impact on the Germans than the later wintry conditions did but neither weather condition had any decisive impact on the result of Typhoon. The Germans lost because their losses became unsustainable, they were running out of ammunition and especially fuel and as a result they were unable to knock out the Soviet Union quickly enough.

Stalin also saved Moscow. The city was in a state of virtual panic on October 16th and Stalin decided to stay and pull things together. Had he fled to the east then it's possible the Germans could have taken Moscow without a fight. Whether they still would have won the war is debatable but capturing Moscow, and most importantly, forcing an internal collapse of the government and state apparatus, was Germany's only key to victory.

http://ww2history.com/key_moments/Ea...anic_in_Moscow

http://books.google.se/books?id=ubWQ...0panic&f=false

http://books.google.se/books?id=l9wb...0panic&f=false

I just read "When Titans Clash" by David Glantz. A Slavic historian who presents the war from the Soviet viewpoint. He states as follows: “In December the snow and cold finally arrived with a vengeance. Both vehicle and aircraft engines had to be heated for hours before attempting to start them. By contrast the Red Air Force had heated hangers at permanent airfields. The Wehrmacht could do no more…” He does talk about the fact that the Germans had poor supply lines that did as much to defeat the Germans as did the Red Army. Now I could understand the Nazi’s using the cold thing as propaganda to excuse the defeat, however why would modern day historians do this?

Both armies were affected and I find the temperature data supplied by lljadw to be thought provoking, I have heard this -40 degree statement many times and can look at several references that state this figure without saying it was a single day low . The Soviets however were better prepared for the winter in other ways as well. T34 tanks could handle the weather better than the German armor, they had troops on ski’s.

One could add that while the Moscow defeat was going on Hitler was foolish enough to declare war on the US. I can understand the thought that winning a war against both these superpowers simultaneously was unlikely if not impossible.

As for Stalin, yes he presented a galvanizing influence by staying in Moscow. With his call "Death to the Nazi Invader" along with his centuries old call to defend the motherland. It should be noted that Moscow did have shelter in the newly completed underground railway stations. Note: He left himself an out in case the city fell.

BTW Monty but up a tread that might prove of interest? It explains that the Ride to Berlin was indeed a bumpy one: The Soviet-German War, 1941-1945: Myths and Realities info

I'll check out the URL's time permitting

The following is from the AHF (early and harsh winter in 1941?)

Daytime temperatures on the Kalinin front (NW of Moscow)


November 1941

13:-18 C

14:-13 C

15:-7

16: -7

17: -6

18: -9

19:-7

20: -7

21:- 6

22 :-6

23: - 5

24:-5

25: -8

26: -10

27:--13

28:-8

29: - 3

30: -2

Thus,we have 4 days of exceptional cold that month, OTOH,I have read that at Moscow,in that month,the snow did not remain but was melting down .

On the average, november 1941 was cold,at Leningrad,the average temperature was -3.5,in 1940:+ 1.8,but, in 1921: -4.9

At Leningrad,between 1881/1940 (thus 60 years),there were 23 november months with a negative average temperature ,thus,as such,november 1941 was not that exceptional .


The temperatures for december will follow,but I can already say that the lowest was -29.

Originally Posted by lljadw

The following is from the AHF (early and harsh winter in 1941?)

Daytime temperatures on the Kalinin front (NW of Moscow)


November 1941

13:-18 C

14:-13 C

15:-7

16: -7

17: -6

18: -9

19:-7

20: -7

21:- 6

22 :-6

23: - 5

24:-5

25: -8

26: -10

27:--13

28:-8

29: - 3

30: -2

Thus,we have 4 days of exceptional cold that month, OTOH,I have read that at Moscow,in that month,the snow did not remain but was melting down .

On the average, november 1941 was cold,at Leningrad,the average temperature was -3.5,in 1940:+ 1.8,but, in 1921: -4.9

At Leningrad,between 1881/1940 (thus 60 years),there were 23 november months with a negative average temperature ,thus,as such,november 1941 was not that exceptional .


The temperatures for december will follow,but I can already say that the lowest was -29.

lljadw why then do the puplication state -40 degrees. I am not looking for a long drawwout depate it's just as with my prevoius posting my source's talk about the Ostreers winter issue in 41 during the counter attack.

Originally Posted by JOC

lljadw why then do the puplication state -40 degrees. I am not looking for a long drawwout depate it's just as with my prevoius posting my source's talk about the Ostreers winter issue in 41 during the counter attack.

My guess is they say -40 degrees because that fits the narrative as to why the Germans faltered and 70 years later it is repeated as fact without ever being verified.

As Goebbels said...If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it.