Originally Posted by MontyB

To deprive the Russians the resource would be the logical answer.
Reducing the ability of an enemy to make war is a viable strategy but in this case I do not believe the German supply of oil was actually enough given the supply lines they had to maintain therefore an oil source closer to the front would have benefited the German army in Russia.




Anyone that thinks there was any realistic chance of a fourth German army linking up with Army Group South in Russia is just plain delusional there is no way they could have resupplied an army over that distance.

Just for shits and giggles lets look at the numbers:
For argument sake I have chosen Stuttgart as the start point not sure why but it is place to start from:

Stuttgart - Tripoli -- 1115 miles
Tripoli - Cairo -- 1080 miles
Cairo - Baghdad -- 804 miles
Baghdad - Baku -- 573 miles
Total --- 3572 Miles

Alternative Route:
Stuttgart - Baku ---2056 miles.

Reality:
Stuttgart - Moscow --- 1283 Miles.

Now if the German logistics system could not maintain 3 Army Groups sufficiently to travel the 1283 miles to Moscow how do you think it would have maintained 3 Army Groups in Russia traveling 2000 miles to the Urals and one touring the Middle East for a further 3572 miles?

The reality is that Rommel was never going to go any further than Cairo and even that turned out to be too far.

The logistics are hypothetical because it didn’t happen. How did England maintain an empire where the sun never sets. My point is this was their ideal long term goal not that it would happen. Read below.

The Germans had logistics problems as did the Soviets on the way back and the Allies until they took Antwerp. That is often the nature of campaigns that travel very long distances. Had things been a bit different the thought is the Soviets would have surrendered before the Germans would actually have had to reach the Urals.

Rommel lines were stretched. However he lost in Africa by a very narrow margin. Had he been victorious he could have linked up with pro Germans Arabs in Palestine and Iraq. Turkey which stayed neutral would have likely joined in or at the least allowed movement of men and supplies at this point with a German victory pending.

The distance Cologne -Alexandria was 4000 km :it was impossible for the Axis to transport and supply the forces needed to go to the Canal :
Cologne-Naples (via Switserland) : 1600 km,via Austria,the distance was longer .

Naples-Tripoli :900 km

Tripoli-Tobruk : 1250 km

Aboit the oil : here are the figures(1:German crude production,2 : synthetic production, 3 import)


1939 : O.9 million ton, 2.2 million ton, 5.2 million ton

1940:1.5, 3.3, 2.1

1941:1.6, 4.1 , 2.8

1942:1.7,4.9, 2.3


1943: 1.9, 5.7, 2.8

1944:1.7,3.9, 1.0


Conclusions:

1)There is no corelation between the oil production/import and the German successes/defeats :1940 total :6.9 million ton, 1943:10.4 million ton

2)During the war years,the synthetic production always was bigger than the imports

3) Germany did not need the ME oil,nor could it transport this oil back home,it also could not capture the ME oil fields.The ME oil also was irrelevant for the SU and for Britain,who used the oil from Central America : there was nothing in the ME that was indespensable for anyone .

4) Germany never could exploit/transport the oil of the Caucasus ,it only could try to deprive the SU of this oil,and,than,it is very questionable if this could have a decisive influence .

Originally Posted by JOC; However he lost in Africa by a very narrow margin. Had he been victorious he could have linked up with pro Germans Arabs in Palestine and Iraq. Turkey which stayed neutral would have likely joined in or at the least allowed movement of men and supplies at this point with a German victory pending.[/SIZE

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Rommel had no chance at all in NA : the only thing the Axis could do was to delay the inevitable loss of NA and meanwhile to tie as much allied forces .

It was impossible for Rommel to go to Baghdad .

Originally Posted by lljadw

The distance Cologne -Alexandria was 4000 km :it was impossible for the Axis to transport and supply the forces needed to go to the Canal :
Cologne-Naples (via Switserland) : 1600 km,via Austria,the distance was longer .

Naples-Tripoli :900 km

Tripoli-Tobruk : 1250 km

Aboit the oil : here are the figures(1:German crude production,2 : synthetic production, 3 import)


1939 : O.9 million ton, 2.2 million ton, 5.2 million ton

1940:1.5, 3.3, 2.1

1941:1.6, 4.1 , 2.8

1942:1.7,4.9, 2.3


1943: 1.9, 5.7, 2.8

1944:1.7,3.9, 1.0


Conclusions:

1)There is no corelation between the oil production/import and the German successes/defeats :1940 total :6.9 million ton, 1943:10.4 million ton

2)During the war years,the synthetic production always was bigger than the imports

3) Germany did not need the ME oil,nor could it transport this oil back home,it also could not capture the ME oil fields.The ME oil also was irrelevant for the SU and for Britain,who used the oil from Central America : there was nothing in the ME that was indespensable for anyone .

4) Germany never could exploit/transport the oil of the Caucasus ,it only could try to deprive the SU of this oil,and,than,it is very questionable if this could have a decisive influence .

No Germany desired the Soviet oil for itself. The synthetic oil was very expensive to produce and was done as a last resort as other supplies ran low. No body said the ME oil was indispensable.

It is irrelevant that synthetic oil was very expensive,it is relevant that the Germans could produce synthetic oil .

Originally Posted by JOC

The logistics are hypothetical because it didn’t happen. How did England maintain an empire where the sun never sets. My point is this was their ideal long term goal not that it would happen. Read below.

The Germans had logistics problems as did the Soviets on the way back and the Allies until they took Antwerp. That is often the nature of campaigns that travel very long distances. Had things been a bit different the thought is the Soviets would have surrendered before the Germans would actually have had to reach the Urals.

Rommel lines were stretched. However he lost in Africa by a very narrow margin. Had he been victorious he could have linked up with pro Germans Arabs in Palestine and Iraq. Turkey which stayed neutral would have likely joined in or at the least allowed movement of men and supplies at this point with a German victory pending.

1)It did happen : supplies were going from Stuttgart /the Ruhr to Tobruk,and it took almost 2 months to transport them .

2)"had things" = IF,would ,could,should,: these things must not be used as an arguments : only facts please .

3)"Turkey would have likely joined" : idem,besides how do you know this ? And,have you explored the possibilities for the Germans to move men and supplies through Turkey ?I have seen this being investigated (on the Axis History Forum),and the conclusions were very negative .

Lets get something straight. The tread is opinion that is why there are so many answers. I have often disagreed with your so called facts. At times they sound ridiculous, perhaps my posting have come across in a similar fashion to you? This matters not. However do not tell me how to post!

I see the menace the Nazi's presented and the fact that they actually stood a chance of winning. This is why the US shifted the bulk of the American resources into the war against Germany 1st, even though Japan attacked them and the American public was thirsty for vengeance against Japan. However Washington recognized the greater treat lie in Europe with Germany. I believe we can all be thankful to both the Allies and Soviets. It is clear from your viewpoint that you don't share this opinion.

I prefer not to go another round on this. I believe each others viewpoint has been repeated thru the treads so often we could start a book.

Originally Posted by JOC

Lets get something straight. The tread is opinion that is why there are so many answers. I have often disagreed with your so called facts. At times they sound ridiculous, perhaps my posting have come across in a similar fashion to you? This matters not. However do not tell me how to post!

I see the menace the Nazi's presented and the fact that they actually stood a chance of winning. This is why the US shifted the bulk of the American resources into the war against Germany 1st, even though Japan attacked them and the American public was thirsty for vengeance against Japan. However Washington recognized the greater treat lie in Europe with Germany. I believe we can all be thankful to both the Allies and Soviets. It is clear from your viewpoint that you don't share this opinion.

I prefer not to go another round on this. I believe each others viewpoint has been repeated thru the treads so often we could start a book.

Of course these replies are opinion but in order to take opinion seriously it must be a viable opinion, I have read arguments that Germany used the first atomic bomb, had a submarine base in the Antarctic and was building a moon base but:
- Given that Werner Heisenberg got his calculations entirely wrong and was completely shocked by the Allied atomic bombs it is safe to assume Germany wasnt an atomic power.

- The only German interest in the Antarctic was a whaling station in what they called New Swabia and no sign of any sort of base has been found in the 70 years since WW2 it is safe to assume that never happened either.

- I wont go into the moon base idea at all.

Now my guess is that Hitler probably said all these things were on the agenda but I also suspect that they were flights of fancy and they all knew it just as the the Middle East/Russia link up was.

JOC is starting from the correct POV : Germany first ,but ,he is drawing the wrong conclusions .

1) Washington decided on Germany first,already BEFORE PH,not because Germany would "win" ,but,because,without the intervention of the US,Britain would give up,and Germany would dominate Europe .

2)JOC is also falling in the IF trap : one can not prove one' s rightness by if's,otherwise, I could argue that IF Britain had the A Bomb in 1940,the war would be over .

3) The facts are that Germany would lose against combinations of Britain + US, Britain + SU,US + SU (although such combination would be unlikely),even against the SU on its own .Would Germany lose in a duel with the US? Probably,although the problem for the US would be to attack Germany without a European base .
That's why Britain was indespensable : it was an unsinkable carrier .

Last point:stubbornly repeating old myths as the winter of 41/42,the Siberian divisions,the winter clothing is not helping one's cause .

Originally Posted by lljadw

JOC is starting from the correct POV : Germany first ,but ,he is drawing the wrong conclusions .

1) Washington decided on Germany first,already BEFORE PH,not because Germany would "win" ,but,because,without the intervention of the US,Britain would give up,and Germany would dominate Europe .

2)JOC is also falling in the IF trap : one can not prove one' s rightness by if's,otherwise, I could argue that IF Britain had the A Bomb in 1940,the war would be over .

3) The facts are that Germany would lose against combinations of Britain + US, Britain + SU,US + SU (although such combination would be unlikely),even against the SU on its own .Would Germany lose in a duel with the US? Probably,although the problem for the US would be to attack Germany without a European base .
That's why Britain was indespensable : it was an unsinkable carrier .

Last point:stubbornly repeating old myths as the winter of 41/42,the Siberian divisions,the winter clothing is not helping one's cause .

I admit the Mideast _USSR hookup was very unlikely. However some Nazis actually considered this as a long term possibility. We must remember that in the Nazi party some were delusional.

I agree with you on Britain. I think we do differ as to the magnitude of the Nazi treat. I do believe the USSR could have lost and was not completely out of the woods until after Kursk. However you could see it coming after Stalingrad. I view this Soviet victory as showing that the USSR could beat Germany and likely would. However Kursk removed all dought.

I have read much and watched the documentaries about the Osteer outside Moscow in winter of 41 with 1000’s of men freezing to death and vehicles the couldn’t run for lack of cold weather lubricates as the temperature dropped to -40 F. Stalin keep the Siberian divisions in the far east so as to counter a Japanese treat. When informed by spy networks “Sorge being among them” that Japan didn’t desired war with USSR “but with the US” Stalin moved the Siberian divisions west to defend Moscow. They were fresh and well prepared for the Russian winter. They were combined with the overwhelmed forces already in Moscow to give the Germans a powerful counter attack. Hitler ordered a no retreat order as the offensive started to run out of steam. By this time the German army in the Moscow area was stabilized they were pushed back ~ 100 miles. Lead by von Bock and von Leeb who were relieved of their commands for the defeat. This is how I've come to understand the failure of Operation Typhoon.