Originally Posted by Doppleganger

If you don't mind me saying you have a rather simplistic and naive view of the Eastern Front. 10, perhaps 15 years ago I might have agreed about Kursk being the defining battle of the Russo-German war. That was when I had a superficial understanding but now that I've done much more research and reading it's clear to me that Kursk was just another speedbump on the way to a Soviet victory. You have to understand that the Germans, from day 1, were not set up to fight extended campaigns. They didn't even go to a full war footing until 1943. Once they had failed to quickly knock out the Russians by way of capturing Moscow (if this even would have ended the war as it's far from certain) there was only going to be one eventual outcome. Compare the potential force ratios of both nations, look at the size of the Soviet Union, even just the European part, consider the strains on Germany from other fronts, consider the strains on the German Wehrmacht, paticularly the Panzerwaffe which rapidly increased in size but with significant shortcomings. I could go on but the essence is that if Nazi Germany didn't defeat an enemy quickly, it was in trouble.

Just to clear up some myths:

1. German winter clothing was available, that wasn't the problem. The problem was the hopelessly over-extended logistical chain that was barely up to the task of supporting one army group, never mind three. Most of the winter equipment was stuck in Poland as there wasn't the available rolling stock to get it any further east.
2. The advances in 1942 in the end merely delayed the inevitable, as the Soviets proved that they could just retreat further into the hinterland and then counter-attack in the winter. Yes the Red Army suffered some horrible casualties as it was poorly led and the average Russian soldier was poorly trained and it was up against a very good seasoned army with superior tactics, leadership and training. Stalingrad and then Kursk demonstrated that the Soviets could afford to lose hundreds of tanks and thousands of men but that the Germans could not. When you have this situation, in an extended war of attrition, there can be only one victor.
3. Kursk wasn't 'Zhukov's trap' as you call it. It was simply the demonstration of one nation attempting to impose itself on another come what may. Both sides knew full well that the other was up to, although the Soviets had far more detailed information due to the failure of German intelligence. By this time, only an armistice was a realistic outcome for Germany; after Kursk it was off the table as the Soviets knew that they had the power now to smash Germany at will, which they slowly did. I will agree that there was a possibility before Kursk that adoption of elastic defence and Manstein's 'backhand' tactics could have bled the Red Army white. Then we might have had a situation whereby both sides would have exhausted themselves somewhere near pre-war borders. All conjecture of course.

Think as you wish I have studied the conflict in detail however you are entitled to your opinion. I believe you underestimate the Nazi's vs. the Ivan's.

I agree with some of what your saying. An exception being that Germany was able to continue to menace the Soviets until the loss of the strategic initiative at Kursk.
Yes their original intention was for a quick 8 week victory. For whatever reason they didn't have the proper clothing at the front in the winter of 41.

However they turned out to more resilient as the conflict continued. All the territory taken in operation Blau was fought for tooth and nail and involved 2 army groups AGC and AGA. At the same time Soviet offensives in the North were fought off with high losses.

Kursk was a trap that the Germans willingly let themselves fall into for whatever reasons. A catastrophe waiting to happen. Regardless if the Germans knew the full extent of Zhukov's defenses "which they didn't". It doesn't matter they went ahead with the doomed offensive anyways " note reason offensive is nicknamed "death ride". The Soviets knew the exact date of the attack and were able to disrupt the attack before it even began. They had other options in the summer of 43. Some on the general staff suggested that they wait it out for the Soviets to attack rather then lose some much men and material on 9 sets of land mines and tank traps while being fired at by defensive forces 1.5 to 2 their size. This victory swiftly lead to the taking of Orel and Belgorod. The Germans were on their way west to the Dniepr from here.

Originally Posted by lljadw

This is very simplistic : the truth is that the Western allies would have defeated Germany if the USSR had remained neutral or was defeated and that the USSR would have defeated Germany if the Western Allies had remained neutral/ were defeated .

The truth is also that Germany had lost the war in the East in the summer of 1941 (NOT at the gates of Moscow) BEFORE even ONE LL shipment arrived at Murmamsk/Archangelsk .

OK general lljadw.

Originally Posted by lljadw

This is very simplistic : the truth is that the Western allies would have defeated Germany if the USSR had remained neutral or was defeated and that the USSR would have defeated Germany if the Western Allies had remained neutral/ were defeated .

I am not sure I agree with this as had Russia remained neutral or been defeated rapidly there would little reason to bring the USA into the war and without the US manufacturing power there is no way in hell Britain could have retaken continental Europe and it would have opened up the Middle East oil fields to German attack from Russia giving them a shorter more secure supply line.

In that senario I suspect a stalemate was the only likely outcome.

Originally Posted by JOC

For whatever reason they didn't have the proper clothing at the front in the winter of 41.

This is not correct : there were problems AT THE START OF THE WINTER,but later,the problems were solved.

Originally Posted by MontyB

I am not sure I agree with this as had Russia remained neutral or been defeated rapidly there would little reason to bring the USA into the war and without the US manufacturing power there is no way in hell Britain could have retaken continental Europe and it would have opened up the Middle East oil fields to German attack from Russia giving them a shorter more secure supply line.

In that senario I suspect a stalemate was the only likely outcome.

Following the Germans, a US intervention was inevitable,whatever would happen in the east= SU defeated or neutral .The only hope was that the elimination of the SU would activate Japan := forcing the US to a 2 front war.

The ME oil was not important for Germany,which had enough oil and there was no way that Germany could transport the ME oil back home .

Originally Posted by JOC

OK general lljadw.

You are forgetting the A Bomb .

Originally Posted by lljadw

Following the Germans, a US intervention was inevitable,whatever would happen in the east= SU defeated or neutral .The only hope was that the elimination of the SU would activate Japan := forcing the US to a 2 front war.

I disagree the one thing that Germany lacked was the one thing Germany needed to effect a "positive" (from the German perspective) outcome to the war and that was a navy without that and with the removal of the Soviet Union the was always headed for a stalemate.

The ME oil was not important for Germany,which had enough oil and there was no way that Germany could transport the ME oil back home .

I believe that is a short sighted view as even if Germany did not need Middle East oil it was still useful to deprive its enemies of that source.

Originally Posted by MontyB

I disagree the one thing that Germany lacked was the one thing Germany needed to effect a "positive" (from the German perspective) outcome to the war and that was a navy without that and with the removal of the Soviet Union the was always headed for a stalemate.



I believe that is a short sighted view as even if Germany did not need Middle East oil it was still useful to deprive its enemies of that source.

Also why would they have fought to try and take Baku, if Romanian and Hungarian sources were considered sufficient?

The long term plan had they also won out in N Africa was to unite the fronts, with oil being the main prize. "As well far sighted plans to knock out the USSR, control of the Suez and bring Soviet and Mideast oil under German control" Thank goodness the dual defeat at both fronts prevented any of this from happening.

Originally Posted by lljadw

This is not correct : there were problems AT THE START OF THE WINTER,but later,the problems were solved.

By the time they had the proper clothing and vehicular lubricates the battle for Moscow was lost. When the Soviets initially attacked the Germans were having major weather issues with personal dying of the cold and equipment seizing up. Of course the failure to take Moscow can't be entirely blamed on the weather, since the Siberian army with it's 18 divisions tipped the balance in their winter counter offensive since they were very well prepared for the worse Russian winter in 40 years.

Originally Posted by JOC

Also why would they have fought to try and take Baku, if Romanian and Hungarian sources were considered sufficient?

To deprive the Russians the resource would be the logical answer.
Reducing the ability of an enemy to make war is a viable strategy but in this case I do not believe the German supply of oil was actually enough given the supply lines they had to maintain therefore an oil source closer to the front would have benefited the German army in Russia.

The long term plan had they also won out in N Africa was to unite the fronts, with oil being the main prize. "As well far sighted plans to knock out the USSR, control of the Suez and bring Soviet and Mideast oil under German control" Thank goodness the dual defeat at both fronts prevented any of this from happening.

Anyone that thinks there was any realistic chance of a fourth German army linking up with Army Group South in Russia is just plain delusional there is no way they could have resupplied an army over that distance.

Just for shits and giggles lets look at the numbers:
For argument sake I have chosen Stuttgart as the start point not sure why but it is place to start from:

Stuttgart - Tripoli -- 1115 miles
Tripoli - Cairo -- 1080 miles
Cairo - Baghdad -- 804 miles
Baghdad - Baku -- 573 miles
Total --- 3572 Miles

Alternative Route:
Stuttgart - Baku ---2056 miles.

Reality:
Stuttgart - Moscow --- 1283 Miles.

Now if the German logistics system could not maintain 3 Army Groups sufficiently to travel the 1283 miles to Moscow how do you think it would have maintained 3 Army Groups in Russia traveling 2000 miles to the Urals and one touring the Middle East for a further 3572 miles?

The reality is that Rommel was never going to go any further than Cairo and even that turned out to be too far.