Most decisive battle in WW2? - Page 32




View Poll Results :Most decisive battle in WW2?
Battle of Stalingrad 34 33.33%
Battle of Kursk (Operation Citadel) 15 14.71%
Battle of Moscow 10 9.80%
Battle of Leningrad 0 0%
Battle of El Alamein 3 2.94%
Operation Overlord (Battle of Normandy) 17 16.67%
Battle of Midway 11 10.78%
Other 12 11.76%
Voters: 102. You may not vote on this poll

 
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May 12th, 2014  
MontyB
 
 
My opinion is that Kursk was "a" decisive battle but only in that it showed the Germans were unable to regain the initiative.
Case Blue and Stalingrad showed that in mid-1942 the Germans were still capable of taking the initiative but by the end of 1942 it was over.

Therefore I would argue that it was the winter of 1941-42 where the balance of power began to change irreversibly so even though I chose Stalingrad early on I am now of the opinion that the period around the battle of Moscow was the decisive moment in that it was the last period of German domination before the gap between the armies began to close.
May 13th, 2014  
JOC
 
 

Topic: Winter of 42


I have heard this position before. However after the victory at Moscow of which general winter played a strong part (due to the ignorance of the Germans to equip the Ostheer with clothing and vehicle lubricates that could tolerate the cold of the worse Russian winter in years). One should consider the extreme losses the Soviets took during the following winter offensive in which 100,000 of thousands more died and 100,000 more were taken prisoner. This proved that they were still incapable of defeating the Germans. As soon as the rasputitsa passed Germany again went 100's of miles deeper into south central USSR. The idiotic decision by Hitler to continuously switch his panzer army's goal back and forth between Baku and Stalingrad, likely cost Germany operation Blau. The defeat at Stalingrad showed that Germany could lose, however not that they would lose. After a strong Russian winter campaign again ended up with a German victory the 2 side got ready to pair off in summer of 43. Kurst was the battle that shouldn’t have happened as far as the Germans were concerned. The Soviets had 9 defensive rings and nearly ˝ the red army waiting for them and knew the exact day of the attack. The Battle of Kursk basically but the nails in the coffin as far any more Blitzkriegs in the USSR. It showed that due to improved quality of the Red army and their massive numbers in both men and equipment the Germans would be forced to be on the defensive for the remainder of the war (with the exception of a few spoiling actions). They would never again be able to amass the men and equipment to for any serous offensive in the USSR.
May 13th, 2014  
MontyB
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by JOC
I have heard this position before. However after the victory at Moscow (operation Uranus) of which general winter played a strong part (due to the ignorance of the Germans). One should consider the extreme losses the Soviets took during the following winter offensive in which 100,000 of thousands more died and 100,000 more were taken prisoner. This proved that they were still incapable of defeating the Germans.
But in my opinion it also showed that the Germans were incapable of defeating the Russians and as such it was a pivot point in the war which I believe was the decisive moment.

If you read German commentary about case blue you see that they were noticing a change in the Russian defense patterns, no more defending to the last man and no more grand encirclements.
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May 13th, 2014  
lljadw
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by JOC
I have heard this position before. However after the victory at Moscow (operation Uranus) of which general winter played a strong part (due to the ignorance of the Germans). One should consider the extreme losses the Soviets took during the following winter offensive in which 100,000 of thousands more died and 100,000 more were taken prisoner. This proved that they were still incapable of defeating the Germans. As soon as the rasputitsa passed Germany again went 100's of miles deeper into south central USSR. The idiotic decision by Hitler to continuously switch his panzer army's goal back and forth between Baku and Stalingrad, likely cost Germany operation Blau. The defeat at Stalingrad showed that Germany could lose, however not that they would lose. After a strong Russian winter campaign again ended up with a German victory the 2 side got ready to pair off in summer of 43. Kurst was the battle that shouldn’t have happened as far as the Germans were concerned. The Soviets had 9 defensive rings and nearly ˝ the red army waiting for them and knew he exact day of the attack. The Battle of Kursk basically but the nails in the coffin as far any more Blitzkriegs in the USSR. It showed that due to improved quality of the Red army and their massive numbers in both men and equipment the Germans would be forced to be on the defensive for the remainder of the war (with the exception of a few spoiling actions). They would never again be able to amass the men and equipment to for any serous offensive in the USSR.
1)The ignorance of the Germans about general winter is an invention .And,general winetr played no part in the German defeat before Moscow .

2)Hitler's decisions did not cost Germany operation Blau .
May 13th, 2014  
JOC
 
 

Topic: Change in Stalin


Quote:
Originally Posted by MontyB
But in my opinion it also showed that the Germans were incapable of defeating the Russians and as such it was a pivot point in the war which I believe was the decisive moment.

If you read German commentary about case blue you see that they were noticing a change in the Russian defense patterns, no more defending to the last man and no more grand encirclements.
Stalin began to take advice of competent staff such as Zuchov, Valutin, Konev rather than his own shoot from the hip approach. This reduced the great encirclements and fight to the last man strategy's that occurred in 41 and 42. A myth however is that the Soviets allowed the Germans to move forward in operation Blau. Every acre of Soviet territory was gained in blood during operation Blau. as was all territory gained in all offensives operations against the Soviets.
In 42 Stalin began carefully giving over control to the Red army's competent military leaders. At the same time Hitler was taking power away from his top military commanders. The Soviets gained from this relationship while the Germans lost out from Hitler's constant meddling.
May 14th, 2014  
lljadw
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by JOC
At the same time Hitler was taking power away from his top military commanders.
Wrong,it started before 1942
May 14th, 2014  
lljadw
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by JOC
the Germans lost out from Hitler's constant meddling.
This was said by the generals to excuse their defeat.
May 14th, 2014  
JOC
 
 

Topic: Hitler the Comander


Quote:
Originally Posted by lljadw
This was said by the generals to excuse their defeat.
So you think Hitler's decisions were the best possibly decision for the Ostheer since he oversaw all major operations and basically often - usually dictated the plan of action (i.e.: not to breakout of Stalingrad), taking away the ability of many of the best generals in the war to strategize? If you believe this is a myth you are wrong. This is a fact to the horror of the Ostheer particularly the no retreat and die to the last man orders which was almost always Hitler's order during the defensive stage of the Eastern conflict. This reduced the Germans ability mobility and replaced it with what Hitler understood the WW1 defense.
May 24th, 2014  
Doppleganger
 
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by JOC
So you think Hitler's decisions were the best possibly decision for the Ostheer since he oversaw all major operations and basically often - usually dictated the plan of action (i.e.: not to breakout of Stalingrad), taking away the ability of many of the best generals in the war to strategize? If you believe this is a myth you are wrong. This is a fact to the horror of the Ostheer particularly the no retreat and die to the last man orders which was almost always Hitler's order during the defensive stage of the Eastern conflict. This reduced the Germans ability mobility and replaced it with what Hitler understood the WW1 defense.
It wasn't just Hitler who favoured WW1 tactics, so did most of the General Staff and many of the field commanders, some of them good ones like Kluge. For example, Kursk was a good example of a WW1 style, 'keil und kessell' style pincer movement and it was the General Staff who were allowed to plan this operation. The General Staff had their way and the bolder field commanders like Manstein were overruled. Hitler had nothing to do with that decision.

It has to be remembered that Hitler allowed himself to be persuaded of quite a few things by his generals. For example, that tanks could play a big role in operations (good) and that Moscow could be captured in 1941 (bad). When Moscow wasn't captured and Army Group Centre nearly routed, he dismissed those commanders who had let him down, Guderian included. He lost a lot of confidence in the ability of his generals and took on more than he could chew.

He did dither and meddle on occasion, like his diversion of 4th Panzer Army from Stalingrad in July 42 which caused a massive traffic jam and slowed down the German advance at a critical time. His deteriorating health and the onset of Parkinson's Disease undoubtedly had a bigger and bigger impact and God knows what drugs he was on to try and control his illness but even so, it's too simple to say that Hitler was always wrong and his generals were always right.
May 24th, 2014  
JOC
 
 

Topic: In general thats what I was saying


Quote:
Originally Posted by Doppleganger
It wasn't just Hitler who favoured WW1 tactics, so did most of the General Staff and many of the field commanders, some of them good ones like Kluge. For example, Kursk was a good example of a WW1 style, 'keil und kessell' style pincer movement and it was the General Staff who were allowed to plan this operation. The General Staff had their way and the bolder field commanders like Manstein were overruled. Hitler had nothing to do with that decision.

It has to be remembered that Hitler allowed himself to be persuaded of quite a few things by his generals. For example, that tanks could play a big role in operations (good) and that Moscow could be captured in 1941 (bad). When Moscow wasn't captured and Army Group Centre nearly routed, he dismissed those commanders who had let him down, Guderian included. He lost a lot of confidence in the ability of his generals and took on more than he could chew.

He did dither and meddle on occasion, like his diversion of 4th Panzer Army from Stalingrad in July 42 which caused a massive traffic jam and slowed down the German advance at a critical time. His deteriorating health and the onset of Parkinson's Disease undoubtedly had a bigger and bigger impact and God knows what drugs he was on to try and control his illness but even so, it's too simple to say that Hitler was always wrong and his generals were always right.
Kursk was a basic head on battle with very limited maneuver due to the extremely extensive Soviet defensives as well as the large number of troops squaring off against each other. Hitler had reservations about Kursk but stated that a summer offensive must take place for political reasons.
A main stumbling block for the Germans during the defensive stage of the Eastern conflict was a Fuhrer order which called for the troops to "dig in and stand to the last man". This order was issued by Hitler with catastrophic effects at Korsum, Crimea, Minsk, etc. Rather than use the mobile defense typical of Manstein who was deposed for stated the unpalatable truth to Hitler once too often.
Hitler understood Blitzkrieg. But didn't possess a strong understanding of mobile defense and cringed at the thought of tactical retreat. With some exceptions i.e.: the retreat to natural defense line of the Dnieper. In regards to defense Hitler often drew upon his own experiences developed in the trenches.
This proved disastrous to an army that then had to stand and fight enormous Soviet forces who at the points of contact outnumbered the Germans many times over in both men and equipment. The Soviets outnumbered the Germans ~2.5:1 in men and equipment. However where the Soviets chose to attack the ratio was increased many times over and often the Germans were ordered to stay and die. By the time they were allowed to or did without order retreat it was usually a route.