Originally Posted by Doppleganger

The Germans had two choices in September 1941, after the Battle of Kiev had been concluded:

1) Press on to Moscow and hope that the Red Army are almost finished and aren't able to replace their huge losses in the field
2) Form a defensive line using the Dnieper River as the basis and wait out the winter until spring

Clearly, the 2nd option allows the Red Army time and breathing space and also ensures that the current German initiative is lost. It is possible for the Germans to resist any Soviet counter-attacks and allow their forces to rest and refit and reestablish the initiative in Spring 1942. This is, in fact, what they did historically and in this scenario the Germans could do so again without having suffered the losses in Operation Typhoon. This is using the benefit of hindsight, of course.

With hindsight, pressing on for Moscow is a viable strategy if you believe your enemy is on its knees and almost finished. This is precisely what the Germans believed. Although the cautious Hitler wanted to go for Option 2 he was persuaded by his senior commanders that the Ostheer could capture Moscow and knock the Soviet Union out of the war. Without the benefit of hindsight (and with the knowledge that your enemy has recently suffered greater numerical losses than any other army in history) Option 1 seems like a gamble worth taking.

The importance of the Battle of Moscow is not a myth. It determined the eventual outcome of the war in the east. To say that this had already been determined in September is silly.

IMHO,the dies were already cast when on 30 september,Typhoon started,and the importance of Typhoon (battle of Moscow ) is a myth.
For Typhoon to be decisive,is needed
1)that Typhoon could succeed:that Moscow could fall :Moscow did not fall,and,even with hindsight,I don't see any chances for the Germans to succeed:between june and october,they could not eliminate the Soviet army,why should they be able to do it between october and december ?
2)that the success of Typhoon (elimination of the Soviet army-fall of Moscow,or both) would result in the collaps of the SU :
a)this is very unlikely
b)this has never been proved in any war game
My conviction is that after the fall of Moscow,at the end of november,the German advance would have stopped some miles east of Moscow,that during the winter a)there would be no fighting or b)there would be a Soviet winter offensive(without any success) and that in the spring the war would renew .

Originally Posted by lljadw

IMHO,the dies were already cast when on 30 september,Typhoon started,and the importance of Typhoon (battle of Moscow ) is a myth.
For Typhoon to be decisive,is needed
1)that Typhoon could succeed:that Moscow could fall :Moscow did not fall,and,even with hindsight,I don't see any chances for the Germans to succeed:between june and october,they could not eliminate the Soviet army,why should they be able to do it between october and december ?
2)that the success of Typhoon (elimination of the Soviet army-fall of Moscow,or both) would result in the collaps of the SU :
a)this is very unlikely
b)this has never been proved in any war game
My conviction is that after the fall of Moscow,at the end of november,the German advance would have stopped some miles east of Moscow,that during the winter a)there would be no fighting or b)there would be a Soviet winter offensive(without any success) and that in the spring the war would renew .

Well. Whether you believe Moscow is decisive or not depends on whether you believe the capture of it would end the war, or at least cause enough of a collapse so that the Soviet Union can no longer win. I think you underestimate the importance of Moscow, both as a political symbol and as a major communications hub.

about Moscow as a communications center f course,the loss of Moscow would be a big blow,but would it be decisive ? There is no proof for this assumption,unless some one would be able to calculate
a) what was the daily needs of the Red army,how much was passing via Moscow,how much could be replaced by other railroad centers. But,AFAICS,this had not be done .
b) about the influence of the fall of Moscow on the Soviet morale :we are here in the uncertainty:some will argue that the result would be desastrous,but I could argue that the fall of Moscow would stiffen the Soviet morale .For both possibilities,there are no proofs .
Last point :a lot of people are starting from the assumption that the Germans could capture Moscow,but that's very doubtfull:these people are forgetting conveniently,that on 1 december there was ,facing the Germans,a Soviet army of 6 million men .

Originally Posted by lljadw

about Moscow as a communications center f course,the loss of Moscow would be a big blow,but would it be decisive ? There is no proof for this assumption,unless some one would be able to calculate
a) what was the daily needs of the Red army,how much was passing via Moscow,how much could be replaced by other railroad centers. But,AFAICS,this had not be done .
b) about the influence of the fall of Moscow on the Soviet morale :we are here in the uncertainty:some will argue that the result would be desastrous,but I could argue that the fall of Moscow would stiffen the Soviet morale .For both possibilities,there are no proofs .
Last point :a lot of people are starting from the assumption that the Germans could capture Moscow,but that's very doubtfull:these people are forgetting conveniently,that on 1 december there was ,facing the Germans,a Soviet army of 6 million men .

Well, equally I can see that there's no proof that it wouldn't be decisive, so we're back to making assumptions and what you believe in. You cannot prove I am wrong as much as I cannot disprove you.

There wasn't 6 million Soviet soldiers in the Moscow area though, nothing like it.

If Ardenne had succeeded for Hitler I could have been the turning point in the wrong direction. The fact that it didnt means that was the most decisive battle and when combined with the followon Operation Varisity was the final blow to Germany.

The most important battlewas the battle of France. If the Germans had lost it, it would have been the suicide of Hitler and there had not been a world war at all.
I described the origins of the allied defeat in my book"1940 victoire-eclair" (lightning victory). I wrote that in French and there's quite a difference with all that has been written until now. You can find it on internet. European historians refuse even to read that. I trust that American historians are more open to something new.
Eric van den Bergh.

Originally Posted by willsrn2000

If Ardenne had succeeded for Hitler I could have been the turning point in the wrong direction. The fact that it didnt means that was the most decisive battle and when combined with the followon Operation Varisity was the final blow to Germany.

The Ardennes offensive was nothing special ,had no chance of success,and if it had some success,it would not prevent the Russian winteroffensive .And ,operation Varsity :it only was show and superfluous:the allied attack would succeed,Varsity or no Varsity .

Originally Posted by Eric van den Bergh

The most important battlewas the battle of France. If the Germans had lost it, it would have been the suicide of Hitler and there had not been a world war at all.
I described the origins of the allied defeat in my book"1940 victoire-eclair" (lightning victory). I wrote that in French and there's quite a difference with all that has been written until now. You can find it on internet. European historians refuse even to read that. I trust that American historians are more open to something new.
Eric van den Bergh.

After a rapid look,I must say :I am not impressed:a lot of things that are already known,and a,IMHO,totally wrong judgement of the French foreign policy between Locarno and 1939 .Why was the French foreign policy wrong ??
France had alliances with Poland and Romania to keep the SU out of Europe,with Poland and Czechoslovakia against Germany (=these two should help France if it was attacked by Germany,but NOT the opposite).
Whatever,when France took the decision to build the Maginotline,it no longer needed Poland and Czechoslovakia .Besides an alliance with Poland and Czechoslovakia was in contradiction with the silent alliance with Britain :the two were excluding each other .
IMHO,the French foreign policy was reasonable,although not without flaws:France was following to much Britain,an extenuating circonstance was that Britain was the only serious possible ally for France .

I think that the sinking of the Japanese submarine "MOMI ",kept the nazi navy from delivering nuclear weapons technology to the Empire of Japan ,along with other HIGH TECH weapons and expert engineering of new type torpedos, jet engines and plutonium, as well as submarine design and delivery capabilites ofdirty bomb type warfare on North America.

As far as I was concerned the most decisive battle 1935-1945 was that between Hitler and me. Lutwaffe got the house I was born in , and also got my next home with direct hits, but me and Churchill survived, against the odds. As I used to warn Hitler - it ain't over til it's over.

I'm still punching. - Thank God.

(Apologies for interupting serious discussion.)