Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
New York Post
October 5, 2008
Pg. 34
Books
What went wrong in the hunt for bin Laden
By Stephen Lynch
Kill Bin Laden. By Dalton Fury, St. Martin's Press
Taking cover behind a small earthen schoolhouse in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, a message crackles over a Delta Force unit radio: "Father is trying to break through the siege line." Adrenaline surges through the American special forces. It's December 10, 2001, the first - and, time would tell, the best - chance for "Father," Osama Bin Laden, to be killed by a small group of soldiers assigned to hunt down the Al Qaeda leader, bringing back "a cloudy photograph . . . a clump of hair . . . perhaps a severed finger wrapped in plastic."
In the gathering darkness of a valley, "the Jackal boys" - Hopper, Admiral and CIA agent Adam Khan (all pseudonyms) - had flushed out some Al Qaeda soldiers, with little help from a small contingent of mujahideen (or "muhj") allies.
The Jackals "moved another thirty meters toward the enemy machine gun in front of them. The muhj decided to stay put. Green tracers passed by the left side of the Americans and tore up the ground around the muhj. The Admiral keyed his hand mike to contact [the bomber] and . . . Adam Khan [lasered] the machine-gun nest. [But] thick cloud cover hampered the gunship, which would have to break the minimum safe altitude to drop low enough to engage the targets."
Lacking air support and soldiers, the Admiral makes the decision to retreat, and calmly gives the order over the radio, "Warpath. Warpath. Warpath."
For Delta Force commander Dalton Fury (also not his real name), author of the new insider's account "Kill Bin Laden" (St. Martin's Press), it's a hard decision not to aid the Jackals' retreat. But if the intelligence was right, and their attacks flushed out Father, the rest of the Delta Force had to jump at the chance. They rush through enemy territory to meet up with local warlord Hazret Ali, an Afghan ally who can guide them through the maze of mountains and tunnels.
Instead, Ali greets them warmly, jumps into his SUV and heads away from the fighting. After some confused translation, Fury realizes, "Ali's fighters were finished for the evening. They were all headed home to break their Ramadan fast. The muhj force that we thought had Bin Laden surrounded and trapped apparently had packed it in for the day and was hightailing it off the mountain in full retreat." Fury seemingly chose his pen name because it sounded like a Chuck Norris character, but it also describes his emotions toward the Tora Bora campaign. Though it ravaged Al Qaeda, he considers it a failed mission, because he agrees with intelligence reports that say Bin Laden escaped and is hiding in Northern Pakistan.
What went wrong? One, the US unwisely trusted Pakistan to patrol its border. Two, NATO allies objected to the use of "GATOR" mines, which are dropped from planes and could have sealed up the Tora Bora area. But mostly, Fury says the decision to let Afghan allies form "the tip of the spear" was the biggest mistake. "The idea worked like a charm when we faced a common foe, the oppressive Taliban . . . but they were fighting Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden . . . we might as well have been asking for them to fight the Almighty Prophet Mohammed himself." Bin Laden thought the US would invade Tora Bora with a large ground force, like the Soviets had, and cut and run at the first casualties, like in Mogadishu. Instead, Delta Force units dressed as Afghans were dispatched, assigned to advise and sometimes accompany Afghan forces, who were paid for their efforts. Fury describes a CIA agent bringing in a canvas bag of $250,000 in cash for Hazret Ali's services.
Though the special forces were itching to fight, Ali was worried one would be killed - and he would be blamed. In what will probably be a surprise to most readers, Fury says that in Tora Bora, "no Delta operator killed anyone other than dropping bombs on their heads. Some of the best snipers, explosives experts, and knife fighters in the world were forced to curb their enthusiasm because the Afghan muhj had to be in the forefront, and their hearts were not in it." Even the bombing wasn't perfect. When the CIA calls in a massive BLU-82 "daisy cutter" bomb, "either the terrain was read incorrectly or there was a typo in the coordinates there were sent; the bomb . . . was off by almost a thousand meters," Fury says.
Readers of "Kill Bin Laden" will be as frustrated as Fury, though he still manages a riveting tale. There are successful "Trojan Horse" missions to kidnap Al Qaeda informers, with Delta Force soldiers hidden in the false bottom of a truck. Tense moments with warlords who tell him, "you Americans cannot survive." Then there are the irresistible special forces guys themselves, with the handlebar mustaches, bail bondsman patches instead of insignias, who don't exit a truck, they "unass" it. And, if they screw up, they're always waiting for the mythical "Black Chinook" to come fly them away to special ops exile.
After the Dec. 10 assault, even without Ali's help, Fury and his men press on in the dark but can't find Bin Laden's unit. For the next week, they continue to call in bombing runs, while they monitor Bin Laden on the radio begging his soldiers to stay and fight. But the leader doesn't follow his own advice. On or about Dec. 16, 2001, he slips into Pakistan, perhaps with the help of a warlord, perhaps dressed in a burka . . . no one knows for sure.
Of course, at the time, Bin Laden's fate was unknown, and special units were dispatched to Al Qaeda cemeteries in Tora Bora to test DNA, and officials even considered dynamiting open caves buried by American bombs. Fury held out hope that Bin Laden's grave will be found until the terrorist released a videotape in October 2004.
"I knew immediately that the tape was the real thing. Unfortunately, the man was still alive. Leaving the back door open gave the rat a chance to run."
October 5, 2008
Pg. 34
Books
What went wrong in the hunt for bin Laden
By Stephen Lynch
Kill Bin Laden. By Dalton Fury, St. Martin's Press
Taking cover behind a small earthen schoolhouse in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, a message crackles over a Delta Force unit radio: "Father is trying to break through the siege line." Adrenaline surges through the American special forces. It's December 10, 2001, the first - and, time would tell, the best - chance for "Father," Osama Bin Laden, to be killed by a small group of soldiers assigned to hunt down the Al Qaeda leader, bringing back "a cloudy photograph . . . a clump of hair . . . perhaps a severed finger wrapped in plastic."
In the gathering darkness of a valley, "the Jackal boys" - Hopper, Admiral and CIA agent Adam Khan (all pseudonyms) - had flushed out some Al Qaeda soldiers, with little help from a small contingent of mujahideen (or "muhj") allies.
The Jackals "moved another thirty meters toward the enemy machine gun in front of them. The muhj decided to stay put. Green tracers passed by the left side of the Americans and tore up the ground around the muhj. The Admiral keyed his hand mike to contact [the bomber] and . . . Adam Khan [lasered] the machine-gun nest. [But] thick cloud cover hampered the gunship, which would have to break the minimum safe altitude to drop low enough to engage the targets."
Lacking air support and soldiers, the Admiral makes the decision to retreat, and calmly gives the order over the radio, "Warpath. Warpath. Warpath."
For Delta Force commander Dalton Fury (also not his real name), author of the new insider's account "Kill Bin Laden" (St. Martin's Press), it's a hard decision not to aid the Jackals' retreat. But if the intelligence was right, and their attacks flushed out Father, the rest of the Delta Force had to jump at the chance. They rush through enemy territory to meet up with local warlord Hazret Ali, an Afghan ally who can guide them through the maze of mountains and tunnels.
Instead, Ali greets them warmly, jumps into his SUV and heads away from the fighting. After some confused translation, Fury realizes, "Ali's fighters were finished for the evening. They were all headed home to break their Ramadan fast. The muhj force that we thought had Bin Laden surrounded and trapped apparently had packed it in for the day and was hightailing it off the mountain in full retreat." Fury seemingly chose his pen name because it sounded like a Chuck Norris character, but it also describes his emotions toward the Tora Bora campaign. Though it ravaged Al Qaeda, he considers it a failed mission, because he agrees with intelligence reports that say Bin Laden escaped and is hiding in Northern Pakistan.
What went wrong? One, the US unwisely trusted Pakistan to patrol its border. Two, NATO allies objected to the use of "GATOR" mines, which are dropped from planes and could have sealed up the Tora Bora area. But mostly, Fury says the decision to let Afghan allies form "the tip of the spear" was the biggest mistake. "The idea worked like a charm when we faced a common foe, the oppressive Taliban . . . but they were fighting Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden . . . we might as well have been asking for them to fight the Almighty Prophet Mohammed himself." Bin Laden thought the US would invade Tora Bora with a large ground force, like the Soviets had, and cut and run at the first casualties, like in Mogadishu. Instead, Delta Force units dressed as Afghans were dispatched, assigned to advise and sometimes accompany Afghan forces, who were paid for their efforts. Fury describes a CIA agent bringing in a canvas bag of $250,000 in cash for Hazret Ali's services.
Though the special forces were itching to fight, Ali was worried one would be killed - and he would be blamed. In what will probably be a surprise to most readers, Fury says that in Tora Bora, "no Delta operator killed anyone other than dropping bombs on their heads. Some of the best snipers, explosives experts, and knife fighters in the world were forced to curb their enthusiasm because the Afghan muhj had to be in the forefront, and their hearts were not in it." Even the bombing wasn't perfect. When the CIA calls in a massive BLU-82 "daisy cutter" bomb, "either the terrain was read incorrectly or there was a typo in the coordinates there were sent; the bomb . . . was off by almost a thousand meters," Fury says.
Readers of "Kill Bin Laden" will be as frustrated as Fury, though he still manages a riveting tale. There are successful "Trojan Horse" missions to kidnap Al Qaeda informers, with Delta Force soldiers hidden in the false bottom of a truck. Tense moments with warlords who tell him, "you Americans cannot survive." Then there are the irresistible special forces guys themselves, with the handlebar mustaches, bail bondsman patches instead of insignias, who don't exit a truck, they "unass" it. And, if they screw up, they're always waiting for the mythical "Black Chinook" to come fly them away to special ops exile.
After the Dec. 10 assault, even without Ali's help, Fury and his men press on in the dark but can't find Bin Laden's unit. For the next week, they continue to call in bombing runs, while they monitor Bin Laden on the radio begging his soldiers to stay and fight. But the leader doesn't follow his own advice. On or about Dec. 16, 2001, he slips into Pakistan, perhaps with the help of a warlord, perhaps dressed in a burka . . . no one knows for sure.
Of course, at the time, Bin Laden's fate was unknown, and special units were dispatched to Al Qaeda cemeteries in Tora Bora to test DNA, and officials even considered dynamiting open caves buried by American bombs. Fury held out hope that Bin Laden's grave will be found until the terrorist released a videotape in October 2004.
"I knew immediately that the tape was the real thing. Unfortunately, the man was still alive. Leaving the back door open gave the rat a chance to run."