Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Washington Examiner
September 18, 2007 By Rowan Scarborough, National Security Correspondent
WASHINGTON -- The number of top generals willing to admit mistakes in planning for post-Saddam Hussein Iraq is increasing.
The most recent mea culpa came right from the top — Marine Gen. Peter Pace, the outgoing Joint Chiefs chairman, who last week gave his most extensive answer to the question of what he would have done differently in 2003.
At the time, Pace was vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs and had a front-row seat in war planning sessions at the Pentagon with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
“One of the mistakes I made in my assumptions going in was that the Iraqi people and the Iraqi army would welcome liberation, that the Iraqi army, given the opportunity, would stand together for the Iraqi people and be available to them to help serve the new nation,” Pace said.
He said the Iraqi army more or less “disintegrated.” The Bush administration made a much-criticized decision in 2003 to disband the army rather than reorganize it, beginning the long process of building a new force from scratch.
Pace said if he could have foresaw the Iraqi army’s lack of cooperation, “I probably would have made a different recommendation about the total size force going in.”
There is a consensus among Democrats, Republicans and military experts in Washington that Rumsfeld, his advisers and generals botched the post-war plan.
For one, there were too few troops to safeguard government buildings, arsenals and neighborhoods.
Retired Army Gen. John Abizaid worked closely with Rumsfeld at the Pentagon as director of the Joint Staff. He eventually became chief of U.S. Central Command during the the insurgency’s rise.
Asked at a 2006 hearing if Gen. Eric Shinseki, then the Army chief, was right in calling for more than 300,000 troops in Iraq, Abizaid said, “General Shinseki was right that a greater international force contribution, U.S. force contribution and Iraqi force contribution should have been available immediately after major combat operations.”
Army Gen. David Petraeus, the top commander in Iraq, was not a Rumsfeld confidante during 2003 war planning, but he did command the 101st Airborne Division in the initial invasion and occupation.
In a run-up to his January Senate confirmation hearing, Petraeus provided an extensive list of the military’s biggest mistakes.
“There were a number of assumptions and assessments that did not bear out,” he told the committee. “Prominent among them was the assumption that Iraqis would remain in their barracks and ministry facilities would resume their functions as soon as interim government structures were in place. That obviously did not transpire.”
September 18, 2007 By Rowan Scarborough, National Security Correspondent
WASHINGTON -- The number of top generals willing to admit mistakes in planning for post-Saddam Hussein Iraq is increasing.
The most recent mea culpa came right from the top — Marine Gen. Peter Pace, the outgoing Joint Chiefs chairman, who last week gave his most extensive answer to the question of what he would have done differently in 2003.
At the time, Pace was vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs and had a front-row seat in war planning sessions at the Pentagon with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
“One of the mistakes I made in my assumptions going in was that the Iraqi people and the Iraqi army would welcome liberation, that the Iraqi army, given the opportunity, would stand together for the Iraqi people and be available to them to help serve the new nation,” Pace said.
He said the Iraqi army more or less “disintegrated.” The Bush administration made a much-criticized decision in 2003 to disband the army rather than reorganize it, beginning the long process of building a new force from scratch.
Pace said if he could have foresaw the Iraqi army’s lack of cooperation, “I probably would have made a different recommendation about the total size force going in.”
There is a consensus among Democrats, Republicans and military experts in Washington that Rumsfeld, his advisers and generals botched the post-war plan.
For one, there were too few troops to safeguard government buildings, arsenals and neighborhoods.
Retired Army Gen. John Abizaid worked closely with Rumsfeld at the Pentagon as director of the Joint Staff. He eventually became chief of U.S. Central Command during the the insurgency’s rise.
Asked at a 2006 hearing if Gen. Eric Shinseki, then the Army chief, was right in calling for more than 300,000 troops in Iraq, Abizaid said, “General Shinseki was right that a greater international force contribution, U.S. force contribution and Iraqi force contribution should have been available immediately after major combat operations.”
Army Gen. David Petraeus, the top commander in Iraq, was not a Rumsfeld confidante during 2003 war planning, but he did command the 101st Airborne Division in the initial invasion and occupation.
In a run-up to his January Senate confirmation hearing, Petraeus provided an extensive list of the military’s biggest mistakes.
“There were a number of assumptions and assessments that did not bear out,” he told the committee. “Prominent among them was the assumption that Iraqis would remain in their barracks and ministry facilities would resume their functions as soon as interim government structures were in place. That obviously did not transpire.”