Monitoring China's Meddling

[bulldogg]

Monitoring China's meddling
By Tom Donnelly

American strategists have, since the end of the Cold War, been a day late and a dollar short in appreciating the change in relations with the People's Republic of China. The first presumption was that, since Beijing had been regarded an ally of convenience against Moscow — the old "triangular diplomacy" was often ranked as Henry Kissinger's most subtle and successful bit of statecraft — that a "strategic partnership" would continue. This attitude took deeper root during the Clinton years, when "geoeconomics" was to have supplanted geopolitics. The world would remain peaceful because people now preferred wealth to power.

And so when China began to use its newfound wealth to buy Russian hardware at bargain-basement prices and to put its own ballistic and cruise missile programs on steroids, few paid attention. Those who did were mocked as warmongers intent on "turning China into a threat." Even the missile "blockades" of Taiwan in 1995 and 1996 were pooh-poohed.

Having now discovered the extent and duration of the Chinese conventional military buildup, and translated a goodly body of People's Liberation Army writings about cyberwar and similar "transformational" and futuristic imaginings, we seem to be missing the more mundane and likely more provocative aspects of China's "rise." Obsessing about the Taiwan Strait situation — the Fulda Gap of the 21st century — we miss the role Beijing is adopting as Third World "spoiler" of the American Imperium. Just as France was unwilling or unable to challenge Great Britain in every corner of the globe but delighted in twisting the British lion's tail whenever and wherever possible, China cannot seem to resist playing footsie with a variety of rogue regimes.

On the theory that it must be true if the Council on Foreign Relations — the keeper of the flame of conventional wisdom among America's foreign policy elites — says so, this month's Must Reads come from two CFR sources. Both deal indirectly, but tellingly, with the issue of China's out-of-area meddling. One is a monograph, "More than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach toward Africa"; the other is a piece in the January-February issue of Foreign Affairs, the gray eminence of policy journals published by the council. Peter Hakim's article, "Is Washington Losing Latin America?," suggests that the "China card," as Kissinger put it, is being played against the United States.

Begin with the monograph. "More than Humanitarianism" is a welcome call to American policy-makers to take Africa seriously in a strategic sense, to see it as a "normal" continent rather than through the lenses of our own domestic and racial politics or simply as a collection of peoples to be pitied. Naturally, it is hedged in the traditional CFR way, pulling most of its punches in recommending changes to U.S. policy. Indeed, several members of the study task force make this point in additional and dissenting views. Brookings Institution military expert Michael O'Hanlon chastises his colleagues for being "insufficiently precise and bold in what we should do" about the Darfur genocide, for example.

But the report also reflects CFR's great strength in that its reporting on China's various activities in Africa is quite thorough, given the space limitations of such a report and its broader focus on Africa policy. So, when the council says, "All across Africa today, China is acquiring control of natural resource assets, outbidding Western contractors on major infrastructure projects and providing soft loans and other incentives to bolster its competitive advantages," it's a pretty safe bet that this pattern is indisputable. And the report's conclusion that it is "most disturbing to U.S. political objectives" that China is willing "to use its seat on the UN Security Council to protect some of Africa's most egregious regimes from international sanction, in particular Sudan and Zimbabwe" is an understatement.

The report also goes beyond these relatively well-known Chinese actions. For example, it describes the "anarchic logging" practices of Chinese lumber companies. This is a political as well as an environmental problem: "China was a major importer of Liberian lumber during Charles Taylor's rule," the report says. "Taylor, who has since been indicted by the UN court in Sierra Leone for financing and fostering that country's brutal civil war" — Taylor's regional provocations sparked a response by U.S. forces in 2003 — "relied heavily on timber resources to support his own military efforts and to fund mercenaries in both Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast."

Hakim's piece on political trends in Latin America is premised on the observation that, since Sept. 11, the Bush administration — which came to office promising a new emphasis on the region — has had its attention diverted to the Middle East. Yet, he also observes that American neglect has opened a door the Chinese already had begun to knock upon.

"China's interest in Latin America is significant and expanding," he writes. "The region has become a vital source of raw materials and foodstuffs for China." Chinese imports from the region have risen 60 percent per year in the past six years. Chinese leader Hu Jintao has visited the region twice in the past two years, and Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and Bolivia's Evo Morales — the poster children of the new Latin left — have embraced Beijing as at least a rhetorical alternative to American imperialism. Even Brazilian President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva, a more moderate leftist in a more stable country, has spoken of a strategic relationship with China.

It will be awhile before the CFR and other mandarins of American strategy can bring themselves to contemplate that China's global economic presence is matched by a global geopolitical influence. And it probably will be longer still before we dare to speak of the problems that might cause. In the meantime, it's still possible to find Must Reading on China buried under the headlines of reports and articles that are intended to describe the festering problems of the world's poorest countries. Keep particular watch, in an appropriately paranoid spirit, on those places plagued by weak governments but endowed with natural resources.

The recent trouble in the Solomon Islands and now in Tonga are a result of a China VS Taiwan cold war that is being waged with checkbooks throughout the Pacific and SE Asia.

 

[bulldogg]

Rising star
What does China's economy mean for U.S. strategy?
By Dan Blumenthal

Did you know that 220 billion text messages were sent over mobile phones in China last year? Or that one in 10 American jobs is at risk of being outsourced to the People's Republic? And how about the fact that China in 2003 consumed a quarter of the aluminum and steel produced in the world, a third of its iron ore, approximately 40 percent of its cement and half of its pork? Or that the Chinese sex industry alone needs 1 billion condoms a year? If these and other factoids of the "China is taking over the world" variety seize your imagination, you are in luck. Among the many spillover effects of the PRC's staggering growth has been the rise of a cottage industry of commentators eager to describe its epochal, earth-shaking significance to you. The bad news is that many of these same efforts to delve into the intersection of economics and strategy have been hobbled by the tendency of economists and strategists to talk straight past each other, especially when it comes to China. A raft of recent publications has attempted to break through this dialogue of the deaf — some with considerably more success than others.

Begin with Ted C. Fishman's new book, "China, Inc.: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America and the World." Fishman brims with confidence as he breathlessly reels off statistics to prove that Beijing "can spend, it can bully, it can hire, it can throw old-line competitors out of work." The rise of China, Fishman insists, "changes the way everyone does business."

Fishman does a reasonably good job detailing Beijing's ability to set prices across a range of industries, which he attributes to its vast, cheap labor force and economies of scale. He interviews small- and medium-sized manufacturers across America's heartland and paints a vivid picture of the problems China presents to these firms.

Yet, as Fishman devotes page after page to cataloging the threat posed by the Chinese industrial goliath, his warnings can't help but begin to sound a bit shrill. Any economist worth his salt will tell you that America's trade with China and the PRC's growing domestic market will improve the lot of a great majority of Americans. Higher-paying jobs replace those lost as each country focuses on its respective comparative advantage. Even a non-economist knows that a job gained in China does not necessarily mean a job lost in America.

Worse yet, a security or military specialist reading "China, Inc." is left wondering what exactly, besides enhanced competition in manufacturing, Chinese economic growth means for U.S. strategy. Fishman doesn't offer much by way of analysis here until near the end of his book. In particular, his assessment of Chinese-European relations is off the mark in important respects, as he relies too heavily on the work of Sinologist David Shambaugh, who believes that the Beijing-Brussels worldview is coming together.

While it is true that Beijing tries to play European and American commercial interests against each other to achieve political aims (getting the European Union to lift its arms embargo, for example), a strategic convergence is not in the cards, and Fishman himself describes why: China is still very much interested in the unilateral, muscle-flexing type of great power that Europe is now allergic to.

Indeed, as Fishman notes, China's "rapid economic ascendancy is transforming its military into a richer, better equipped, technologically improved fighting force and is also giving the country the ever greater clout in shaping its strategic relations with other nations." Likewise, "on the Taiwan issue China's rhetoric on the use of force is unambiguous." No signs of post-historical multilateralism here.

What Fishman grasps correctly is that it is getting increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to separate economics and politics in China. The oft-used term, "China's rise," refers not only to the country's staggering growth rates, but the resilience of its one-party dictatorship, the growing confidence of its global diplomacy, and the progress of its military buildup and modernization. The concern caused by these latter three phenomena is inseparable from the expanding economic strength underpinning them.

But it isn't just raw wealth that is moving to China. The crown jewels of American industry — Motorola, Intel, Microsoft — are investing heavily in research and development (R&D) and co-production, helping Beijing to build a world-class communications infrastructure and information technology industry. And it is these commercial technologies, to a much greater extent than generally appreciated, that are being leveraged to form the backbone of China's modern, networked military force.

While it might lack the journalistic verve of "China, Inc.," the 2005 report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission provides much-needed analysis of the linkages between China's investments in science and technology and its geopolitical aspirations. The so-called National High Technology Research and Development Program, the report notes, "was initiated in 1986 as the guiding ideology to focus national policy on key scientific areas to develop technology and ultimately build national power and military strength." For Beijing, in other words, high-tech production has long been linked to its international strategic position.

The commission points to a trend in China whereby the marketplace has become just as effective a tool of technological acquisition and development as government-directed research. China now has more than 700 foreign-owned R&D centers and is making great strides in developing indigenous high-tech firms that are globally competitive. Beijing's focus here is integrated circuitry and software production. While companies such as Intel have tried to protect proprietary information about their most advanced products, they have discovered that China may have already developed a microprocessor as fast as the Pentium II.

A new book published by the Rand Corp., "A New Direction for China's Defense Industry," takes a deeper, if narrower, look at why exactly this matters for American security. Since observing the devastating effectiveness of the American military in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been enamored of what until recently was called the Revolution in Military Affairs — the leveraging of digital and information technology to make a military force better networked and more joint, collapsing the time it takes to sense, track, target, and shoot, and increasing the lethality and precision of its attacks. This has led Beijing to embark on an ambitious program of strategic military modernization, focused in the short term on precision targeting, information warfare, and C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance).

According to the Rand researchers, the PLA is successfully executing "the wholesale shift to digital, secure communications via fiber optic cable, satellite, microwave, and encrypted high-frequency radio." The secret of its success, Rand argues, is an approach it terms "the digital triangle" — an alliance among China's booming commercial information technology companies, the state R&D infrastructure and the military. Under the digital triangle, private Chinese companies such as Huawei are designated "national champions," allowing them to receive lines of credit from state banks as well as funding and staff from the military and state research institutions. The military, in turn, benefits as a favored customer and research partner. National champions also enjoy "infusions of near state-of-the-art foreign technology, thanks to the irresistible siren song of China's huge information technology (IT) market, which encourages foreign companies to transfer cutting edge technology for the promise of market access." Among the main foreign partners of Huawei, for instance, are Motorola, IBM, Intel, Altera, Agere, Sun, Microsoft, Texas Instruments and NEC.

continued...

 

[bulldogg]

The linchpin that companies such as Huawei form between foreign firms on the one hand and the Chinese military and state R&D institutes on the other is an example of what the Rand authors characterize as China's new approach to weapons building: "civilianization," or the use of civilian entities to conduct military research. According to the Rand researchers, the tripartite arrangement has proved mutually beneficial to the PLA's C4ISR program and the country's commercial IT sector: "While it is true that the Chinese IT industry is commercially oriented, the research and financial apparatus underlying its success derives significantly from state research and development institutes, including those affiliated with the defense industry and military units. In this sense, the information-technology sector, particularly those firms supplying finished C4ISR and related products to the PLA could be seen as a new defense-industrial sector in China ... ."

Fishman likewise observes in "China, Inc." that Motorola, Intel, Mitsui and some of the world's other leading research-driven companies have set up development centers in Chinese cities like Chengdu, and that foreign investors have pledged or invested $15 billion in new semiconductor factories there. But what troubles him is less the strategic implications of these investments than their potential to exert downward pressure on the price of the global microchip market.

Thankfully, not everyone is so myopic. Pentagon official Lisa Bronson has publicly identified the connection between China's growing microelectronics industry and its production of the kind of advanced phased array radars that causes headaches for U.S. Air Force planners. For that matter, there may be no causal link between the terminal guidance capabilities of Chinese DF-31 ballistic missiles and foreign investment in the PRC's semiconductor industry, but it is no coincidence that the PLA seeks state-of-the-art integrated circuit technology to improve its radars, sensors and precision munitions. This is not to say that the conversion of civilian technologies to military uses is a trivial matter. And because China's progress in science and technology is the result less of indigenous innovation than of technology transfers, Beijing is faced with some unique strategic vulnerabilities. But because the PRC's defense expenditures are so opaque, it is difficult to get a sense of how much China is spending on R&D — and thus, just how devoted it is to closing the technology gap between the PLA and the Pentagon. This uncertainty has the unfortunate, but predictable, consequence of polarizing U.S. attitudes, which tend to oscillate between a sense of complacency about high-tech trade and hysteria each time Beijing buys into a U.S. company that manufactures sensitive technology. Security specialists want to know if the sale of IBM to Lenovo threatens American security. Economists want to know what all the fuss is about.

Despite the many obstacles to finding clear answers at the bloody crossroads of trade and security, the Rand researchers draw some compelling conclusions. First, they note that the PLA's use of commercial off-the-shelf technologies has already rewarded it with quick strategic dividends, such as the expansion of its fiber-optic networks. Second, they argue that the increasing sophistication of Chinese commercial semiconductor manufacturing facilities "provides the base production capacity necessary for the military to implement design ideas in a secure, domestic environment." Given Chinese reliance on technology transfers to develop expertise in both of these fields, it seems fair to conclude that foreign companies have provided a lift to at least some of the PLA's top goals.

An analyst contrasting the sheer amount that the United States spends on R&D and its defense budget with that of the PRC may be tempted to dismiss concerns about Beijing's military as paranoia. Total Chinese R&D expenditures are, after all, less than a quarter of America's, and even assuming the U.S. government's most liberal assessment of Chinese defense spending — roughly $80 billion a year — it remains minuscule next to the over-$400 billion the Pentagon enjoys. But from a strategic perspective, the right analytical framework is not how soon the PLA will close the technological or spending gap with the United States, but what kind of asymmetric challenges it can pose to a technology-reliant American military. PLA capabilities that degrade the American military's information network, hold regional air bases at risk or blind U.S. satellites have the potential to greatly complicate America's strategic tasks.

One of the rare "bilingual" sinologists — i.e., someone able to speak both about economics and security — is Harvard professor Dwight Perkins. His chapter in the latest volume of Strategic Asia, the always informative, annual publication of the National Bureau of Asian Research, examines the complex interplay between China's economic and military conditions.

Perkins does here what the Fishmans of the world do not: He acknowledges the vast problems that the Chinese economy faces. From a troubled banking system saddled with nonperforming loans made for political purposes (proof again of the difficulty in separating politics and economics in China) to the massive migration of rural workers to the cities, China's long-term growth is far from preordained. That being said, barring external or internal shocks, Perkins argues that it is reasonable to expect China to maintain an annual growth of 7 percent over the next decade thanks to solid capital, labor and exports markets.

Perkins then conducts a sophisticated analysis of what this growth means for China's military, essentially confirming projections made by the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment in the late 1990s. China, he notes, has foreign exchange earnings clearing $600 billion per year (exports plus foreign direct investment), which have enabled it to purchase up to $10 billion of foreign military equipment per year — half of that amount from overseas. The bottom line? If China continues to grow at 7 percent, Beijing will be able to accelerate its military buildup without damaging growth in gross domestic product (GDP). In fact, Perkins argues, China could spend up to 6 percent of GDP per year and barely affect its underlying economic strength. Perkins concludes that beyond prohibiting the sale of technology with military applications by either Washington or Europe, there is little America can do to slow the growth of the Chinese military.

This conclusion appears both troubling and realistic. As it is becoming more difficult to draw the exact boundaries between civilian technologies and military applications, it is evident that a sound scientific and technological base is the ingredient for military power. And China — with the help of the United States, Japan and the European Union — is developing just such a capability.

America thus faces a challenge today it has not confronted in over a century: strategic competition with a country that is economically and technologically dynamic and with which it is also deeply interconnected economically. The challenge for Washington is therefore to maintain strategic pre-eminence without needlessly harming the most advanced sectors of its economy or causing a protectionist backlash.

In the near term, one can expect more heated debates about China's purchase of American companies, as well as more dust-ups with Europe about the sale of dual-use technology to Beijing. It will take time — or in the worst case, a crisis — for America to sort out its China policy. But ultimately, if the United States is to develop a coherent set of policies toward China, it will require that the dialogue of the deaf between economists and strategists should end.

It is also not outside of China's bag of tricks to foment, arm and sustain an insurgency, just ask Nepal.

 

[ASTRALdragon]

Good read, bulldogg. This is why I am all for reforming the UN Security Council. The current positions are a relic of WWII. Today, there are a few other countries that deserve veto-toting spots on the UNSC: Japan and Germany to name a few plus an African nation to represent the whole bloc.

 

[Missileer]

So only Tom Donnelly and myself "got it" about Communist China for years?

 

[5.56X45mm]

Been telling folks for a while that the Devil himself has a "Made in China" sticker on his ass.

 

[jequirity]

C'mon China!

 

[bulldogg]

What the :cen: is that supposed to mean?? You cannot seriously be rooting for the most oppressive regime since Stalin to supplant the USA? Come for a visit and let me enlighten you as to what you are advocating come witness it firsthand.

 

[jequirity]

I respect China for the savvy and rational factor, its an upcoming nation with plenty of potential.

 

[bulldogg]

We found Chamberlain.

 

[jequirity]

So because i disagree with yourself I can be compared to a man who is mostly only remembered by "appeasing" nazis. I don't think the chinese have been going around annexing austria, invading czechoslovakia and poland. Nor have they been initiating a final solution.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neville_Chamberlain

Have a wee read on wiki mate, yes he did try to resolve things through diplomacy mostly and failed and for that he messed up big time. He is not however the sole reason why germany marched across most of europe and he did lay the ground work for the defence of Britain that would ultimately see the country through the war.

Back on topic though:

Go China!

 

[MontyB]

So only Tom Donnelly and myself "got it" about Communist China for years?

How so?
It looks to me like China is doing nothing more than Russia or the USA did to attain superpower status. I can certainly understand the fear of losing top dog status but I think it somewhat unrealistic to expect China to remain a bit part player just to appease another nations sensitivities.

 

[Missileer]

How so?
It looks to me like China is doing nothing more than Russia or the USA did to attain superpower status. I can certainly understand the fear of losing top dog status but I think it somewhat unrealistic to expect China to remain a bit part player just to appease another nations sensitivities.

Actually, I don't trust any Communist Nation and the bigger and more powerful they become, the less I trust them. The whole idea of true Communism has never worked on it's own and the last thing the World needs now is expansionism backed up by multi-megaton nuclear weapons. China has never been a haven of rest for dissidents and has shown no mercy when confronted by such.

 

[ASTRALdragon]

So because i disagree with yourself I can be compared to a man who is mostly only remembered by "appeasing" nazis. I don't think the chinese have been going around annexing austria, invading czechoslovakia and poland. Nor have they been initiating a final solution.

Hmm different era but today it would be comparable to China imposing its will over Taiwan, Tibet, and buying out the short-term relationships with various African and Latin American countries for face support. Why is it that only China's neighbors are concerned for their safety at an alarming rise in China's military buildup unlike America's neighbors who have witnessed America's military buildup for the last century and have not felt threatened? Last time I checked with the Asian summit Bush attended about 2 weeks ago, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and several other Asian countries were expressing their concern to America about China's dramatic and unnecessary military buildup and hoping that America would remain a major player in the region to offset China's power. It wasn't Canada, Mexico, the Bahamas, Greenland, and the other nations surrounding the U.S. complaining that the U.S. was going to invade them.

 

[MontyB]

Actually, I don't trust any Communist Nation and the bigger and more powerful they become, the less I trust them. The whole idea of true Communism has never worked on it's own and the last thing the World needs now is expansionism backed up by multi-megaton nuclear weapons. China has never been a haven of rest for dissidents and has shown no mercy when confronted by such.

I certainly agree but what it boils down to is that no one is going to stop a nation with the resources and population of China from becoming a super power once they have their minds set on it. I also don't think its an entirely bad idea to have another super power simply to keep the one we have now in check.

 

[Missileer]

I certainly agree but what it boils down to is that no one is going to stop a nation with the resources and population of China from becoming a super power once they have their minds set on it. I also don't think its an entirely bad idea to have another super power simply to keep the one we have now in check.

I think there are more Countries approaching super power status every year. China is just better funded than most. Remember, an alliance can also be a super power, this is a different World than the Cold War era where there were two super powers.

 

[MontyB]

I think there are more Countries approaching super power status every year. China is just better funded than most. Remember, an alliance can also be a super power, this is a different World than the Cold War era where there were two super powers.

Agreed however I would think that it is highly unlikely super powers will ever be in an alliance unless you have more than two and even then I would suspect out of convenience more than friendship, its just not human nature to share power.

 

[jequirity]

What it comes down to is that neither china nor the rest of the world want any serious confrontation due to the fact that china is big business for the world and the world big business for china. More and more asian countries are trading more with china than ever and any war would just be uneconomical and not advantageous to any country. China knows this, the whole world knows this.
There is going to be more of a super power balance which is going to be refreshing again.

 

[bulldogg]

One, wikipedia is blocked in China, which in and of itself should be most instructive as to what the future holds should your hero nation gain supremacy.

Two, I live here so I am painfully aware of what China values and it is NOT business or money. The legitimacy of this government is based solely on re-claiming all lands in Asia once ruled by China. Achieving this aim even at the expense of the economy is the reality of the situation. Again, I invite you to quit the armchair general approach and come hither for a visit. The Chinese worldview is far removed from that of western societies. It is a grave and serious error to try and understand China and its intentions without a full appreciation and knowledge of Chinese "logic".

Three, China has annexed parts of India, Tibet, Xinjiang and is amassing the force and technology to annex Taiwan. None of the peoples in these regions wish to be apart of China. Recent polls proffered by the Chinese are the result of a gentrification pogrom which dispersed local populations and replaced them with loyal party member Han chinese families. Very much like Stalins pogrom in Chechnya.

Four, you didn't live through the Cold War so your comments about a renewed one being refreshing are bollocks and the voice of a sophomore in the classic meaning of the word.

Five, it would serve you well to educate yourself as to the reality of the situation instead of the rosy colored state sponsored propaganda being spoonfed to the Scottish people by your current PM's agenda of selling out Scotland to the Chinese because of an overdeveloped sense of guilt from plundering of millions of pounds from the Chinese in days gone by.

 

[ASTRALdragon]

What it comes down to is that neither china nor the rest of the world want any serious confrontation due to the fact that china is big business for the world and the world big business for china. More and more asian countries are trading more with china than ever and any war would just be uneconomical and not advantageous to any country. China knows this, the whole world knows this.
There is going to be more of a super power balance which is going to be refreshing again.

China may not want a confrontation right now but when they have all the military weapons/technology they want along with the economic resources, you can bet they're going to go on a rampage. Why else would they be spending almost 6% of their GDP on the military when their rural citizens are poor farmers revolting every chance they get? More and more countries are trading with China because they have cheap labor. They have hundreds of millions of workers willing to work for anything. But more and more nations are realizing at how China is cheapshotting them with the unfair currency value. There are many other countries the world can revert to for cheap labor but China is just convenient at the moment.

I think the EU would be a better candidate for a superpower balance to the US. The only thing the EU must achieve to attain this goal would be to overcome their petty differences (i.e. official EU language, currency, government, bureaucrats, etc.). You also forgot to mention that more and more Asian countries feel threatened by China's military spending. A nation isn't going to the best of trading partners if one party feels threatened by another.