Military Theories

I3BrigPvSk

The Viking
I got an idea to test the military theories on historical battles to see if the theories can explain how military commanders were thinking prior the battles. To analyze the entire Second World War through the theories can be too much, but we can take few battles.

D-Day and Liddell Hart's theory about the indirect approach instead of the direct approach? Is the indirect approach applicable to the Operation Overlord?

What about if we test the indirect approach on the Falklands war?

Or on the dual Gulf Wars?

Can Liddell Hart's theory be applicable for the battles or shall we use Clausewitz or Jomini theories to explain how the commanders were thinking prior the battle, during the battle, and if the different military theories have any significance for the commanders at all
 
Overlord was indirect being they had decided the direct assault on harbor cities wasn't the way to go after the Dieppe Raid was such a failure, and not going to Calais. In hind sight they should have skipped Omaha Beach and put those troops elsewhere.
 
Liddell Hart's indirect approach also included a psychological part. The Operation Fortitude fooled the Germans to think the major attack would occur at Calais.

I would say the Soviets followed the indirect approach when they trapped the 6th army in Stalingrad.
 
Liddell Hart's indirect approach also included a psychological part. The Operation Fortitude fooled the Germans to think the major attack would occur at Calais.

I would say the Soviets followed the indirect approach when they trapped the 6th army in Stalingrad.
In the US Civil War the strategy was to attack the enemy's strongest position. If you break that the rest falls easily. By WWII the strategy had changed to attacking weaker sections. The strategy of "leap frogging" developed in the Pacific was the 1st to bypass enemy troops and isolate them vs destroying them was new.
 
In the US Civil War the strategy was to attack the enemy's strongest position. If you break that the rest falls easily. By WWII the strategy had changed to attacking weaker sections. The strategy of "leap frogging" developed in the Pacific was the 1st to bypass enemy troops and isolate them vs destroying them was new.

The US military was influenced a lot by Jomini during the 19th century. Dennis Hart Mahan developed Jomini's theories to be more applicable to the American context, Mahan was an influential military theorist, but maybe not so famous outside the US. His son, a naval officer was influential in the development of naval strategies.

Jomini had geometrical approach to warfare and so did the older Mahan and the fighting during the US Civil War indicate of the Jomini and Mahan approach with head on attacks with the exception of Sherman's March. His offensive through Georgia ruptured the Confederates lines of communication and supplies. I can view it as an indirect approach, but Liddell Hart was from the dual world wars and to use a theory from much later can be problematic.

The Pacific theatre of war can be viewed as an indirect approach on the strategic level. The campaign I raise some questions about is the decision to capture Peleliu
 
In hind sight Peleliu should have been by-passed. Grant's Vicksburg Campaign is considered a text in maneuver warfare.
 
Clausewitz and Jomini were both influenced by the Napoleonic wars and even if there were some differences between their perceptions of war. Not much changed in the military mind after the wars. The European faced another major conflict during the Crimean War and later the Franco-Prussian War. The military MO didn't change much during these two conflicts.

Mahan and other US officers were influenced by the US Civil War, did they change the MO during the Spanish-American War?
 
Don't think so. Basic strategy, defeated the enemy fleets, then landed and captured Santiago de Cuba and Manilla.
 
Don't think so. Basic strategy, defeated the enemy fleets, then landed and captured Santiago de Cuba and Manilla.

Shall we take this discussion further and discuss what happened with the military theories after the Second World War? We have seen several "Revolutions in Military Affairs" after the big one. The US and NATO developed the Airland Battle" Does it work against a competent opponent?
 
Shall we take this discussion further and discuss what happened with the military theories after the Second World War? We have seen several "Revolutions in Military Affairs" after the big one. The US and NATO developed the Airland Battle" Does it work against a competent opponent?
"Vertical Envelopment" (helicopter warfare) certainly increased enemy casualties in Vietnam. Not sure if Iraq would be Airland strategy or not, but what ever it was it worked well. Hope we don't have to find out if it works in Eastern Europe or China.
 
"Vertical Envelopment" (helicopter warfare) certainly increased enemy casualties in Vietnam. Not sure if Iraq would be Airland strategy or not, but what ever it was it worked well. Hope we don't have to find out if it works in Eastern Europe or China.

I think the airland doctrine worked quite well in Iraq during the first Gulf War. Maybe not everywhere, but when the Iraqis launched an offensive into Saudi and captured Khafi. The combined air forces and ground forces expelled the Iraqis pretty fast.
 
I think the airland doctrine worked quite well in Iraq during the first Gulf War. Maybe not everywhere, but when the Iraqis launched an offensive into Saudi and captured Khafi. The combined air forces and ground forces expelled the Iraqis pretty fast.
Well, you asked about use against a competent enemy, Iraq didn't really qualify.
 
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