Team Infidel
Forum Spin Doctor
Washington Times
April 8, 2008
Pg. 20
In "Real roles, missions debate" (Commentary, yesterday), Andrew Hoehn and David Ochmanek lay out their case for a greater degree of role specialization within the U.S. military services.
Specifically, they call for the Army to dedicate one-third of its combat force as advisers in the training of foreign militaries. They argue that the Air Force and Navy should remain structured to prevail in two major conflicts.
The authors spectacularly miss the lessons learned from Iraq. Their thesis is "shock and awe" all over again.
To quote Col. John Nelson's War College thesis, the question must be "shock and awe but then what?" The key force-sizing lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan is that combat doesn't end with completion of the strategic bombing campaign.
The subsequent irregular warfare campaign requires not only the Army niche capabilities that Mr. Hoehn and Mr. Ochmanek call for, but also the ability to dominate the tactical environment.
In Iraq, that has meant tanks, armored fighting vehicles, Stryker combat vehicles, attack and lift helicopters and the best-trained and equipped infantrymen in the world.
The Iraqi offensive in Basra shows what happens when a lightly armed force goes against insurgents who match them in firepower. While the authors are correct in the need for the U.S. Army to address the advisory mission, their recommendations for restructure are a recipe for disaster in the nonpermissive irregular warfare environment of future conflict.
The lessons of the post- Sept. 11 world could more persuasively argue that we have become so technically proficient at "taking down" regimes, that we really only need the air arms of the joint force to be able to execute it one country at a time.
I don't believe this is the case, but it follows logically better than the falsely benign and optimistic view of advisory missions and irregular warfare that these authors make.
Advisory capacity and doctrine need to be part of the Army's future force, but the core unit must remain the fully trained and equipped combat brigade that can secure all aspects of the mission and dominate all opponents that might challenge it.
COL. TOM COSENTINO, Army, Army Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington
Editor's Note: The op-ed by Andrew Hoehn and David Ochmanek appeared in the Current News Early Bird, April 7, 2008.
April 8, 2008
Pg. 20
In "Real roles, missions debate" (Commentary, yesterday), Andrew Hoehn and David Ochmanek lay out their case for a greater degree of role specialization within the U.S. military services.
Specifically, they call for the Army to dedicate one-third of its combat force as advisers in the training of foreign militaries. They argue that the Air Force and Navy should remain structured to prevail in two major conflicts.
The authors spectacularly miss the lessons learned from Iraq. Their thesis is "shock and awe" all over again.
To quote Col. John Nelson's War College thesis, the question must be "shock and awe but then what?" The key force-sizing lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan is that combat doesn't end with completion of the strategic bombing campaign.
The subsequent irregular warfare campaign requires not only the Army niche capabilities that Mr. Hoehn and Mr. Ochmanek call for, but also the ability to dominate the tactical environment.
In Iraq, that has meant tanks, armored fighting vehicles, Stryker combat vehicles, attack and lift helicopters and the best-trained and equipped infantrymen in the world.
The Iraqi offensive in Basra shows what happens when a lightly armed force goes against insurgents who match them in firepower. While the authors are correct in the need for the U.S. Army to address the advisory mission, their recommendations for restructure are a recipe for disaster in the nonpermissive irregular warfare environment of future conflict.
The lessons of the post- Sept. 11 world could more persuasively argue that we have become so technically proficient at "taking down" regimes, that we really only need the air arms of the joint force to be able to execute it one country at a time.
I don't believe this is the case, but it follows logically better than the falsely benign and optimistic view of advisory missions and irregular warfare that these authors make.
Advisory capacity and doctrine need to be part of the Army's future force, but the core unit must remain the fully trained and equipped combat brigade that can secure all aspects of the mission and dominate all opponents that might challenge it.
COL. TOM COSENTINO, Army, Army Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington
Editor's Note: The op-ed by Andrew Hoehn and David Ochmanek appeared in the Current News Early Bird, April 7, 2008.